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  “The Agony of Democracy: Antagonism and Urban Life in the American Realist 
Novel” argues that American literary realism’s claim to being “democracy in literature” (to 
use William Dean Howells’s phrase) is linked to the antagonistic reality of cities along the 
Eastern Seaboard of the United States between 1865 and 1920. In chapters on Howells, 
Henry James, Abraham Cahan, Edith Wharton, and Charles Chesnutt, “The Agony of 
Democracy” upends a pervasive literary-critical stereotype suggesting that these authors 
disdain the democratic crowds and spaces of American cities and that the realist novel 
ignores or ideologically contains urban-industrial strife. “The Agony of Democracy” shows, 
on the contrary, that antagonistic us-versus-them relations inflected everyday life and realist 
writing between the end of the Civil War and the dawn of women’s suffrage, when the U.S. 
became predominantly urban and nominally more democratic.  
The novels in this study place antagonisms of class, race, and gender at the center of 
their representations of the urban everyday, redefining the tradition of literary realism. To 
begin with, the release of destructive energy when an antagonism spills into the streets 
unsettles the realist conventions of plot and narration. In response, Howells, James, Cahan, 
Wharton, and Chesnutt harness the destructive aesthetic and political energy of urban 
antagonisms by transforming them into agonistic dialogue between characters and the 
political positions they represent. In the process, these authors find new ways to make 
subordinated bodies/voices be seen and heard as debating equals by both other characters 
and their readers. These American realists thus anticipate contemporary political 
philosophers such as Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière, who valorize dissent and 
conflict rather than consensus in liberal-democratic society. The result is a consideration of 
American realists as public philosophers of democracy and antagonism for an urban age, 
 
 iii 
writers whose lessons are as relevant today as they were in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.   
First Reader: Eric Sundquist  
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The Missing Hand and the Crowded Bar: 
American Literary Realism at the Intersection of Urbanism, Antagonism, and Democracy 
  
In 1860, twenty-three-year-old William Dean Howells, an Ohio transplant who had 
just started to make a name for himself in Boston’s literary scene, travelled to New York City 
to meet some of the city’s representative writers. It was something of an “anticlimax” for 
him (Cady, Road 85): he was still overawed by the genteel, if socially awkward, literary giants 
of New England (James Russell Lowell, Nathaniel Hawthorne, James T. Fields) and found 
the Bohemian pretenses of New York’s hack-writers (namely a newspaperman named Henry 
Clapp) extremely tiresome. One August night, Clapp took Howells to Pfaff’s beer cellar on 
Broadway, a “fragrant temple of tobacco smoke, lager beer, Rhine wine, wurst and 
sauerkraut” (J. Kaplan 245), where Walt Whitman was holding court with a band of 
Bohemian followers. Howells felt awkward: his lukewarm review of Leaves of Grass had 
recently been published in New York’s Saturday Press, where Clapp had incorrectly identified 
the relatively unknown Howells as an Indiana “Hoosier” instead of an Ohio Buckeye.1  
Whitman and Howells met in the middle of the bar and shook hands. “[T]he dignity 
and spiritual power of Whitman,” Howells’s biographer writes, “became a permanent 
memory for Howells, though nothing ever persuaded him to give unqualified approval to 
Walt’s poetry” (Cady, Road 85). Indeed, Edward Cutler has tracked Howells’s later reviews of 
Whitman, written when Howells had become the country’s preeminent literary critic, and 
found that the so-called Dean of American Letters was consistently ambivalent about 
Whitman’s poetry. Howells’s praise was usually qualified and his critique roughly similar: he 
                                                      
1 See Cutler 132-133.   
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did not object to its sexual frankness but found Whitman’s poetry bloated, unconstrained, 
and lacking in aesthetic unity.2 In essence, Howells faults Whitman for not writing realist 
novels. Realism, in Howells’s estimation, is “narrow,” which is “a virtue. Indeed, we should 
call the present American work, North and South, thorough, rather than narrow”; after all, 
“each man is a microcosm, and the writer who is able to acquaint us intimately with half a 
dozen people, or the conditions of a neighborhood or a class, has done something which 
cannot in any bad sense be called narrow; his breadth is vertical instead of lateral, that is all” 
(Selected 63). In direct contrast is Whitman’s poetry, which is fit for the horizontal vastness of 
America with its imperial first-person pronoun, free verse, endless catalogues of types and 
professions, and the incorporation of more materials over time. 
Despite these very real formal differences, Howells would go on, in the same vein as 
Whitman, to argue that literature could help deepen American democracy after the Civil 
War. Indeed, John Burroughs, a Whitman acolyte, would write an article on “Mr. Howells’s 
Agreements with Whitman” in 1892. Whitman and Howells, he shows, both train their eyes 
on everyday life rather than transposing readers back in time and place like the pre-modern 
landscapes of Romantic fiction. “Mr. Howells is preaching the Whitman gospel,” Burroughs 
writes, “when he says, the true realist ‘cannot look upon human life and declare this thing or 
that thing unworthy of notice, any more than a scientist can declare a fact of the material 
world beneath the dignity of his inquiry. He feels in every nerve the equality of things and 
the unity of men; his soul is exalted, not by vain shows and shadows and ideals, but by 
realities in which alone the truth lives’” (86).3 As Fredric Jameson notes, the “everyday” in 
literature is tied to the modern city,4 and thus a further comparison of Whitman and Howells 
                                                      
2 See Cutler 133.  
3 See Howells, Selected 302. I discuss this Howells quote in more detail in chapter 1.  
4 See Jameson, Antinomies 146.  
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might focus on their leveraging of everyday urbanism for the aesthetic and political purpose 
of creating what they both thought of as “democracy in literature” (Howells, Selected 62).  
 
Figure 1: “The Meeting with Whitman” 
Source: Howells, Literary Friends and Acquaintance, p. 74 
There is a prevailing literary-critical stereotype, however, that has only sharpened the 
differences between these two figures on the subject of urban democracy, with Howells 
typically coming out on the less flattering end. The stereotype can be traced back to the 
drawing accompanying Howells’s description of their encounter in Literary Friends and 
Acquaintance (1900): Whitman leans back easily in his chair, democratically at home in this 
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dingy, smoky bar, while Howells stands and bows slightly with his hat at his side, helplessly 
formal and generally a fish out of water (see fig. 1). If their shared aesthetico-political project 
links everyday life and democracy, then here, in this instance of everyday urbanism, we 
notice differences: Whitman is the poet of the urban crowd, perfectly at home in the smells, 
sounds, and tastes of city life, while Howells stands aloof, prudish and uncertain. 
In her otherwise compelling study of nineteenth-century urban culture, Mary Ryan 
falls prey to this stereotype of Howells and how he compares to Whitman: 
Many educated commentators showed . . . symptoms of being ill at ease in public 
spaces, among them William Dean Howells, who made a literary excursion [to New 
York City] in 1871. “The Wedding Journey” [sic] recounts the tour of Basil and Isabel 
March, commencing with the familiar promenade down the old artery of the 
republic, Broadway. Some familiar literary devices can be found along the route: like 
the diurnal schedule of occupying the thoroughfare, beginning with the early 
morning cordons of working men followed by businessmen and shop girls, then 
finally the late-sleeping fashionable ladies. And from the mouth of Basil March came 
some venerable notices of urban attractions, especially the “Niagara of people” that 
“transformed a shabby stretch of pavement into a stunning spectacle.” To his bride, 
however, . . . [t]he passage down Broadway to refuge in the hotel became a 
disagreeable obstacle course. . . . The reputation of the city seemed to have decayed 
considerably since the days Lydia Maria Child and Walt Whitman walked so happily 
down Broadway. [For] [t]he Marches . . . New York was just one rather unpleasant 
memory, buried in the exquisitely private communication between husband, wife, 
and reader. Writers such as Howells had not deserted the city, but they began, even 
before 1880, to divert the literary imagination away from symbols of democratic 
association and toward a landscape of intimacy. (212-213) 
 
Their Wedding Journey (1871), Howells’s autobiographical novel based on his 
honeymoon in New York (City and State), is replete with instances of everyday urbanism, as 
Ryan’s account demonstrates. Howells, though, becomes a stand-in not only for the anti-
urbanism of American literary realists (Henry James is soon named as an author “such as 
Howells”) but for an entire movement in American culture away from the pluralistic face-to-
face sociality of antebellum urbanism. Now, there is “a barricade around middle-class 
privacy” (213). Howells and the realists, Ryan suggests, at least “had not deserted the city,” 
though they implicitly loathe every minute they spend outside their bourgeois cocoons (213).  
 
 5 
Even those who study realism more closely than Ryan, who is an urban historian, 
conform to this stereotype. Amy Kaplan, Daniel Borus, Nancy Glazener, and Christophe 
Den Tandt, for example, note the inextricable link between the city and realism but focus on 
the realists’ dismissive stance toward urban publishers, with their anonymous mass of 
readers, and city spaces more generally. “The city has long been viewed as both the setting 
and the subject of American realistic fiction at the turn of the century,” Kaplan writes (44). 
Kaplan and Borus include under the “realist” heading authors like Howells, James, Edith 
Wharton, Theodore Dreiser, Frank Norris, Jack London, and Stephen Crane. I follow 
Glazener and Den Tandt in making a distinction between the realism of Howells, James, and 
Wharton—the subjects of this study, along with Abraham Cahan and Charles Chesnutt—
and the naturalism of Dreiser, London, Norris, and Crane, against whom the charges of 
elitism and anti-urbanism have failed to stick, at least by comparison. Glazener shows how 
Boston’s Atlantic Monthly, where Howells ascended to editor-in-chief in 1871, established 
cultural hegemony for the “institution” of “high realism” as well as the northeast urban 
bourgeoisie after the Civil War. At century’s end, these cultural elites found themselves in a 
losing battle for readership with more popular genres—muckraking novels, naturalism, the 
sensation novel, and romance. Borus also studies this fin de siècle moment, when Howells and 
others reconfigured the “work” of the realist author as distinct from those Fifth Avenue 
publishers who pandered to readers. Kaplan argues that realism attempted to construct a 
unified world in the face of an un-representable urbanism defined by class conflict and mass 
urban readership.5 Den Tandt follows Kaplan’s influential argument, describing the realists’ 
positivistic “focu[s] on the visible logic of the social world,” which only extends as far as 
“the family, the workplace, the neighborhood” (17). Any textual “slippages” into the register 
                                                      
5 See Glazener 20-50; and Borus 27-64, 77-90. I discuss Kaplan’s position throughout this introduction. 
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of “the urban sublime”—the more violent, shadowy elements of city life that confound the 
contained, knowable world of bourgeois domesticity—move realist texts into the generic 
mode of naturalism (18, 24). Though Den Tandt claims that “neither realist nor naturalist 
discourse exists in isolation, texts that are predominantly realist tend to be more 
homogeneous than their naturalist counterparts” (17).  
These critics suggest that realist authors were bourgeois elites who looked on with 
ambivalence if not disdain at the democratic processes of mass market publication and 
consumption, which were of a piece with all the vagaries of urban-industrial life. They feed 
the stereotype that the realists took refuge inside their homes or in their work to protect 
themselves from “the terror of urban life” (Den Tandt 23). If we return to our beginning 
scene, the meeting between Howells and Whitman in 1860, their assessment appears to be 
correct. Not only is Howells ill at ease in the smoky bar, he distances himself from hacks like 
Clapp and the democratic, self-publishing Whitman. However, we need to look beyond that 
moment, to the developments of urban democracy and the realist novel after the Civil War.  
 “The decades following the war,” Alan Trachtenberg writes, “witnessed a major 
acceleration, striking many contemporaries as a radical departure. In these years, American 
society decisively crossed the threshold of modern urban culture” (115). Carl Smith provides 
the corresponding statistics:  
Between 1870 and 1900, the number of places classified by the census as cities (i.e., 
having 2,500 or more inhabitants) went from 663 to 1,737, while the population of 
such places more than tripled, from just under ten million to over thirty million. In 
1870 there were fourteen cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants; by the turn of the 
century there were thirty-eight, including fifteen with at least a quarter of a million. 
(Urban Disorder 5)  
 
This was also a time of great labor agitation and racial/ethnic violence in American 
cities. In New York City in 1870 and again in 1871, Irish Protestants clashed with working-
class Irish Catholics as the former paraded through the latter’s neighborhoods, leaving eight 
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dead and hundreds wounded.6 Across the continent, in the fledgling frontier city of Los 
Angeles, a mob of 500 men attacked and lynched the Chinese residents of Chinatown on 
October 24, 1871, following the death of a white man who had intervened in a police 
shootout with local gangs.7 The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 produced local skirmishes 
between agitated crowds and U.S. troops in various towns and cities across the country. “In 
the towns,” Robert Wiebe writes, “people expressed a rather orderly hostility to the roads. 
But in the cities crowds gathered and milled, clashed with trigger-happy vigilantes and militia, 
then drifted downtown to riot and loot” (10). Chicago’s Haymarket riot in 1886 led to the 
execution of four anarchists for rhetoric that supposedly influenced an unknown person to 
throw a bomb into a crowd of peaceful strikers.8 The South, meanwhile, saw “legal 
disenfranchisement, the passage of rigorous Jim Crow laws, new and more horrible forms of 
lynching, and a series of one-sided race riots” (Fredrickson 266). There were such riots in 
two prominent Southern cities at the turn of the century: in Wilmington, North Carolina, a 
white supremacist coup in 1898 led to the expulsion of the city’s black politicians and the 
murder of black citizens; and in New Orleans in 1900, the death of a policeman at the hands 
of Robert Charles led to a white mob shooting black people while Charles evaded the law 
for a time, returning fire on those who hunted him down.9   
Ryan references some of these events when she writes that urban festivals and 
processions, which in the antebellum age celebrated diverse groups coming “together in a 
short-term commitment to [a] larger civic identity” (15), devolved after the war: “Hatred of 
Chinese Americans, antagonism to those of African descent, bitterness between Irish 
                                                      
6 See Ryan 229-234.  
7 See Johnson Jr.  
8 See Smith, Urban Disorder. 
9 See Fraser. 
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Catholics and Irish Protestants blemished parades across the country” (257). Though Ryan’s 
history ends in the late nineteenth century, we could add the 1913 Women’s Suffrage March 
to the list of “blemished parades”: as they marched the streets of the capital the day before 
Woodrow Wilson’s inauguration, many women were verbally and physically assaulted while 
the police stood there doing nothing.10 Ryan notes that, “for better and for worse,” these 
ceremonies gave “some bolder names and clearer shapes to the differences that had been 
spectral antagonists” in antebellum urbanism (257). The last is a point that my study will 
build on: antagonisms, defined as any us/them relation, colored urban life and politics 
between 1865 and 1920. American realism, I argue, does not shy from, and in fact seeks out 
and works through the implications of urban antagonisms for literature and democracy alike.  
All the authors in this study had some encounter with or interest in the historical 
antagonisms besetting urban life between 1865 and 1920. Howells was one of the few 
cultural commentators of his day to protest the miscarriage of justice surrounding the 
Haymarket riots. In a newspaper editorial that cost him friends and readers, he openly 
condemned the U.S. government for killing innocent people for their beliefs.11 Cahan, a 
Russian-Jewish immigrant who became one of Howells’s many discoveries, was a central 
figure in the Lower East Side Yiddish-speaking socialist movement. In this capacity, he 
supported and coordinated numerous strikes in New York City, seeking shorter and safer 
working conditions for the city’s Jewish workers. In The Marrow of Tradition (1901), Chesnutt 
produced a timely and, to Howells’s mind, “bitter” account of the 1898 Wilmington 
massacre. Even James and Wharton, ostensibly apolitical and continentally minded, were 
fascinated by the physical growth and population changes in the cities of their youth (New 
                                                      
10 See Taylor. 
11 See Cady, Realist 70-72.  
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York and Boston). For both, the so-called woman question stood out most vividly in these 
Northeastern hubs as the country tensely reunified itself after the Civil War.  
We can start to trace out how an urban antagonism makes its way to the pages of 
American literary realism by turning to Howells’s own description of his meeting with 
Whitman at Pfaff’s, written in 1901. Although Howells is mostly rosy-eyed in his account, a 
strange detail stands out: “I remember how he leaned back in his chair, and reached out his 
great hand to me, as if he were going to give it [to] me for good and all. . . . [W]e hardly 
passed a word, and our acquaintance was summed up in . . . the grasp of his mighty fist upon 
my hand” (Literary Friends 74). Again, the image (fig. 1) speaks louder than words: their hands 
meet in what looks like an abyss between them. It is as if Whitman has, indeed, given his 
hand to Howells while Howells’s hand has simultaneously collapsed into his “mighty fist.”  
When Howells wrote a bar encounter into A Hazard of New Fortunes (1890), he 
worked some of the strange, latently violent elements of this handshake into clearer thematic 
focus. In this scene, Basil March—the same character from Their Wedding Journey—is taken 
out to a small Italian restaurant by Fulkerson, who has convinced the Marches to move from 
Boston to New York to edit a literary magazine. They dine in a converted parlor-room “set 
about with tables, where men smoked cigarettes between the courses, and a single waiter ran 
swiftly to and fro with plates and dishes and exchanged unintelligible outcries with a cook 
beyond a slide in the back parlor” (Howells, Hazard 71). As Fulkerson broaches the topic he 
has brought March here to discuss (that their financial “angel” is a natural gas tycoon), 
March “was watching, with a teasing sense of familiarity, a tall, shabbily dressed, elderly man 
who had just come in. . . . March recognized him at once as German. His carriage was erect 
and soldierly, and March presently saw that he had lost his left hand” (74). As they leave, 
March asks if this is Mr. Lindau, an old acquaintance from Indiana. His suspicions are 
 
 10 
confirmed: “the old man took his hand and made a mechanical movement with his mutilated 
arm, as if he could have taken it in a double clasp. He laughed at himself. ‘I wanted to gife 
you the other handt too, but I gafe it to your gountry a goodt while ago’” (82).  
Howells’s feeling that Whitman wanted to give him his hand is written here not only 
as a macabre joke but also as a sobering reminder of the violence of the Civil War. It is a 
reminder of that and much more, since Lindau “was fighting the antislavery battle just as 
naturally at Indianapolis in 1858 as he fought behind the barricades at Berlin in 1848” (83). 
With the war over and slavery apparently eradicated, though neither Howells nor Lindau 
understands how slavery continued under different names, Lindau has turned his energies to 
the labor question in New York. He will eventually lose the rest of his arm and then his life 
after a violent streetcar strike. Before this, Lindau joins March’s magazine as a translator but 
upsets the tycoon, Dryfoos, with his socialist rhetoric, requiring tense discussions to reach a 
resolution. Lindau stops working for the magazine, symbolically sending him back to the 
streets to be killed. I will argue, in chapter 1, that Howells seeks everyday urbanism neither in 
the domestic spaces his characters inhabit (the “equality” practiced therein being make-
believe) nor in the streets during a strike. Like Whitman, Howells searches for a crowd 
feeling capable of uniting strangers rather than tearing them apart. The Marches revel in the 
“fleeting intimacy” (54) created by the noise of the elevated train, which is similar to the 
connection Whitman felt with commuters on the Brooklyn Ferry half a century earlier, 
though updated to account for technological developments in public transportation.  
At this stage, I will use March’s encounter with Lindau in the bar to sketch the larger 
theoretical dimensions of this study. Lindau’s missing hand points to the visibility of urban 
antagonism in the American realist novel. It is a paradoxical visibility, which has nothing to 
do with the realists’ supposed focus on the known, the tangible, the visible. We are dealing 
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here with the presence of a ghastly absence. We can understand this paradox by turning back 
to Ryan’s description of the difference between antebellum and postbellum urbanism, the 
latter giving “bolder names and clearer shapes to the differences that had been spectral 
antagonists” (257). The image of antagonists becoming more sharply defined could be 
amenable with a “positivistic vision” (Den Tandt 17); but the adjective “spectral” opens up a 
different, anti-positivist reading of antagonism, one that, I will show, is consistent with the 
realists’ approach to the aesthetics and politics of urban life.  
In Jacques Derrida’s account, spectrality undoes dichotomies like past/present and 
absent/present: “the specter is the future, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that 
which could come or come back” (48). “Spectral” does not describe the before stage of an 
antagonist’s appearance, I argue, but the condition and effect of an antagonism. In 
Jameson’s vivid description, the always untimely appearance of a specter “makes the present 
waver: like the vibrations of a heat wave through which the massiveness of the object 
world—indeed of matter itself—now shimmers like a mirage,” showing that “the living 
present is scarcely as self-sufficient as it claims to be” (Valences 142). An antagonism, as this 
study defines it, is an experience where “reality” falters and becomes out of joint with itself, 
imperiling one’s sense of self and one’s place in the world. The eruption of us-versus-them 
relations, for example, shocks city people out of their routines and identities, forcing them to 
confront the vague, undefined violence that is always simmering under the surface and, in 
many cases, forcing them to occupy a new role as “friend” or “enemy.” This is how 
Chesnutt describes the opening of the Wilmington massacre:  
At three o’clock sharp the streets were filled, as if by magic, with armed white men. 
The negroes, going about, had noted, with uneasy curiosity, that the stores and 
places of business, many of which closed at noon, were unduly late in opening for 
the afternoon, though no one suspected the reason for the delay; but at three o’clock 
every passing colored man was ordered, by the first white man he met, to throw up 




Ostensibly the object of Chesnutt’s realist representation, the riot itself proves impossible to 
capture directly—it would be like staring into the sun; instead, he makes it the subject of a 
character’s present and future haunting: “In his dreams he repeats it night after night, and 
sees the sights that wounded his eyes, and feels the thoughts—the haunting spirits of the 
thoughts—that tore through his heart as he rode through hell” (171). 
Lindau’s missing hand has a similar “spectrality effect” on those who see it (Derrida 48): 
[Fulkerson] was one of those Americans whose habitual conception of life is 
unalloyed prosperity. When any experience or observation of his went counter to it 
he suffered something like physical pain. He eagerly shrugged away the impression 
left upon his buoyancy by Lindau and added to March’s continued silence, “What 
did I tell you about meeting every man in New York that you ever knew before?” 
(Howells, Hazard 82) 
 
Lindau’s missing hand is (not) there to remind Howells’s characters and readers that 
democracy did not arrive and become equal with itself (i.e., true to its name) after the Civil 
War; its wounds have not healed and, in fact, can only be further torn open. And, as March’s 
response to Fulkerson makes clear, the big city is a place where you run into the ghosts of 
your past—not the dead in this case but someone who should have died or at least never 
reappeared, since the disheveled, mutilated veteran disrupts one’s sense of self and country: 
“I never expected to meet Lindau in the world again,” Basil tells Fulkerson. “I had the 
impression that he had been killed in the war. I almost wish he had been’” (82). From their 
point of view, Lindau’s missing hand introduces the troubling specter of poverty and class 
struggle that they would rather ignore (“That shabby dress! That pathetic mutilation!”) (83). 
Right before Lindau’s entrance into the text, in fact, Fulkerson gives a speech condemning 
New York’s socialists, pointing to a future conflict not just between him and Lindau but 
between us and them: “They [socialists] do a lot of mischief, shooting off their mouths round 
 
 13 
here. I believe in free speech and all that, but I’d like to see those fellows shut up in jail and 
left to jaw each other to death. We don’t want any of their poison” (74). 
The city is “the setting and the subject” of the American realist novel, I argue, 
because it carries the most potential energy for an outbreak of antagonism as well as for 
perceiving scars of past conflicts that are also symptoms of an antagonism’s future return—
indeed, Lindau loses the rest of his arm in a streetcar strike (Kaplan 44). An urban 
antagonism—whether the outbreak of violence in the streets or a symptom of violence to 
come—points to an unending civil war tearing apart society on multiple fronts (race, class, 
gender, nationality). For that reason, the awareness of an urban antagonism also produces a 
desire to heal the social wound, though this solution always proves illusory or imaginary. 
Indeed, when Lindau’s death brings the once-divided newspaper office together in Hazard, 
“there was a poetry that appealed to [March] in this reconciliation through death of men, of 
ideas, of conditions, that could only have gone warring on in life” (395). Borrowing a term 
from Jameson, Kaplan deems this Howells’s “strategy of containment” (10) for urban 
violence: “He kills off Lindau at the end of the novel . . . to protect the unifying goal of 
realism from conflict and fragmentation. At the same time, he shows that the necessary 
expulsion of this threatening foreign force blocks the achievement of unity” (58). It is because 
Howells and the realists are aware that narrative containment both requires and is threatened 
by absent-present remainders, I argue, that they search for alternative, and often progressive, 
means of conjuring these “spectral antagonists” without wishing them away (Ryan 257).12  
The realists in this study—Howells, James, Cahan, Wharton, and Chesnutt—realize 
that they cannot directly perceive let alone objectively describe the violent energy evoked by 
the antagonisms of American urban life; so, they call attention to such violent urban realities 
                                                      
12 See Derrida 49-50 for the two meanings of “conjure” (to form an alliance against and to evoke). 
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through its scars and symptoms (Lindau’s missing hand) or through metaphor and allegory.13 
Once it is indirectly represented, the realists channel antagonistic energy into a character 
system where people and ideas “g[o] on warring” without hope of final reconciliation 
(Howells, Hazard 395). In other words, the paradoxical absent presence of an antagonism 
makes itself felt most concretely in the tense character debates it sparks. Yet, there is still an 
entire world “out there” not participating in character debates (Kaplan 9). While this is a 
byproduct of antagonism’s “spectrality effect”—there is always an excluded remainder waiting 
to come back—the realists leveraged this reality for radical-democratic ends (Derrida 48). 
On the one hand, we can speak of the progressive work of the American realist novel as an 
evolving discourse: identifying with the aesthetic and political aims of realism, authors from 
various backgrounds included new kinds of characters and situations under the democratic 
umbrella of everyday urbanism. On the other hand, they attempt to reach those who 
populate the world “out there” without channeling their presence through what Kaplan, 
following Raymond Williams, calls the “knowable community” (47). The appearance of the 
nameless bodies and voices from “out there” in the foreground of novelistic representation 
is antagonistic to realism itself, since their very existence exposes the specious totality of the 
“knowable community,” however tense and diverse. These authors had to ask themselves, or 
answer in practice, whether it was the death of realism or its radical reconfiguration that 
resulted from the antagonistic appearance of these constitutively missing bodies and voices. 
To articulate the aesthetic and political implications of urban antagonism in the 
context of American realism, I will now sketch the theoretical paradigm at the center of this 
dissertation: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s conception of social antagonism and 
                                                      
13 I will discuss these representational options in more detail below.  
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hegemony.14 Their work, together and solo, insists on the intractability of antagonism in 
liberal-democratic society; and they have proposed radical solutions for working with, rather 
than ignoring, us/them relations in democratic theory and Left politics. Laclau and Mouffe 
have been thrown prematurely into the dustbin of “theory” for their reliance on figures like 
Derrida, which leads them into abstractions at odds with their concrete political aims.15 I will 
make the case for their usefulness for a historically-grounded theory of American realism.  
It will be my claim, in what follows, that Henry James uncannily prefigures the 
philosophical underpinnings of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory in one of his most famous 
prefaces. I will then argue that certain historical factors—the end of the Civil War and the 
rise of the big city—paved the way for an understanding of social antagonism not as a 
conflict between geographically-distinct regions (North/South, city/country) or between 
predefined “antagonists” but rather as a proliferation of possible, and hence spectral, 
conflicts within the liberal-democratic state and, more specifically, individual cities. The 
following sections will illustrate the general method of this study by triangulating nineteenth-
and twentieth-century realist texts, twentieth- and-twentieth-century political philosophers, 
and the sociopolitical realities of the United States between 1865 and 1920, when the country 
officially became an urban nation. The result will be a consideration of American realists as 
public philosophers of democracy and antagonism for an urban age, writers whose lessons 
are as relevant today as they were in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.   
I. Antagonism and Democratic Discourse 
                                                      
14 Derrida cites Laclau and Mouffe in Specters of Marx (226 n. 31) as precursors of the kind of post-Marxism he 
aims to create by conjuring the specter of Marx in a moment of neoliberal hegemony. In turn, as we will see, 
Laclau and Mouffe were heavily influenced by Derridean deconstruction in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.  
15 See Judis.  
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 In their now-classic study on the possibility of a radical Left politics, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe define antagonism as the experience of the limits 
of “the social.” They state, in no uncertain terms, that “the social” is not an object that can 
be viewed as a totality from the perspective of an objective Marxian science. Rather, 
following Derrida, they argue that “the social” is defined by a system of differences with no 
outside, no “transcendental signifier” that would fix the internal elements definitively, nailing 
the signifier to the signified once and for all (98). While this leads them to the conclusion 
that society is “impossible,” they draw on Jacques Lacan to argue the following: 
If the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a 
society, the social only exists, however, as an effort to construct that impossible object. 
Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to . . . arrest the flow of differences, to 
construct a centre. [Following Lacan, they] call the privileged discursive points of this 
partial fixation, nodal points. (98-99)  
 
Hegemony names the practice of creating a nodal point or, to use Lacan’s phrase, “quilting 
point” that sutures signifiers into a chain of signification (Lacan 268). Since there is always 
an excess of other possible meanings for the elements in this chain, nothing is fixed 
completely. Antagonism marks the recognition of the failure of the local sutures or quasi-
totalities to fix meaning definitively and “arrest the flow of differences” once and for all.  
There is a fascinating homology between Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist 
account of society’s impossibility and James’s description of writing in the preface to Roderick 
Hudson: “Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is 
eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily 
appear to do so” (Literary 1041).16 James, like Lacan, takes his metaphor from quilting:  
a young embroiderer of the canvas of life soon began to work in terror, fairly, of the 
vast expanse of that surface, of the boundless number of its distinct perforations for 
                                                      
16 Barrish notes the parallels between this statement and Derrida’s “il n’ya pas d’hors de texte” (there is no 
outside of the text) but he does not mention Lacan and his “points de capiton.” See American 69. 
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the needle, and of the tendency inherent in his many-coloured flowers and figures to 
cover and consume as many as possible of the little holes. (1041) 
 
 If realism is defined by the totality created by a select group of characters engaged in 
“relations,” James evinces an awareness, within the American tradition, of the arbitrary 
stitches that fix the unending, endlessly configurable relations of life into an aesthetic unity 
covering the “little holes” of the canvas. Faced with the antagonistic limits of society, in 
other words, the artist “has at once intensely to consult and intensely to ignore it” (1041). 
Or, as Laclau and Mouffe have it: “every language and every society are constituted as a 
repression of the consciousness of the impossibility that penetrates them” (111).  
If “the social” is defined by a field of differences and local nodal points fixing some 
of those signifiers in a chain of relations (i.e., a hegemonic totality), how does one experience 
the failure of this system? In other words, how does antagonism begin? Laclau and Mouffe’s 
answer is: when the logic of equivalence interrupts the field of differences. Again, we find a 
difficult-to-grasp abstraction; but Laclau and Mouffe ground these claims in an historical 
example: what Tocqueville called the “democratic revolution” of the eighteenth century 
(139). This moment represents the articulation between two distinct discourses: the liberal 
language of individual freedom and equality, with its valorization of pluralism and difference, 
meets the democratic logic of political equality, which in Carl Schmitt’s formulation means 
radical equivalence or identity between citizens, and the concept of popular sovereignty.17 
The conflictual combination of liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty in liberal-
democratic discourse “impos[ed] itself as the new matrix of the social imaginary” and 
“constitute[d] a fundamental nodal point in the construction of the political” (138-139). The 
liberal-democratic revolution created a new socio-symbolic order that, by definition, can 
                                                      
17 See Mouffe, Democratic Paradox 44-45; and “Democratic Politics” 42-43. In The Return of the Political, Mouffe 
acknowledges the importance of civic republicanism “in the revolutionary period” (24). See chapter 4. 
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never be completed or fully realized: it is precisely what constituted “the social” as an endless 
flux of signifiers and hegemonic sutures. In her solo work, Mouffe goes on to argue that the 
constitutive tension between the “grammars” of liberalism and democracy “can never be 
overcome but only negotiated in different ways. This is why the liberal-democratic regime 
has constantly been the locus of struggles. The tension between its two components can 
only be temporarily stabilized through pragmatic negotiations between political forces which 
always establish the hegemony of one of them” (Democratic Paradox 5). 
In his global history of democracy, Toward Democracy (2016), James Kloppenberg 
notes, in terms that are strikingly similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s, that “the concepts of 
popular sovereignty, autonomy, and equality are mutually constitutive; they have no meaning 
except in relation to each other. . . . The internal tensions between the principle of popular 
sovereignty and the principles of autonomy and equality make the notion of a smooth-
running, conflict-free democracy a contradiction in terms” (8-9). Democracy marks the 
radical impossibility of a closed system of fixed differential meanings, as was the case with the 
Ancien Régime.18 After the American Revolution, Richard Schneirov and Gaston Fernandez 
explain, taking us back into the U.S. context, 
Americans quickly discovered that even when rid of monarchy and aristocracy, the 
people were not a united, harmonious whole. Despite the appeal of revolution’s 
leaders to citizens’ civic virtue, the people invariably split up into factions or interest 
groups, the most important being those based on different kinds and amounts of 
private property. Some Americans were creditors, some were debtors; some made 
money from exporting, others from importing; some made a living from enslaving 
other human beings who were not part of the political community, while others were 
independent farmers or merchants; some were rich, and many more were poor with 
little or no property. How was it possible to prevent a single dominant faction or 
majority coalition of self-interested factions from corrupting the republic, reducing it 
to a tyranny, and oppressing the rest of the people or a minority of the people? (15)  
 
                                                      
18 See Lefort. 
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In Laclau and Mouffe’s account, relations of subordination (creditor/debtor, 
master/slave) are not automatically but rather become oppressive and hence antagonistic when 
held against the liberal-democratic promise of freedom and equality for all. To clarify their 
use of terms, “relations of oppression . . . [are] those relations of subordination which have 
transformed themselves into sites of antagonisms” (138). An oppression is the site of 
antagonism on the individual level insofar as “the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from 
being totally myself” (111), which is true for both oppressor and oppressed. Howells puts it 
succinctly: “You spoil the joy of life for your inferior, just as your superior spoils the joy of 
life for you” (“Equality” 64). Antagonism, as an “experience of the limit of the social,” is felt 
as an “identity crisis”: the Other creates the condition for self-identification around a chain 
of equivalence (I am/we are “not them”) and puts this identity into question (“its objective 
being is a symbol of my [or our] non-being”) (Laclau and Mouffe 113). The Other is not one 
identity among others but an amorphous force of pure negativity and violence threatening 
and yet defining the self. On the sociopolitical level, oppression is antagonistic when the 
oppressed cite the democratic promises they have been denied, with the Other as that force 
blocking my access to and enjoyment of freedom and equality.19 Laclau and Mouffe clarify 
that “the forms of resistance to new forms of subordination are polysemic and can perfectly 
well be articulated into an anti-democratic discourse” (153). For example, neoliberalism 
draws on the classical liberal tradition to paint the democratic state and its welfare recipients 
as oppressors and the hard-working, independent, traditionally-minded, and often white 
individuals as the oppressed (154). Chesnutt, in his time, showed that white supremacists 
believed they, for whom democracy was fought during the Revolution, were oppressed by the 
economic and political gains made by blacks after the Civil War. Laclau and Mouffe aim to 
                                                      
19 See Laclau and Mouffe 138.  
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make antagonism work for Left politics without relying on the assumption that Schneirov 
and Fernandez evince above—that relations of subordination surrounding private property 
are the “most important” (15). Antagonism is put to radical-democratic ends when different 
groups “propose . . . different forms of inequality as illegitimate and anti-natural, and thus 
make them equivalent as forms of oppression” (Laclau and Mouffe 139). Laclau and Mouffe 
match group equivalence with the liberal idea of autonomy. In a radical-democratic 
hegemony, each group (anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-capitalist) is autonomous but “produce[s] 
effects of equivalence with other struggles in a differential political space” (164).  
The American Civil War and its aftermath represent a particularly vivid instance of a 
polarizing us/them relation splitting off into a plurality of potential antagonisms, radical and 
conservative. In antebellum America, politicians, capitalists, (ex-)slaves, and ordinary citizens 
formed alliances across political, regional, racial, and class lines on the moral and economic 
issue of slavery in a growing republic. Once the South seceded, these alliances hardened into 
what Laclau and Mouffe call “a clear-cut ‘politics of frontiers’” between the pro-Union, pro-
democratic North and the pro-states rights, pro-slavery South (120). The contingent result of 
this war was the emancipation of slaves (the Emancipation Proclamation, the Thirteenth 
Amendment), the promise of equal protection before the law (the Fourteenth Amendment), 
and suffrage for black men (the Fifteenth Amendment). With the implementation of 
Reconstruction, which sought to secure the South’s adherence to those war amendments 
while at the same time institutionalizing free and equal black-white relations, a new 
conception of democracy was born.20 The liberal ideal of freedom from coercion and the 
                                                      
20 See Du Bois’s groundbreaking essay “Of the Dawn of Freedom” in The Souls of Black Folk (13-35). 
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promise of free contracts met hand-in-hand with the promise of social and political equality 
protected by a centralized “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”21  
Lindau’s missing hand has already shown, however, that the war’s conclusion did not 
“bind up the nation’s wounds,” as Lincoln anticipated in his “Second Inaugural Address” 
(1865). Instead, as the progressive Dr. Miller learns in The Marrow of Tradition, “the old 
wound [is] still bleeding, [and] the fruit of one tragedy [becomes] the seed of another” (70-
71). White supremacism is but one example. W.E.B. Du Bois argues, in Darkwater (1920), 
that the promises of the Civil War amendments and state-sponsored Reconstruction ran 
aground on deepening race hatred (codified by Jim Crow), class strife from the industrial 
revolution, and the ongoing exclusion of women from public life. Du Bois calls for the 
creation of new political identities to demand equal participation in democratic life, knowing 
that “[t]he appearance of new interests and complaints means disarrangement and confusion 
to the older equilibrium” (Darkwater 84). He links socialism and women’s suffrage with black 
civil rights as forces that “will for many years confuse our politics” (85). Du Bois hopes for 
the extension of suffrage, the elimination of Jim Crow, and the “democratic ownership of 
industry,” “where no human soul will be neglected” and “[t]he problem of government . . . 
would be to reduce the necessary conflict of human interests to the minimum” (91, 84). 
Laclau and Mouffe believe that there will never be an end to antagonism. They uncover 
oppressions in different situations to show how oppressed groups or identities are equivalent 
in their arbitrary exclusion from sociopolitical life and the rights/protections it implies.  
Kenneth Warren has argued that American literary realism aimed to create such an 
ever-expanding radical-democratic hegemony: “these fictions often evinced a commitment 
to imagining the consequences that would ensue from an ‘extension of the field of 
                                                      
21 See Schneirov and Fernandez 22-25.  
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democratic struggles to the whole of civil society and the state’” (13) (he quotes Laclau and 
Mouffe [160]). The hope was that, “as realism secured a position as the dominant aesthetic 
in the nation’s most prestigious magazines[,] the unfinished business of black political 
liberation would emerge from the relative oblivion that had enveloped it following the 
abandonment of Radical Reconstruction” (50). Realism’s extension of literary representation 
to new people and situations is homologous to, if not part of the same historical process as, 
the democratic promises of Reconstruction.22 According to Warren, though, the radical-
democratic aesthetics of three realist authors (James, Howells, Chesnutt) were doomed from 
the beginning.23 This is because their treatment of the personal and the social as political fed 
into racist fears of absolute social equality in public space, fueling arguments in support of 
Jim Crow laws in the South and complicity with those laws in the North. More specifically, 
realism invalidated the “liberal” defense against Jim Crow legislation, stated most forcefully 
by fellow realist George Washington Cable, who distinguished between civil equality (equal 
access to public space so long as you behave properly) and social equality (the loss of 
distinction between the street and the home). Warren views liberalism as the road not taken 
by other realists. Mary Esteve similarly faults Cahan for blurring the personal and the 
political in his representation of Lower East Side crowds, feeding nativist anxieties about 
immigration in the process, instead of opting for a properly liberal distinction between 
politics and everyday urban life (174). 
The realist novel, under Howells’s direction, did indeed spread beyond the issue of 
“black political liberation,” or at least treated race in reductive ways (Warren 50). But this is 
where Chesnutt makes his intervention. As I argue in chapter 5, he returns the American 
                                                      
22 See Thomas 1-2. 
23 James and Howells are discussed throughout Warren’s monograph. Chesnutt only receives a few passing 
mentions (see Warren 78-79 and chapter 5 of this dissertation).  
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realist novel to its origins by leveraging liberalism’s starting point (the equality of all humans 
qua humans) for radical-democratic ends (social and political equality). People “are willing to 
concede the Negro this kind of equality, but deny him that kind of equality,” Chesnutt writes. 
“There is but one kind of equality, as there is but one kind of truth” (Essays 254). Warren’s 
starting point is correct even if his conclusion is not: the realists, like Laclau and Mouffe, 
extend democratic struggles beyond the privileged people and places of liberal-democratic 
politics; but this is an ongoing project filled with failures as well as successes.  
Importantly, for our purposes, Laclau and Mouffe deem the “urban” a new site for 
the extension of the democratic imaginary. But their analysis relates specifically to the 
aftereffects of twentieth-century (sub)urbanization. The implication is that the world is far 
more complex now than before, so that there is a “multiplicity of social relations from which 
antagonisms and struggles may originate” within the city alone (145). It has been my claim 
that, after the Civil War, the division of the U.S. into North and South split off into a series 
of internal battles. I will now argue that the East Coast city became a node in realist 
discourse for marking the proliferation of antagonisms in postbellum American society.  
While the rise of the industrial city resulted in the draining of the countryside, which 
hardened regional distinctions and prejudices,24 the country-city divide was reconfigured as 
the U.S. became an interconnected urban society after the Civil War. Frederick Law 
Olmsted, designer of Central Park, noted that “the intimacy of [the farmer’s] family with the 
town will constantly appear, in dress, furniture, viands, [and] in . . . conversation” (qtd. in 
Klimasmith 62). “To speak of metropolis,” Trachtenberg writes, “is to speak not only of 
individual cites but of a national system, a coordination of urban regions linked by rail and 
telegraph, creating a network of producing and consuming goods” (115). Mr. Hughes, a 
                                                      
24 See Trachtenberg 112-115. 
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character in Howells’s The World of Chance (1893) who comes to New York after years in 
socialistic communes, describes why a realist might set up shop in urban centers instead of 
the regional spaces that fed them with people and goods: “If I had back the years that I have 
wasted in a perfectly futile effort to deal with the problem of the race at a distance where I 
couldn’t touch it, I would have nothing to do with eremitism in any of its forms” (90). There 
are many great realists—often termed regionalists—who explore the country’s antagonisms 
from a rural point of view (Hamlin Garland, Mark Twain, and Sarah Orne Jewett, for 
example). The ones in this study look to its economic and cultural centers, Boston and New 
York, as well as smaller but regionally-important cities along the Atlantic Coast. 
To understand what they found, I turn to The American Scene (1907), James’s travel 
narrative detailing a 1904/05 trip up and down the Atlantic Coast after twenty years abroad.  
II. Antagonism and the City 
The American Scene follows a meandering itinerary, with every chapter but the first and 
last (New England and Florida, respectively) named after an East Coast city—a list that runs 
the gamut from large metropolises to mid-size regional cities: four chapters on New York 
City and one each on Newport, Boston, Concord and Salem, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Washington, Richmond, and Charleston. James names Democracy as the force behind 
everything he sees from the moment he disembarks in New York: 
The great presence that bristles him on the sounding dock, and that shakes the 
planks, the loose boards of its theatric stage to an inordinate unprecedented rumble, 
is the monstrous form of Democracy, which is thereafter to project its shifting 
angular shadow, at one time and another, across every inch of the field of his vision. 
It is the huge democratic broom that has made the clearance and that one seems to 
see brandished in the empty sky. (American Scene 43-44)25 
 
                                                      
25 Hereafter cited parenthetically as AS.  
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Figured first as a “presence” that shakes the dock, then as a “shifting angular shadow,” and 
finally as a “broom,” Democracy is a powerful, shadowy, and ubiquitous force. Generalizing 
from this moment, I argue that, for the authors in this study, cities along the Atlantic Coast 
became privileged sites for witnessing the sweeping force and blind spots of the democratic 
revolution. For these authors, that is, the East Coast city is defined by its place within the 
overflowing discursive field created by the democratic revolution. Some qualifications are 
needed to understand precisely what this means and, by extension, what it does not.  
First, I do not intend to suggest that the city has no extra-discursive presence. 
Rather, the material reality of the city is interpreted through the language of liberal-
democratic discourse. Mouffe uses the example of kicking a ball: it is a physical act, but how 
we understand that kick depends on its discursive context—say, the rules of a soccer 
match.26 In Carl Smith’s provocative formulation, “a city is as much an infrastructure of ideas as 
it is a gathering of people, a layout of streets, an arrangement of buildings, or a collection of 
political, economic, and social institutions” (City Water 2). Smith’s examples are antebellum 
waterworks projects, which “brought to the fore conflicting ideas of the public good, 
including disagreements over what resources should be provided, and by whom, to that 
elusive entity, ‘the people,’ in a burgeoning capitalist democracy” (4). To use a postbellum 
example, a skyscraper is a physical object constructed out of steel, concrete, and glass, but it 
only comes into existence with paperwork and bureaucratic oversight (blueprints, contracts, 
city codes, etc.) and with a host of ground-level interpretations by the city’s everyday users. 
Note, for example, how realist writer Henry Blake Fuller describes Chicago’s skyscrapers:  
[F]or the first time in the rearing of a vast city, the high and the low have met 
together, the rich and the poor have built together: each with an astonishing freedom 
as to choice, taste, expenditure; each with an extreme, even an undue liberty to 
indulge in whatever independences or idiosyncrasies might be suggested by greed, 
                                                      
26 See Barret 258. 
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pride, carelessness, or the exigency of the passing moment,—democracy absolutely 
manifested in brick, stone, timber. (“The Upward Movement” 308) 
 
When James and Wharton looked at the same structures on the East Coast, they pondered 
the dangers of democratic conformism. Thus, feats of urban engineering produced 
conflicting interpretations of the city and the democratic experiment it came to represent. 
That being said, the city and its material elements are not necessarily imbricated in the 
fate of democracy, though there is often a privileged site of democracy in the cultural 
imaginary—the farm, the meeting-house, the open sea, the frontier, etc. For our purposes, it 
is in Whitman’s Democratic Vistas (1871) that the postbellum American city first became 
attached to the fate of both democracy and literature:  
When I . . . behol[d] the crowds of the great cities, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, 
Cincinnati, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, New Orleans, Baltimore—when I mix 
with these interminable swarms of alert, turbulent, good-natured, independent 
citizens, clerks, young persons—at the idea of this mass of men so fresh and free, so 
loving and so proud, a singular awe falls upon me. I feel, with dejection and 
amazement, that among our geniuses and talented writers or speakers, few or none 
have yet really spoken to this people, created a single image-making work for them, 
or absorb’d the central spirit and idiosyncrasies which are theirs—and which, thus, in 
highest ranges, so far remain entirely uncelebrated, unexpress’d. (34) 
 
Whitman is not all positive, though. His depiction of New York leads to a Jamesian 
“pro and con” list, with the boundless energy of the crowd and the great material growth of 
the city in the positive column but conformism, machine politics, and a general lack of moral 
fiber among the negative traits holding “the people” back from an expression of democratic 
culture (13-14, 16). One can perceive the start of a tradition stretching to the Progressive 
Era, specifically to Frederic Howe’s The City: The Hope of Democracy (1905). Howe relates what 
he calls “The Profit Account” (24-31) and “The Loss Account” (32-42) for the state of 
democracy in urban America. Despite all the “[v]ice, crime, and disease”; despite the 
replacement of the home with “the hotel, flat, tenement, boarding house, and cheap lodging 
house”; despite “corruption [that] has so allied itself with our institutions that many despair 
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of democracy,” there is still hope for the future, as Whitman promised, augured in already-
existing spaces (32): the “saloon, . . . the streets, the parks, the theatre, the church, . . . night 
schools, art exhibitions, popular lectures, and concerts, college settlements, . . .  playgrounds, 
a cheap press, labor organizations” (25). All of which, Howe claims, “is enlarging life, 
modifying our civilization, deepening the significance of democracy” (25). For Whitman, it is 
poetry, while for the realists of the Howells school it is the novel that can best absorb and 
express the democratic gains of the city while also exposing its blind spots.  
The reference to democracy’s blind spots requires another qualification with respect 
to the discursive articulation between the city and democracy, since it brings antagonism 
back into the picture. “By the 1880s,” Kaplan writes, “the city had become a shorthand term 
for everything threatening in American society” (44). In the scenario Kaplan has in mind, the 
Others threatening self and society are huddled in a slum. But a city can be antagonistic in a 
different sense. Defined as the “density of densities,” “the concentration not just of people 
but of materials, capital, and the human transformation of nature” (Rotella 1), the city 
threatens personal and national stability with a surplus of beliefs, identities, and practices that 
might run counter to the hegemonic notion of what “the people” or a citizen look(s) and 
sound(s) like. For the realists, who made the urban everyday the touchstone of democracy, 
the city is a frightening but enticing surplus of bodies, voices, and situations that have not 
been given representation, politically or aesthetically. To use a phrase shared by Whitman 
and Derrida, the flowering of both urban and literary democracy is always “to come.” 
Whitman believed that the democracy “to come” would be in the West: the U.S. 
capital “will migrate a thousand or two miles” and “[t]he main social, political, spine-
character of the States will probably run along the Ohio, Missouri and Mississippi rivers” 
(Vistas 30). By dint of biographical accident and professional affiliation, the realist authors in 
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this study stayed on the Atlantic side of things—near literary-cultural centers like Boston, 
New York, London, and Paris. Among literary critics influenced by world-systems theory 
(Joe Cleary, Jed Esty, and Colleen Lye) there has been attention paid recently to the twinned 
destinies of international publishing centers, which often doubled as imperial metropolises, 
and the aesthetic and political influence of classical realism. However, the focus has been on 
the rise and fall of European realism alongside the slow decline of Paris, London, and St. 
Petersburg/Moscow as literary and political hegemons. When the U.S. become a literary and 
world-systems hegemon after World War I, the argument goes, romance and modernism 
triumphed while realism became labeled as provincial at best and dangerous at worst.27  
Our focus will be on a neglected time and place in these accounts—the U.S. in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when, Glazener writes, “cultural authority . . . 
was intensely localized, concentrated in the Northeast and especially in urban centers such as 
New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia” (23). Even James and Wharton, the only writers 
in this study who might be deemed continental, had close ties to these literary-cultural 
centers. James was born in New York but his family moved to the Boston area when he was 
just starting out as a writer. Wharton tacitly described herself when she writes, of her 
character Newland Archer, that “in spite of the cosmopolitan views on which he prided 
himself, he thanked heaven that he was a New Yorker” (Age 80). Wharton published 
exclusively in Charles Scribner’s Sons in New York before switching to the Pictorial Review 
(NY). James published in The Atlantic Monthly (Boston), Harper’s Weekly, (NY), Century (NY), 
and Cosmopolitan (NY) before naming the final collection of his work the New York Edition.  
Howells, Chesnutt, and Cahan were considered outsiders—the first two came from 
Ohio, the latter from Russia—in the fierce literary marketplaces James and Wharton called 
                                                      
27 See especially Cleary 258, 262-263.  
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home. Howells started out as a writer for central Ohio newspapers before moving to 
Boston. He made his name at The Atlantic Monthly, succeeding James T. Fields as editor-in-
chief in 1871 before moving to New York in 1885 to take over the “editor’s chair” at 
Harper’s Weekly. He became the spokesperson for literary realism, a figure whose good 
review or letter of recommendation could help a writer at any stage of his or her career. 
James, Cahan, Chesnutt, and Wharton all benefitted from Howells’s professional support.28 
The other Ohio transplant, Chesnutt, did not rise to the same dizzying literary 
heights as Howells, though his aesthetic, sociopolitical, and legal defense of black civil rights 
has made him an important figure across several disciplines. Chesnutt moved with his family 
from Ohio to rural North Carolina before going alone to Charlotte and then trying his hand 
at being a writer in New York. “The lack of literary centers in the South,” Richard Brodhead 
writes, “meant that Chesnutt’s ambition to write always drove him mentally northward, the 
North being the place where a literary career could be successfully established in his time. 
And it was by studying the operation of northern literary markets . . . that Chesnutt came to 
discover black southern life as a possible literary subject” (21). His first story “The 
Goophered Grapevine” (1887) appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, with six more stories 
published there between 1887 and 1904. While Chesnutt wrote about Northern urban life,29 
his best novel, The Marrow of Tradition (1901), published by Boston’s Houghton Mifflin, 
details the 1898 “revolution” in Wilmington, the largest city in North Carolina at the time. 
Cahan’s journey to America began with reactionary violence in Russian ten years 
before the Wilmington massacre. He escaped the country during the anti-Semitic pogroms 
                                                      
28 On Howells and James, see Anesko; on Howells and Cahan, see Kirk and Kirk; on Howells and Chesnutt, 
see McElrath, “W.D. Howells.” See also Anesko 461-463 for letters from James to Howells involving the 
latter’s contribution to Wharton’s edited volume, The Book of the Homeless (1916), the proceeds of which went to 
the Children of Flanders Rescue Committee (a charity for Belgian war refugees organized by Wharton).  
29 See Northern Stories, ed. Duncan. In his fiction, Cleveland (or Groveland) often represents the northern city.  
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of 1881, hoping to join one of several anarchist communes created by fellow Jewish 
refugees. Instead, he stayed in New York, working in a cigar factory and then tutoring 
children before editing the Jewish Daily Forward and writing stories set in the Lower East Side. 
“[I]t took me just three days,” he writes in his autobiography, sounding like Mr. Hughes 
from The World of Chance, “to realize that the establishment of commune colonies was not 
really my dream. I was not fascinated by village life . . .  On the contrary, I felt strongly 
drawn to the life of the city. My heart beat with its rhythms” (Cahan, Education 226).  
Even if Cahan “felt America’s freedom every minute” in the city, “all the time [he] 
was saying to [himself], ‘All of this is a capitalist prison’” (228). While he repeats the Marxian 
critique of democratic freedoms, there were also new divisions forming within the Jewish 
population of the Lower East Side that produced unforeseen obstacles to the orthodox 
Marxist vision of a future class consciousness arising amongst the (urban) proletariat: 
Once, a woman passing by as a friend and I were conversing in Russian on East 
Broadway, turned on us with disgust and spat out: “T’fu! The nerve, actually talking 
Russian! Wasn’t it bad enough that you had to hear that dirty language in Russia?” 
Even the uneducated immigrants could speak Russian, although they 
preferred Yiddish. But the intellectual minority spoke only Russian amongst 
themselves. This was a new thing in New York and it was because we were the first 
Russian-Jewish intellectuals in the United States . . . We could feel the resistance of 
the old-fashioned Suwalki Jews to the spirit of our new movement [Marxian 
socialism]. They considered us to be atheists and lunatics; we intellectuals thought of 
them as ignorant, primitive people. (225)  
 
Working the pluralism of the Lower East Side into his novella Yekl (1896), Cahan puts a 
finer point on the aesthetic and political problem posed by the American city, not just for 
revolutionary politics but for liberal-democratic and realist discourse more broadly. He 
describes the variety of self-identification in the “Ghetto of the American metropolis” (13):  
Lithuanian Jews, Volhynian Jews, south Russian Jews, Bessarabian Jews; Jews 
crowded out of the “pale of Jewish settlement”; Russified Jews expelled from 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kieff, or Saratoff; Jewish runaways from justice; Jewish 
refugees from crying political and economic injustice; people torn from a hard-
gained foothold in life and from deep-rooted attachments by the caprice of 
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intolerance or the wiles of demagoguery [;] students shut out of the Russian 
universities, and come to these shores in quest of learning; artisans, merchants, 
teachers, rabbis, artists, beggars . . . [I]n fine, people with all sorts of antecedents, 
tastes, habits, inclinations, and speaking all sorts of subdialects of the same jargon, 
thrown pell-mell into one social cauldron—a human hodgepodge with its 
component parts all changed but not yet fused into a homogenous whole. (14) 
 
Cahan wonders to what degree a heterogeneous neighborhood with varying methods 
of self-identification could be deemed “Jewish,” let alone “American” or “proletarian”—
labels implying “a homogeneous whole.” James uses strikingly similar language to make a 
related point in The American Scene. The democratic “machine,” in the form of free public 
schools, slowly makes the “alien” elements of New York’s “hotch-potch” into “brothers and 
sisters” (AS 92). James has no problem naming the “elements” going into this “cauldron”—
Jews, Italians, etc.—but is unsure of what will become of the “American” character in the 
future (92). Cahan has a better understanding of the changes to group self-identification that 
come with being “thrown pull-mell into one social cauldron” but is equally unsure of the 
communal identification “to come” (Cahan, Yekl 14). Working on different levels (local and 
national), these authors imagine the possibility of a future homogeneity, a sense of who “we” 
are, emerging from urban heterogeneity, though a final identity, they realize, will never arrive. 
In The American Scene, to return to our guiding thread, James describes the 
unresolvable tension between equivalence and difference as giving rise to new antagonisms 
and new hegemonic positions, this time anticipating not just the philosophical underpinnings 
of Laclau and Mouffe’s philosophy (“relations stop nowhere”) but its political implications: 
It is true, at any rate, that no application of the aristocratic, none of the democratic, 
idea is ever practically complete; discriminations are produced by the mere working 
of the machine. . . . Nature and industry keep producing differences as fast as 
constitutions keep proclaiming equality, and there are always, at the best, in any really 
liberal scheme or human view, more conscious inaptitudes to convince of their 




In Western society, “relations stop nowhere” and the democratic machine keeps churning 
precisely because constitutional proclamations of equality can never cover the ground of 
differences produced by nature and industry (James, Literary 1041). In a “liberal” democracy, 
James argues, one can either try and fail to convince oneself of “their privilege” or one can 
remind oneself of “their limits,” which could refer to the privileges/limits of “differences” 
or “constitutions.” James’s emphasis, however, is on the ongoing clash between the logics of 
equivalence and difference, and hence the ever-present possibility of antagonism in the 
American urban scene. While he wants to explore the limits of the liberal-democratic 
machine—where differences meet discursive claims to equality, in a process that never 
ends—it is more common to find “conscious inaptitudes to convince of their privilege.”  
That strange phrase, “conscious inaptitude,” recalls Althusser’s famous definition of 
ideology as misrecognition: when an individual, the “little” subject, consciously identifies with 
the subjectivity prescribed by a “big” Subject (God, etc.), s/he simultaneously fails to see, fails 
to perceive, the antagonistic limits of this system (the capitalist relations of production).30 We 
can accept Althusser’s Lacanian definition of ideology as an Imaginary relationship to the 
Real relations of production so long as we understand that there is not one antagonistic 
force (the class struggle as the Real) but rather many possible antagonisms. Applied to 
democratic theory, this conception of ideology—akin to Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemony—
explains the cementing of the status quo, wherein people convince themselves they live in a 
democracy while privileging the fact that, due in part to nature and in part to industry, the 
promise of equality cannot apply to everybody or to every situation. In other words, they 
accept inequality in a democracy but instead of (repeatedly) exposing this fact as the limit of 
a system dedicated to human equality, as James and the realists do, liberals make the case 
                                                      
30 See Althusser 54-57. 
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that it is a privilege—something to hold on to. They are satisfied with the equality in certain 
delimited places/spaces and argue that some sociopolitical differences are necessary. I will 
call this position, which critics too readily associate with the realists, “naïve liberalism.” 
G.W. Cable embodies “naïve liberalism.” He argues that one distinction produced by 
the liberal-democratic machine—between social and political equality—must be retained. 
But at what cost? Bryan Wagner shows how Cable altered the Bras-Coupé legend in his 
realist novel about antebellum New Orleans, The Grandissimes (1879-1880), to fit the political 
viewpoint established in pieces like “The Freedmen’s Case in Equity” (1885). The Bras-
Coupé legend, in Wagner’s reading, is tied to the codification of the “police power” in New 
Orleans. The police, in effect, created the myth of the lawless escaped slave living in the 
swamp outside the city, sealing his fate as a stateless person who is not afforded the rights 
the police are meant to protect. In both the police propaganda and the black vernacular 
tradition, Bras-Coupé is defined by his missing arm—the constant reminder of a battle with 
police (the connection to Lindau in Hazard should be noted). While the black vernacular 
tradition speaks “back” from the swamp and emphasizes the missing arm, Cable restores 
Bras-Coupé’s arm and eliminates the association between the police and racial violence. He 
does this, Wagner explains, to protect the distinction between black culture (folklore) and 
politics, “thereby cleans[ing] the state of racial contamination, preserving the possibility of a 
law that can make good on the pledge of equality” at the state level (Wagner, Disturbing 83). 
Hegemony can be even more sinister when it comes to naturalizing distinctions 
produced by the liberal-democratic machine. In the timeframe covered here—1865 to 
1920—Herbert Spencer’s American acolytes (William Graham Sumner and Andrew 
Carnegie most notably) took up the discourse of economic and philosophical liberalism, with 
its focus on individual freedom, and welded it to Social Darwinism’s conception of the 
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survival of the fittest, creating an anti-democratic hegemony akin to what we now call 
neoliberalism.31 In Triumphant Democracy (1886), Carnegie holds up the postbellum American 
city as a clear example of the discursive confluence of Social Darwinism and liberalism:  
In 1830 only six and a half per cent. of the population lived in towns of eight 
thousand inhabitants and upwards; in 1880 the proportion had risen to twenty-two 
per cent. Thus, nearly one person in every four in America is now a member of a 
hive of more than eight thousand human beings. . . . The American, however, need 
not fear the unhealthy or abnormal growth of cities. . . . The free play of economic 
laws is keeping all quite right . . . Oh, these grand, immutable, all-wise laws of natural 
forces, how perfectly they work if human legislators would only let them alone! (47-
48) 
 
Carnegie articulates the “triumph” of democracy with differences evident in the city; but he 
wants to naturalize race, class, and gender differences under the guise of economic freedom 
while portraying big government as an enemy that meddles in this free play of differences.  
Crucially, Carnegie points to the Western “mushroom” cities that grew out of 
nowhere after the Civil War—Chicago, St. Paul, Milwaukee, Kansas City, “to say nothing of 
the cities of the Pacific coast”—as the exemplars of the natural spread of free market 
capitalism in American democracy (50). The literary analogue for this position is not 
Whitman, who also placed hope in Western cities but without an ounce of Carnegie’s 
cutthroat economic beliefs; rather, it is American naturalism, which found in these new 
Western cities a snapshot of “natural” conflict playing itself out in so-called civilization. In 
chapter 3 I briefly compare Cahan’s realist masterpiece about a Social Darwinian 
businessman, The Rise of David Levinsky (1917), to Jack London’s San Francisco novel Martin 
Eden (1909). For now, I want to make a point about the relation between literary form and 
geographic setting: just as a unique blend of realism took root in East Coast literary centers, 
so a unique blend of naturalism, one that matched Émile Zola’s Darwinism with an 
                                                      
31 See Hawkins 98 and chapter 3 of this dissertation for a comparison between these ideologies. 
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American rugged individualism, took root in “mushroom cities” like Chicago and cities 
along the Pacific coast.32 London’s account of a San Francisco street fight demonstrates that 
the Western city is the backdrop for a more elemental struggle to emerge: “Martin and 
Cheese-Face were two savages, of the stone age . . . They sank lower and lower into the 
muddy abyss, back into the dregs of the raw beginnings of life, striving blindly and 
chemically, as atoms strive . . . colliding, re-colliding, and colliding again and eternally again” 
(179). Martin’s victory augurs his “rise” as a writer: “You licked Cheese-Face and you’ll lick 
the editors if it takes thrice eleven years to do it in” (183). The self-made man, one of the 
founding myths of American democracy, is recast in Social Darwinian terms as an 
exceptional individual hardwired to triumph in a ruthlessly competitive urban market.  
The fight scene in Martin Eden also demonstrates that Social Darwinism and literary 
naturalism mobilize us/them relations. In conservative thought, Laclau and Mouffe explain, 
“[a]n antagonism is . . . constructed between two poles: the ‘people’, which includes all those 
who defend the traditional values and freedom of enterprise; and their adversaries: the State 
and all the subversives (feminists, blacks, young people, and ‘permissives’ of every type” 
(154). The Forgotten Man, as Sumner calls the victim of the proto-welfare state, is snuffed 
out by the egalitarian imaginary (conformism, charity, big government). Martin Eden, 
London’s surrogate, calls the latter a “mongrel democracy that is nothing else than pseudo-
socialism” and claims he “look[s] to the state for nothing” (384). The realist novel not only 
puts forward a representation of the city that uncovers new sites of social antagonism; it 
must confront and try to unseat an opposing, but still urban-antagonistic, conception of “the 
social” codified by literary naturalism and Social Darwinism.  
                                                      
32 There are of course exceptions one would want to point out: Stephen Crane and Theodore Dreiser on New 
York, Howells and Chesnutt on the Midwestern city. There is also a Chicago school of realists that included 
Fuller, Robert Herrick, and David Graham Phillips. See Den Tandt 109-122.  
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This is what Laclau and Mouffe aim to do on the political level: they want to 
construct a sense of who “we” are for those who are excluded from the democratic 
imaginary by “them,” the defenders of the status quo or the anti-democratic Right. Radical 
democracy is hegemonic, but it is distinguished from naïve and anti-democratic liberalism by 
its awareness of the ever-receding limits of its own meaning-making operation: there is 
always an excess of people who remain in the democratic shadows, oppressed into silence. 
In naïve liberalism, these people are virtually ignored and in the neoliberal Darwinian view 
they belong in the shadows by dint of their failure to succeed. A radical-democratic political 
identity, by contrast, is constantly altered by the addition of new subjects and situations.  
This is what American literary realism accomplishes, in my account. Recall James’s 
compromise as an artist: knowing that “relations stop nowhere,” he draws a circle with 
concrete, knowable relations (Literary 1041). By recognizing the limits of each creation, he 
opens the possibility of endless figurations. “The prime effect of so sustained a system,” 
James writes, “is to lead on and on” (1041). James, I have already implied, provides a 
political version of this thesis when he describes American democracy as a never-ending 
clash between equivalence and difference. As a writer and an urban explorer, James 
continually “remind[s]” himself of the “limits” of this system (AS 241). It is the plurality of 
possible sites of antagonism that makes the urban setting of American literary realism so rich 
but also so daunting. To write or to read realism means continually taking account of the 
limits of the symbolic order created by the democratic revolution by confronting new, 
previously excluded or marginalized urban spaces and bodies. Each author in this 
dissertation locates antagonism in different kinds of urban social relations, pointing to an 
underlying rift, tension, or violence besetting a particular city in a moment in its history. For 
Howells, antagonism names the tension between the bourgeois drawing room and New 
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York’s “other half”; for James, it is a tug-of-war between men and women in the joint 
production of urban space in Boston (men build streets and buildings that women occupy 
and define); for Cahan, it is the Marxian conception of the class struggle as it is embodied in 
the Lower East Side sweatshop; for Wharton, it marks the clash between love and marriage 
in Old New York; and for Chesnutt, “race antagonism” is a combination of white 
supremacist discourse (e.g., local newspapers) and spatial practice (e.g., segregation) creating 
a narrative of “our” superiority over “them” that is constantly undermined by the realities of 
post-Reconstruction cities like Wilmington, with its large and influential black middle class.  
Because antagonism can be articulated in different ways, I will call on different 
theorists of antagonism to help analyze the us/them relation at work in an author’s oeuvre: 
Jameson (chapters 1-3); Slavoj Žižek (chapter 2); Jean-Paul Sartre (chapter 3); and Jacques 
Rancière (chapters 4 and 5). In the Lacanian tradition from which these thinkers emerged—
itself an outgrowth of the Sartrean “dilemma of the Other” fully as much as Freudian 
psychoanalysis (Jameson, American 74)—antagonism does not designate predefined groups 
facing off; rather, like the Real, it is “an impossible kernel, a certain limit which is in itself 
nothing; it is only to be constructed retroactively, from a series of its effects, as the traumatic 
point which escapes them; it prevents the closure of the social field” (Žižek, Sublime 184).  
If antagonism cannot be experienced in itself, it can be located by visible disruptions 
to the socio-symbolic system in which we locate ourselves. The classic example is the 
symptom, which Žižek traces back to Marx and relates to Derrida’s specter.33 Lindau’s 
missing hand is a symptom in this sense. Laclau and Mouffe borrow Lacan’s redefinition of 
the symptom as metaphor: “antagonism . . . situates itself within the limits of language, and 
can only exist as the disruption of it—that is, as metaphor” (111). Indeed, metaphor tears 
                                                      
33 See Žižek, Sublime Object 3-55; and “Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology” 26.  
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two unrelated signifiers away from their normal chain of signification and creates a new 
meaning from their equivalence, though there is always the possibility for the resignification 
of these elements in yet another chain of meaning. Jameson makes similar claims about 
allegory as an experience of failure. From Walter Benjamin, he borrows the idea of allegory 
as a collection of objects in “a world in which things have been for whatever reason utterly 
sundered from meanings, from spirit, from genuine human existence” (Jameson, Marxism 
71). Any attempt to place these objects back in their human, historical context is bound to 
uncover “breaks, gaps, discontinuities, and inner distances and incommensurabilities of all 
kinds” (“Metaphor to Allegory” 25). Drawing on the classic definition of allegory as an 
extended metaphor, we can relate these theories: antagonism must be approached indirectly, 
as an extended metaphor or allegory that both points to and enacts the breakdown of the 
socio-symbolic system of differences. Examples from our novels include: James’s rewriting 
his metaphor for artistic production as an antagonism between a male canvas and female 
embroiderers in the production of urban space (chapter 2); Cahan’s boxing allegory relating 
class antagonism, assimilation, and divorce (chapter 3); Wharton’s star-crossed lovers being 
likened to the ghosts of time (chapter 4); and Chesnutt’s Dr. Miller seeing a black body in 
the streets during the Wilmington riot and knowing “what it signified” (chapter 5). 
For Jameson and Žižek, the class struggle is the un-representable “absent cause” 
constitutive of our alienated existence in capitalist society (which Sartre reframes as the 
realm of scarcity), undermining desire and containment at every turn.34 Laclau, Mouffe, and 
                                                      
34 Jameson describes Sartre’s late-career turn to the language of scarcity in terms that align a Lacanian reading 
of desire with the Marxian analysis of historical preconditions: “[when] man’s emptiness takes the form of need, 
the resistance of the world to man is now defined in terms of scarcity. For scarcity is precisely the unanalyzable 
starting point, the contingent datum, of the world in which we exist” (Marxism 232-233). Jameson later names 
this “The Real,” “that which resists desire, that bedrock against which the desiring subject knows the breakup 
of hope and can finally measure everything that refuses its fulfillment” (Political 183-184). 
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Rancière reject class essentialism. Political identities are created in the act of articulating any 
us/them relation, disrupting the differential and often oppressive relations in which the 
subject had been (mis)placed. When done in the name of radical democracy, a subordinated 
person or group challenges a hegemonic totality—the commonsense “map” of sociopolitical 
life (where it starts/ends and whom it encompasses)—by announcing and embodying 
society’s non-coincidence with itself. There is no pure, essentialist core to political activity—
it can crop up at any time/place, to be measured by the warping effect it has on the who, 
what, when, and where of politics. The Lacanian underpinnings of Hegemony were discussed 
above. As for Rancière, Jodi Dean explains that his conception of the demos—“the people” 
who become the subjects of democratic politics through a process he calls subjectification—
“does not designate a subset of persons . . . that can be empirically indicated.” Rather, it  
names the gap, division or antagonism that marks the non-identity of any ordering 
with its own components. The Lacanian term for [this] . . . would then be object petit 
a, an impossible, formal object produced as the excess of a process or relation, a kind 
of gap that incites or annoys, the missingness or not-quite-rightness that calls out to 
us. . . . [P]olitical subjectification is itself a disidentification and registration of a gap. . 
. . There are various politicizations, various mobilizations and subjectifications that 
call out to and organize different convictions and interests. (Dean, “Communist” 94) 
 
Many of these theorists (Dean included, Sartre excluded) have recently been drawn 
into the adjacent fields of urban studies/planning and architecture to explain and harness the 
energies released by contemporary urban political movements like Occupy and Arab Spring 
(2011).35 Urban politics, in these accounts, must be rearticulated outside the familiar liberal 
variants of the Tocquevillian association or the Habermasian public sphere by emphasizing 
antagonism (conflict, dissent, power struggles) over consensus and rationality. Instead of 
there being pre-defined, acceptable identities and spaces for politics, political subjects and 
spaces can be created at virtually any time and place. In Dan Webb’s terms, “cities facilitate 
                                                      
35 See Davidson and Iveson; Lahiji; Purcell; Swyngedouw; and Webb.  
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the capacity for millions of people to organize and articulate themselves as ‘the people’” (26). 
From Baron von Haussmann’s supposedly barricade-proof Parisian boulevards to the 
evacuation of Zuccotti Park, however, cities are also sites where radical politics are 
squashed—proactively or retroactively, but always imperfectly—to ensure the smooth, 
conflict-free circulation of people and capital that Rancière calls the police order. I hope to 
bring to bear on literary studies the linkage between urban space, antagonism, and politics 
that has influenced such a wide swath of urban theorists, planners, and architects.        
To this end, I liken my use of the aforementioned theorists of antagonism to 
Jameson’s model of allegorical “transcoding,” which names the rewriting of philosophical 
concepts and ideas under a shared interpretive horizon. As I will discuss in chapter 3, using 
Cahan’s transition from orthodox Marxism to post-Marxism as an example, Jameson’s 
transcoding requires a “master narrative” (the Marxian narrative of History) not just to 
justify the process itself but to give a final, proper place to various “codes” or collected 
objects from different historical moments. Laclau and Mouffe are opposed to such “master 
narratives” but they suggest a similar operation when they name Marxian socialism a 
development within the discursive context of the democratic revolution.36 Taking the 
democratic revolution as the “master code” means that there are no right answers and thus 
no promised unification of democratic ideals and realities, democratic theory and practice. 
What can the realist novel accomplish, then, faced with the constitutive fact of social 
antagonism in a society defined by the discursive matrix that is the democratic revolution? In 
one of his nonfiction essays, Chesnutt similarly asks, after listing examples of race 
antagonism: “What is it then that we want and can help bring about?” (Essays 253). When 
the world is separated into “classes” or “castes,” violence is often the result. But if each party 
                                                      
36 See Laclau and Mouffe 140.  
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views the other as an “individual citizen” with democratic rights, the results might be 
different: “Every effort to segregate and to stamp as different or inferior a class of people 
redounds to the injury of the class less fortunate. The Negro cannot compete with white 
people, as a class. As individuals they can make such a showing as their deserts may qualify 
them for” (253). In a relation of oppression, one side has power over the other but each sets 
a limit on the other’s happiness and development. When the Other is viewed as a citizen 
with rights, however, a real competition begins. This is no dream of liberal consensus but 
rather the beginning of an adversarial competition where there had once been oppression. 
This is a crucial feature shared by all the novels in this study: the transformation of 
antagonism into agonism. The theoretical background for the latter concept is Mouffe’s 
engagement with Carl Schmitt, who claims that equality is shared by “friends,” while 
“enemies” are not equal and must be kept out of the group of equals. Antagonists have 
nothing to say to each other—all that is possible is war. Agonism provides “channels 
through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues 
which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent 
as an enemy but an adversary” (Democratic 103).37 Adversaries “have a shared adhesion to the 
ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But [they] disagree 
concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is 
not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion” (102).  
                                                      
37 “[T]he term agonism comes from the Greek agon, meaning conflict or strife,” but, as Mark Wenman points 
out, it has taken on new life in the work of Mouffe, Hannah Arendt, William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, James 
Tully, and others (4). There might be some question, then, why this dissertation focuses on only one of these 
theorists. In answer, I would point to the moment when Wenman articulates why he will part from Mouffe in 
his theorization of agonism as a global phenomenon: “Mouffe has rejected arguments for cosmopolitanism 
outright, suggesting instead that we should focus on renewing democracy at the national and regional level as 
the best way to challenge the negative impact of the processes of globalisation” (xv). The realists similarly 
thought of democracy in local/regional and national contexts, which is why Mouffe is appropriate here.  
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There has been some discussion, within the context of political philosophy, over the 
degree to which Mouffe’s solo work constitutes either an extension or a repudiation of the 
conception of antagonisms as experience of the “failure” of “the social” in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy.38 Indeed, Schmitt offers a conservative, positivistic account of an antagonism 
that can be figured as a line drawn in the sand or a walled city; whereas in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s work, antagonism expressly does not indicate two self-consistent, internally whole 
and coherent groups facing off. Yet Mouffe claims that Hegemony provided the “theoretical 
terrain” of her later thinking of antagonism (Democratic 101). She turns Schmitt’s 
friend/enemy relation into an ontological category of human behavior, making it a 
possibility in any social relation, always-already subverting a liberal belief in consensus. 
Power and violence are thus spectral possibilities for all encounters in a liberal democracy, 
retaining the specifications for antagonism in Hegemony. Mouffe simply transcodes Schmitt’s 
antagonism into the discursive context of liberal-democratic society.   
The realists, I think, would have understood things in this way—not (or not only) by 
any exceptional powers of political imagination but by (or also by) experiencing the 
sociopolitical realities of postbellum urban America. The rise of a Social Darwinian brand of 
white supremacy after the Civil War provided a clear-cut example of the friend/enemy 
relation operating within the context of liberal-democratic pluralism. Chesnutt’s The Marrow 
of Tradition explores how conservative discourse tries and fails to draw the entire world into 
unequal camps (white/black). The rise of a powerful black middle class in Wilmington, 
North Carolina, exposes the failure of this discourse since there are bodies and spaces that 
refuse to fit their hierarchical vision of the world. The white supremacists experience this 
failure just as Laclau and Mouffe predicted, as an “identity crisis” (113). 
                                                      
38 See Wenman 180-198.  
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It is not Mouffe’s transcoding of antagonism, then, that constitutes something new 
on the level of political or aesthetic theory (we can add Schmitt’s name to the list of theorists 
above). Rather, it is her conception of the transformation of antagonism into agonism—
when the enemy becomes “an ‘adversary’, that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but 
whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (Democratic 102). On the one 
hand, agonism is another name for hegemony: it is a war of position instead of a war for 
existence; it is “us” (radical democrats) versus “them” (neoliberals) instead of friend (those 
in the nation state) and enemy (those outside). The political thrust of Hegemony required the 
discursive proliferation of antagonisms; however, in Mouffe’s work, agonism is an attempt to 
contain antagonism. In her words, agonism “consists in domesticating hostility and in trying 
to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations” (Democratic 101). 
 Domesticating and defusing: is agonism not then an ideological “strategy of 
containment” in Kaplan’s Jamesonian sense? In the next section, I will differentiate agonism 
from the Kaplan/Jameson model and show how the realists critique the aesthetic and 
political limits of face-to-face conversation. In other words, agonism is not the be-all and 
end-all of the American realist novel but is rather a waystation on the road to acknowledging 
and working through the effects of antagonism in an increasingly pluralistic urban society.  
III. From Antagonism to Agonism and Beyond 
 Agonistic debates between characters might be the most recognizable feature of the 
American realist novel. As Howells stipulates, it is best for characters to be distinguished as 
“types” instead of “classes” (Selected 63); and one of the defining features of a realist “type” is 
his or her political identity, which takes shape as a character defends a position against a 
political opponent in a debate. The examples are numerous: the tense dinner party to 
celebrate a literary magazine’s success in Howells’s Hazard, where Lindau the socialist and 
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Dryfoos the Social Darwinist square off on the topic of strikebreaking; the debates between 
two cousins in James’s The Bostonians, the Southern male chauvinist Basil Ransom and the 
Bostonian feminist Olive Chancellor; or, in Cahan’s Yekl, the Orthodox Jewish immigrant, 
Gitl, warning her Americanized, philandering husband that a wronged wife has rights and 
can sue for divorce in the U.S. Yet there is also something undeniably problematic about 
such agonistic relations, no matter how heated they get. 
To begin with, agonistic dialogue rarely occurs in the streets or in the public square 
but rather in offices and apartments. Made into a formal component of the realist novel, 
Kaplan would want to stress, debates between characters represent the containment of 
antagonisms “out there,” in the background of the text (the space of everyday urbanism), 
within the foreground of domestic interiors. I would like to reorient our understanding of 
agonism by viewing it as a variant of what Mikhail Bakhtin calls the chronotope of the parlor 
in European realism: “In salons and parlors the webs of intrigue are spun, denouements 
occur and finally—this is where dialogues happen . . . revealing the character, ‘ideas’ and 
‘passions’ of the heroes” (246). It is here we find “the interweaving of petty, private intrigues 
with political and financial intrigues, the interpenetration of state with boudoir secrets, of 
historical sequences with the everyday and biographical sequences” (247). With this 
description, we can start to see how the channeling of background into foreground, of 
antagonism into agonism, need not be ideological in the sense of containing or cordoning 
off—it can also mark the interpenetration of inside and outside, public and private, 
background and foreground. In Kaplan’s reading, Howells follows the strategy of his main 
characters, the Marches, as they try to find the “line” between respectable middle class life 
and urban strife: “Just as the Marches cordon off a domestic space against the teeming 
streets, the narrative distinguishes a colony of interrelated characters in the foreground 
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against a background of fragmented objects and characterless masses” (52). In my reading, 
by contrast, authors should be distinguished from their characters. For realist authors, 
antagonisms “out there” in the city penetrate the dialogues and destinies of individual 
characters (qua political types), giving them a spark of energy and sociopolitical significance 
even if those same characters wish to re-contain or dampen or ignore the antagonistic 
relations of urban life.  
At the same time, however, the realists expose the limits of agonistic dialogue to 
shore up the plurality of other possible voices and identities worthy of novelistic and 
political representation; after all, “relations stop nowhere” (James, Literary 1041). No matter 
how many named characters clash in tense debates, there is still a whole world “out there” 
not participating and not being heard. Open antagonism and tense face-to-face debates are, 
in some sense, the Scylla and Charybdis of the realist novel: if one wants to avoid open 
warfare to engage in dialogical agonism, the reality is that someone will be excluded, 
prevented from fully participating. Rather than giving up, the realists keep attempting to 
chart this perilous aesthetic and political path, inviting different kinds of characters into the 
dialogical arena—characters whose personal and political identities are formed in the very act 
of engaging in debate.  
Wharton and Chesnutt alert our attention to another way to experience the limit of 
the agonistic character system: sometimes agonism never gets started. Polite society, as 
Howells states and Wharton more than anybody bears out, “hates a scene” (“Equality” 64). 
When Newland Archer broaches the topic of divorce at a dinner party in The Age of Innocence, 
his words “fall like a bombshell in the pure and tranquil atmosphere of the Archer dining-
room. . . . [T]he young man, himself mindful of the bad taste of discussing such intimate 
matters in public, hastily branched off” (Wharton, Age 87). Chesnutt’s Southern characters 
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are not so polite and the issues in the Jim Crow South are more pressing, but a similar 
evacuation of agonism is at play in The Marrow of Tradition. One of Chesnutt’s white 
supremacists, faced with a “slanderous” editorial written by a black newspaper editor, states: 
“To meet words with words upon such a subject would be to acknowledge the equality of 
the negro and his right to discuss or criticise the conduct of the white people” (Marrow 148). 
Mouffe’s agonism requires that the interlocutors acknowledge the “right” of their opponent 
to defend their position. If there are barriers to this acknowledgement, as there are in the Jim 
Crow South and Old New York, then an adversarial dialogue would never start.  
Wharton and Chesnutt both invent novel ways of making voices and bodies speak 
and appear so that they can be heard and seen. These are issues that Rancière’s political 
philosophy directly takes up and helps us rethink. Rancière will take a prominent place in the 
last two chapters of this study—on Wharton and Chesnutt—precisely so we can understand 
how an author can overcome the limitations of agonism by retooling antagonism as the 
sudden appearance, and just-as-rapid disappearance, of a living, breathing political being 
capable of speech where there had been mere noise or silence. Rancière compares radical-
democratic politics and literature/aesthetics—his most consistent example is the European 
realist novel—as forces that invent new ways of speaking, hearing, and feeling the world 
around us. There realist novel “does” politics by reimagining the perceptual world: it opens 
the novel to everyday subjects/situations; its impersonal, free-floating style exposes readers 
to the swirl of atoms that make up a life; and its author/narrator deciphers the “mute 
speech” of bodies and objects that populate the setting—often the background—of a novel.  
An attentive reader will note the lurking presence of Rancière throughout this study, 
not just the Wharton and Chesnutt chapters. This is because, along with Mouffe but in a 
more directly aesthetic register, Rancière will help us push against Jameson’s insistence that 
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democratic values or concepts (e.g., equality, freedom, the people) are nothing but 
ideological mirages produced by capitalism itself.39 Although Jameson wants to rescue 
utopian impulses (e.g., the figuration of collectivity) baked into the ideology of literary 
realism and other mass art forms, this process only highlights the failure to imagine or 
describe, let alone realize, the radically new. For Rancière, Marxism is the quintessence of 
“metapolitics”: the keeping at bay of radical politics in the oscillation between the critique of 
bourgeois democracy as illusory and the promise of a “real” democracy that never seems to 
arrive. I prefer to think of Rancière’s aesthetics and/as politics as providing a 
representational third gear that can reach the nameless and forgotten bodies and voices “out 
there”: the demos (the subject of democratic politics as well as “democracy in literature”) or 
the “part with no part” (that is, with no part in the ruling of the community and/or in the 
agonistic character system). The antagonistic aesthetic and political appearance of these 
voices/bodies can productively disrupt and reenergize texts that otherwise adhere to the 
spatio-temporal, linguistic, and/or political limits of agonistic face-to-face conversation. 
In Hazard, as my first chapter will illustrate, Howells momentarily reaches this once-
invisible and silent population when the Marches revel in New York’s elevated trains. I 
reserve the term “affect” to describe this new way of seeing, feeling, and hearing the world 
“out there.” In reaching this world, however, Howells’s realist project runs aground, 
aesthetically and politically: aesthetically because he dissolves plot and narration into the 
bodily experience of the here-and-now, paving the way for the molecular preoccupations of 
modernism; and politically because he is unable to make affective immersion the center of a 
radical-democratic platform. This could be explained by two of Rancière’s more contentious 
claims: realism is part of the same aesthetic regime as modernism; and while literature does 
                                                      
39 See Jameson, “Postmodernism and the Market” 279-280. 
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something akin to political demonstration by rearranging the perceptual world, it does not 
form new collective subjectivities but rather challenges singular subjectivities. I treat 
Howells’s failure as an opening for other realists, rather than an aesthetico-political 
imperative. By giving voice and body to the excluded, can the realist novel as such represent 
in its pages, and/or produce among its readers, new political identities that name and combat 
the multifaceted sites of oppression in postbellum cities? If so, we could speak of the realist 
novel as creating a radical-democratic, counter-hegemonic bloc for an urban era dominated 
by naïve liberalism and Social Darwinian liberalism. I close this introduction with a brief 
account of the rest of my chapters and how the four authors therein answer this challenge.   
James, the subject of my second chapter, is less concerned with real-world change 
than with highlighting the temptation, felt on both sides of the political spectrum, to ignore 
troubling remainders and “resolve” an antagonism on the level of agonistic debate. Turning 
to the city of his youth in The Bostonians (1886) to show the woman question as a product of 
democratic social conditions, James found Boston difficult to map, geographically and 
socially. His solution is threefold. First, he references the local reason Boston is hard to map 
(the filling of the Back Bay of the Charles River). Then, he names the antagonism behind the 
growing city, which is the tension between male and female roles in the production and 
usage of urban space. Finally, he shows the process by which this antagonism motivates an 
agonistic debate between two cousins. Ransom and Olive proffer two “solutions” to this 
antagonism, which intervene at different urban scales: architecture (Harvard’s Memorial 
Hall) and the female voice (Verena Tarrant). Memorial Hall celebrates Harvard’s Northern 
soldiers but causes Ransom, a Confederate veteran, to forget “the whole question of sides 
and parties” (189). Similarly, when Verena gives a speech on equality, her voice “reduced the 
company to unanimity” (206). These solutions are not fixed: Ransom reconfigures the 
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memorial as a paean to masculinity and Verena can promote either Ransom or Olive’s 
divergent positions. In the end, Ransom “wins” as Verena deserts a feminist rally, leaving 
Olive to fall prey to a disappointed, increasingly agitated crowd. The closing moments show 
James’s main lesson: social antagonism will never be resolved. 
Cahan believed that Howells and the other realists overlooked the fact that the 
antagonism between labor and capital would be resolved only by the ruinous march of 
capitalism. Yet, Cahan was dismayed when fellow members of the Second International 
brushed off his proposal to condemn anti-Semitism in the party. Ethnic identities, he 
realized, were not counted or heard within party debates, a sign that class struggle would not 
automatically yield the workers’ unity needed for revolution. In my third chapter, I argue that 
Cahan’s English-language novella Yekl (1896) dramatizes the tension between ethnic identity 
and class identity in New York’s Lower East Side. Cahan introduces the Marxian master 
narrative through an allegory relating the title character’s sweatshop labor to boxing. 
Desiring to rise above his class like a successful boxer, Yekl (he goes by Jake) unintentionally 
adopts the orthodox Marxist position on assimilation. This position is challenged in agonistic 
fashion by his wife Gitl, who wants to mold a Jewish identity in urban America, which she 
achieves by divorcing her husband. However, in the last chapter, “A Defeated Victor,” 
Cahan folds Gitl’s identity back into the Marxian dialectic (the loser wins and the winner 
loses). It is only in his later novel, The Rise of David Levinsky (1917), and in his work as editor 
of the Jewish Daily Forward, I claim, where Cahan locates a Jewish identity that is aligned with 
socialist party in its attack on capitalist injustices but also retains the autonomy to explore 
uniquely Jewish issues on the Lower East Side. A subtle reference to the Forward in the pages 
of Levinsky secures realism’s place in naming and fostering the new Jewish Left, blurring the 
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boundary between fiction and reality, aesthetics and politics. The moment is small enough, 
however, not to pose any formal problems for Cahan’s realism.  
The fourth chapter considers the aesthetic and political implications of a key 
moment in Wharton’s The Age of Innocence (1920), in which Ellen Olenska and Newland 
Archer visit the Metropolitan Museum near Central Park. Though this impeccably 
researched novel is set in the 1870s, the museum did not move to its location in Central Park 
until the 1880s. To explain this deliberate anachronism, I turn to Rancière’s conception of 
politics and the police. Politics, or the egalitarian promise of democracy as such, is 
antagonistic to the police, which distributes people, places, and roles within a well-mapped 
hierarchy. Old New York, in my reading, is an example of the police. When Ellen’s love for 
Archer is made visible in the museum, Wharton enacts a redistribution of the sensible on 
behalf of all those who have been forgotten in and by time. The anachronistic setting shows 
Wharton bucking the conventions of realism to represent the ghosts of time. I speculate 
whether anachronistic love moved her readers to resist gender oppressions even after 
democracy seemed to “arrive” with women’s suffrage in 1920, the same year Age came out.  
Charles Chesnutt, my final author, is very clear about his aesthetic and political aims 
as a realist author: to advance black civil rights through literature, he writes in his journal, the 
author must first “mine” the opposition’s viewpoint and then subtly prepare readers for 
“social recognition and equality” (Journals 140). I follow this double purpose in Chesnutt’s 
masterwork, The Marrow of Tradition (1901). I show that the construction of “race 
antagonism” in both white supremacist discourse (newspapers, speeches) and spatial 
practices (segregation, riot activity) is the result of an identity crisis brought on by the visible 
successes of Wilmington’s black middle class. Chesnutt also prepares readers for “social 
recognition and equality” (Journals 140) through a plotline involving the half-black Janet 
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Miller, who wants to be recognized by her white half-sister and near twin Olivia. For Olivia to 
recognize Janet, I claim, she must see and hear a fellow human being, an equal, which she 
refuses to do. Olivia’s recognition of Janet comes in the last scene of the novel, when she 
hears how Janet has been “foully wronged”: “you . . . left me nameless all my life!” (Marrow 
195). In a radical moment, she identifies herself with the nameless victims of the riot.  
I save Chesnutt for last because he overcomes two problems in Rancière’s 
conception of politics, problems on which my other authors run aground. First, Rancière 
wishes to combine realism and modernism while distinguishing between aesthetics and 
political demonstration, something that Chesnutt gets around by collapsing Janet’s search for 
recognition and his readers’ struggle for “social recognition and equality.” If Olivia and the 
reader find themselves agreeing with the radically realist (because true, confirmable) and 
radical-democratic idea that Janet is not different from Olivia, Chesnutt has done his job. 
The other problem is on the side of political demonstration. If it is a temporary time-place 
wherein new subjects suddenly emerge, how can there be any substantive social or political 
change? If Rancière challenges Mouffe’s antagonism-agonism relay by keeping “the people” 
as a category irreducible to liberal interest politics, then Chesnutt points to a more politically 
pragmatic method like Mouffe’s to return the favor and patch over this problem in Rancière. 
Black civil rights, for Chesnutt, is an autonomous force within the fight for greater social and 
political equality in the liberal-democratic state. These two poles draw energy from each 
other: the autonomous group is strengthened by its reference to the equality promised to all 
“men” in a democracy; and the radical-democratic bloc of groups referencing these same 




“Feel Like Populace”: 
Public Transportation and Affective Contagion in Howellsian Realism 
 
“People who want to understand democracy should spend less time in the library 
with Aristotle and more time on the buses and in the subway”—Simeon Strunsky, 
No Mean City (1944) 
 
In The Antinomies of Realism (2013), Fredric Jameson makes a startling claim about the 
origins of European realism: the body—its range of feelings and sensations (sight, smell, 
touch, taste)—entered the works of Gustave Flaubert, Émile Zola, Leo Tolstoy, and others 
as the narrative opponent of emotions. Jameson thus historicizes a postmodern literary-
critical term, affect: “it will be appropriate to associate the rise of affect with the emergence 
of the phenomenological body in language and representation; and to historicize a 
competition between the system of named emotions and the emergence of nameless bodily 
states” (Jameson, Antinomies 32).1 Affect’s opposite narrative number, “the system of named 
emotions,” is a list of emotions akin to “the system of colors [ROYGBIV]” (29). One is also 
reminded of charts with illustrations of emotions (fear, love, guilt, etc.), the idea being that 
our emotional state can be approximated by these word/picture combinations. Affects—the 
smells, sounds, tastes, and feeling registered by the body—muddle the self/other distinction 
propping up named emotions: they refer not to my personal feeling but a sort of free-
floating, sliding, autonomous mood—ranging “from the depressive to the manic, from 
gloominess to ecstasy” (42)—that can be picked up by anybody (35-36).2  
                                                      
1 I follow Jameson in this “very local and restricted, practical use of the term ‘affect’” (29). However, it is worth 
pointing out that there has been a very productive turn to affect in Americanist criticism. A scarcely exhaustive 
list includes: Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism (2011); Christopher Castiglia’s Interior States (2008); Peter Coviello’s 
Intimacy in America (2005); and Dana Luciano’s Arranging Grief (2007). 
2 A great example of affect comes from War and Peace: “When Prince Andrew left the palace he felt that all the 
interest and happiness the victory [by the Russians over the French, in 1805] had afforded him had now been 
left in the indifferent hands of the Minister of War and the polite adjutant” (qtd. in Jameson, Antinomies 84).  
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“[T]he very force and pungency of the realist writing” in Jameson’s account lies in 
“the irrevocable antagonism between” affect and named emotions, which can take many 
different forms (11). For instance, affect and named emotions address two kinds of 
temporality that a writer can draw upon. Affect is the domain of the here-and-now, the 
“perpetual present,” while named emotions are on the side of narration, the well-constructed 
plot, and a character’s pre-determined destiny (28). The waxing and waning of bodily 
intensities in the pure present strain identity, narration, and language itself to their breaking 
points. The most famous theorization of this tension is Henry James’s “antagonism” 
between showing (scene, picture) and telling (narration, event) (22). This is one of Jameson’s 
few references to American-born authors.  
If his narrative about the birth of realism from the récit (tale) and its death into the 
scenic preoccupations of modernism were applied to the American literary scene, it would 
need to account for W.D. Howells, who defended literary realism in The Atlantic and Harper’s 
but saw his star fade near the end of his long life (born in 1837, he died in 1920). In a 
“Roundtable” in the Journal of American Studies meant to address and correct the dearth of 
American authors in Antinomies, contributor Mark Storey makes this point:  
The other obvious [missing] name is William Dean Howells, not just the editorial 
gatekeeper of American realism through the late nineteenth century but also its chief 
practitioner. It would have been interesting to see Jameson account for Howells, 
whose best novels—The Rise of Silas Lapham (1885) and A Hazard of New Fortunes 
(1890)—would seem to both reinforce some of the claims being made and offer a 
socially and aesthetically committed version of realism in its American context. 
(Bennett et al. 1081-1082).  
 
This chapter will be just such an attempt to test Jameson’s account by applying it to Howells 
and his aesthetico-political defense of realism as “democracy in literature” (Selected 62).  
One of Howells’s most programmatic statements on realism is fatefully split between 
narrative destiny and an affective embodiment in the flux of everyday life: 
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In life [the realist] finds nothing insignificant; all tells for destiny and character . . . 
He cannot look upon human life and declare this thing or that thing unworthy of 
notice, any more than a scientist can declare a fact of the material world beneath the 
dignity of his inquiry. He feels in every nerve the equality of things and the unity of 
men; his soul is exalted, not by vain shows and shadows and ideals, but by realities, 
in which alone the truth lives. (Selected 302) 
 
On the one hand, the realist classifies and tells of individual destinies like a scientist who 
places no taboo on possible subjects; on the other, he participates in a Whitmanesque 
celebration of the embodied soul that feels “the equality of things” and the “unity of men.”3 
I will historicize Howells’s deployment of affect by tracking not only its antagonism 
with named emotions across his oeuvre but also the preexisting artistic forms (Whitman’s 
poetry, Tolstoy’s novels) and the social/historical constraints (class antagonism and the 
development of public transportation technologies) that make affect thinkable for Howells. 
His evolving realist project, I claim, is defined by his attempt to show the emergence of a 
radical-democratic public—or “populace,” to use a phrase from Hazard (360)—in the here-
and-now of urban-industrial capitalism4 by registering an instance of collective enjoyment in 
the bodily equality made possible by public transportation. The price to pay is great: it means 
dissolving realist narration and utopian politics in the “perpetual present” of affect. 
Furthermore, as Howells came to realize with a melancholic sense of dismay, even the 
momentary enjoyment of equality on the train car presupposes an entire world “out there” 
                                                      
3 This description of Howells’s literary democracy opens up possible connections between Jameson’s 
antinomies and Rancière’s politics of aesthetics: the equality of subjects; the mute speech of bodies, deciphered 
by the author; and the swirl of atoms that make everything equal in the end. In an interview, Jameson 
confirmed that his notion of affect is close to Deleuzeian “intensity” or haecceity (“Revisiting 152)— “a 
relationship of movement and rest between molecules or particles, the power to affect and to be affected” (qtd. 
in Rancière, Politics 62)—which is also the source of Rancière’s “molecular equality” (Politics 25). Realism, in 
both accounts, (d)evolves as it manages its tensions and achieves provisional solutions. We can thus transcode 
Rancière’s terms into Jameson’s: democratic subjects and mute speech are compatible with named emotions 
(i.e., they are narratable), while molecular equality is a version of affect because it resists narration. 
4 For all its collective potential, affect for Jameson is a method for registering the bourgeois body under 
capitalism. Overthrowing the capitalist means of production would “ge[t] rid of a whole range of intensities and 
gratifications in terms of which we individual subjects of late capitalism have become accustomed to defining 
our own ‘identity’” (Jameson on Jameson 34).  
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not participating and not feeling the same way. How and why Howells learned to stop 
worrying and register what the “equality of things and the unity of men” feels like in an 
antagonistic urban-industrial reality is the subject of this chapter.  
I. Riding Nahant Ferry 
As Storey implies in the “Roundtable” on Jameson’s Antinomies, the twin presence of 
named emotions and affect in Howells’s oeuvre can be traced back to The Rise of Silas 
Lapham. Early in this novel, Tom Corey, a member of Boston’s social elite, starts working 
for the Midwestern transplant and new millionaire Silas Lapham. Lapham asks the young 
man to dine at his family’s summer home in Nahant, Massachusetts. On the ferry, Lapham 
claims that the human face does not “tell” anything: 
The astonishing thing to me is not what a face tells, but what it don’t tell. When you 
think of what a man is, or a woman is, and what most of ‘em have been through 
before they get to be thirty; it seems as if their experience would burn right through. 
But it don’t . . . I don’t suppose it was meant we should know what was in each 
other’s minds. It would take a man out of his own hands. As long as he’s in his own 
hands, there’s some hopes of his doing something with himself; but if a fellow has 
been found out . . . it’s pretty much all up with him. (Howells, Lapham 79-80) 
 
Amy Kaplan contrasts this moment with Whitman’s “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” (1856). I 
will address the specifics of her reading in a moment. First, I want to suggest that, along with 
Charles Baudelaire in Jameson’s account,5 Whitman first “discovered” the body’s intensities 
amid the urban crowd, providing a roadmap for its insertion into realist narration.  
The temporality Jameson associates with affect is very much in play in “Crossing 
Brooklyn Ferry.” The universal properties of the commute—the sense of being in between 
home and work, daydreaming while looking out onto the majestic city—allows Whitman not 
only to understand but to feel the same way as a future commuter: “It avails not, time nor 
place—distance avails not, / I am with you, you men and women of a generation, or ever so 
                                                      
5 See Jameson, Antinomies 32-34; and Modernist 228.  
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many generations hence, / Just as you feel when you look on the river and sky, so I felt / 
Just as any of you is one of a living crowd, I was one of a crowd” (Leaves 136). The commute 
is a bodily experience shared in an eternal present. The feeling of such an experience erupts 
on the surface, blurring the distinction between self and other: “Appearances, now or 
henceforth, indicate what you are, / You necessary film, continue to envelop the soul / 
About my body for me, and your body for you, be hung our divinest aromas” (Leaves 139).  
Lapham, meanwhile, finds it impossible to read the feelings of the people around 
him, which comes as a relief: “No, sir. I don’t want to know people through and through” 
(Howells, Lapham 80). The narrator then interrupts Lapham to assure his readers that “[t]he 
greater part of the crowd on board—and, of course, the boat was crowded—looked as if 
they might not only be easily but safely known” (80). The narrator begins codifying the kinds 
of people all around them, distancing himself from the crowd by deciphering what Jacques 
Rancière would call the “mute speech” of these bodies. What is in question, here, is whether 
“experience” can burn through to the surface, as it does in “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” (80). 
Unlike Lapham, the narrator answers, “yes,” but he strikes a very different note than 
Whitman, who feels at one with his fellow riders, present and future, as they bask in the 
urban landscape. Howells’s narrator typifies the experiences shining through these 
passengers: they are seeking fun or relief from city life because they are of the class of people 
who can afford to do so. Rancière claims that “mute speech” produces a form of 
symptomatic reading: the body “tells” of a time and place in history.6 Kaplan points out that 
in contrast with both Whitman, who first finds the crowd “enigmatic and threatening” but 
then ecstatically joins it, and Lapham, to whom “the crowd remains illegible,” Howells’s 
“narrator finds the crowd to be an open book, easily, safely, and monotonously known” (40, 
                                                      
6 As we will see in chapter 4, Wharton and her characters are experts in this kind of symptomatic reading.   
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41). A system of classification into which bodies and experiences can be safely placed wins 
out over the loss of self in affective transmission. 
Next, Lapham nervously calls attention to “the people thickly packed on the pier, 
and under strong restraint of locks and gates, to prevent them from rushing on board the 
boat and possessing her for the return trip before she had landed her Nantasket passengers” 
(81). The feeling experienced by the crowd, if it were named, would be “excitement” or 
“impatience,” but it is not named. Between the image of a “thickly packed” crowd and the 
restraints holding them back we are shown what group excitement looks like. Whitman 
utilizes a similar technique: “Be firm, rail over the river, to support those who lean idly, yet / 
haste with the hasting current” (Leaves 139). The palpable fear, in Lapham, is that this crowd 
will overtake the boat before it lands at the pier, thus overflowing the narrator’s classification 
system with the presence of unruly, unclassifiable bodies.  
As if to avoid the aesthetic and political dangers of the crowd, Howells has Lapham 
recognize his daughter, Penelope, standing amongst those threatening to overload the pier: 
“There’s my girl!” (81). If the crowd threatens the narrator’s classification system, Penelope 
restores it. From this moment forward, Penelope slowly moves to the forefront of Tom 
Corey’s consciousness (he’s in love with her). While Penelope moves to the forefront of 
novelistic attention as well, she does not become a main character but joins a crowded field 
of secondary characters giving shape to the rise and fall of Silas Lapham (Mrs. Lapham, 
Irene Lapham, the Coreys, Silas’s ex-partner Mr. Rogers, and his typist Miss Dewey).  
According to Jameson the “discovery” of affect around midcentury had a warping 
effect on character systems in the realist novel. In War and Peace (1865-1869), for example, 
the narrative becomes distracted by this or that minor character, which can only interrupt the 
unfolding of Tolstoy’s history of Russia between 1805 and 1812 and the entwined destiny of 
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his characters across that timeframe. By the time we get to Benito Pérez Galdós and George 
Eliot, secondary characters populate the space once occupied solely by the protagonist. 
Novels are no longer concerned with the destiny of heroic protagonists but instead focus on 
what other genres would consider minor, unimportant characters engaged in decidedly non-
heroic, quotidian situations. Following Erich Auerbach, Jameson calls the latter the realm of 
the everyday. Yet “the triumph of the everyday” is one side of a two-headed development in 
realism and bourgeois society alike, the other being “social equality” (Antinomies 109). 
Strangely, these are “two distinct and opposing trends or tendencies which miraculously 
complement each other” (108). One is left wondering: why are the everyday and social 
equality opposed and how do they then go about complementing each other?  
The answer to the first question, as one might expect, is that they exist on opposite 
sides of the named emotions-affect divide. The everyday is on the side of affect and it is thus 
in a strict sense un-narratable (Antinomies 142-143). Social equality is on the side of named 
emotions, along with destiny, telling, and narration. The answer to the second question (how 
do they complement each other?) is as follows: it is the fate of protagonists to “renounce 
their right to be protagonists of the novel and now cheerfully or with resignation accept their 
democratic future in the new world of secondary characters as such” (112). By submitting 
characters to this democratic destiny, social equality invests the everyday with a narrative and 
political arc that it otherwise lacks. Social equality is, in other words, an imaginary solution to 
a more fundamental tension, which on the literary level is between affect and named 
emotions but extends deeper for Jameson, to the disjuncture between existential reality and 
the totality of class relations in which we are all enmeshed.  
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Moving from the recognition of Penelope on the docks to Howells’s theory of 
realism more generally, we will notice that this genre opens the pages of literature to a class 
of people previously ignored by great literature:  
[We] invite the artist to the study and the appreciation of the common, and to the 
portrayal in every art of those finer and higher aspects which unite rather than sever 
humanity, if he would thrive in the new order of things. The talent that is robust 
enough to front the every-day world and catch the charm of its work-worn, care-
worn, brave, kindly face, need not fear the encounter, though it seems terrible to the 
sort nurtured in the superstition of the romantic, the bizarre, the heroic, the 
distinguished, as the things along worthy of painting or carving or writing. The arts 
must become democratic, and then we shall have the expression of America in art . . 
. (Howells, Selected 99) 
 
The American author must be “robust” enough to face the dangerous power of the 
everyday, where “care-worn” bodies reside. When it comes time to write, the everyday is 
made narratable by aligning it with the promises of democracy, confirming Jameson’s thesis.  
Kaplan traces this impulse to A Hazard of New Fortunes, the second novel mentioned 
by Storey as bearing out Jameson’s conclusions. Among other things, the novel is about a 
middle-aged couple, Basil and Isabel March, who move from Boston to New York City 
when the former is offered an opportunity to edit a literary magazine. The overly long and 
seemingly pointless description of their search for an apartment in New York, Kaplan 
argues, is a way to find and reify the line separating the subject of realist representation—the 
“knowable community” (47) of characters that visit each other in various Manhattan 
apartments—from the unreal, indescribable class strife going on “out there,” in the everyday 
lives of city people. This narrative solution is borrowed from Jacob Riis’s How the Other Half 
Lives (1890), which exposed the execrable living conditions of New York’s poor to bolster 
the importance of “middle-class domesticity” (46). To mark the need for such a distinction 
in novels, Kaplan argues, Howells registers the unpleasant bodily sensations that bubble up 
when “the other half” approaches: the search for an apartment “is undercut by the sensory 
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assault of the streets” (49). Once it is located, the line between genteel middle-class 
domesticity and “the other half”—between realist narration and the registration of affective 
states—must be policed constantly for the realist novel to exist as such. In those moments 
when “the other half” threatens to force its way back into the narrative, as when the 
Marches ride the elevated train (the El) and catch a glimpse of the everyday lives of people 
living in adjacent apartments, the line must reconstitute itself: “[the El] expands their 
perspective to otherwise inaccessible corners of urban life, and it violently dislocates what 
they see” (50). Kaplan qualifies Howells’s “democracy in literature” by pointing to the unruly 
bodies that are ignored in an “aesthetic of the common” that looks suspiciously like middle-
class domestic life: “realism does not jar readers with the shock of otherness, it provides a 
recognizable mirror of their own world” (23). In other words, social equality only 
complements the everyday when one definition of the common (the bourgeois knowable 
community) is smuggled in for the more jarring commonplaces of everyday urbanism.  
Applied to Howells, then, Jameson’s framework presents the Dean of American 
Letters as a genteel liberal who, like the titular heroine of his Annie Kilburn (1885), wants to 
help the poor but cannot stand their affective presence: “if she kept beyond the range of the 
powerful corporeal odour that enveloped them, she could experience the luxury of pity for 
them” (Howells, Novels 746-747). In his essay “Equality as the Basis of Good Society” 
(1895), Howells associates inequality with bad feelings: “If you meet an inferior or a superior, 
you are at once wretched . . . You spoil the joy of life for your inferior, just as your superior 
spoils the joy of life for you” (63-64). Žižek might call this the “theft of jouissance” by the 
Other. Jameson even theorizes that the feeling that the Other has stolen my jouissance “is at 
stake in class conflict and class struggle” (American 74). Howells finds that these feelings yield 
antagonisms between classes and equality within them, which carries overtones of Carl 
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Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction, the basis of Chantal Mouffe’s conception of social 
antagonism.7 “Inferiority and superiority were intolerable to men, and so they formed 
themselves into classes, that inside of these classes they might have the peace, the comfort, 
of equality and each kept himself to his own class for that reason” (Howells, “Equality” 64).  
Howells, we might conclude, represses the bodily existence of the Other to focus on 
equality within bourgeois circles. Indeed, in a now infamous 1886 Harper’s column, Howells 
asks American writers to ignore social ills, which are the raw materials of European realism: 
Whatever their deserts, very few American novelists have been led out to be shot, or 
finally exiled to the rigors of a winter at Duluth; one might make Herr Most the hero 
of a labor-question romance with perfect impunity; and in a land where journeymen 
carpenters and plumbers strike for four dollars a day the sum of hunger and cold is 
certainly very small, and the wrong from class to class is almost inappreciable. We 
invite our novelists, therefore, to concern themselves with the more smiling aspects 
of life, which are the more American, and seek the universal in the individual rather 
than in the social interests. (Selected 35) 
 
The timing of this column is odd to say the least. On May 4, 1886, an unknown assailant 
threw a bomb into a crowd in Chicago as police attempted to break up a peaceful rally 
related to an ongoing strike for an eight-hour workday. One officer died immediately, with 
seven more officers and four civilians perishing in the resulting scuffle. Seven anarchists 
were charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for inciting violence with their rhetoric. 
Howells became interested in the case in September. After the Supreme Court denied later 
appeals, Howells wrote a letter published in the New York Tribune (November, 1886), hoping 
to start a petition for clemency. The effort failed and Howells was roundly criticized for his 
position.8 Yet, in this column written between the riot and his public defense of the 
anarchists, Howells suggests that class warfare is all but nonexistent on American soil. Russ 
Castronovo notes Howells’s head-scratching reference to the German anarchist Johann 
                                                      
7 See Mouffe, Democratic Paradox 36-57.  
8 See Cady, Realist 70-73.  
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Most (“Herr Most”), whose recipe-book for homemade bombs, The Science of Revolutionary 
Warfare (1885), would become evidence in the trials.9 When Howells edited the “smiling 
aspects” passage for Criticism and Fiction (1891), he removed Most’s name but left his 
assessment of American happiness. Why and to what end?  
As one will have guessed, the “smiling aspects of life” are intimately related to social 
equality. While inequality feels bad because the Other has stolen my joy, equality “is the only 
social joy, the only comfort” (Howells, “Equality” 63). On its own, “joy” could be mistaken 
for a named emotion. But it is best labeled an affect for two reasons. First, it is a group 
feeling (“social joy”) that exceeds and even muddles the individuated named emotion, “joy.” 
Second, this state is best described not by naming it but by registering its difference from the 
negative feelings on the other end of the spectrum, those associated with inequality.10 
Howells’s example of the social joy in equality is the bourgeois dinner party, which 
would again seem to confirm the Jameson/Kaplan position. No guest is inherently above 
another, including the host. The comparison to minor characters and protagonists sharing 
pages in a novel is striking: “If you are asked to a house, the theory is that you are the equal 
of every person you meet there, and if you behave otherwise, you are vulgar” (63). Of 
course, the bad feelings associated with inequality are nowhere to be found: “good society, 
which always hates a scene, instinctively does its best to ignore inequality” (64). Howells, 
though, admits that bourgeois equality is “an effect of equality, and not equality itself, or 
equality merely for the moment. Perhaps it is because we know society to be merely a make-
believe in its equality that so many society people regard a real equality as impossible, and are 
                                                      
9 See Castronovo 69. 
10 Jameson’s affect is registered in the change of moods, from the low to the high or vice versa (Antinomies 42). 
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content to remain in the make-believe” (64, emphasis mine). Recognizing bourgeois social 
equality to be a mere pretense, Howells wants to make equality “real” again.  
Equality will become “real” when “good society” spreads to the whole world, 
eradicating inequality (67). The utopian fantasy of universal equality appears to distance 
Howells from Schmitt, Mouffe, Žižek, and Jameson, for whom there will never be a state 
where Self and Other stop forming into opposing camps.11 More in line with the nationalists 
and collectivists of his era (led by Edward Bellamy and Laurence Gronlund, respectively), 
Howells believed that capitalist society was developing toward greater social equality via the 
collective ownership of wealth.12 In practice, though—and this is something we must wait to 
confirm in the analysis of specific texts—Howells learns a lesson hinted at in his description 
of the dinner party: “real” equality is always hopelessly local and temporary. “Real” equality 
is a utopia of the here-and-now, one that is liable to disappear at any moment.  
Outside the home, where can one find a group that momentarily feels the social joy 
of human equality? What other space presupposes the equality of everybody therein, 
allowing for the “smiling aspects of life” to take hold? If affect finds its home in the urban 
everyday, then Howells realized that public transportation is not only the time of the 
everyday (the commute) but the perfect space for the positive feelings associated with 
equality. As Whitman shows, it is but one small step from a cautious, distanced awareness of 
all the socially-constructed differences in the crowd—where the narrator of Lapham stops—
to an exuberance at the loss of personal identity that comes with the mass transport of 
bodies. Whitman, however, believed that the commute between Brooklyn and New York 
would look the same “[f]ifty years hence” (Leaves 136). Commuter ferries became outmoded 
                                                      
11 This is a surprising admission for Jameson, made in American Utopia (2016). See pp. 66-77.  
12 See Howells’s positive review of Laurence Gronlund’s Co-Operative Commonwealth (1884) in Selected 86-89. 
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by the opening of the Brooklyn Bridge in 1883, which had its own cable car. Howells 
understood that Whitman’s ode to public transportation had to be updated. Thus, the ferry 
sequence in Lapham is only the beginning of a career-long engagement with public 
transportation and its relationship to the shared feelings of the urban crowd.  
We have already come across a later point in this engagement, when Basil March 
daydreams on the El in Hazard. Here, I argue, Howells explodes the limits of his own 
realism by describing the everyday experience of riding the El as “gay,” a term he repeats so 
much that it empties language of its power to name bodily states. The missing link, both in 
Howells’s novelistic development and the development of transportation technologies, is the 
horse-car, which, we will see, is the site of a full-blown theory of affective entanglement in 
The Minister’s Charge (1886), a Boston-based novel that borrows characters from Lapham.  
By following the historical transformation from ferry to elevated transit as it unfolds 
across Howells’s novels, we can uncover a representation of positive bodily feeling that shows 
rather than tells of situational equality. Yet the un-smiling aspects of American life, given 
narrative figuration as the crowd of striking streetcar workers in Hazard, haunt Howells’s 
project like a bad dream. The strike is framed in terms of affect—the phrase “feel like 
populace” comes from this section of the novel (Hazard 360)—but it inspires decidedly 
negative bodily feelings Howells associates with inequality or a feeling of political impotence 
best approximated as melancholia. Since affect exists along a continuum, the feeling that the 
Other has stolen my joy and the related torpor of melancholia are complexly tied to 
Howells’s search for shared joy in equality on public transportation. Jameson is thus right to 
say that the everyday and social equality complement each other; the problem is that he only 
focuses on one direction this relationship can go. It all depends on which end of the 
affective spectrum we are dealing with. Faced with the bodily feelings evoked by signs of 
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inequality (revulsion or melancholia), Howells mobilizes the equality of the drawing room as 
an ideological containment strategy (the Jameson/Kaplan thesis). Moving in the other 
direction, public transportation complements the ideal of equality, making it “real” by 
showing (rather than telling of) strangers feeling “gay” in a state of bodily equality.  
II. The Boston Horse-Car and the Theory of Affective Contagion 
In The Rise of Silas Lapham and The Minister’s Charge, Reverend David Sewell, a minor 
character in the former and the titular co-lead lead in the latter, has the distinct honor of 
giving voice to two doctrines that will remain central to the realist project that Howells 
began promoting in the pages of Harper’s in 1886. On its own, this is enough to confirm 
Jameson’s contention, which follows Alex Woloch’s The One Versus the Many (2003), that in 
the great realist novels anybody has the right to become a protagonist. Sewell establishes his 
credentials in Lapham by providing a timely piece of advice. Visited by relative strangers, Silas 
and Persis Lapham, Sewell is asked if their daughter Penelope should give up on love 
because the family once thought the man in question (Tom Corey) preferred her sister. He 
responds with advice that they and, it turns out, Howells’s readers, will not forget: “One 
suffer instead of three, if none is to blame? . . . That’s sense, and that’s justice. It’s the 
economy of pain which naturally suggests itself, and which would insist upon itself, if we 
were not all perverted by traditions which are the figment of the shallowest sentimentality” 
(Howells, Lapham 241). The sentimental novel, for both Sewell and Howells, teaches an 
imperative duty of self-sacrifice that only exists in its pages: “The novelists might be the 
greatest possible help to us if they painted life as it is, and human feelings in their true 
proportion and relation, but for the most part they have been and are altogether noxious” 
(Lapham 197). Howells implicitly holds up the realist novel as the form that can display the 
feelings, motives, and movements of ordinary people with social-scientific exactitude. 
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While Sewell plays the unlikely hero as a secondary character in Lapham, he occupies 
a morally dubious role as a co-lead, next to his “charge,” in The Minister’s Charge. After 
praising a young man’s bad poems while on a country vacation, Sewell feels responsible 
when this young man, Lemuel Barker, comes to Boston in search of prospective publishers. 
After leaving the dream of writing behind, Barker is too ashamed and too broke to go home. 
He goes through the crucible of homelessness, jail, the poor-house, and manual labor, 
returning home a broken man. Weaving in and out of Barker’s life throughout this process, 
Sewell obsesses over his moral and economic obligations to the boy. Reverend Sewell 
ultimately gives a stirring sermon on the topic “Complicity” with his “charge” in mind: “he 
preached the old Christ-humanity . . . and enforced again the lesson that no one for good or 
for evil, for sorrow or joy, for sickness or health, stood apart from his fellows, but each was 
bound to the highest and the lowest by ties that centered in the hand of God” (Howells, 
Novels 309).  
Wai Chee Dimock has argued that “complicity” is a moral and formal problem for 
the realist novel insofar as it awakens us to the unthinkable scale of human interconnection 
in urban-industrial society. Implicitly referencing Robert Wiebe’s influential thesis, that the 
nineteenth century saw a transformation from “island communities” to a vast national 
network answerable to urban-industrial supply and demand,13 Dimock writes:  
As local livelihood became tied to distant events—to the Wall Street crash of 1873, 
for instance, or the bitter railroad strikes of 1877—local welfare also seemed bound 
up with the welfare of strangers, strangers unknown, unloved, unconscionably 
numerous. Nineteenth-century Americans, in short, had to adapt not only to an 
expanded geographical universe but also, even more crucially, to an expanded causal 
universe, in which human agency, social relations, and moral responsibility all had to 
be redefined. (“Economy” 102) 
 
                                                      
13 See Wiebe xii-xiv.  
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Although Dimock focuses on transcontinental railways and big business, realist and 
naturalist writers often registered the interconnection of America by looking to new urban 
structures that were seen to embody this process, such as the stunning vertical growth of 
skyscrapers (the home of big business)14 or the horizontal extension of public transportation 
(city-specific versions of the many-tentacled “octopus” that is the national railroad system).15  
Howells preferred the latter image: “There’s nothing like having railroads and 
steamboats transact your plot for you” (qtd. in Goodman and Dawson 74). In The Minister’s 
Charge, Barker learns the contours of Boston and meets the characters that will be central to 
his urban Bildung by following the horse-car lines, taking note of their stopping-points and 
thus creating a cognitive map of the city.16 In Hazard, Boston transplants Basil and Isabel 
March explore New York City by riding the El, sometimes just to see how far they could 
take them (something the poet George Oppen and his wife would later do using the next 
generation of rapid transit, the subway).17 Between 1886 and 1890, Minister’s Charge and 
Hazard, there is a discernible shift from Boston to New York as the big city that Howells’s 
protagonists must learn to map (along with his readers) as well as a transformation in public 
transportation technology, from ground-level tracks navigated by horses to steam-powered 
locomotives rumbling along huge, elevated steel structures. Eventually, the growing city 
could no longer rely on such a large, loud, slow, clumsy means of public transport, going 
                                                      
14 The banker in the bottom floor of Henry Blake Fuller’s fictional skyscraper in The Cliff-Dwellers (1893) has 
“business interests spread all over the city, the state, the West, even the Far West, and this vast web must have 
a center. That center was on the lower floor of the Clifton” (80).  
15 Frank Norris’s The Octopus (1901) is built around the popular image of a railroad monopoly as a giant octopus 
sucking life from various places across the country. María Ruiz De Burton, in The Squatter and the Don (1885), 
offers a more sanguine assessment of the Texas and Pacific Railway—which promised to unite the South and 
the West, literally and symbolically—while also lambasting the monopolistic practices of Southern California 
railroads. See Thomas 208-242.  
16 See chapter 2 for James’s version of cognitive mapping in Boston. 
17 In her autobiography, Mary Oppen writes: “We didn’t yet know the subway system, and we got off at 
stations at random just to see what was above ground. Once we stuck our heads out into a cemetery, another 
time we were on clay fields with standing pools of water, and once we were among gigantic identical apartment 
buildings in the Bronx, block after block” (89).  
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below ground instead of above it.18 “It was technological innovations,” Gunther Barth 
writes, “from horsecar to subway, rather than architectural forms, that unified the space of 
the modern city” (28). Howells would agree: technological developments in public 
transportation spurred the creation of the modern city, with New York as its capital. After 
all, there is an instructive difference between Barker’s piecemeal approach to mapping the 
city using the small but crowded terrain of Boston’s horse-car lines and the Marches riding 
New York’s elevated lines, which were run by two private companies (the New York 
Elevated Company and the Metropolitan Railroad Company). In this way, Howells’s novels 
support a city-specific version of Wiebe’s narrative: the nineteenth-century city saw the move 
from “island communities” (isolated neighborhoods) to a fully incorporated civic system.  
As Dimock points out, there is a dark side to this triumphalist account whereby 
machines and/or buildings evoke a sense of urban interconnection: “The nineteenth century, 
an age of rapid industrial expansion, was also an age of industrial poverty and urban slums, 
haunted both by the growing proximity and visibility of human suffering and by the 
perception that this suffering was not just an isolated phenomenon but part of a 
symptomatic network” (“Economy” 101). If we are all tangled up in a city’s rapid transit 
system, then everyone is responsible for the suffering of fellow city people. Complicity is a 
problem insofar as it threatens to stretch the bounds of moral responsibility beyond the 
limits typically respected by novelistic representation; thus, it requires a narrative solution: 
the economy of pain, figured by Sewell as a moral limited liability that reduces the number of 
people for whom one is responsible. “Even within the space of these two novels [Lapham 
and Charge],” Dimock writes, “a double pattern begins to emerge: a problem and a solution, 
something that produces moral entanglements and something that releases those 
                                                      
18 For a fuller historical overview of public transportation technologies see Cheape 21-39; and Sante 46-54. 
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entanglements” (“Economy” 103). This logic has a corollary in the humanitarian thinking of 
the day, which posited “that different people might feel [pain] differently” (read: less) than 
“the more civilized races” (105). Isabel March states this position clearly: “I don’t believe 
there’s any real suffering . . . among those people [the urban poor]; that is, it would be 
suffering from our point of view, but they’ve been used to it all their lives, and they don’t 
feel the discomfort so much” (Howells, Hazard 60). Annie Kilburn, meanwhile, “discovered 
what must always astonish the inquirer below the pretentious surface of our democracy—an 
indifference and incredulity concerning the feelings of people of lower station” (Howells, 
Novels 752). With complicity, Howells recognizes moral complicity—“[w]e are all bound 
together,” Annie Kilburn asserts (792)—but with the economy of pain he “tries to minimize 
not only suffering but also the obligations that suffering entails” (Dimock, “Economy” 103).  
In the end, Dimock’s wide-ranging essay on the cognitive limits of sympathy from 
the nineteenth century to today confirms Kaplan’s account of Howells: his characters are 
plucked from the white middle class while the suffering underclass is effectively banished 
from novelistic existence. Dimock’s complementary forces can also be transcoded as 
Jameson’s affect and named emotions. Sewell’s economy of pain is part of a system of 
named emotions: “human feelings” must be presented in their “true proportion and 
relation” (Howells, Lapham 197). While feelings and emotions are different categories, the 
point here is that they are proportioned out and named.19 Defined this way, though, Sewell’s 
doctrine of complicity follows the same logic. When Sewell delivers his sermon, the word 
“complicity” names the guilt he feels about Barker’s ever-degrading moral and physical 
condition in Boston and, beyond that, about the suffering working poor (“It was largely 
supposed that Sewell’s sermon referred indirectly to [a] telegraphers’ strike”) (Howells, Novels 
                                                      
19 Jameson distinguishes between emotions and feelings, the latter term belonging to affect (Antinomies 31-32).  
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308). Widespread suffering is an affective experience insofar as it explodes the possibilities of 
narration, but when complicity is named as guilt it can be resolved by the economy of pain, 
which tries to limit this (named) emotion by blocking out the presence of “the other half.”  
In one sense, then, Dimock is right: there is no real development between Howells’s 
two theories, only self-cancelling, downsizing, economizing. Dimock’s complementary 
process requires a response from the realm of affect if Howells’s work can be said to 
develop at all. Bodily suffering is no help, since its very existence inspires the named feeling 
of complicity (guilt) and is thus readily made complementary to the bourgeois character 
system. John Cyril Barton has introduced a polyvocal theory of complicity that can offset the 
theory of a flawed character like Reverend Sewell. The line Dimock attaches to Sewell’s 
sermon on complicity—“everybody’s mixed up with everybody else” (qtd. in “Economy” 
102)—is, in fact, spoken by a horse-car conductor in The Minister’s Charge (Howells, Novels 
126). Sewell uses the word “tangled” in what is otherwise the exact same line (308). Barton 
suggests that the conductor is a privileged spokesperson for complicity in realism because he 
is the kind of everyday character Howells wants to introduce to the reading public. 
The horse-car conductor, in fact, provides a theory of complicity that introduces 
bodily feelings thus far shut out of the realist novel: 
It’s a pretty queer kind of a world, anyway, the way everybody’s mixed up with 
everybody else. What’s the reason, if a man wants to steal, he can’t steal and suffer 
for it himself, without throwin’ the shame and the blame on a lot more people that 
never thought o’ stealin’? I don’t notice much when a fellow sets out to do right that 
folks think everybody else is on the square. No, sir, they don’t seem to consider that 
kind of complaint so catching. Now. You take another thing: A woman goes round 
with the scarlet fever in her clothes and a whole carful of people take it home to their 
children; but let a nice young girl get in, fresh as an apple, and a perfect daisy for 
wholesomeness every way, and she don’t give it to a single soul on board. (126) 
 
It might not seem like the conductor adds anything new to the doctrine of complicity. His 
sense that a thief shames not only himself but the whole community is precisely the lesson 
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that the minister will later teach (309). The conductor also makes a related point that Sewell 
will later echo: why can’t a man’s good deed then reflect positively on the community?  
It is the conductor’s last point that strikes a different note. A speech that begins as a 
morality tale fit for the pulpit becomes, by the end, a question of bodily contamination: why 
is it that scarlet fever can be passed so easily from passenger to passenger but not a girl’s 
wholesomeness? Wholesomeness, here, does not signify moral goodness but a health-giving 
property, which makes scarlet fever the perfect inverse example: both are contagious but one 
has the potential to kill while the other has the potential to strengthen. The most obvious 
difference between Sewell and the conductor, then, is that the former is pessimistic about 
the current state of urban-industrial society but imagines a utopian transformation brought 
on by the followers of Christ; the latter wonders why a girl’s wholesomeness does not infect 
people in the here-and-now. If Sewell’s conception of complicity evokes the image of urban 
transit connecting disparate people in a single system, then the conductor offers a micro-
level approach to the same phenomenon, without the barriers put up by the system of 
named emotions (guilt) and hence language itself: he longs for a time-place where strangers 
feel good because they are equally in this veritable web of urban life together.  
Of course, scarlet fever does infect those on the train car, while the girl’s 
wholesomeness does not. We will return to this sense of failure shortly. To illustrate what 
contagious wholesomeness might look like in practice, though, we can quote from one of 
Howells’s favorite authors, Tolstoy, as he describes the pregnant Lise at the beginning of 
War and Peace: “Everyone brightened at the sight of this pretty young woman . . . Old men 
and dull dispirited young ones who looked at her, after being in her company and talking to 
her a little while, felt as if they too were becoming, like her, full of life and health” (qtd. in 
Jameson, Antinomies 92). While affect is often registered through a single character’s body as 
 
 72 
s/he moves through the world, in this passage there is an “affective contagion, a glowing 
enlargement of affect well beyond the natural limits and boundaries of the individual 
subject” (Jameson, Antinomies 92). The conductor’s wish for contagious wholesomeness 
belongs to the “interpersonal” (93) version of affect. Wholesomeness is not this girl’s unique 
moral trait in a sinful world; rather, it is a bodily state defined by its transmissibility.  
The health-giving property hinted at with the word “wholesome” therefore 
overcomes the typical signification of the word, serving instead as the bodily marker of the 
feeling of urban interconnection that is given narrative figuration in/as the public 
transportation system. While wholesomeness ultimately resists categorization, the system of 
named emotions returns at the end of The Minister’s Charge to make sense of this feeling. For 
the reader, Sewell’s sermon on complicity names the feeling of urban interconnection first 
expressed by the conductor, replicating almost the exact same line the conductor fed Barker, 
with only the verb changed. Barton is right to say that this change matters greatly: “On the 
one hand, the conductor’s ‘mixed up’ invokes a metaphor of partnership, a metaphor of 
social intermixing . . . in which individuals become part of a whole yet retain their discreet 
identities . . . Sewell's ‘tangled up,’ on the other hand, calls to mind a metaphor of 
incorporation, a textual metaphor in which separate identities are interwoven to form a 
single, homogeneous fabric or corporate identity” (182). I will argue the opposite point, 
however: it is Sewell who makes room for the self/other distinction by drawing on moral 
categories (good/evil) and named emotions (guilt), which is what allows Howells’s character 
systems to be foregrounded against “the other half.” The horse-car conductor wants to 
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explode the self/other distinction, and hence embrace radical social equality and unity, with a 
transmissible feeling that serves as a metaphorical reference to urban interconnection.20  
In other words, the conductor’s version of complicity, were it to succeed, would feel 
like equality; or, rather, it would show what equality feels like. After all, as Howells writes in 
Suburban Sketches (1871)—a travelogue about Cambridge, Massachusetts—the Boston horse-
car “suffer[s] no . . . inequality”: “The people who are thus indecorously huddled and 
jammed together, without regard to age or sex, otherwise lead lives of at least comfort, and a 
good half of them cherish themselves in every physical way with unparalleled zeal” (104, 
112). This is a moment of exception in which the rampant individualism of modern 
American culture is checked by the state of bodily equality required by the small size and 
high occupancy of the horse-cars. Howells goes so far as to claim that “when art becomes 
truly national the overloaded horse-car will be celebrated in painting and sculpture” (113). 
There is an element of humor in the mixing of high art and low, everyday subject matter. At 
the same time, Howells’s description of the crowded horse-car limns his rejoinder, in the 
pages of Harper’s, to Matthew Arnold’s disparaging claim that American society lacks 
“distinction”: “If we have really got rid of distinction of the sort he seems to prize, we have 
made a great advance on the lines of our fundamental principles” (Selected 95). “One of the 
truths which Americans have always held to be self-evident,” he explains, “was that a man, if 
he was honest, was not only privileged, but was in duty bound, to look other men in the 
face, with eyes as nearly upon the same level as congenital differences would allow” (95). 
Natural differences cannot be avoided but social distinctions are artificial and contrary to 
democracy. “The fear with most Americans,” he goes on, “has been that our social structure 
                                                      
20 According to Laclau and Mouffe (111), all forms of equivalence disrupt the system of differences in which 
we are placed, which is what metaphor does on a linguistic level and antagonism does on a political level. 
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was not responsive to our political ideal”; he then lists, in Jamesian fashion, where America 
comes up short: “we cannot be particularly proud of our legislatures and administrations; the 
relations of capital and labor in our free democracy are about as full of violence as those in 
any European monarchy; we have wasted the public lands which we won largely by force 
and fraud, and we are the prey of many vast and corrupting monopolies” (95).  
If Arnold were right about the lack of distinction in America, Howells reasons, then 
“democracy has subtly but surely done its work; our professions of belief in equality have 
had their effect in our life” (96). The horse-car, at least, offers a time-place where bodies are 
packed so tightly that cultural distinctions are erased and equality prevails. Elias Canetti 
makes a similar point in Crowds and Power (1960). Normally, social life is defined by 
distinctions of rank, status, and property, but in dense crowds “distinctions are thrown off 
and all feel equal”—a feeling he describes as “so desired and so happy” (18). Jodi Dean’s 
gloss on Canetti’s work helps us perceive that this is a moment in which the theft of 
enjoyment Howells associates with inequality is momentarily eclipsed: “Canetti gives us the 
crowd as a strange attractor of jouissance, a figure of collective enjoyment,” which Dean also 
names “affective pull of the crowd” (“Dual Power” 115, 113). She also distances this from 
the formal “bourgeois equality” attacked by the Marxian tradition (113). Crowd equality is the 
real thing. “All . . . theories of equality ultimately derive their energy from the actual 
experience of equality familiar to anyone who has been part of a crowd” (Canetti 29).  
Yet, in Suburban Sketches, the shared feeling or affect that arises from the bodily 
equality on the horse car is hardly the relieving situation Canetti and Dean describe: “The 
horse-car . . . reduces us all to the same level of melancholy” (104). Melancholia, Jameson 
points out, is the sine qua none of affect; but instead of absolutizing it as such he suggests that 
“melancholy stand[s] . . . in an imperceptible relationship with its more vulgar opposite 
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number, euphoria” (Antinomies 72). Euphoria was the expected response to crowd equality 
but instead we find the affective scale stuck around melancholia, somewhere between 
revulsion, envy, and euphoria. Recalling the torpor and antisocial behavior associated with 
melancholia, Howells comments on the “mystery of our strength as a nation and our 
weakness as a public” (Suburban 114). “Weakness as a public” signifies the crowd’s inability 
to come together in a manner befitting the democratic ideals that its tangled bodies evoke. 
This is how we can read the conductor’s lament: we are too sad to notice the young girl’s 
wholesomeness, let alone share in it. Indeed, Howells sounds like a combination of the 
horse-car conductor and Tolstoy when he opines about “the frequent presence of those 
lovely young girls in which Boston and the suburban towns abound and who . . . would 
brighten even the horse-car if fresh young looks and gay and brilliant costumes could do so 
much” (Suburban 105). What would it take to brighten up a melancholic crowd?  
Instead of telling us the answer, Howells shows us an example:  
The silencing influence is quite successfully resisted by none but the tipsy people 
who occasionally ride out with us, and call up a smile, sad as a gleam of winter 
sunshine, to our faces by their artless prattle. I remember one eventful afternoon that 
we were all but moved to laughter by the gayeties of such a one, who, even after he 
had ceased to talk, continued to amuse us by falling asleep, and reposing himself 
against the shoulder of the lady next him. Perhaps it is in acknowledgment of the 
agreeable variety they contribute to horse-car life, that the conductor treats his 
inebriate passengers with such unfailing tenderness and forbearance. (99-100) 
 
There is a cause (the drunk) behind this change in group feeling but it is far less important 
than the process of turning melancholic silence into shared joy in this temporary state of 
equality. A successful democratic crowd, then, shares momentary joy in the lack of 
distinction on the horse-car, punctuating long periods of melancholic silence.   
For the same reason, melancholy is not a permanent response to situational equality 
but rather a contingent feature that depends not just on the crowd but on the observer’s 
mood. In The Minister’s Charge, Lemuel Barker counters “the black pessimism of the 
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conductor” with characteristic optimism: “Maybe the right thing makes us feel good in some 
way we don’t know of” (Howells, Novels 126). If affect escapes language, then perhaps we 
could pick up the girl’s wholesomeness without even realizing it. The conductor responds: 
“Well, I don’t want to feel good in some way I don’t know of, myself” (126). Barker 
begrudgingly accepts this logic and I think Howells does, too: there must be some register of 
affective contagion, otherwise we cannot speak of a democratic public being formed around 
the state of bodily equality on the horse-car. Thus, I want to suggest that Howells lauds 
Barker’s optimism at the same time as he concedes the conductor’s point: realist authors and 
readers should be on the lookout for those (relatively rare) moments when a crowd sloughs 
off melancholic silence and revels in the “social joy” of equality (Howells, “Equality” 63).   
In Suburban Sketches, the conductor facilitates the momentary good mood of his 
passengers. In The Minister’s Charge, Howells probes the problems with this example. At the 
end of the novel, Barker becomes a horse-car conductor to support his sickly fiancée, 
introducing class differences to the relatively smiling picture of crowd equality: 
He entered upon his duties the next morning, under the instruction of an old 
conductor, who said “Hain’t I seen you som’eres before?” and he worked all day, 
taking money and tickets, registering fares, helping ladies on and off the car, and 
monotonously journeying back and forth over his route . . . At nightfall, after two 
half-hour respites for dinner and tea, he was so tired that he could hardly stand. 
(Novels 298) 
 
To confirm that this working-class lifestyle is not for Barker, Howells has him become 
injured on the job (he is kicked by one of the horses) and sent back to the countryside. The 
lesson is clear but unnerving: to turn pessimism to optimism on the horse-car, one would 
need to bracket all signs of lurking class differences and occupational hierarchies.  
Howells’s auto-critique of the democratic crowd allows us to see that someone or 
some group is necessarily excluded when the crowd achieves bodily equality on the train 
car—whether that be the conductor or the people who simply cannot afford this means of 
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transportation (at the beginning of Minister’s Charge Barker fits the latter category). There is 
also the inevitable return of hierarchies and inequalities when members of the crowd arrive 
at the office or return home.21 In comparison to the equality of the drawing room, the train 
car is more inclusive, and thus its equality more “real,” but it is still an exclusive, temporary 
time-place. This is Schmitt’s lesson in antagonism for liberal universalism: equality means 
that somebody, some group (Rancière would call it the “part with no part”) does not count 
as equal. This is a tough lesson to swallow, which explains why Howells is as pessimistic as 
the conductor: there will never be “real” equality that encompasses everybody; a line is 
always drawn between those who get to count as equal and those who do not.  
Around the publication of Minister’s Charge, Howells was beset by melancholia and 
liberal guilt. At this point in his career, that is, the complementary pair of complicity (a 
named emotion) and melancholy (an affect) replaced the play-equality of the knowable 
community, which had been enjoyed only when the economy of pain reduced the awareness 
of suffering and eased guilt. In other words, the economy of pain stopped functioning 
properly and excessive guilt in the face of mass suffering became matched with melancholic 
resignation. This stems from Howells’s unsuccessful defense of the Haymarket anarchists in 
the fall of 1886 and the death of his eldest daughter, Winifred, in the spring of 1888.22  
III. Melancholia and Liberal Guilt: An Interlude 
After four of the so-called Haymarket rioters were hanged on November 11, 1886 
Howells penned an editorial attacking “the whole nation” for openly or tacitly supporting 
the state-sanctioned murder of these men “for their opinions’ sake” (qtd. in Cady, Realist 
                                                      
21 This is true of Canetti’s crowd as well: “the people who suddenly feel equal have not really become equal; nor 
will they feel equal for ever. They return to their separate houses, they lie down on their own beds, they keep 
their possessions and their names” (Canetti 18). 
22 On Winifred Howells’ illness, see Cady, Realist 96. 
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74).23 Michael Anesko notes that the doctrine of complicity took on more of a political role 
in Howells’s writing around this time (196). In Sewellian fashion, complicity meant that all 
Americans were guilty of letting four men be sent to death by the state for their opinions. 
Complicity speaks to Howells’s liberal guilt, an often remarked-upon aspect of his persona.24  
Howells was also deeply melancholic for personal reasons. In a famous October 
1888 letter to Henry James, written one month before he placed Winifred in the care of Dr. 
Weir (of the notorious “rest cure”) as a last resort, Howells writes: “I should hardly like to 
trust pen and ink with all the audacity of my social ideas; but after fifty years of optimistic 
content with ‘civilization’ and its ability to come out all right in the end, I now abhor it, and 
feel that it is coming out all wrong in the end, unless it bases itself anew on a real equality” 
(Anesko 272). His earlier call to look at the “smiling aspects of life” has turned to outright 
despair. Howells does reference an escape that appears superficially radical: society would 
have to “bas[e] itself anew on a real equality.” But then Howells offers a resigned critique of 
himself for perpetuating social distinctions: “Meantime I wear a fur-lined overcoat, and live 
in all the luxury my money can buy” (272). We can relate this to Wendy Brown’s “left 
melancholy,” a melancholic attachment to socialist ideals stripped of a belief in true change. 
In his book on the intersection of American realism and liberalism, Phillip Barrish compares 
left melancholy and liberal guilt: “Suffering from liberal guilt or left melancholy, one feels 
hopelessly implicated in mechanisms of violence, injustice, and exploitation” (Liberal 11).  
How does Howells break from the melancholic despair and guilt-ridden language of 
the liberal bourgeoisie? One possible response has already been covered: the economy of 
pain limits his and his readers’ cognitive awareness of the vast suffering going on “out there” 
                                                      
23 Cady’s The Realist at War (1958) remains the best source for the facts surrounding Howells’s involvement in 
the Haymarket affair. He provides an inscription of the unsent letter to the New York Tribune. See 69-80.  
24 See Bramen 93. 
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and their structural role in maintaining it. But we are deep in a search for aesthetic and 
political alternatives to the economy of pain. Another answer is hidden in the way Howells 
re-edited the “smiling aspects” passage in 1891 for publication in Criticism and Fiction: “the 
wrong from class to class has been almost inappreciable, though this is changing for the worst. Our 
novelists, therefore, concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of life” (Selected 336, 
emphasis mine). More so than before, the passage is a challenge for writers to locate the 
utopian moments of everyday urbanism. If melancholic resignation and liberal guilt are ever-
present feelings and emotions (respectively) in a world where class struggle is only 
deepening, the key is to locate moments when crowd feelings arrive at the “smiling” end of 
the affective spectrum. This is different from the outright ignorance of the Other’s suffering 
prescribed by the economy of pain. Class (and other) antagonisms are considered but not in 
a way that will prevent the crowd from enjoying momentary equality. We can think of this 
new attitude alongside Mouffe’s attempt to liberalize Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction: 
conceding that all claims to equality are necessarily local and delimiting, she nonetheless calls 
for the continual inclusion of new subjects into the democratic circle of equals.25  
Howells calls for novelists to enjoy an instance of everyday equality outside the 
drawing room instead of feeling melancholic or expressing guilt about its limits. In Suburban 
Sketches and The Minister’s Charge Boston’s horse-car system represents the best opportunity 
for a crowd to congeal around a shared feeling, even if instances of this were rare if not 
completely foreclosed. By the time he wrote Hazard, Howells had moved from Boston to 
New York and now viewed the latter as the laboratory for American democracy-in-action. 
However, New York’s horse-car system was not only outmoded by the 1890s, it was steeped 
in labor struggles, as we will see. Howells looks to the next generation of public 
                                                      
25 See Mouffe, Democratic Paradox 44-45. 
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transportation, the El, for a mode of representation that can burst beyond the constricting 
categories of his own earlier realist project (an economy of pain that assuages guilt while 
remaining stuck in the realm of named emotions). The fact that it is the El, and not the 
horse-car, that unlocks such a possibility can be explained by Howells’s willingness to adapt 
to the times: it represents the next step in bringing city people into a single, unified system 
and thus offers an unprecedented chance for riders to feel joy in being mixed together with 
others, living completely in the moment where one can be temporarily free of liberal guilt 
and melancholic sadness. Luc Sante even describes the El in Howellsian terms: “The El was 
democratic in a way that no other means of transport had been: higher-priced luxury 
streetcars ran on Third Avenue for many years, and for a while the Sixth Avenue surface line 
even maintained Jim Crow wagons. The El mixed everybody up together” (53).  
To understand how this works, we need to pay attention to the different kinds of 
spaces taking up narrative attention in this loose, baggy novel. In his essay on the 
“chronotope” (time-space) in the novel, Mikhail Bakhtin suggests that there are three “new 
space[s]” through which events run to shape the narrative of the nineteenth-century 
European realist novel: “the space of parlors and salons” (where “webs of intrigue are spun, 
denouements occur and finally—this is where dialogues happen, something that acquires 
extraordinary importance in the novel, revealing the character, ‘ideas’ and ‘passions’ of the 
heroes”); the provincial town (“the locus for cyclical everyday time. Here there are no 
events, only ‘doings’ that constantly repeat themselves . . . It is a viscous and sticky time that 
drags itself slowly through space”); and, finally, the chronotope of the threshold (“the time 
and place of crisis, the instantaneous moment when fates are changed forever, people fall or 
rise”) (246, 247, 248). Howells’s Hazard offers a unique take on each of these three 
chronotopes: the newspaper office serves as a literary salon where characters meet, engage in 
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agonistic debate, and make decisions about one another’s fate; the El becomes the time-
space of the everyday, when/where nothing happens to advance the plot; and finally, the 
horse-car strike is the climax of the novel, the antagonistic limit beyond which the 
characters’ lives are changed forever. Before approaching the distinction between the El and 
the horse-car, though, we need to detail why the chronotope of the parlor is ineffective in its 
role at the aesthetic and political center of the novel and hence why two other peripheral 
spaces become testing-grounds for a new development in American literary realism. 
With Hazard, Howells makes evident the aesthetic and political qualities that will 
infuse these chronotopes when deployed by the rest of the realists in this study. Antagonism, 
for instance, is felt on a threshold: existing in the background for most of the novel, or in 
the foreground as a symptom of violence past and future (Lindau’s hand), antagonistic urban 
violence suddenly becomes unleashed in its full capacity and warps the text to the point 
where a “strategy of containment” (Kaplan 10) is needed to achieve aesthetic closure (a 
process bound for failure since there can be no final closure). The chronotope of the office 
is the avenue through which Howells learns to channel the background antagonism into the 
foreground of agonistic debate without sacrificing language and narration. While this could 
be mistaken for containment of antagonistic violence on Howells’s part, we will see that 
agonistic dialogue disrupts the consensus desired by the characters and thus motivates 
economizing strategies within the character system. These chronotopes do not exhaust the 
realist novel. There is still a vast time-space “out there” of people going about their lives, for 
which the El serves as Howells’s emblem. Because they do not give off obvious signs of 
inequality or suffering, the bodies and voices populating this time-space are not defined 
enough to be either a friend or an enemy in an antagonistic relation; they are neither 
oppressed nor oppressive. Yet, their affective presence exposes the false totality of the 
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character system and brings narration to a halt. To make a distinction that the rest of my 
authors (sans James) attempt to bridge in their own ways, these bodies/voices are 
aesthetically antagonistic without yet being politically so. Howells, more concretely, is unable 
to make the El the site for a radical-democratic politics. It is his genius, though, to make the 
El the space of everyday affect in the realist novel, since it comes with a material barrier to 
narration/dialogue in the form of overwhelming noise. Instead of falling for the temptations 
of narration/dialogue in this time-place, Howells rides the El to the point of narrative 
silence, pushing his novelistic project to the yet-unmapped realm of modernism. 
IV. The Chronotopes of Hazard 
Hazard centers on a New York-based literary magazine funded by a natural gas 
tycoon with a Social Darwinian worldview (Dryfoos), promoted by an advertising man 
(Fulkerson), managed by the tycoon’s Christian socialist son (Conrad Dryfoos), and edited 
by Basil March, the closest thing to a protagonist in the novel. The magazine is set up such 
that profit will be shared equally amongst its wide cast of contributors, including a self-
obsessed aesthete (Angus Beaton, who serves as the art editor), a reactionary who believes 
that slavery was better than capitalism (Colonel Woodburn), and a German translator who 
lost his hand in the Civil War but has become a socialist (Lindau). As a profit-sharing 
venture, the magazine, Every Other Week, “amounted to something in literature as radical as 
the American Revolution in politics; it was the idea of self-government in the arts” (183).  
The newspaper office, meanwhile, “offers the only point of intersection for all the 
characters in the novel and, for many, their only social and economic tie to New York City” 
(Kaplan 55). As Basil March explains to his wife, the group that gathers in the Greenwich 
Village office, which Kaplan calls a “knowable community,” is quite a motley crew:  
I don’t believe there’s another publication in New York that could bring together . . . 
a fraternity and equality crank like poor old Lindau, and a belated sociological crank 
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like Woodburn, and a truculent speculator like old Dryfoos, and a humanitarian 
dreamer like young Dryfoos, and a sentimentalist like me, and a nondescript like 
Beaton, and a pure advertising essence like Fulkerson . . . (Howells, Hazard 281) 
 
Individual traits and characteristics are highlighted, as if to show off the contrasting 
personalities that merge together for a common endeavor. Indeed, this is how March also 
describes their first issue: “the heterogeneous forces did cooperate to a reality which March 
could not deny . . . and the first number was representative of all their nebulous intentions in 
a tangible form” (169). Both on the page and in the office, political and aesthetic unities are 
crafted from a variety of opinions: it is an example of liberal democracy in literature. 
While the individual stands at the center of this community, Fulkerson adds an 
important caveat: “It’s astonishing how you always can get along in this world without the 
man that is simply indispensable. Makes a fellow realize that he could take a day off now and 
then without deranging the solar system a great deal” (384). If they are equal in the profit-
sharing scheme, then they are equally replaceable. Idiosyncrasies are acceptable so long as 
they do not disrupt the liberal-democratic solar system. In fact, the dramatic thrust of Hazard 
turns around two events where the moral and aesthetic limits of this knowable community 
are tested, not by a day off (as Fulkerson jokes) but by revolutionary politics. First, Lindau 
levels a personal and political attack against Dryfoos at a dinner party the latter hosts; and 
second, Lindau and Conrad are killed because of injuries suffered at a horse-car strike. 
However, these events set in motion an economy of pain to restore consensus.  
The first event is easiest to see in this light. Despite Fulkerson’s attempt to keep the 
conversation away from politics at a dinner party celebrating the magazine, a discussion of 
the Civil War and a toast to Lindau’s “empty sleeve” (290) introduce the specter of social 
antagonism, which in the postbellum urban setting of the novel signifies class relations.26 In 
                                                      
26 See the introduction to this dissertation for a reading of Lindau’s missing hand along these lines.  
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Howells’s terms, the missing hand signals the not-quite-wholeness of society and hence the 
ejected bodily presence of (class) violence continuing apace amongst “the other half.” At this 
moment, the “absent presence” of urban antagonism is drawn into the content of the dinner 
party talk, disrupting the play-equality and the good feelings (the celebration of the 
magazine) the attendees might have enjoyed. Lindau suggests that egotistical “pusiness 
motifes” (business motives) moved some men to fight and die for the North or South (289, 
290). This leads the Southern apologist Colonel Woodburn to  
sho[w] how commercialism was the poison at the heart of our national life; how we 
began as a simple, agricultural people . . . [and] how the spirit of commercialism had 
stolen insidiously upon us and the infernal impulse of competition had embroiled us 
in a perpetual warfare of interests . . . till now that impulse had exhausted itself, and 
we found competition gone, and the whole economic problem in the hand of 
monopolies. (292-293)  
 
Dryfoos, the Social Darwinian millionaire, “did not like to hear competition called infernal; 
he had always supposed it was something sacred, but he approved of what Colonel 
Woodburn said of the Standard Oil Company” since monopolies drive down prices (293). 
The party deteriorates when Dryfoos glorifies his fights with the labor unions, after which 
Lindau calls him a “tyrant” in German, though he says it to March, who speaks German 
(298). Colonel Woodburn interrupts to say that this commercial society is not long for life—
a sentiment with which Lindau agrees—but then calls for a return to feudalism: “we shall 
build upon the central idea, not of the false liberty you now worship, but of responsibility. . . 
. The enlightened, the moneyed, the recultivated class shall be responsible to the central 
authority. . . . The working classes shall be responsible to the leisure class for the support of 
its dignity in peace and shall be subject to its command in war” (298-299). Lindau takes a 
familiar socialist line in response, though he (dis)articulates it using Lincoln’s famous 
definition of democracy: “All the roadts and mills and mines and landts shall be the beople’s 
and be ron by the beople for the beople. There shall be no rich and no boor” (299). 
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 What we have here is a literary version of Mouffe’s dialogical agonism, which she 
also calls “conflictual consensus”: the men all agree on the terms of the debate—which are 
liberal-democratic principles like liberty, equality, brotherhood, and the people—but they all 
define, value, and even pronounce these terms differently. The undeniable fact of 
antagonism in urban America, signaled by Lindau’s empty sleeve, structures their positions. 
Fulkerson’s attempts to steer the conversation back toward the magazine is a reminder of 
the liberal emphasis on non-conflictual consensus that first held them together. Unlike 
Fulkerson, who wishes to keep the “real” New York in the background, Kaplan claims that 
Lindau “forces ‘the other half’ into the line of vision,” “bridg[ing] the background and the 
foreground, undermining the reassuring distinctions between them” (56, 57). But she 
qualifies this: Howells’s own representation of Lindau’s broken English re-contains this 
now-present “background,” “muting the force of his speech” (57). I want to suggest that the 
channeling of antagonism into agonism is equivalent to the intermingling of background and 
foreground in Kaplan; however, Kaplan overstates the silencing of Lindau’s voice in the 
fierce character debates of the foreground. Lindau is paid as a contributor to the newspaper 
and invited to the dinner party celebrating its success (recall Howells’s thesis in “Equality”: if 
you are invited to a party, you are treated as an equal). Furthermore, we learn that Dryfoos 
grew up around the Pennsylvania Dutch and understands Lindau’s German insults, along 
with March and, thanks to Howells’s translation, the readers. Lindau’s words are heard, 
which means that he participates in the conversion of antagonism into the debates between 
secondary characters that mark the foreground at this moment.  
Since he feels insulted by an employee in his own home, Dryfoos moves to fire 
Lindau as a translator for the magazine. Fulkerson supports Dryfoos while March defends 
his friend’s right to a political position that contrasts with that of the financial “angel.” It is 
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Fulkerson’s job to patch up the agonism threatening liberal consensus. This is where 
Kaplan’s thesis holds water: it is not in the sound of Lindau’s voice—and hence the formal 
decisions of Howells qua realist author—but the moves made by the characters when 
agonistic debate goes too far that re-contain the threat of otherness. Fulkerson’s is a familiar 
position, as it turns on the desire to sacrifice one person (Lindau) instead of seeing the whole 
magazine go belly-up because of March’s offered self-sacrifice (if Lindau goes, I go, March 
in effect tells Fulkerson). The minimum number of people who must suffer for this 
transgression becomes the main point of the debate. 
Throughout this process, Fulkerson is beside himself as March blocks his attempt to 
deliver punishment to one instead of many. Fortunately for Fulkerson, Lindau resigns his 
position, effectively sacrificing himself—his job, his income, and, most abstractly, his status 
as a character. However, even with this instance of self-sacrifice, the newspaper is saved with 
its ideals still intact—after all, individuals are equally replaceable. As “the affairs of Every 
Other Week settled into their wonted form again,” March oscillates between self-reproach (he 
never told Lindau that Dryfoos was a strikebreaker) and “moments of revolt against his own 
humiliation before Lindau” (March does not sympathize with his friend’s politics) (330). The 
feeling that Howells is illustrating for us here is guilt: March returns to work knowing that an 
innocent man was punished for his political opinions (the novel’s version of the Haymarket 
trial) and he, unlike Lindau, is still tied with that noose-like rope to Dryfoos’ ill-gotten gains 
(capitalistic complicity). When March starts to criticize himself for his own feeling of guilt, 
Howells suggests that his main character’s feelings are melancholically impotent. 
Lindau is the only character in the novel who acts out the possibility for radical 
political change. If this is so, then, as Kaplan notes, “[i]n the climactic strike near the end of 
Hazard the threat posed by Lindau is dramatized on the streets of the city” (59). The 1889 
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New York horse-car strike was a godsend for Howells: once he realized that the climax of 
the novel would center on the strike, “the story began to find its way to issues nobler and 
larger than those of love-affairs common to fiction” (“Bibliographical” vi). This is why it is 
proper to call the strike a chronotope of the threshold: it is a narrative limit toward which 
everything has been geared and after which nothing will be the same.  
At first, the horse-car strike is framed entirely by its relation to the newspaper. “The 
strike” not only “made a good deal of talk in the office of Every Other Week” but March is 
encouraged to break a promise to his wife and visit the scene of the strike so he can work it 
up into a story (354). Fulkerson makes March an offer he can’t refuse: “you could treat it in 
the historical spirit—like something that happened several centuries ago” (357). He knows 
he has his man: March had just compared the fight between “[t]he roads and the strikers” to 
“a private war in our midst . . . as any street was in Florence or Verona” (356). As March 
heads out to capture the strike in these terms, he is initially disappointed: the streets are 
empty save for a strong police presence. He hails “a crosstown car” (359) and converses 
with an officer on board. The officer’s demeanor “gave him a fine sense of the ferocity 
which he had read of the French troops putting on toward the populace just before the coup 
d'état; he began to feel like populace, but he struggled with himself and regained his character 
of philosophical observer” (359-360). After March imagines himself one of the crowd, we 
come to the threshold: “Suddenly the car stropped . . . and the police-man jumped down 
from the platform and ran forward” (360). The next chapter circles back to detail Dryfoos’s 
day, including a fight with his son that sends the latter to the scene of his death. 
Before we cross the threshold, we should pause at the moment when March “began 
to feel like populace.” Russ Castronovo contrasts “feeling like populace” with a correct 
version of the sentence with an article (“a” or “the”), which he likens to the contemporary 
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distinction between “feeling like shit” (subjection, abjection) and “feeling like the shit” 
(feeling great): “in the first, March relishes subjection and timidity while in the second he 
flirts with an empowering collective identification” (103). No doubt because of the overt 
presence of social inequalities, Howells ultimately registers a downtrodden, melancholic 
feeling instead of the “smiling” mode he so desperately seeks. But this is only the lead-up to 
the threshold. As we cross it, an antagonistic violence spills over into the text: 
The driver was lashing his horses forward, and a policeman was at their heads, with 
the conductor, pulling them; stones, clubs, brickbats hailed upon the car, the horses, 
the men trying to move them. The mob closed upon them in a body, and then a 
patrol wagon whirled up from the other side, and a squad of policemen leaped out 
and began to club the rioters. Conrad could see how they struck them under the rims 
of their hats; the blows on their skulls sounded as if they had fallen on stone; the 
rioters ran in all directions. (Howells, Hazard 368)   
 
There is nothing like this anywhere else in the novel—the chaos of moving bodies (human 
and animal), the brutal images, the sound of skulls cracking. Antagonism, political and 
aesthetic at once, warps the text. However, the mere mention of Conrad’s name by Howells 
begins a familiar process of recognition. First, Conrad hears a familiar dialect (“Why don’t 
you co and glup the bresidents that insoalt your lawss”) and “recognize[s] Lindau”; moments 
later, March sees “Lindau drop under the club of a policeman” (368). The scene is ultimately 
not very different from the ferry sequence in Lapham: the presence of the unruly crowd is 
subdued when the knowable community is circumscribed from within it.  
While Conrad Dryfoos is shot and killed immediately, March is the first to learn that 
Lindau died after a painful surgery to remove his whole arm after it was clubbed. Believing 
him to still be alive, Dryfoos asks March if he can set up a meeting of reconciliation. What 
follows is deemed a “ghastly comedy” by the narrator: March tries to let Dryfoos down easy 
with hints about Lindau’s death (“it would make little difference to Lindau now”) but his 
boss keeps misunderstanding him, owing in part to the fact that March perversely enjoys 
 
 89 
delaying the inevitable (390, 389). When it comes time to inform Dryfoos, March has a 
curious thought: “he consoled himself by thinking that at least he was not obliged to meet 
Dryfoos’ wish to make atonement with the fact that Lindau had renounced him and would 
on no terms work for such a man . . . In this light Lindau seemed the harder of the two” 
(391). Lindau would have stuck to his principles while Dryfoos, like March, is racked with 
guilt about his actions. March’s strange alignment with Dryfoos gives the former a feeling of 
sympathy he lacked when delaying the news of Lindau’s death: their guilt leads them both to 
a place of political impotence and moral softness in comparison to Lindau. Ultimately,  
March felt all the grotesqueness, the hopeless absurdity of Dryfoos’ endeavor at 
atonement in these vain obsequies to the man for whom he believed his son to have 
died; but the effort had its magnanimity, its pathos, and there was a poetry that 
appealed to him in this reconciliation through death of men, of ideas, of conditions, 
that could only have gone warring on in life. (394-395) 
 
This perfectly describes both the ideal and futility of the economy of pain: the knowable 
community only stays afloat after Lindau sacrifices his position and then is killed off (in the 
“cause of disorder,” March tells his son), which motivates guilt-ridden gestures of closure 
(392). The knowable community shares in this guilt, while Howells gets as much mileage out 
of the resulting irony and humor as he can (much like the letter to James). Once meant to 
ease the guilt brought on by urban suffering, the economy of pain now brings its own guilt.  
For all their potential energy, neither Lindau nor the strike inaugurates a radical 
political and aesthetic transformation in Howellsian realism. Importantly, only the street-
level system is beset by the strike—the El runs on schedule: “on the avenues, roofed by the 
elevated roads, this silence of the surface tracks was not noticeable at all in the roar of the 
trains overhead” (359). On the ground, the narrative and the city are impeded by the strike, 
creating the need for the now-ineffective economy of pain; however, the elevated trains exist 
on a different plane of narrative and urban existence that is untouched (and is in fact 
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invigorated) by the strike. Kaplan and Castronovo both fail to notice the distinction between 
the El and the horse-car, which has far-reaching consequences: they look to the unsatisfying 
conclusion of the novel for closure in the antagonism between the knowable community and 
“the other half.”27 However, the sight and sound of the El still running, triumphant, points 
to a potentially utopian time-place literally above these labor struggles.  
This is not necessarily a good thing. Indeed, the text is hyper aware of the El’s 
intrusive presence in the city: “They kill the streets and avenues; but at least they partially 
hide them, and that is some comfort; and they do triumph over their prostrate forms with a 
savage exultation that is intoxicating” (54). While the El aids the character system by 
connecting the members of the knowable community, it too stands in antagonistic 
relationship to New York’s “other half.” Kaplan is not wrong to suggest that the El is the 
machinery by which the Marches both perceive and displace the existence of the lower 
classes, an action that re-creates, in the aesthetic realm, the process by which the elevated 
structures displaced homeowners and further alienated social classes even as they appeared 
to connect the entire city. Thus, on one reading, the El functions like Sewellian complicity, 
with all its shortcomings: it appears to unite while drawing more distinct lines.  
But this is not the whole story. Indeed, one needs to recall Howells’s sympathetic 
reading, at this point in his career, of Gronlund and Bellamy. Instead of focusing on the 
battle between labor and capital, Gronlund and Bellamy pointed to the ways America was 
becoming more collective, with public transit monopolies a prime example. “In 1880,” 
Charles Cheape writes, “public transportation in large American cities was provided by 
numerous, competing horsecar companies. . . . By 1912 a monopoly in each city operated a 
system” (1). A collectivist impulse motivates Howells to find a way to describe something 
                                                      
27 See Kaplan 62-64 and Castronovo 103.  
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positive about this system: the El is intoxicating despite the fact that it “kills the streets.” The 
violent, divisive yet ostensibly unifying structure of the El is complemented, I will 
demonstrate, by the intoxicating experience of being between stops. The commute is capable 
of exposing passengers, and in certain cases the adjacent apartment-dwellers, to a truly 
democratic feeling or affect to which a concept like complicity only weakly alludes. 
Keep in mind that the defining feature of the El’s supremacy over the horse-car is 
the “roar” drowning out the silence of the streets during the strike. The overwhelming 
sound of the trains will inaugurate the sliding of affect into the “positive” side of the 
spectrum, thus instituting the horse-car conductor’s dream of a bodily feeling that shows, 
rather than names/narrates, the interconnection of strangers in the city’s vast machinery. 
The clear formal problem, here—how do you show a loud noise?— enables Howells to 
overcome his own temptation, which becomes Basil March’s, to aestheticize poverty.28    
V. The Hazards of New Noises 
 “First and last,” Howells tells his readers, “the Marches did a good deal of travel on 
the elevated roads, which, he said, gave you such glimpses of material aspects in the city as 
some violent invasion of others’ lives might afford in human nature” (264). Their rides on 
the El tend to be rendered in purely voyeuristic or picturesque terms: 
He said it was better than the theater, of which it reminded him, to see those people 
through their windows: a family party of workfolk at a late tea, some of the men in 
their shirt-sleeves; a woman sewing by a lamp; a mother laying her child in its cradle; 
a man with his head fallen on his hands upon a table; a girl and her lover leaning 
over a windowsill together. What suggestion! What drama! What infinite interest! (66) 
 
The Whitmanesque list of everyday people going about quotidian, domestic tasks becomes 
mere fodder for a stage production of “How the Other Half Lives.”  
                                                      
28 See Jameson, Political 239-242 for a related discussion of Joseph Conrad’s modernism, which involved 
moving beyond the containment strategies of “the image” by “registering auditory perceptions” associated with 
modern machines like the railway (239).  
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Something similar happens when March trains his eye on the people inside the cars: 
The sort was never so squalid. For short distances, the lowest poverty, the hardest 
pressed labor must walk; but March never entered a car without encountering some 
interesting shape of shabby adversity, which was almost always adversity of foreign 
birth. . . . The small eyes, the high cheeks, the broad noses, the puff lips, the bare, 
cue-filleted skulls, of Russians, Poles, Czechs, Chinese; the furtive glitter of Italians; 
the blond dullness of Germans; the cold quiet of Scandinavians—fire under ice—
were aspects that he identified and that gave him abundant suggestion for the 
personal histories he constructed, and for the more public-spirited reveries in which 
he dealt with the future economy of our heterogeneous commonwealth. It must be 
owned that he did not take much trouble about this: what these poor people were 
thinking, hoping, fearing, enjoying, suffering; just where and how they lived; who 
and what they individually were. These were the matters of his waking dreams as he 
stared hard at them, while the train raced further into the gay ugliness—the 
shapeless, graceless, reckless picturesqueness of the Bowery. (159) 
 
During the ferry ride in Lapham, the narration was split between the one who sees, knows, 
and catalogues otherness (the narrator) and the one who cannot describe what others think, 
feel, or experience based on external cues (Lapham). In Hazard, these positions are joined in 
the figure of March. He begins by cataloguing the races and nationalities like an amateur 
phrenologist. Out of this raw material he “construct[s]” “personal histories” (159). Unlike 
Lapham, March is not concerned that he cannot know what these people experience—he 
makes it up as he goes along, creating a picturesque representation of heterogeneity. March 
plans to work his personal histories into one of his projected “sketches” for Every Other 
Week, which he and Fulkerson hope will tap into the public’s voyeuristic appetite for stories 
of “life in New York City” that would otherwise remain unseen by middle-class eyes (128).  
March’s preference for the aesthetic distance over true contact on the El prefigures 
Georg Simmel’s complaint about modern urban life: 
Interpersonal relationships in big cities are distinguished by a marked preponderance 
of visual activity over aural activity. The main reason for this is the public means of 
transportation. Before the development of buses, railroads, and trams in the 
nineteenth century, people had never been in situations where they had to look at 
one another for long minutes or even hours without speaking to one another. (qtd. 




Howells makes a strikingly similar point in Suburban Sketches: 
A whole car-full of people, brought into the closest contact with one another, yet in 
the absence of introductions never exchanging a word, each being so sufficient to 
himself as to need no social stimulus whatever, is certainly an impressive and stately 
spectacle. (Suburban 99) 
 
The loss of “aural activity” for Simmel means a lack of communication, and one 
imagines that the solution to this problem is to break the silence and begin a conversation 
with a stranger on the train. This is not the route March takes: while “listening to the jargon 
of their unintelligible dialect, he had occasion for pensive question within himself as to what 
notion these poor animals formed of a free republic from their experience of life under its 
conditions” (Howells, Hazard 158). Even though these “Neapolitans” come from a country 
(Italy) that March, like his author, knows very well, he deems the Southern Italian dialect 
unintelligible. Later in the novel, Howells makes it clear that regional dialect does not always 
obstruct understanding: having grown up with the Pennsylvania Dutch, Dryfoos is able to 
piece together Lindau’s German. With knowledge of Italian, March might have been able to 
understand the Neapolitan dialect. Yet, throughout the novel New York’s foreign elements 
“gratify an aesthetic sense” in March and “renew the faded pleasure of travel” (47): he is 
happy to escape into a purely visual, picturesque daydream about the foreign riders. 
Keith Tester provides a simple explanation for why listening or talking to strangers 
on the train may be difficult: “It is strange that [Simmel] did not stress the point that public 
transport is frequently extremely noisy. Either the bus or train makes so much noise that we 
cannot hear a conversation or, alternatively, there might be so many conversations going on 
at the same time that it is impossible clearly to make out any single one of them” (92). What 
if the Neapolitans remain unintelligible because of the train’s unbearable noise? Dialogical 
agonism is rendered implausible if not impossible by the physical constraints imposed by 
public transportation. This drives Howells to unleash his lurking interest in bodily states that 
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tell much more than speech, narration, or dialogue. A new method of representation is 
needed to bring the El crowd to the foreground. Affect must be decoupled from March’s 
aestheticizing impulses, which attempt to catalogue otherness by nationality if not class.  
Sound proves to be effective in this regard. When they first arrive in New York,  
[the Marches] recalled the Broadway of five, of ten, of twenty years ago, swelling and 
roaring with a tide of gaily painted omnibuses and of picturesque traffic that the 
horsecars have now banished from it. The grind of their wheels and the clash of their 
harsh bells imperfectly fill the silence that the omnibuses have left, and the eye 
misses the tumultuous perspective of former times. (Howells, Hazard 47)  
 
By paying attention to noise, Howells comes to an entirely different conclusion than Simmel: 
in the era before the horse-car, the eye reigned supreme; after its advent, the aural takes over. 
During the strike, the El fills the silence left by the horse-car, illustrating a neat development 
in public transportation—omnibus, horse-car, El—with the old silenced by the new.  
As Howells notes in Impressions and Experiences (1896), elevated trains normally add to 
street-level noise, creating an overbearing urban sensorium: 
[T]he horse-cars run even under the elevated tracks, and no experience of noise can 
enable you to conceive of the furious din that bursts upon the sense, when at some 
corner two cars encounter on the parallel tracks below, while two trains roar and 
shriek and hiss on the rails overhead, and a turmoil of rattling express wagons, heavy 
drays and trucks, and carts, hacks, carriages, and huge vans rolls itself between and 
beneath the prime agents of the uproar . . . (258) 
 
The aural is related to affect insofar as it is indescribable: “The noise is not only deafening, it 
is bewildering; you cannot know which side the danger threatens most” (258). Sound 
overwhelms the directional impulse, effectively blinding the urban stroller. James, indeed, 
described the El as “a sinister over-roofed clangorous darkness” (AS 145). For one of Edith 
Wharton’s returning expatriates, “new” New York—that is, after the First World War—is a 
“fluid city . . . where the stoutest buildings seemed like atoms forever shaken into new 
patterns by the rumble of Undergrounds and Elevateds” (Mother’s 32).  
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The Marches are nostalgic: they think back to a time when the visual dominated the 
aural. The time is quite specific: it is their experience of Broadway in the 1870s, catalogued 
by Howells in Their Wedding Journey (1871). He first develops a distinction between the visual 
and the aural in the Niagara Falls portion of this travel narrative, which is less surprising 
when we consider that Broadway is likened to the Falls earlier in the novel (28). Speaking of 
the actual Niagara Falls, Howells writes: “[Basil and Isabel March] remembered afterwards 
how they were able to make use of but one sense at a time, and how when they strove to 
take in the forms of the descending flood they ceased to hear it; but as soon as they released 
their eyes from this service, every fibre in them vibrated to the sound, and the spectacle 
dissolved away in it” (Wedding 126). On its own, “[t]he eye could no longer take truthful note 
of quality, and now beheld the tumbling deluge as a Gothic wall of carven marble” (126). In 
other words, the eye tends to aestheticize experience—to make the unknowable known. The 
ear, meanwhile, “could give the brain no assurance of the sound that filled it, and whether it 
were great or little” (126). The aural is a bodily feeling—“every fibre in them vibrated to the 
sound”—that confounds meaning and hence representation. “It was only when the sight, so 
idle on its own behalf, came to the aid of the other sense, and showed them the mute 
movement of each other’s lips, that they dimly appreciated the depth of sound that involved 
them” (127). What Howells achieves, here, is the representation of affect. It is a representation 
that takes affect as both subject and proposed effect: he wants to paint a picture that can 
make his main characters and his readers appreciate the “depth of sounds that involved 
them.” This is a clever way to confront the un-representability of affect: instead of imposing 
an aesthetic form on excessive noise, Howells starts with a pictorial representation and 
allows affect to break from its grasp. After all, the image of two people trying and failing to 
talk hints indirectly but effectively at the vibrations that envelop them. 
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Similarly, the aural and hence affective experience of the El indirectly enters 
Howells’s Hazard, disrupting the visual supremacy of 1870s New York:  
They kill the streets and avenues; but at least they partially hide them, and that is 
some comfort; and they do triumph over their prostrate forms with a savage 
exultation that is intoxicating. Those bends in the L that you get at the corner of 
Washington Square, and just below the Cooper Institute—they’re the gayest thing in 
the world. Perfectly atrocious, of course, but incomparably picturesque! And the 
whole city is so . . . or else the L would never have got built here. New York may be 
splendidly gay or squalidly gay, but prince or pauper, it’s gay always. (54)  
 
Around the time that Howells wrote Hazard, The New York Times produced a handful 
of articles detailing the legal battle between landlords and railroad companies, which 
centered on the emotional and physical damages caused by the noisy structures literally 
pressed up against apartments, hotels, and schools. Typically, the lawyers for the El spoke of 
the benefits of having it close to hand29 while landlords recalled the structural damages their 
buildings suffered. A January 1889 article describes the second kind of case: 
Testimony was offered to show that the walls of the building had been cracked by 
the jarring caused by the stopping trains at the Grand-street station . . . . Mr. O’Brien 
also says the clouds of smoke darken his upper windows and sometimes fill the 
rooms, rendering the building unfit for certain kinds of business. The noise of the 
trains, too, interfere with conversations in the stores and offices. (“Annoyed”)  
 
Using Howells’s terms, the failed conversation between office mates demonstrates the 
“depth of sound that involved them” (Wedding 127). The reference to “the Cooper Institute” 
in Hazard (54) is interesting in this regard. In “1873 when the Third Avenue El opened 
adjacent to Cooper Union College, students complained that the train noise disrupted their 
classes” (Bronzaft 2). The El companies compensated the institute for the inconvenience.  
Neither Howells nor March cares much for the financial remunerations (or lack 
thereof) dispensed on behalf of the elevated. This is why Howells could keep the “smiling 
aspects” passage in Criticism and Fiction, published a year after Hazard: the fight—whether in 
                                                      
29 See, for example, “Jay Gould’s Detectives.”  
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the streets or the courtroom—between antagonistic social classes had to be acknowledged 
but then bracketed to represent a shared positive feeling in urban America. In line with this, 
March calls the El “incomparably picturesque” (54). Yet the “picturesque” does not function 
in the same way here as it does at earlier points in the novel. Starting within but moving 
beyond the constraints of earlier visual/literary categories, Howells tries to communicate the 
unspoken and unspeakable feeling created by these loud, vibrating structures for those 
caught in tis web. Using March as his mouthpiece, Howells sidesteps the socioeconomic 
implications of the El’s presence and instead focuses on the affective present: not only is the 
El personified in its “savage” triumph over the streets, the result is “intoxicating.”  
If one looks outside of court reporting, there are records of intoxicating feelings 
passed between strangers on the El. A New York Tribune article from Christmas Eve in 1890 
reads: “Men, women and children were packed together in regular New York elevated road 
fashion. The crowding and pushing was continuous, yet everybody suffered good-naturedly, 
as everybody should on the eve of the jolliest day of the year” (“Passengers”). The crowd’s 
positive reaction to what was once a negative—the pushing and shoving—becomes a 
measure of the good spirit and fellow-feeling awakened by the holidays. There is also a genre 
of lighthearted stories about the interesting characters one finds on the El. In one from 
1889, a “thin-faced old gentleman, carrying a paper bandbox, came into a car on the Sixth-
avenue elevated railroad at the Forty-second street station” and takes his seat amongst a 
varied cast of characters (“Mysterious”): two women discussing fashion; a man with his 
paper; “a pale, clerical-looking young man”; and, in a striking parallel to Hazard, a newlywed 
couple “discussing the merits of flats and boarding houses” (the Marches discuss the merits 
of flats versus homes on the El [53]). As the train clatters into the next station, Twenty-
Eighth Street, the passengers hear a conductor yell out “Tweunuy-uth!” “The two young 
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women . . . were somewhat doubtful as to what the guard had said, and wished to make sure 
by a glance at the station sign. The same emotion had been aroused in the breasts of many 
other passengers. Only the thin-faced old gentleman with the bandbox seemed to retain 
perfect calmness.” In the end, we discover that inside the man’s bandbox is a parrot that has 
“[l]earned the name of every station on the line from the ferry to Forty-second street, and 
shouts ‘em out often.” It is a comical story—strangers share feelings of confusion while 
readers laugh at the introduction of the hidden parrot, which might be said to stand in for 
the discordant, confusing, seemingly source-less noise of the El itself. 
What about those outside the train car, in the buildings lining the El? “Passengers,” 
Luc Sante writes, “enjoyed the opportunity to peer in, feasting their eyes on endless rows of 
tableaux vivants featuring men in undershirts and women in housedresses” (51). But, he goes 
on, “perhaps third-story occupancy did have its dubious pleasures, if one is to believe the 
1882 Police Gazette illustration entitled ‘Shooting at the Elevated,’ which shows a soubrette in 
a hotel room aiming a revolver out the window” (51). Well-dressed hotel guests, wine glasses 
and cigarettes in hand, look on smiling, as if watching a show (they return the gaze, so to 
speak). Wharton’s unpublished poem “Terminus,” though not about New York, details the 
more erotic elements of staying in a hotel next to screeching trains. While spending a night 
of passion with her lover in London’s Charing Cross Hotel, Wharton “thought of those 
others, the nameless, the many, / Who perhaps thus had lain and loved for an hour on the 
brink of the world, / Secret and fast in the heart of the whirlwind of travel, / The shaking 
and shrieking of trains, the night-long shudder of traffic” (“Terminus”).  
In Hazard, Howells wants to describe a feeling fit only for the razor’s edge of the 
present, where consequences are thrown out the window and strangers share a positive 
feeling. March names his feeling “gay,” which oscillates between “splendidly gay” and 
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“squalidly gay” (54). Kaplan suggests that “[h]is obsessive repetition of the word ‘gay’ levels 
all distinctions in meaning and refers to nothing but itself” (51). A free-floating, referent-less 
feeling is also how Jameson describes the affective charge of Tolstoy’s “happiness”: it “has 
preconditions but cannot be caused; and clearly, it cannot be the aim or end of any action or 
project” (Antinomies 82). The precondition of Howells’ “gay,” relating to the El (its 
overwhelming noise), is similarly displaced: the feeling seems to belong neither to the El nor 
the people on it, but rather encompasses both and, in fact, all of New York. Kaplan is wrong 
to conclude that the word also represses those that would disrupt the normal workings of 
the realist novel. Rather, it marks the emergence of the population that Wharton deems “the 
nameless, the many” (“Terminus”): “New York may be splendidly gay or squalidly gay, but 
prince or pauper, it’s gay always” (Howells, Hazard 54). Kaplan might claim that this 
description is a way for the bourgeois writer to control the socioeconomic rift in modern 
society by drawing on and imaginatively resolving the outmoded feudal split between prince 
and pauper. But the use of feudal language serves a more radical purpose by tacitly linking 
affect with democracy as the force capable of leveling unnatural social distinctions, then and 
now. Howells thus re-imagines the democratic revolution of the eighteenth century as an 
aesthetic force kept alive in the present moment by “the fleeting intimacy you for[m] with 
people in second- and third-floor interiors,” which levels the distinction between prince and 
pauper, bourgeois and proletariat, character and reader, past and present (Hazard 66). 
This democratic leveling becomes even clearer later in the novel, in yet another long 
description of March’s feelings about the El: 
He was interested in the insolence with which the railway had drawn its erasing lines 
across the Corinthian front of an old theater, almost grazing its fluted pillars and 
flouting its dishonored pediment. The colossal effigies of the fat women and the 
tuft-headed Circassian girls of cheap museums; the vistas of shabby cross streets; the 
survival of an old hip-roofed house here and there at their angles; the Swiss-chalet, 
histrionic decorativeness of the stations in prospect or retrospect; the vagaries of the 
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lines that narrowed together or stretched apart according to the width of the avenue, 
but always in wanton disregard of the life that dwelt, and bought and sold, and 
rejoiced or sorrowed, and clattered or crawled, around, below, above—were features 
of the frantic panorama that perpetually touched his sense of humor and moved his 
sympathy. Accident and then exigency seemed the forces at work to this 
extraordinary effect; the play of energies as free and planless as those that force the 
forest from the soil to the sky; and then the fierce struggle for survival, with the 
stronger life persisting over the deformity, the mutilation, the destruction, the decay, 
of the weaker. The whole at moments seemed to him lawless, Godless; the absence 
of intelligent, comprehensive purpose in the huge disorder and the violent struggle to 
subordinate the result to the greater good penetrated with its dumb appeal the 
consciousness of a man who had always been too self-enwrapt to perceive the chaos 
to which the individual selfishness must always lead. (159-160) 
 
If the “frantic panorama” moves in disregard to human life, its insolence recalls those 
individuals clattering along with or crawling under the El, which physically “touche[s] his 
sense of humor” (it is splendidly gay) as well as “his sympathy” (it is squalidly gay).  
Though the rest of the passage is couched in the language of Social Darwinism 
(“struggle for existence,” etc.), March comes to recognize “the chaos to which the individual 
selfishness must always lead” (160). Through March, Howells deconstructs the discursive 
articulation between liberal individualism and Social Darwinism in American culture and 
politics.30 If Nature is as “planless” and “Godless” as the Social Darwinists believe, then it 
will swallow up even their own master narrative and the proud individualists it produced. 
Antagonism is one name for this chaos which threatens self and society, which is here 
metaphorized as the brute power of Nature—that which “force[s] the forest from the soil to 
the sky” (160). One is reminded of George Eliot’s famous aside on (the limits of) realism in 
Middlemarch (1871-1872): “If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it 
would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that 
roar which lies on the other side of silence” (194). Howells finds the frequency of everyday 
                                                      




life in the city—in the buildings adjacent to the El—and not in some imagined countryside. 
If only for a moment, March resonates with the affective forces once excluded from the 
realist novel; and those forces—which seemed so silent, so benign from the kinds of 
aesthetic distances Howells once set up in his novels—push, crawl, and clatter quite loudly 
when you are on their frequency, threatening to lead the realist novel into chaos. 
To be on this frequency of pure affect and then return to report about it requires a 
new way of writing realism. Aware of this problem, Howells portrays the El as something 
that skates uneasily between Romance and a new kind of art: 
[The Marches] often talked . . . of the superb spectacle, which in a city full of painters 
nightly works its unrecorded miracles; and they were just to the Arachne roof spun 
in iron over the cross street on which they ran to the depot; but for the present they 
were mostly inarticulate before it. They had another moment of rich silence when 
they paused in the gallery that leads from the elevated station to the waiting rooms in 
the Central Depot and looked down upon the great night trains lying on the tracks 
dim under the rain of gaslights that starred without dispersing the vast darkness of 
the place. What forces, what fates, slept in these bulks which would soon be hurling 
themselves north and east and west through the night! Now they waited there like 
fabled monsters of the Arab story ready for the magician’s touch, tractable, reckless, 
will-less—organized lifelessness full of a strange semblance of life. (Hazard 66-67) 
 
If the depot strikes the romantic chord of the “Arab story,” then the entire elevated system, 
encompassing the city like Arachne’s web, “ma[kes] Reality its Romance,” as Howells once 
defined realism (Selected 328). However, in a city full of painters, the El goes “unrecorded.” 
Thus, the Marches remain silent before the “spectacle.” As at Niagara Falls, they see that they 
cannot or should not speak, which alludes to the depth of sound that envelops them.  
Of course, Howells eventually breaks this silence. Yet, he remains tacitly aware of the 
formal and political impotence that follows his attempt to represent affect. Formal 
impotence comes from a narrative double bind: to speak about shared feeling at all is to 
pervert it, to render it susceptible to co-optation by named emotions. “Gay” is, of course, a 
named feeling, signaling that language has moved in to fill the silence of affect. Howells 
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repeats the word so that, as we saw, it appears free-floating and referent-less, signaling that 
March’s feeling bursts language from within, rendering it impotent. Even this “solution” to 
the affect/named emotions antagonism is momentary: it occurs during what Bakhtin would 
call the slow, viscous time-space of the commute, which necessarily dissipates when the 
characters arrive at their destinations (an apartment or the office), where agonistic dialogues 
occur, problems are resolved, and the narrative moves forward.    
Howells’s turn to the El was motivated by his reading of the nationalists and 
collectivists, who hoped that public transport monopolies augured a more collective future. 
Howells draws this optimism into the present, giving up the overt political narrative of 
gradual centralization to focus on what it would feel like at a particular moment of that 
process. The non-narrative qualities of affect, however, preclude the possibility of any 
political platform (a set of demands, a manifesto) based around a crowded train car. Thus, 
the El in Hazard is not much different from the horse-car in Suburban Sketches: the affected 
passengers and apartment-dwellers do not come together as a democratic public. Failure is 
inevitable: affect never congeals into a political form with a history, an agenda, or a clear 
path towards the future. In fact, it destroys utopian agendas.  
Kaplan claims that, after Hazard, “Howells stops exploring the dangerously shifting 
boundary lines of his urban representation, and turns to domestic and utopian fictions that 
remain within the untested perimeter of the foreground” (63). She references A Traveler from 
Altruria (1894), in which a traveler from a utopian land, Altruria, visits a New England hotel 
and engages in agonistic debate with various American types. Kaplan’s narrative is too 
simple, however: first, Howells’s Letters of an Altrurian Traveller (1893-1894), written around 
the same time, is decidedly urban—the visitor travels to New York City; and, finally, it is 
incorrect that “domestic and utopian” novels replaced realism. In his next New York novel, 
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The World of Chance (1893) Howells acknowledges, with a clarity missing from Hazard and the 
utopian romances, that utopianism based around public transportation is bound for political 
failure. The result leads Howells closer to American modernism than the utopian tradition.  
VI. From The World of Chance to American Modernism 
The World of Chance is about a young author named Percy Bysshe Shelley Ray who 
submits his subpar romance to the “world of chance” that is New York’s publishing market. 
A subplot involves a family of socialists that has moved to New York after leaving a Brook 
Farm-style commune because it remains out of touch with the problems of modern society. 
David Hughes, the family patriarch, is first introduced when Ray visits the home to find out 
of if this man’s daughter, a reader at a publishing house, will give his novel a chance: 
Ray found himself in what must be the principal room of the apartment; its two 
windows commanded an immediate prospect of the elevated road, with an effect of 
having their sills against its trestle work. Between them stood a tall, gaunt old man . . 
. [who] was saying: “. . . If I had back the years that I have wasted in a perfectly futile 
effort to deal with the problem of the race at a distance where I couldn’t touch it, I 
would have nothing to do with eremitism in any of its forms, either collectively as we 
have had it in our various communistic experiments, or individually on the terms 
which Tolstoi apparently advises.” (Howells, World 90) 
 
Living next to the El means the Hughes family must make an impossible choice: 
“When we came here first, it was warm weather; it was stifling when we shut the windows, 
and when we opened them, it seemed as if the trains would drive us wild. It was like having 
them in the room with us” (102). “As the season advanced, and the heat within-doors 
increased, they had to open the windows, and then the infernal uproar of the avenue filled 
the room, so that they could not hear one another speak till the windows were closed again” 
(296). Once he steps inside one of the houses lining the El, Howells notices that nobody is 
“smiling.” Put differently, Howells’s “smiling” evaluation of the El speaks to the relatively 
well-off class on the train rather than the families whose lives are intruded upon by its 
overwhelming noise.  
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In his utopian romances, written around the same time as The World of Chance, 
Howells contemplates the potentially positive outcomes of these loud, invasive, dangerous 
machines. In his Letters of an Altrurian Traveler, Howells’s utopian visitor Mr. Homos is 
surprised at the American defense of individual liberty and selfishness, which to him is out 
of touch with the reality of economic and political concentration in the El: 
Every seat in them is taken, and every foot of space in the aisle between the seats is 
held by people standing, and swaying miserably to and fro by the leather straps 
dangling from the roofs. Men and women are indecently crushed together, without 
regard for that personal dignity which we [the Altrurians] prize, but which the 
Americans seem to know nothing of and care nothing for. The multitude overflows 
from the car, at either end, and the passengers are as tightly wedged on the platforms 
without as they are within. . . . Sometimes horrible accidents happen; a man clinging 
to the outside of the gate has the life crushed out of his body against the posts of the 
station as the train pulls out. But in this land, where people have such a dread of 
civic collectivism of any kind, lest individuality should suffer, the individual is 
practically nothing in the regard of the corporate collectivities which abound. (69) 
 
In a dialectical reversal, Howells suggests that what looks bleak about the present—
individuals are literally or figuratively crushed by public transit—augurs a more progressive 
future when the state will own all monopolies, eliminating the immoral individualism at the 
core of capitalist society. For the collectivist, such examples point toward a future where a 
plutocracy will be destroyed and replaced by a “real” democracy. Fittingly, Mr. Homos is 
unsure whether change in America will come about via revolution (the socialist way) or from 
a gradual progression in collective values due to the growing centralization of life, even if he 
hopes for the latter outcome (Letters 17). While Howells was still in his realist phase, he 
burrowed into the ambiguity of the present, where one could not be sure whether change 
will come, if at all, via revolution or through a gradual awakening of civic consciousness. 
For a similar reason, Hughes sadistically enjoys the sounds of the city. While he 
admits that it is “atrocious,” he tells Ray that he is “glad [he] came and placed [himself] 
where [he] could fully realize the hideousness of a competitive metropolis”: “All these 
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abominations of sight and sound, these horrible discords, that offend every sense, physically 
express the spiritual principle underlying the whole social framework” (World 297). For 
Hughes, the overwhelming noise of the El in combination with regular street noise 
concretize a vision of a more collective urban lifestyle that might be generated if only people 
awakened to a sense of interconnection in the monopoly stage of capitalism. In this vein, 
Hughes imagines a city “without a horse, where electricity [will bring] every man and 
everything silently to the door” (297). The El augurs “the greatest possible monopoly; one 
that includes the whole people economically as they are now included politically” (119). 
While Hughes’s utopian vision is tied to the development of urban transportation 
systems (the replacement of horses with machines), his life is threatened by an illness that is 
exacerbated by the noises of the El. As his condition worsens and his manifesto fails to find a 
publisher (while Ray’s romance does), Hughes begins to shut out the city as well as his hopes 
for the future: “The smells of the street, and the sick, hot whiffs from the passing trains were 
excluded; the powerful odors of the useless drug burdened the air” (318). Hughes winds up 
shutting out the noise of the El and reverting to his small circle of friends, which replicates 
the kind of eremitic lifestyle he hoped to avoid by moving to the city in the first place.   
There is a simple formal reason why Howells cannot seem to usher in the reign of 
affect in his writing. The price to pay for absolutizing the affective realm of the everyday to 
the exclusion of plot and narration is that one stops writing a realist novel and enters the 
territory of modernist experimentation. A study of the afterlife of Howellsian realism in 
American modernism is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is worth noting 
that John Dos Passos, Hart Crane, Charles Reznikoff, and Henry Roth all turn to the image 
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of rapid transit systems crushing the life and souls of urban inhabitants. 31 Dos Passos’s 
Manhattan Transfer (1925) is the best modernist novel to pair with Howells. The novel spans 
the growth of New York from the incorporation of the five boroughs in 1898 to the 
turbulent 1920s. The “plot,” which revolves around a set of characters who only become 
knowable over time, is less important for Dos Passos than capturing the feeling of walking 
or riding public transit through the city at a certain moment in its history. The opening of 
each chapter leaves room for a description of everyday urbanism, told through snapshot-like 
images rife with accompanying smells, sounds, and tastes. One pertinent example: 
Morning clatters with the first L down Allen street. Daylight rattles through the 
windows, shaking old brick houses, splatters the girders of the L structure with 
bright confetti. [. . . ] 
At the corner of Riverton the old man with the hempen beard who sleeps 
where nobody knows is putting out his picklestand. Tubs of gherkins, pimentos, 
melonrind, piccalilli give out twining vines and cold tendrils of dank 
pepperyfragrance that grow like a marshgarden out of the musky bedsmells and the 
rancid clangor of the cobbled awakening street. (123) 
 
Later in this chapter, we are riding the next mode of transportation, overwhelmed by affect:  
In the crammed subway car the messenger boy was pressed up against the back of a 
tall blond woman who smelled of Mary Garden. Elbows, packages, shoulders, 
buttocks, jiggled closer with every lurch of the screeching express. His sweaty 
Western Union cap was knocked onto the side of his head. If I could have a dame 
like dat, a dame like dat’d be wort havin de train stalled, de lights go out, de train 
wrecked. I could have her if I had de noive an de jack. As the train slowed up she fell 
against him, he closed his eyes, didn’t breathe, his nose was mashed against her neck. 
The train stopped. He was carried in a rush of people out the door. (139) 
 
Dos Passos, like many of his peers, ushers in the modernist emphasis on pure scenic 
description to the exclusion of the well-made plot. Howells, for his part, rides modern 
machinery as close as he can toward this representational sound barrier, blissfully ignorant of 
the new artistic form that lies in the wake of realism’s sonic boom.
                                                      
31 These are the works I have in mind: Crane’s The Bridge (1930), Part VII, “The Tunnel”; Dos Passos’s 




“Arched Over Friends as well as Enemies”: 
Reproducing and Resolving Antagonisms in The Bostonians 
 
In The Bostonians (1886), Henry James repeatedly visits the windows of Olive 
Chancellor’s Charles Street rowhouse to catch a view of Boston and its environs. Olive, a 
wealthy Boston feminist, shows off this view to her guests, including Basil Ransom (a distant 
cousin from the South) and Verena Tarrant (a young orator from Cambridge whom she 
hopes to recruit). James’s readers find detailed descriptions of what these characters perceive 
along the Charles River. Robert K. Martin writes that “[t]he first book of the novel is . . . 
framed by these landscape passages, which define its subject as Boston, and, more 
importantly, as ways of seeing” (79). For Martin, the two subjects are intertwined: James’s 
characters have romantic or sentimental “ways of seeing” that prevent them from truly 
perceiving Boston. The correct “way of seeing” is displayed in an oft-quoted passage: 
The western windows of Olive’s drawing-room, looking over the water, took in the 
red sunsets of winter; the long, low bridge that crawled, on its staggering posts, 
across the Charles; the casual patches of ice and snow; the desolate suburban 
horizons, peeled and made bald by the rigour of the season; the general hard, cold 
void of the prospect; the extrusion, at Charlestown, at Cambridge, of a few chimneys 
and steeples, straight, sordid tubes of factories and engine-shops, or spare, 
heavenward finger of the New England meeting-house. There was something 
inexorable in the poverty of the scene, shameful in the meanness of its details, which 
gave a collective impression of boards and tin and frozen earth, sheds and rotting 
piles, railway-lines striding flat across a thoroughfare of puddles, and tracks of the 
humbler, the universal horse-car, traversing obliquely this path of danger; loose 
fences, vacant lots, mounds of refuse, yards bestrewn with iron pipes, telegraph poles 
and bare wooden backs of places. (The Bostonians 135-36)1 
 
In Irving Howe’s influential “Introduction to The Bostonians,” this description stands for the 
“slowly accumulating seediness of the city as it stumbles into the factory age” (158) and 
                                                      
1 Hereafter cited parenthetically as BO. 
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Martin continues this line of thinking: “The Boston of Transcendentalism is disappearing 
and being reshaped by a new urban reality,” which Martin characterizes as “a new industrial 
order” replete with “poverty and decay” (Martin 79, 78). 
Verena, however, “thought such a view lovely” (James, BO 136). Looking out a 
different window, Ransom also suffers from what Martin calls “picturesque misperception”: 
The view seemed to him very picturesque, though in the gathered dusk little was left 
of it save a cold yellow streak in the west, a gleam of brown water, and the reflection 
of the lights that had begun to show themselves in a row of houses, impressive to 
Ransom in their extreme modernness, which overlooked the same lagoon from a 
long embankment on the left, constructed of stones roughly piled. (BO 14)  
 
Martin wants us to notice that James qualifies this “picturesque” vision with the concrete 
details of urban space, thereby pointing up the city’s “all-too-real sordidness” (Martin 79).  
By describing the “reality” of this landscape as one of poverty and decay, however, 
Martin fails to explore one of the implications of his argument: the landscape is being 
“reshaped by a new urban reality” (79). Far from falling into decay, the city is being rebuilt 
on new foundations, signified by the modern houses on “stones roughly piled” (James, BO 
14). Amy Kaplan argues that “[r]ealists show a surprising lack of confidence in the capacity 
of fiction to reflect a solid world ‘out there’” and that “the weightiness of descriptive detail,” 
which we certainly get in the passages above, “often appears in inverse proportion to a sense 
of insubstantiality” (9). Thus, “the urban-industrial transformation of nineteenth-century 
society did not provide a ready-made setting which the realistic novel reflects, but [rather] 
these changes radically challenged the accessibility of an emergent modern world to literary 
representation” (8). The world of the novel, like the city it represents, is under construction. 
Betsy Klimasmith and Janet Wolf Bowen have read The Bostonians through the lens of 
the evolving city. Instead of suffering from misperception, James’s characters, in their 
readings, anxiously confront and try to redefine the changing relationship between public 
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and private space. According to Klimasmith, “the very notions of privacy and domesticity 
must be reconfigured spatially in response to new urban realities” (53). Olive’s rowhouse is 
initially buffered against “new urban realities” (Klimasmith pluralizes Martin’s description), 
but her home eventually becomes a waystation for various characters throughout the novel, 
“transform[ing] [it] from a place of respite to a node in the developing networks of 
transportation and communication” (68). The characters frequently travel to and from 
Olive’s apartment via the horse-car and engage in agonistic dialogue, echoing the function 
played by the Every Other Week office and the El, respectively, in Hazard.2 Thus, according to 
Bowen, who similarly traces a fall from domestic grace, Olive’s apartment is “the perfect 
symbol for the fluidity of interior and exterior being, home and homelessness, and private 
and public life during the final decades of the nineteenth century in America” (4).  
If a rowhouse is the symbol for the fluidity of the public/private divide, then Lynn 
Wardley helps us see that Olive’s window is the conduit through which these two zones 
enter The Bostonians and are (re)defined in terms of one another: “If from one perspective the 
suburbs threaten to enter Olive’s home, from another they are safely framed within it, made 
a feature of its decor” (650). The signification of the public/private divide at Olive’s window 
accounts for the two perspectives in Martin’s account—the narrator’s view of urban blight 
and the characters’ picturesque misperception—without the assurance that the narrator is 
correct: the window is either a barrier or a passageway to the world, leading to a lovely, 
framed picture for one person and a sense of impending urban encroachment for another.  
Klimasmith makes this link between the public/private distinction and the 
interpretations of the landscape not via the characters’ perspectives but in the 
                                                      
2 See James, BO 61, 73, 121, 165. James, like Howells, associates the horse-car with Boston (note the “universal 
horse-car” in the long passage above [135]) and the El with New York. In New York, Basil and Verena travel 
from Olive’s temporary apartment on Tenth Street “up to the Central Park by the elevated railway” (252). 
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(mis)perception of other critics: “[m]ost discussions of Olive[’s] Charles Street home . . . 
focus on the house’s interior, and implicitly extend [her] class status to the neighborhood 
that surrounds her” (87). The neighborhood is thus an extension of the apartment, “a feature 
of its decor” (Wardley 650). In this camp we have Bowen, who assumes that Olive lives in a 
Back Bay rowhouse, and Howe, who calls Olive a “St. Theresa of Beacon Hill” 
(“Introduction” 165). “While placing Olive’s rowhouse in the Back Bay or Beacon Hill 
offers coherence to Olive’s bluestocking spinsterhood, it obscures the reality of Charles 
Street in the 1880s” (Klimasmith 87). Interestingly, Howe and Bowen disagree about where 
Olive lives even as they make the same mistake of projecting her “home culture” onto her 
neighborhood (James, BO 71). Instead of trying to understand why this discrepancy arises, 
however, Klimasmith describes what she sees as the reality of Charles Street, adding a third 
neighborhood to the mix: “given its river view, Olive’s section of the street would have been 
considered part of the West End, the working-class tenement neighborhood” (87). Not only 
is the view seedy or lovely, but Olive’s apartment is located amongst the Boston Brahmin of 
Beacon Hill, the nouveau riche of the Back Bay, or the working classes of the West End.  
Clearly, we need to be careful when ascribing a “reality” to the social world of the 
novel. After all, even those critics who are attentive to the fluid public/private distinction 
wind up trying to reify Olive Chancellor’s place in Boston. To get around this trap, we 
should not ask where Olive lives and what is true about the neighborhood or landscape but 
why it is so hard to tell where she lives and why the space outside her window means 
different things to different people. And how does James represent this ever-changing, 
conflicted, and seemingly inaccessible space? The lesson is clear: rather than offering one 
“way of seeing” as the “way of seeing” we should pay attention to the formal innovations 
James deploys to make sense of a contradictory or, better, antagonistic urban space.  
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In what follows, I will argue that James, his characters, and his critics are 
experiencing a failure to map Boston after a postbellum landfill project upset the city’s 
defined neighborhood lines. “Boston” only comes to cohere as an object of representation 
through an empty signifier of togetherness—what Slavoj Žižek, by way of Claude Lévi-
Strauss, calls the “zero-institution.” The “zero-institution” “has no positive, determinate 
function—its only function is the purely negative one of signalling the presence and actuality 
of social institution as such, in opposition to its absence, to pre-social chaos” 
(“Architectural” 267). In Žižek’s reading, the “zero-institution” is “ideology at its purest” by 
resolving social antagonism and enabling communal living (266). It is also homologous with 
Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemony, described by Mark Wenman “as a form of order as such, set 
against the backdrop of an inherent threat of social disintegration” (191). Brought to bear on 
the study of the novel, however, the “zero-institution” seems to confirm Kaplan’s thesis 
under a different name: American literary realists “actively construc[t] the coherent social 
world they represent” against the threat of urban-industrial “unreality” (9, 20). James, I 
argue, distinguishes himself by being aware of the antagonistic limits of his representation 
while holding up the “zero-institution” as a valuable meaning-making tool. 
Recall the terms of James’s famous preface to Roderick Hudson: “Really, universally, 
relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a 
geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so” (Literary 
1041). In the introduction, I argued that this statement makes possible a conception of 
hegemony and social antagonism within the American realist novel. Hegemony and realist 
representation make sutures within the fabric of everyday life, though there are countless 
holes capable of producing different kinds of aesthetic and political work: 
a young embroiderer of the canvas of life soon beg[i]n[s] to work in terror, fairly, of 
the vast expanse of that surface, of the boundless number of its distinct perforations 
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for the needle, and of the tendency inherent in his many-coloured flowers and 
figures to cover and consume as many as possible of the little holes. (1041) 
 
Antagonism marks the experience of the limits of this meaning-making process, 
where the endless relations of everyday life—the surplus of possible configurations within 
the canvas—bleed through the suture; or, what amounts to the same thing, where the 
“continuity” of the canvas is shown, as in a close-up, to consist of more “holes” whose 
function is “to invite, to solicit, to persuade, to practise positively a thousand lures and 
deceits” (1041). The constitutive surplus and missing-ness of “the social” (Laclau and 
Mouffe) opens the possibility for authors identifying with the realist project to test the limits 
of representation by bringing readers’ attention to voices and bodies, subjects and situations 
that have not been given representation, aesthetically or politically, and whose spectral 
presence, when brought into the open, calls into question the social/aesthetic totality.  
James, however, is more interested in the aesthetic and political function of the 
sutures than he is in uncovering the violence, oppression, and injustice—as well as their 
triumphant if momentary reversals—at the site of antagonism. Howells, we saw in the last 
chapter, wants desperately to break outside the bounds of his own novelistic totality, and by 
stressing James’s preference for “scene” over “drama” at that.3 James instead simplifies “the 
social” to aid representation. After all, he implores the artist faced with the canvas of 
everyday life to begin “an immense counting of holes and a careful selection among them,” 
even though those holes can deceive and even though the embroiderer wants “to cover and 
consume as many holes as possible” (Literary 1041). To translate, he must choose a subject (a 
set of relations) and a location (a hole in the canvas). After returning to the Boston area4 in 
                                                      
3 See Jameson, Antinomies 22.  
4 Born in New York City in 1843, James travelled around Europe with his family for most of his childhood. 
After returning to the U.S., the James family lived on Ashburton Place in Boston in 1864 and then Quincy 
Street in Cambridge starting in 1868. In 1875, Henry made the decision to leave for Europe because it provided 
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the early 1880s following the deaths of his parents, James wrote: “the most salient and 
peculiar point in our social life,” which he felt Boston localized, “[is] the situation of women, 
the decline of the sentiment of sex, the agitation on their behalf” (Notebooks 20).  
Unlike Wharton, whose novels critique gender oppressions despite her own 
conservatism,5 James displays no understanding of or sympathy with the Woman Movement. 
For James, as we will see, “the agitation” for women’s rights is intricately tied to the problem 
of urban representation and hence to the material growth of Boston; or, in Wardley’s words, 
“modern women had colluded with those modern, material forces at work to upset Boston’s 
established configuration” (644). In The Bostonians, James simplifies “the social” and aids 
representation in three related steps: 1) by naming the “new urban reality” making Boston 
hard to map; 2) by rewriting his metaphor for artistic production to articulate an antagonism 
between a male canvas and female embroiderers in the production of urban space; and 3) by 
attempting to resolve that antagonism to aid representation. To move from point 2 to 3, 
James teaches us the ideological function of the “zero-institution,” avant la lettre, with a visit 
to a Civil War monument that appears to “arc[h] over friends as well as enemies,” ostensibly 
suturing an antagonistic nation while celebrating the North (BO 189). He draws this function 
into the novel through Verena Tarrant, an empty signifier of an orator who can be 
influenced by a partisan political position even as the sound of her voice magically unifies an 
audience. James uses her voice to resolve the gender antagonism at the heart of his novel, 
making Boston cohere as an object of representation even as he shows that a single political 
                                                      
better opportunities for him as a writer, though he continued to publish in Eastern U.S. periodicals. Boston and 
Cambridge, we should note, are distinct cities but James called the latter “the particular Boston neighborhood . . . 
with which I had been formerly somewhat acquainted” (American Scene 45, emphasis mine) 
5 See chapter 4.  
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position will benefit from this sense of unity.6 This story will be told across different scales 
of space (the national, the urban, the architectural, and the bodily), demonstrating that 
antagonism goes all the way up and all the way down in a democracy, despite, or rather 
because of, the “zero-institution.” This is James’s and Žižek’s shared lesson: the “zero-
institution,” whatever form it takes—a preconscious idea, a piece of architecture, or a 
sonorous voice—always reproduces a social antagonism in the name of resolving it.   
I. The Changing Scales of Boston 
Hsuan Hsu’s work on the multilayered, conflicting “scales” of geographical 
identification in American literature (“home, region, city, nation, and globe” [1]) allows us to 
better understand the fluid relationship between public and private space in The Bostonians as 
well as the different (extra) textual perspectives of the same landscape. These interpretive 
problems arise from what Hsu calls “scale enlargement” in the nineteenth-century city, 
which signifies its physical growth as well as its connections to national and international 
markets. Hsu argues that such “scale enlargement affected representations of urban 
interiors” by “expos[ing] such tightly circumscribed spaces to the oblique influence of larger 
geographic scales” (57). In one sense, this argument echoes Klimasmith and Bowen on The 
Bostonians: the urban apartment is the locus where public and private overlap. However, Hsu 
goes one step further: “Large cities gave rise to experiences of scale enlargement in which 
writers, characters, and readers felt—but could not quite comprehend—the effects of an 
unrepresentable and unprecedented global space” (58). The “ways of seeing” catalogued 
above represent the failure of cognitive mapping as the city expands in size: James, his 
                                                      
6 If James had written Howells’s Hazard, in other words, he would have focused on the simultaneously unifying 
and antagonistic function of the El, which is itself a kind of “zero institution” for New York. Instead of 
anxiously trying to reach “the other half,” James would have zeroed-in on the political struggle to control the 
baseline sense of civic unity established by the interconnected web of public transportation.   
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characters, and his readers are having trouble locating themselves and others within 
(descriptions of) urban spaces that exist at the intersection of multiple scales of space.  
In his notebooks, James writes about The Bostonians in a way that exposes a similar 
slippage between scales in Hsu’s account: the novel will be “as local, as American, as 
possible, and as full of Boston” (Notebooks 19).7 The scales of Boston are hinted at in the 
second landscape that Olive’s apartment looks out onto, this time through her dining-room 
window: “the dusky, empty river, spotted with points of light” (James, BO 16). This “view of 
the Back Bay” (324) signals at least three things to James’s readers. Most simply, it refers to 
the brackish Back Bay of the Charles River. It also “describes an extensive area which was 
created by filling in the tidal flats of the Back Bay; [and finally,] understood in a sociological 
sense it refers to the smaller residential district which . . . has been the home of well-to-do 
Bostonians” since the last few decades of the nineteenth century (Bunting 1). Indeed, this is 
the up-and-coming but still unfinished neighborhood where the titular social-climbing 
millionaire builds his home in Howells’s The Rise of Silas Lapham: “It was found necessary to 
dig for the kitchen; at that point the original salt marsh lay near the surface, and before they 
began to put in the piles for the foundation they had to pump. The neighborhood smelt like 
the hold of a ship after a three years’ voyage” (43). This is more than a mere metaphor, since 
the neighborhood is bordered by water on the Beacon Street side: “The Back Bay spread its 
glassy sheet before them, empty but for a few smaller boats and a large schooner . . . which a 
tug was rapidly towing toward Cambridge” (54). Olive’s dining room thus looks out onto a 
residential landfill and “a brackish expanse of anomalous character, which is too big for a 
river and too small for a bay” (James, BO 14). When Ransom looks westward from Olive’s 
                                                      
7 Although the finished product has significant moments in Cambridge, New York, and Cape Cod, I propose 
that we take James’s claim about the centrality of Boston (indicated by the title) seriously. 
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parlor window, he sees houses of “extreme modernness” and “a long embankment . . . 
constructed of stones roughly piled” (14), which is his first glimpse of the landfill, though 
Olive later “giv[es]” him a fuller view of “the Back Bay” in her dining room (16).8  
Figure 2, an 1858 photograph looking west from Boston’s State House, offers a 
“before” view of the Back Bay (Charles Street is parallel to the water on the right-hand side 
of the perpendicular embankment). Between the 1850s and the 1870s, a landfill (fig. 3) was 
built along the western (left-hand) side of the Mill-dam, the dam-cum-road stretching away 
from us in the figures, connecting Boston and Brookline (this is most likely the 
“embankment” with adjacent modern houses James references).9 The finished product was 
shaped into a grid pattern with boulevards modeled after those in Haussmann’s Paris. “A 
civic project funded with public monies” (Domosh 104), the Commonwealth thus helped 
build this residential enclave for some of Boston’s wealthiest citizens. As if in compensation, 
developers reserved plots of the new land for public institutions that would contribute to the 
civic good but also increase the price of adjacent properties.10 A Boston Globe article from 
1872 outlines the stunning changes to the city in a relatively short timeframe: 
Bostonians who have been absent from their native city for a few years, return to 
express astonishment as they regard the rapid growth of the city. . . . Old landmarks 
and localities have almost completely disappeared, and about one-half of Boston to-
day is built upon made ground, reclaimed from the tide waters. The Back Bay—
scene of past skatings, and boatings, and smeltings, and snipe shootings, has 
vanished, giving place to palatial residences, elegant parks, superb avenues, and 
scores of stone churches whose architectural beauty cannot be excelled (qtd. in 
Holleran 27) 
                                                      
8 The editors of the Penguin edition of The Bostonians describe this view quite clearly: “The rear of Olive’s house 
on Charles Street—one of the city’s oldest and most select—looks west towards Back Bay, and north-west over 
the river toward Cambridge” (BO 380 n. 1). Because Olive’s parlor incorporates a view of Cambridge and 
Charlestown, Klimasmith believes that Olive’s home is on the northern portion of Charles Street bordering the 
West End. However, to glimpse the Back Bay so clearly, Olive’s home would have had to be farther south on 
Charles Street, though it is not clear where.  
9 In Howells’ novel, the Laphams “crossed the Milldam into Longwood; and here, from the crest of the first 
upland, stretched two endless lines, in which thousands of cutters went and came” (Lapham 35). 




Figure 2:  Boston’s Back Bay, “Before” 
Source: Boston Athenaeum  
 
Figure 3: Boston’s Back Bay, “After” 
Source: Boston Athenaeum  
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After moving to Europe in 1875, James made three trips back to the Boston area—
two nearly consecutive trips in the early 1880s “after six years of absence” (November 1881-
May 1882; December 1882-August 1883) and another in 1904/05 (a trip that yielded The 
American Scene)—where he saw the small city of his youth transformed by the filling of the 
Back Bay (Notebooks 214). In The American Scene, James describes the Back Bay in terms that 
give a negative spin to the astonishment of the Boston Globe’s hypothetical expatriate. 
Describing a walk down Charles Street, for example, James associates the “new land” with a 
logic of expansion that encompasses the Back Bay and the entire American scene: 
It is from [Charles Street] southward that the new splendours of Boston spread, and 
will clearly continue to spread, but it opened out to me as a tract pompous and 
prosaic, with which the little interesting city . . . had had absolutely nothing to do. 
This disconnection was complete, and the southward, the westward territory made 
up . . . a platform or stage from which the other, the concentrated Boston of history, 
the Boston of Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Longfellow, Lowell, Holmes . . . and 
the rest . . . could be seen in as definite.  . . . Where the “new land” corresponds most 
to its name, rejoices most visibly and complacently in its newness, its dumped and 
shoveled foundations, the home till recently of a mere vague marine backwater, there 
the long, straight residential avenues . . . testify with a perfection all their own to a 
whole vast side of American life. (AS 181-82) 
 
Although he made few notes about Boston during his 1880s visits, James does work 
his reactions to the new space into The Bostonians. Above, I indicated that the interpretations 
of the city outside Olive’s window are related to the “new urban reality” blurring the 
distinction between public and private. More specifically, I claimed that there are two ways 
that characters can experience these overlapping scales, one that produces a “lovely,” framed 
view and another that leads to a fear of incursion. A similar situation arises in a debate 
between Olive and a fellow Bostonian over the status of the Back Bay. Mrs. Farrinder, a 
leader in the feminist movement, “wanted to know why [Olive] shouldn’t stir up some of her 
friends down there on the Mill-dam” (James, BO 28). By using the name of the old 
dam/road extending across the Bay, which Beacon Street literally buried and replaced, she 
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establishes continuity between two moments in Boston’s history (which James will later 
associate with a romantic “way of seeing”).11 Mrs. Farrinder also mends the break between 
Back Bay and old Boston by assuming that Olive’s “place in the Boston hierarchy” (28) 
aligns her with the new land, conflating two kinds of “places” (social and geographic) in the 
process. This is perhaps what leads Bowen to place Olive’s home in Back Bay. There is 
historical precedent for the association, even if Olive does not live there. “The Back Bay was 
a women’s space,” Sarah Deutsch notes, “because it was littered with women’s organizations 
and because as early as the 1880s about 30 percent of the Back Bay’s residential lots were 
owned by women and 60 percent of the area’s residents were female” (12).  
Olive, meanwhile, updates Mrs. Farrinder’s lingo and, in so doing, also complicates 
the latter’s conflation of Beacon Street and wealth: she “hated to hear [Beacon Street] talked 
about as if it were such a remarkable place, and to live there were a proof of worldly glory. 
All sorts of inferior people lived there” (BO 28). Although this lends credence to 
Klimasmith’s contention that she lives in the working-class West End, Kevin Lynch points 
out, in his seminal study of cognitive mapping in Boston, that “Beacon Street is primarily in 
the Back Bay but relates to Beacon Hill by its name” (52). Olive is unclear about which 
neighborhood she aligns herself with: she dissociates her social and geographic “position” 
from the Back Bay by referencing Beacon Street’s inferiority—as if she wants it to be part of 
the West End—but neglects the fact that this “fine avenue” is both attached to Beacon Hill 
(the neighborhood associated with Charles Street) and runs across the newly-filled Bay 
(James, BO 28). Olive’s clarification of her own “position” is thus steeped in ambiguity.12  
                                                      
11 While James sympathizes with the “Charles Street ghosts” (181), who take the pessimistic perspective, he 
also tries “to . . . make the real romantic claim” for the “vanished objects” of old Boston (169). 
12 Although the interviewees in Lynch’s The Image of the City are able to locate Back Bay, Charles Street “acts 
ambiguously” and fulfills different functions “for various people at various times” (65). 
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After Olive convinces Mrs. Farrinder of her inability to “wake up the Back Bay!” (as 
a metonym for the wealthy women who live there, this statement confuses public and 
private) the latter jumps scales of geographical identification (53): Olive “might [make] 
liberal donations to a fund for the diffusion among the women of America of a more 
adequate conception of their public and private rights” (30). The implication is that public 
and private have yet to be adequately “mapped” on either a local or a national level. Put 
more broadly, then: the critics’ inability to decide where Olive lives, the lovely/seedy divide, 
the Olive-Mrs. Farrinder debate are all part of a collective failure to map the conflicting 
scales (public and private, local and national) created by the filling of the Back Bay.  
It is worth pointing out here that Howells’s depiction of Boston in the throes of 
urbanization, written three years before James’s novel though set after the 1870s timeframe 
of The Bostonians, lacks confusion over neighborhood lines and alliances. In fact, returning to 
the language of chapter 1, everything in Howells’s Boston is easily known and categorized: 
the “New Land” represents (allegorizes, even) the shaky foundations on which the nouveau 
riche build their place in society. Thus, as Carlo Rotella notes, “[t]he novel’s elegantly 
intertwined money plot and family plot are arranged on the armature provided by this figure 
of urban development” (5). When the still-unfinished Lapham house is accidentally burned 
down, completing Lapham’s financial ruin, it is clear to the reader that the solid foundations 
of Beacon Hill and its established elite—represented by the Corey family and their 
understatedly beautiful mansion on Beacon Hill—are held up as the only viable alternative. 
James takes a wholly different approach. His Back Bay is a truly overdetermined13 space 
whose signification for the citizens of Boston is as in flux and un-finished as the urban 
                                                      
13 I take this term from Laclau and Mouffe, who borrow it from Freud and Althusser. It names “a very precise 
type of fusion entailing a symbolic dimension and a plurality of meanings” (94).   
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landscape itself—it is at once a river, a landfill, and a neighborhood that can be both 
attached to or detached from the more established Boston landscapes and neighborhoods. 
James thus captures the un-knowability and confusion of urban flux far more successfully 
than Howells, at least until the latter’s New York novels (Hazard and The World of Chance).  
James’s masterstroke, perhaps, is to show this overdetermined, unfinished space only 
through a window, giving it a spectral presence felt in its deforming effects on the characters’ 
maps of the city. It thus becomes a site for marking the limits of Boston as an object of 
realist representation—the place where its differences and cultural significations threaten to 
dissolve into the void, not of non-meaning but a surplus of possible meanings. Indeed, if 
there is no correct “way of seeing” the landscape—only so many competing perspectives of 
the same, multi-layered space—then every description of Boston, including the author’s, 
runs the risk of being purely subjective and any interpretation of those descriptions the result 
of side-taking (this “way of seeing” is correct). For one of James’s American realist novels—
as opposed to his modernist experiments with point of view later in his career—it is not 
enough to say that subjective positioning is a solution to problems introduced by emergent 
scales.14 James’s problem can be framed as follows: how does the city cohere as an object of 
realist representation despite the conflicting perspectives presented in the text?  
For Hsu, “multiple, shifting, and at times contradictory allegiances to home, city, 
nation, and globe” are threats to representation and problems an author can resolve (92). 
Literature, Hsu argues, with a nod both to Jameson’s project of cognitive mapping and 
James’s canvas metaphor, can register the pressure of and ideologically resolve the social and 
spatial problems created by a “crisis of scale” by creating “new relations between individual 
subjects . . . and the fascinatingly, frighteningly immense spaces entailed by global capital” 
                                                      
14 See Jameson, Postmodernism 411–12. 
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(92). It will be helpful to work through Hsu’s references, Jameson and James, to understand 
precisely how this works.15 Jameson takes his concept of cognitive mapping from Kevin 
Lynch’s work on Boston, “[t]ranscoding [it] into the very different problematic of the 
Althusserian definition of ideology” (Postmodernism 52). Cognitive mapping takes the missing 
place of the Symbolic—i.e., representation through recognizable codes—in Althusser’s 
Lacanian definition of ideology as “the representation of the subject’s Imaginary relationship 
to his or her Real conditions of existence” (Althusser qtd. in Postmodernism 51). Though 
postmodernism is marked by the failure of cognitive mapping, a dialectical reversal would 
mean harnessing the power of ideology so that “we may again begin to grasp our positioning 
as individual and collective subjects” (54). James’s artist does something strikingly similar: 
faced with the endless relations of everyday life, he makes them appear to stop somewhere.  
As James’s notebook entry on The Bostonians makes clear, however, the largest scale 
in this novel is not the global but the national. Ann Brigham helpfully limits the scales of The 
Bostonians to the “urban, regional, and national,” preventing the (interpretive and scalar) leap 
into international markets: “From the seemingly mappable pairs of North/South, 
Boston/Cambridge, and Boston/New York to the more conceptual couplings of 
public/private, exterior/interior, and local/national, The Bostonians is replete with places 
staked out, contiguous, and contested” (7, 6). She has also done the work of locating the 
unique solution that James draws upon to help capture these “seemingly mappable” scales. 
The key to her analysis is that these scales are evoked during the Memorial Hall sequence, 
when Verena leads Ransom, her suitor and political rival, on a tour of Harvard’s architectural 
commemoration of the Civil War. Memorial Hall stands virtually alone in space, set off from 
other buildings, where it (re)creates the conflicting scales of urban experience—
                                                      
15 See Hsu 75-77 for a comparison between James and Jameson on cognitive mapping. 
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public/private (it is a public monument at a private university), local/national (the local 
structure commemorates a national event)—but as a Civil War memorial it mediates the core 
difference evoked by these scales (North/South) by “erasing the difference of their causes” 
with a plea for “national, rather than local, loyalty” (10, 11).  
Brigham shows how the reference to the Union at Memorial Hall motivates the 
marital “union” between Ransom and Verena at the end of the novel. Architecture thus acts 
as a go-between for the “seemingly mappable” scales of a growing urban space and local, 
everyday experience (6). While she is correct to read the resolution of the heterosexual 
romance as a rescaling of the Union at Memorial Hall, she misses an important paradox: 
James goes to smaller scales of experience—first architecture and then a courtship plot—to 
resolve the problem of representation introduced by the city. But the marital “union” 
between Ransom and Verena is not the only characterological resolution offered: for most 
of the novel, Verena is involved in an intimate intellectual and personal relationship with 
Olive. Verena’s “unions” with both Ransom and Olive are as political as they are personal. 
Olive and Ransom, I argue, both want to win over Verena because, like Memorial Hall, she 
can resolve the formal and political tensions in the novel’s treatment of urban space.  
Before we can understand how a character functions like a building, however, we 
need a theoretical paradigm that can help explain how architecture can aid the project of 
cognitive mapping.16 To this end, I will now turn to Žižek’s explication of the “zero-
institution,” which describes how a community with an antagonistic divide remains stable by 
reference to an empty signifier of togetherness. While he acknowledges that the “zero-
institution” performs a similar function to Jamesonian ideology, Žižek “applies the same 
                                                      
16 In Jameson’s famous example, postmodern architecture, specifically Los Angeles’ Bonaventure Hotel, 
confounds cognitive mapping rather than aiding it. See Postmodernism 39-44. 
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type of analysis to urbanism and architecture” (“Architectural” 266). The “architectural zero-
institution” will help us move from urbanism as a problem for representation to architecture 
as a formal solution that does its ideological work by drawing the world into two camps and 
appearing to resolve their irresolvable deadlock with a reference to collective identity.   
II. The Architectural Zero-Institution 
The “zero-institution” originated as the solution to a problem of cognitive mapping. 
After he asked them to sketch a map of their village, Claude Lévi-Strauss found that 
members of the Winnebago tribe produced two very different drawings depending on which 
of the tribe’s two subgroups the mapmaker belonged to. According to Žižek, the divergent 
maps of the same space are produced because of a fundamental antagonism within that 
society. The “zero-institution,” a term Lévi-Strauss uses to describe the sense of tribal unity 
that prevents social disintegration, is then “the direct embodiment of the ideological 
function of providing a neutral all-encompassing space in which social antagonism is 
obliterated, in which all members of society can recognize themselves” (“Architectural” 268). 
A “zero-institution” is the ideology that allows those who produce fundamentally different 
cognitive maps to imagine themselves as part of the same collectivity. 
While American society has its own zero-institution, with the classic example being 
the “nation,” it also projects this foundational sense of togetherness into the built 
environment. In the postmodern era, Žižek writes, certain buildings “bea[r] the imprint of 
different and mutually exclusive perspectives” in the form they take, often as two or more 
dialectically-opposed positions, only to then mediate between or resolve them 
(“Architectural” 255). For instance, there is a “series of oppositions which performance-arts 
buildings have to deal with: public/private, open/restrained, elite/popular—all variations of 
the basic motif of the class struggle . . . The space of these oppositions delineates the 
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problems to which performance-arts buildings are proposed solutions” (Žižek, Living 269). 
These “architectural zero-institutions” become “islands of meaning” open to all in a divided 
world (257). Nonetheless, the democratic ideals displayed by these buildings do not make 
them, for Žižek, mere screens for class relations: “it is not only that the fantasy embodied in 
the mute language of buildings can articulate the utopia of justice, freedom, and equality 
betrayed by actual social relations; this fantasy can also articulate a longing for inequality” (255). 
Or, as Žižek puts it using Jameson’s terminology: “The effective message of the ‘political 
unconscious’ of these buildings is democratic exclusivity: they create a multi-functional 
egalitarian open space, but the very access to this space is invisibly filtered and controlled” 
(“Architectural” 284). Thus, the architectural zero-institution retains or, better, actively 
recreates a core social antagonism that structures individual experience. 
Although Žižek maintains that the architectural zero-institution is unique to the 
postmodern era17 and centers around the class struggle, his framework can help articulate the 
function of architecture in The Bostonians. Memorial Hall, for example, is a Reconstruction-
era architectural “zero-institution.” A space unto itself, the structure reproduces the scales of 
modern life: it is public and private, local and national, and recalls the war between North 
and South. In Žižek’s framework, the goal is to read a building’s (scalar) oppositions 
(public/private, local/national) and related “ways of seeing” (sectionalist loyalties) as not 
only responses to but also as attempts to resolve a sociopolitical deadlock. Memorial Hall 
displaces the deadlock between North and South onto a neutral third party: the names of the 
student-soldiers killed in battle, found on tablets in a vestibule at the center of the building. 
                                                      
17 If one were to insist upon the postmodern nature of Žižek’s analysis, I would point to those critics, like Hsu, 
who locate the features that will later be associated with postmodernism lurking in James’s work. My claim here 




The moment he steps inside the vestibule, Ransom “forgot . . . the whole question of sides 
and parties . . . [the monument] arched over friends as well as enemies, the victims of defeat 
as well as the sons of triumph” (James, BO 189). Yet, the names of Harvard students who 
died for the Confederate cause (257 fought, 64 died) are omitted: the feeling of national 
unity belies support for the North. Thus, in Brigham’s words, “[a] union . . . does not signify 
a seamless merger or dissolution of parts into a greater whole. Rather, the metaphor 
describes a system that brings together two parts that both interlock and push against each 
other,” which could also be a description of the “zero-institution” (18). The “zero-
institution,” at Memorial Hall, is achieved by the evocation of the union, which not only 
brings together North (the Union in the particular sense) and South but retains a political 
divide under the surface (they push back apart), positioning Ransom as a defeated outsider. 
Memorial Hall might then serve as an aesthetic and political lesson for an artist: 
divergent “ways of seeing” need not lead to cultural relativism but can be resolved with a 
reference to the national “union.” The only question left is the “hegemonic” one of “how 
this zero-institution will be . . . coloured by some particular signification” (Žižek, 
“Architectural” 268). This interpretation stipulates that a single social deadlock sits at the 
heart of mutually exclusive “ways of seeing” and the building’s materialization of the latter.18 
For Žižek, the central antagonism that ideology reproduces and “resolves” is the class 
struggle; and the secret political meaning of the “architectural zero-institution” always 
benefits the bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, the split between North and South is what “the union” 
                                                      
18 Žižek reserves the term “parallax gap” for what I have described as competing “ways of seeing” and the 
antagonistic deadlock between them: “The parallax gap is not just a matter of our shifting perspective (from 
this standpoint, a building looks like this—if I move a little bit, it looks different . . . ); things get interesting 
when we notice that the gap is inscribed into the ‘real’ building itself—as if the building, in its very material 
existence, bears the imprint of different and mutually exclusive perspectives” (“Architectural” 253). From here, 
“the task is . . . to conceive all possible positions as responses to a certain underlying deadlock or antagonism, 
as so many attempts to resolve this deadlock” (255).  
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at Memorial Hall both resolves and sustains. However, as Brigham points out, in The 
Bostonians “geographical difference is reconciled with the reassertion of gender and sexual 
difference. That is, the two are imbricated” (14). Indeed, as we will see, the scene at the 
monument gives way to an argument about women’s role in public life. For now, I want to 
alert us to Brigham’s use of the word “imbricated,” as it evokes the possibility that one 
“difference” might be at the bottom of this stack of scales, in what Žižek would call the 
antagonistic core of ideology. As such, it would not be one social difference among many 
but a core deadlock, an impassable and irresolvable tear at the center of “the social.”   
We can be more specific than “gender and sexual difference” as the core deadlock in 
question. In a letter to his editor written from Boston in 1883, which James copied in his 
personal notebook, he named “the most salient and peculiar point in our social life . . . the 
situation of women, the decline of the sentiment of sex, the agitation on their behalf” 
(Notebooks 20). In The American Scene, James similarly defines “the intersexual relation” as “the 
feature of the social scene,” this time describing “a queer deep split or chasm between the 
two stages of personal polish . . . at which the sexes have arrived” (51). James in fact places a 
“queer split or chasm” between the sexes at the heart of the urban fabric. Indeed, after noting 
that Cambridge, Massachusetts has “a more embroidered surface” than he remembers and 
wondering “how far [it] might . . . go” (45), he genders the metaphor: “American life may . . . 
fall upon the earnest view as a society of women ‘located’ in a world of men . . . the men 
supplying, as it were, all the canvas, and the women all the embroidery” (52). James rewrites, 
by drawing together, his metaphor for artistic production and urban growth. Matching 
metaphors, women and authors make meaning by circumscribing a sphere of aesthetic 
relations within a masculine urban canvas that is never ending and constitutively torn open.  
When we pay attention to the gender metaphor in isolation, however, we note that  
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“[w]omen are complexly necessary to, and separated from, the male world” (McNamara 27). 
This points to an antagonism between the masculine canvas and the feminine embroiderers. 
Each side in the “intersexual relation” defines and yet sets limits on the other’s contrasting 
role (James, AS 51). Indeed, James notes “[the] apparent privation, for the man, of his right 
kind of woman, and [the] apparent privation, for the woman, of her right kind of man” (51). 
There is only mutual “privation” between men and women, which, to transcode, Žižek 
would call “lack”19 and Jameson, following Sartre, would call “scarcity.”20 Privation leads to 
antagonism insofar as the other has prevented self and society from becoming a harmonious 
whole: neither man nor woman finds an equal and willing partner in their work. “Insofar as 
there is antagonism,” Laclau and Mouffe write, “I cannot be a full presence for myself. But 
nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence” (111). We should also note James’s use 
of metaphor to describe this relation, as with his account of urban growth and artistic 
production: “antagonism . . . situates itself within the limits of language and can only exist as 
the disruption of it—that is, as metaphor” (Laclau and Mouffe 111).21 
Despite its apparent homology with postmodern theories of antagonism, one could 
argue that James’s metaphor relies on an outmoded separation of spheres and duties for men 
and women to go along with an overarching gender essentialism. However, the metaphor is 
more complex than this; it will be worthwhile to pause and explain how and why. 
First, on the issue of separate spheres, men and women have opposed positions in 
the joint creation of urban space, but this does not always map onto public (male) versus 
                                                      
19 See Žižek, Sublime 95-144.  
20 See chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion of scarcity (a term Jameson borrows from Sartre).  
21 They mean this in the Lacanian sense that metaphor crosses the “bar” separating signifier from signified and 
thus marks an experience of limits of a signifying chain. See Lacan 218.  
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private (female). Rather, this relationship is always changing. In The American Scene, James 
notes that men have recently ceded control of the canvas to their female counterparts:  
[T]he field he so abdicates . . . lies there waiting, pleading form [sic] all its pores, to be 
occupied—the lonely waste, the boundless gaping void of “society.” . . . Here it is 
then that the world he lives in accepts its doom and becomes, by his default, subject 
and plastic to his mate; his default having made, all around him, the unexampled 
opportunity of the woman—which she would have been an incredible fool not to 
pounce upon. It needs little contact with American life to perceive how she has 
pounced, and how, outside business, she has made it over in her own image. She has 
been, up to now . . . in peerless possession, and is occupied in developing and 
extending her wonderful conquest, which she appreciates to the last inch of its 
extent. (254-55) 
 
The masculine urban canvas, like James’s aesthetic counterpart, is filled with “pores” or 
“voids.” Women, in an act likened to a violent conquest, have taken control of the “void” of 
society—the home and “all of the social” realm—leaving men only the business world (255). 
In what capacity, by what aesthetic means, do women embroider “the boundless 
gaping void of ‘society’”? Kevin McNamara clarifies that, for James, the female voice, in 
particular, “embellishes the otherwise dull social canvas with richer colorings and more 
intricate patterns of events that define cultured life” (27). Indeed, in his visits to the U.S. in 
the 1880s and in 1904/05 James became obsessed with the speech patterns of American 
women, giving lectures and writing essays on the topic during and after the latter trip.22 
Wardley claims that, in these works, James participates in a literary-cultural tradition that 
aligns women’s voices, especially in domestic conversation, with the (re)production of 
“democratic culture” (640)—a tradition that includes Emerson, Tocqueville, and Whitman. 
Insofar as “woman’s speech and her physiology serve as the source of both cultural and 
biological regeneration in the democracy,” this tradition appears to essentialize the 
                                                      
22 See Henry James on Culture (cited parenthetically as HJC). “The Question of Our Speech” (42-57) was 
originally given as a graduation address at Bryn Mawr College in June, 1905; “The Speech of American 
Women” (58-81) was published in Harper’s Bazar in installments between November 1906 and February 1907; 
and “The Manners of American Women” (82-112) was published in Harper’s Bazar, April-July, 1907.  
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simultaneously biological and cultural role of women (639). James himself called women 
“the most confidently ‘grown’ and most freely encouraged plant in our democratic garden” 
(HJC 59). As Wardley shows, however, in his speeches to and about women James 
undermines this organicist position23 by demonstrating that a woman’s social role, far from 
being fixed for a particular domestic or reproductive purpose, is as public and as undefined 
as the urban spaces she populates: “while Whitman’s [women] are the already wifely and 
motherly ladies of his generation, set self-complacently apart from the whirl of commercial 
production, James’s [female] audience is . . . more immediately implicated in the social and 
material conditions that had newly produced the American woman in public life” (642).  
In other words, James at least thought he was being historical when he named the 
cultural role women play with their voices in a democracy. I want to suggest that he is 
participating in what Laclau and Mouffe deem “a sex/gender system,” or “[t]he ensemble of 
social practices of institutions and discourses which produce woman as a category” (104). As 
a critic studying James’s writings on gender relations as an example of a fundamental social 
antagonism, I want to emphasize a crucial point made by Laclau and Mouffe: “It is . . . 
possible to criticize the idea of an original antagonism between men and women, constitutive 
of the sexual division, without denying that in the various forms of construction of 
‘femininity,’ there is a common element which has strong overdetermining effects in terms 
of the sexual division” (104). In other words, there is no natural antagonism between men 
and women but discourses constructing differential male/female relations do influence how 
the sexual division is lived out and expressed. Unlike Žižek, I will not make the Lacanian 
case for “sexual difference” as the ultimate Real of self and society. 24 Rather, I claim that 
                                                      
23 As we’ll see, James also mocks this position, which becomes Basil Ransom’s, in The Bostonians itself.  
24 See Butler et al., 139-151 for Judith Butler’s critique of “the ‘quasi-transcendental’ status that Žižek attributes 
to sexual difference” (139) Butler takes a historical approach to the Lacanian “lack” or radical negativity, which 
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James rewrites a hegemonic masculine discourse on the role of women in a democracy to 
account for the “realities” he discovered in American cities and to aid representation. As 
Judith Fetterley points out, “American literature is a masculine territory in which the 
situation of women, if dealt with at all, is dealt with . . . primarily in terms of its effects on 
men. While no one would want to make a claim for James as an ardent or perhaps any kind 
of feminist, still he has the ability to place himself on the side of women” (116). Indeed, it 
should not be forgotten that authors and women play the same meaning-making role.  
For this self-styled historian of American manners, however, the female voice is not 
necessarily an arbiter of democratic culture but can evoke its opposite in Matthew Arnold’s 
scheme: anarchy. Anarchy holds a central place in the democratic tradition: for Plato, it 
connoted the overturning of established hierarchies and rules of social decorum in the 
streets of the city-state.25 In “The Speech of American Women” (1907), James recalls a stroll 
through Boston from a “quarter of a century” before (i.e., in the 1880s), during which he 
perceived the democratic anarchy instituted by the female voice in the growing city: 
I used to sally forth . . . across the pleasant [Boston] Common and down the 
spacious slope of Mount Vernon Street. This caused my passage almost invariably to 
coincide with the hour of “recess” of a seminary for young ladies flourishing hard by; 
the attendants at which . . . were . . . in possession of the public scene. . . . [T]he 
vociferous pupils . . . had been turned out [for play] . . . to the pavements of the 
town, and with this large scale of space about them for intercourse they could scarce 
do other than hoot and howl. They romped, they conversed, at the top of their 
lungs, from one side of the ample avenue to the other . . . [and] they . . . indulged in 
innocent mirth quite as if they had been in a private garden or play-room. (HJC 69)  
 
At the time of this stroll (1882), the Back Bay landfill to the southwest of his rented 
apartment on Mount Vernon Street had been recently completed. Thus, Wardley argues, 
                                                      
is closer to what I want to accomplish here. Žižek’s architectural criticism is more helpful because he names the 
class struggle as the Real of postmodern buildings and capitalism more generally, which has more of a historical 
purchase than his writings on the Real of sexual difference. 
25 See Rancière, Dissensus 49-50.  
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“[t]he sound of Boston maidens ‘vociferating over the Boston gutters’ suggested to Henry 
James that modern women had colluded with those modern, material forces to upset 
Boston’s established configuration” (644). There is some historical precedent for this claim. 
In a study of gender and power in postbellum Boston, Sarah Deutsch writes: “In a city 
neither designed for nor controlled by women, women had to reimagine or reconceive the 
city before they could create female-controlled public and semipublic spaces” (6). To relate 
this back to James’s metaphor, urban space is not created by women (men “supply” the 
canvas) but, by 1882, the embroiderers of urban space began to reimagine the old public 
(male)/private (female) distinction, setting up female-run (counter)publics in the city.   
In James’s hands, the example speaks to a larger rule: “in railway-trains and hotels, in 
shops and in city streets, in all centres of the particular life the most gregarious that the 
‘principal countries’ have to exhibit, women contributed a vast and conspicuous contingent” 
(HJC 91). Boston alerted James to a new development within the march of the democratic 
revolution: first, that women populate and define urban spaces and second, Americans have 
bad manners in public. At the same time, he finds that there is some base level of civility 
persisting under the surface, “avert[ing] complete social disintegration” (92). By what “odd 
law,” James wants to know, do Americans avoid the “easy triumph of chaos” (92)? 
In many ways, the idea of an abiding “democratic culture” is meant to contain the 
threat of dissolution and non-meaning at the core of democracy itself.26 Thus, women 
themselves, in their role as cultural embroiderers, prevent “social disintegration.” This is not 
merely a fantasy of what women are capable of so much as, in James’s mind at least, a reality 
in certain cities on the 1904/05 trip. The difference between 1882 and 1904/05 is between 
the rule of democratic anarchy and democratic culture. In the early 1880s, James is 
                                                      
26 See Rancière, Dissensus 47. 
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exasperated by the breakdown in the distinction between public and private, male and female 
spaces, which is yet another failure to map Boston, though it is now clear that the back-and-
forth between the male canvas and female embroidery is at the heart of the “large scale of 
space” (HJC 69). In The American Scene, James notes that all apparent signs of warfare 
between men and women have subsided. This is an act of ideological mystification, however: 
The effect of these high signs of assurance in her has been—and it is really her 
masterstroke—to represent the situation as perfectly normal. Her companion’s 
attitude . . . does everything it can to further this feat; so that, as disposed together in 
the American picture, they testify, extraordinarily, to the successful rupture of a 
universal law. (AS 255) 
 
Modern life is a site of rupture in a double sense—it is a historical rupture in gender relations 
founded upon a fundamental divide between male and female contributions to space—but 
women, with men following, represent it as a normal “American picture.” The effect is 
beneficial for James the “restless analyst”: “the equilibrium strikes us, however strangely, as 
at least provisionally stable; we see that a society in many respects workable would seem to 
have been arrived at, and that we shall in any case have time to study it” (255). Recall that 
women and the artist play the same role as cultural embroiders; now, one helps the other. 
The “provisionally stable” “equilibrium” between men and women—itself the 
“masterstroke” of women—allows for the artistic representation of the American city. 
As Wardley points out, James’s women perform their new cultural function neither 
in the home nor in the streets but rather “someplace in between” (640). Her example is the 
Isabella Stewart Gardner House, a private home-cum-museum on the Back Bay Fens, a later 
addition to the landfill: “the image of the house as a museum . . . enable[s] traffic between 
private and public space. The Gardner museum becomes a medium of woman’s appearance 
in public life, the stage of her occupation as cultural competitor or manager” (658). Though 
a masculine product, in James’s metaphor, architecture has become both an ally and a stage 
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for women to craft a cultural equilibrium: certain buildings rearrange the “traffic” between 
public and private space in a way that can help women appear in public as both 
“competitors” of men and the “managers” of social life.  
Written between the 1882 stroll and the American tour twenty years later, The 
Bostonians depicts a moment when Olive and her fellow Bostonians have entered a changing 
urban space as political agents but have yet to achieve equilibrium with their male 
counterparts. Instead, they engage in an all-out war with Ransom, a supporter of an all-
masculine canvas. The creation of a purely ideological equilibrium in the “embroidered 
canvas” of Boston and the political position that will benefit from this “union” are at stake in 
the novel. James, as embroiderer, achieves “a society in many respects workable” for 
representation by representing the (re)creation and obfuscation of the antagonism between 
the male canvas and female embroidery through the “zero-institution” (James, AS 255).  
An aurally pleasing voice—which James implores his listeners to adopt in “The 
Speech of American Women” after recalling the 1882 stroll—has the ability to represent an 
equilibrium between men and women, which is similar to the “slightly prosaic equilibrium” 
between North and South at Memorial Hall (AS 48), although for obvious reasons the 
female voice is better suited to resolve what James views as American society’s fundamental 
antagonism. In The Bostonians, James puts forward both architecture and the female voice 
(Memorial Hall and Verena) as related but not equally effective bastions of cultural unity in a 
divided world: the union at Memorial Hall becomes wrapped up in the divide between men 
and women in the production of urban space, creating the need for a new solution via 
Verena’s voice, which will parallel the architectural rearrangement of scales in the name of 
civic or national unity but on a smaller and more fundamental scale of experience. 
III. It All Comes Together in Boston 
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Early in The Bostonians, James describes the “latent incompatibilities” between Olive 
and Ransom (BO 17). These “incompatibilities” first manifest themselves when Olive 
prepares the dinner table so that Ransom can see the Back Bay “through a window where 
the curtain remained undrawn by her direction (she called his attention to this—it was for 
his benefit)” (15-16). Olive frames Boston for her impoverished cousin, shoring up a series 
of conceptual divides (public/private, insider/outsider, man/woman, North/South, 
rich/poor). We know this because of Ransom’s belated recognition, via Olive’s sister, of his 
host’s motivation: “‘That’s what they call in Boston being very ‘thoughtful,’’ Mrs. Luna said, 
‘giving you the Back Bay . . . to look at and then taking credit for it.’ . . . This, however, was 
in the future; what Basil Ransom . . . actually perceived was that Miss Chancellor was a signal 
old maid” (16). By jumping forward and back in time, James encourages us to map what we 
later find out about these characters’ politics onto this view. In what follows, I will argue that 
the antagonistic canvas metaphor structures the “latent incompatibilities” between Olive and 
Ransom as well as their experience of the overlapping scales evoked by the Back Bay view. 
Gender antagonism is like a black hole at the center of all these relations; only when it is 
named and then resolved will the novel’s conceptual divides (public/private, etc.) be fixed in 
a signifying chain denoting a commonsense “way of seeing” Boston. Verena’s voice takes 
over the ideological function of architecture as the tool James utilizes to make the divided 
urban canvas signify as a unified space. In other words, she provides the city and the text 
itself with a “zero-institution” that achieves order against the threat of anarchy. For the same 
reason, James makes her the object of desire for both Ransom and Olive, since they hope to 
benefit, personally and politically, from the baseline civic unity Verena achieves.   
Olive’s “simple and comprehensive contention” is that “the very essence of the 
feminine lot [is] a monstrous artificial imposition, crying aloud for redress” (BO 141). The 
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idea of a “lot” as an “artificial imposition” carries overtones of the “vague marine 
backwater” imposed upon by the Back Bay landfill (James, AS 182): it is as if women are 
trapped behind and need to break free from the artificial domesticity created by Back Bay 
brownstones. At another point, when Olive has begun to mentor Verena on the history of 
women’s oppression, they “turned away [from the window] with a sense that the winter 
night was even more cruel than the tyranny of men” (James, BO 136). The reason why 
nightfall is “more cruel than the tyranny of men” is perhaps because it appears natural while 
subtly allowing masculine tyranny to continue its oppressive creation of an urban canvas in 
which women are trapped in the private sphere. If this represents, in Deutsch’s words, the 
“dominant, idealized sexual division of urban space,” then the next step, historically, was for 
upper-class Bostonians to “entwin[e] the reconstruction of northern domesticity after the 
Civil War with the postwar reconstruction of the public sphere, demarcating their own zone 
of public authority while bolstering the . . . sanctity of their own homes” (4, 285).  
Olive participates in the historical reconfiguration of public and private space in a 
way that benefits both her gender and her “home culture”: she visits “squalid lodging-houses 
. . . [b]ut she reflected that after such exertions she had the refreshment of a pretty house, a 
drawing-room full of flowers”; furthermore, she attends meetings at a colleague’s South End 
home, “the common residence of several persons, among whom there prevailed much 
vagueness of boundary” but, unbeknownst to others, “she mortally disliked it [there] and . . . 
her most poignant suffering came from the injury of her taste” (James, BO 140, 24, 25). She 
prefigures James’s conclusions about the role of the female voice in promoting culture in a 
divided world: “The age seemed to her relaxed and demoralised. . . she looked to the influx 
of the great feminine element to make it feel and speak more sharply” (98).  
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Ransom, meanwhile, has the exact opposite position: “The whole generation is 
womanised; the masculine tone is passing out of the world; it’s a feminine, a nervous, 
hysterical, chattering, canting age” (260). “Ransom’s values and character,” according to 
Joyce Rowe, “evoke a Southern conservative vision of the social order, based upon 
allegiance to the principle of an organic interconnection among land, family, and 
community” (177). He believes feminists like Olive have disrupted the natural course of 
societal growth by entering the public realm. In his view, women should “fertilise” domestic 
conversation, leaving men to “dare and endure” public space (James, BO 304, 260). He thus 
attempts to “reform the reformers” by sending them back home (17).  
 “[I]t was [Ransom’s] belief that he saw things in their absolute reality,” and the same 
can be said of Olive: they both believe that they can map the true socio-spatial coordinates 
of society, even if they produce what looks, to the other, like an “infatuated, deluded 
geography” (248, 319). Because the narrator refuses to privilege one perspective over the 
other,27 the text sways back and forth between these competing representations of reality. 
Alfred Habegger has even used the phrase “The Disunity of The Bostonians” to describe a 
narrative split between the satire of both Olive’s feminism and Ransom’s organicism. 
However, this does not mean that cultural relativism is the only narrative technique left. 
Žižek posits that two divergent maps of the same space are produced by mutually exclusive 
attempts to symbolize the same social antagonism. Similarly, Olive and Ransom agree that 
men and women play fundamentally different roles in the creation of urban space, with 
female voices embroidering a growing masculine canvas (giving it a culture). They are both 
opposed to the social and political anarchy of urban space as they currently find it and 
                                                      
27 Howe was the first critic to argue that James equally disparages Olive and Basil’s positions. 
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believe the female voice will be central to restoring order. In other words, they both perceive 
a force threatening to destroy self and society and believe women are crucial to restoring 
order; they simply blame the other side (man or woman, organicists or feminists) for 
unleashing anarchy and preventing cultural unity. What they disagree on is where (the home, 
the concert hall), how (delightful conversation, political speeches), and to what degree 
(slight, revolutionary) women should perform their role as cultural embroiderers.  
Trying to explain the difference in the way he and Olive understand the role of 
women in modern society, Ransom tells Verena,  
I don’t object to the old old maids; they were delightful; they . . . didn’t wander about 
the world crying out for a vocation. It is the new old maid that you have invented 
from whom I pray to be delivered. He didn’t say he meant Olive Chancellor, but 
Verena looked at him as if she suspected him of doing so. (James, BO 262) 
 
Here we find our way back to that original window view. Until Mrs. Luna supplies her 
motives, “what Basil Ransom . . . perceived was that Miss Chancellor was a signal old maid” 
(16). When Ransom first imagines Olive taking an “old old maid’s” view of the Bay, the 
cousins appear to be in harmony regarding the separation between a female-run domestic 
space and the masculine space “safely framed” by the window (Wardley 649). The window 
allows for a theoretical connection between interior and exterior, but as a barrier it also 
prevents their interrelation. Thus, the “old old maid” supports an organic vision of society.  
However, when Mrs. Luna later unveils Olive’s true intentions, the latter becomes a 
“new old maid” capable of acknowledging the separation between inside and outside before 
pulling the metropolis inside her home and “giving” it to her guest to demonstrate his 
outsider status in a Northern city teeming with politically empowered women. Later, Verena 
explains to Ransom just how politically charged this view is:  
last June . . . [t]here were delegates [in town] from every State and every city . . . 
Olive had six celebrated, high-minded women staying in her house . . . and in the 
summer evenings we sat in the open windows . . . looking out on the bay . . . and 
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talked over the doings of the morning, the speeches, the incidents, the fresh 
contributions to the cause. (184-85)  
 
Olive’s “way of seeing” relies on the open window, which is capable of blurring public and 
private, local and national while still allowing her to retain control of a “home culture” 
(hosting guests). Thus, the divide between public and private, local and national scales, as 
well as the sentimental and seedy “ways of seeing” (the suburbs framed like a picture, the 
suburbs threatening to enter the home) become wrapped up in the political positions of 
James’s characters, which are themselves ways to symbolize the same antagonism.    
In summary: Ransom and the old old maids imagine an organic connection between 
the feminine home and the masculine exterior while at the same time erecting a boundary 
between them to prevent a further slide into cultural anarchy. Inversely, Olive and the new 
old maids separate private space from an artificially imposed masculine canvas but utilize a 
breakdown in that barrier to fight for women’s rights.  
This divide between the masculine canvas and the female embroidery as well as the 
two interpretations of the role women should play as embroiderers (the old old maid-new old 
maid) also underlie the Memorial Hall sequence. Of course, the scales of analysis are reduced 
from the urban to the architectural. Verena tells Ransom that his home state (Mississippi) is 
not “mentioned. But there is a great praise of our young men of war” (BO 188). Yet, because 
he does not listen to her, Ransom falls for the image of the union in the memorial vestibule. 
This parallels Olive’s initial success at her window: Verena positions Ransom as the defeated 
Southern outsider. However, as with the Back Bay, James must account for what he sees as 
the more fundamental divide between different “ways of seeing” emergent scales. At the end 
of this sequence, Ransom launches a counter-interpretation of the building, excluding 
women from all memorials: “If, when women have the conduct of affairs, they fight as well 
as they reason, surely for them too we shall have to set up memorials” (189). “Verena 
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retorted that they would reason so well they would have no need to fight—they would usher 
in the reign of peace,” pointing to the sovereign power that must fight for and maintain 
peace (189). Later, in the Cape Cod section of the novel, Miss Birdseye, a former abolitionist 
in Olive’s circle, perceives what she believes to be Verena making Ransom a participant in a 
union benefitting both the North and the feminist cause, as if she had maintained control of 
the ideology at Memorial Hall and instituted her “reign of peace”: “What Miss Birdseye 
clung to . . . was the idea that . . .  the closest of all unions . . . was preparing itself. Then his 
being a Southerner gave a point to the whole thing” (309). This union is redolent of the one 
Ransom redefined at Memorial Hall—it treats geographic difference as an offshoot of 
gender politics—but this time feminism achieves the upper hand. Thus, between Ransom 
and Miss Birdseye, Memorial Hall and Cape Cod, union-making architecture becomes routed 
through a disagreement about the public role of women in urban-industrial society.  
James here presents a version of Mouffe’s agonism, where antagonistic “enemies” 
become adversaries who disagree on just about everything under the sun but at the very least 
share the terms of their debate. In this case, some form of cultural unity is desirable for both 
Ransom and Olive, who wield concepts like “equality” and “freedom/liberty” to articulate it. 
They also recognize a fundamental deadlock between men and women. One of the elements 
in the debate they agree on, in other words, is the gender antagonism itself.  
What this divide lacks is aesthetic mediation, which Memorial Hall originally 
provided before it was taken up in a new set of divides related to the novel’s feminist 
politics. In other words, by redefining the ideology of Memorial Hall to account for a more 
fundamental social divide, James has to give up the “solution” that it provides. This is an 
important moment, one that makes evident a point that I must insist on to differentiate my 
reading of the agonism of the realist novel from critics like Kaplan who would read this as a 
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mere “strategy of containment” (10). The transition from antagonism—the us/them relation 
that is the background of the realist novel and the urban world it depicts—to agonism—the 
character debates that make up the foreground—is not itself a formal containment strategy, 
since the background antagonism motivates and energizes the positions taken in the 
foreground; but the re-containment of the antagonism can be the desired result of the agonistic 
relation and is hence a function of the characters. The Bostonians is one of the most 
spectacularly agonistic novels in this study because its conflictual foreground is so heavily 
infused by the mutual recognition of antagonism; and yet the goal of the two parties in the 
agonism is to achieve the brand of ideological defusing of antagonism that we found at 
Memorial Hall (the union that “arched over friends as well as enemies”) (189). The goal of 
agonistic character relations, in other words, is to name the “zero-institution,” that (purely 
ideological) point of convergence that prevents society from splitting apart at its seams. 
Verena’s voice, I will now argue, is capable of providing this kind of ideological 
solution. The first time he hears Verena speak, “Ransom became aware that the whole 
audience—Mrs Farrinder, Miss Chancellor, and the tough subject from Mississippi—were 
under the charm” (48). Men and women, North and South are all drugged, as it were, by her 
voice. Initially, her father, a mesmerist, has to “draw her out” when she steps in front of an 
audience and “[s]he let it come out just as it would—she didn’t pretend to have any control” 
(101, 44-45). Olive eventually replaces her father as the source of inspiration (by paying him 
off), but the effect of Verena’s voice is the same. When Ransom hears her speak in New 
York City, “[s]he had . . . reduced the company to unanimity” (206). Verena is thus the 
characterological equivalent of the “zero-institution”: she is an empty signifier capable of 
being influenced by various political actors, who motivate the content that she will then 
deliver to an audience in a seemingly neutral, unifying form. After all, “the only thing in life 
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she cared for was to put the truth into a form that would render conviction irresistible” 
(206). Yet, when Verena spurns Olive and chooses Ransom, “the truth . . . change[s] sides,” 
showing just how fluid this “truth” really is (299). Properly speaking, she transforms partisan 
political content into an abstract truth that seems to have been delivered “fresh from the 
hand of Omnipotence” and hence “outside and above all vulgarising influences” (90, 263).  
The novel traces Olive’s and Ransom’s attempts to control this “zero-institution” to 
ensure that their respective agendas benefit from “truths” about unions on a personal, civic, 
or national level. And these unions, we should add, only appear to resolve the antagonism 
between men and women, male and female spaces. In one of her speeches under Olive’s 
guidance, Verena clarifies that she will not make a call “to deepen the gulf that already yawns 
between the sexes, and [that she] doesn’t accept the doctrine that they are natural enemies,” 
which is the language of antagonism; rather, her “plea is for a union far more intimate—
provided it be equal—than any that the sages and philosophers of former times have ever 
dreamed of” (208). Yet, Olive’s personal “union” with Verena is betrayed by the 
socioeconomic power that she wields over their friendship, while the non-antagonistic 
doctrine that she teaches her is undermined by what Verena sees as Olive’s “desir[e] . . .  not 
only [for] justice but vengeance,” or what Ransom calls “a different inequality” (208, 178).  
While Olive is initially focused on teaching Verena about feminism rather than just 
controlling her voice, once she senses that her protégée is being persuaded by her cousin’s 
overtures, “Olive . . . made her go over every word of her lecture twenty times. There wasn’t 
an intonation she hadn’t made her practise” (305). Ransom, who never cared for the content 
of her voice, only appreciates the form it takes: “He took for granted the matter of her 
speech was ridiculous . . . She was none the less charming for that” (206). He simply tries to 
convince her to drop Olive’s cause for his own: “Your gift is indestructible; don’t talk as if I 
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either wanted to wipe it out or should be able to make it a particle less divine. I want to give 
it another direction . . . It won’t gush out at a fixed hour and on a fixed day, but it will 
irrigate, it will fertilise . . . your conversation” (303-04). Fitting with his organic vision of 
society, Ransom imagines that domestic conversation will have a social impact: “Think how 
delightful it will be when your influence becomes really social . . . in conversation” (304). Of 
course, his version of domestic bliss conforms to the history of matrimony “as a union that 
claims to abolish dominance only to recuperate dominance in natural terms” (Wardley 646).  
Thus, the zero-institution is ideology at its finest: Verena’s voice, described as 
“artless,” “pure,” “magical,” “edifying,” “delightful [,] not dogmatic,” and “above the brutal 
uproar of the world” is a mystification resulting from Ransom and Olive’s war to tune her 
voice to a particular ideological station (James, BO 42, 75, 122, 47, 177, 50). Her voice 
achieves (personal, civic, or national) unity while preserving the antagonism between the 
masculine canvas and feminine embroidery in a form that bolsters a single political position. 
In this way, Olive, Ransom, and Verena come to represent the “three main 
divisions” of Memorial Hall: academic theater, dining hall, and Civil War memorial (188). 
Olive, whose two brothers died fighting for the Union, is clearly linked to the Northern 
soldiers in the memorial vestibule. Furthermore, her idea that Verena “should come before 
the public” after pursuing “high intellectual and moral work” reflects the “theatre, for 
academic ceremonies” (112, 134, 188). As a veteran who espouses the “ancient prejudices” 
of “those really medieval universities . . . at Oxford, or Göttingen, or Padua” and who 
proclaims that Verena’s platform will be on “the dining-table,” Ransom represents not only 
the excluded South but the “vast refectory” with windows “like the halls and the colleges of 
Oxford” (187, 303, 188). Importantly, the memorial vestibule stands between the theater and 
the dining hall. In between these two camps—North and South, academic theater (the 
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woman as public orator) and refectory (the woman as private orator)—is Verena, whose 
voice promotes and creates a union that holds a divided audience together. Appropriate for 
this in-between space, James’s readers expect Verena to make a decision between her suitors, 
giving resolution to a novel split down the middle between Olive and Ransom’s views. 
A key moment occurs when Olive draws the curtain on her window, creating an 
intimate space with Verena inside her home before taking her on a U.S. tour: 
They watched the stellar points come out at last in a colder heaven, and then, 
shuddering a little, arm in arm, they turned away, with a sense that the winter night 
was even more cruel than the tyranny of men—turned back to drawn curtains and a 
brighter fire and a glittering tea-tray and more and more talk about the long 
martyrdom of women . . . (136) 
 
The attempt to change the signification of the space outside Olive’s window is placed in 
abeyance so that Verena’s interior can be shaped by Olive. A lot has been made of Olive and 
Verena’s relationship in James criticism, with a focus on the homosexual or homoerotic 
connotations. How this relationship fits (or, to anticipate, does not) with the undeniably 
heteronormative metaphor of the gendered canvas is thus worth pausing to explore. 
 Fetterley famously exposed the political agenda of “phallic” critics like Howe who 
stressed James’s condemnation of Olive’s lesbianism “as abnormal, unnatural—in a word, 
evil” (110). The novel itself, she points out, does not support this reading. There is 
undeniably satire directed at Olive, though, and the question becomes where it is focused, if 
not on her “abnormal” sexuality. Peter Coviello has provided a fascinating answer to this 
query. He claims that James satirizes Olive’s feminism as the displaced object of her erotic 
attachment to Verena. But the reason for that displacement is viewed sympathetically: “If the 
novel . . . heaps opprobrium on [her] feminism, it nevertheless nurtures an open-heartedness 
and a generosity toward Olive that is rooted in precisely the sense of feminism as a sort of 
forced and debilitating misapprehension, an inadequate substitute in the place of which there 
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are . . . no immediately better options” (171). The “Boston marriage,” of which the Olive-
Verena relationship is a type, existed before the codification of hetero- and homo-sexuality 
at the turn of the century. We thus find in Olive “the melancholia proper to an object not so 
much repressed as foreclosed—the blocked mourning, that is, for a loss that was itself never 
articulable, that could never take shape as a possibility” (179). Olive’s “queer melancholia” 
(179) takes the place affect served for Howells, as that which can’t be named/narrated: “For 
all the intensities of being by which Olive wishes to define herself (rage, captivation, delight), 
there are, it seems, no words” (174). Affect, as Howells learned, also cuts against utopian 
politics: “Her suffering, James insists both mockingly and tenderly, is not the same as that of 
other women, and has no easy equivalence in the world of reformers. It is, perhaps, a silence 
not to be ameliorated even by the winning of the ballot” (177). Perhaps, I would want to 
add, in that world “to come” there will be an opening for an equivalence between feminism 
and queer politics—while retaining their autonomy—first to name and then mobilize against 
suffering and oppression along the sex/gender axis even after the ballot has been achieved.28  
At any rate, it is nonetheless the case that James satirizes Olive’s feminism. In my 
reading, this is less because it represents unspoken/unspeakable sexuality displaced onto 
identity politics but because the radical fight for gender equality belies the degree to which it 
keeps open an ongoing war between men and women while symbolically resolving their 
antagonism: her more equal future might just institute a “different inequality” as Ransom 
fears (James, BO 178). But the key to James’s representational project is that he does not 
simply side with Ransom but rather parodies his utopian “solutions” as well.    
                                                      
28 Coviello takes up this issue later: “A more theoretically-minded reader might . . . appraise Olive as a figure 
who anticipates the necessarily vexed, ever-unsettled relation of feminism to queer studies: modes of inquiry 
and critique that can neither function coherently without acknowledgment of one another, nor without 




There is a layer to the Memorial Hall scene that mimics Olive’s act of closing the 
curtains: by “keeping the incident of Basil Ransom's visit . . . buried in unspoken, in 
unspeakable, considerations,” Verena transfers the conflict between Olive and Ransom into 
her mind, which James associates with her body as they sit in Central Park after one of 
Verena’s speaking engagements (224): “Strange I call the nature of her reflections, for they 
softly battled with each other as she listened [to Ransom], in the warm, still air, touched with 
the far-away hum of the immense city” (255). The body and the voice reflect the two levels 
of ideology at work in Memorial Hall: the tablets and Verena’s voice represent and create 
unity while, on a deeper level—in the smallest scale possible, at the core of Verena’s being—
two opposed political positions continue to do battle.  
Once Olive plans a countrywide lecture tour slated to begin at Boston’s Music Hall, 
the shades blocking out the Back Bay are metaphorically pulled up and the city and nation 
alike are prepared to hear Verena Tarrant. When the newspaperman Matthias Pardon first 
pitches the Music Hall idea to Olive, he mentions that “he want[s] something on another 
scale, something so big that people would have to go round if they wanted to get past” (99). 
James plays on the two kinds of scales at work here—musical/vocal and geographic—in a 
way that aligns Verena’s voice with scale-changing architecture. While Pardon is crafting this 
plan, “Mrs Tarrant was inquiring of Mr Burrage whether he visited much on the new land,” 
and this is no coincidence: Verena’s voice, likened to civic architecture, can evoke and 
resolve the tensions endemic to the emergent scales of urban-industrial life (99). Thus, we 
have the imaginary transposition of Memorial Hall (Verena is explicitly aligned with 
Cambridge and, in my reading, the memorial vestibule) to Boston, where the scalar and 
personal/political tensions surrounding the filling of the Back Bay can now be resolved. 
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Initially, the new signification of the city benefits Olive’s ideological position. Indeed, 
the streets are lined with advertisements, “[t]he city of Boston is under [the Music Hall’s] 
roof,” and Pardon is ready to report on the event (343). In Chris Walsh’s formulation, mass 
publicity performs a quasi-religious function: it “serves as a . . . unifier of a decidedly non-
transcendent, fragmented society” (16). Pardon’s piece will create a “union” for a widespread 
audience after Verena unifies Boston: local and national scales are working as one. When 
Ransom compares himself to “a young man . . .  [who] has made up his mind . . . to 
discharge a pistol at the king or president,” two things are clear: Ransom is a deviant in 
Olive’s space, and, due to the publicity surrounding this event, his attempt to aid Verena’s 
defection will spread far and wide, like the news of Lincoln’s assassination (James, BO 333).  
The largest indication that urban space has been re-signified to benefit Olive’s cause 
is “[t]he figure . . . of a robust policeman” at the door to Verena’s waiting room (336). Not 
only does he prevent Ransom from getting to Verena, he suggests that “the lecture . . . will 
do [him] good” (337). When the policeman admits that “[t]hey’ve got the key on that side,” 
James indicates that Olive now polices the fundamental divide between them (literalized as a 
locked door) (340). However, this control is momentary. Verena opens the door and the 
policeman “stroll[s] aside a little, with the air of being superseded” (341). Ransom then 
convinces Verena to run away with him. Without Verena’s voice, however, the crowd begins 
to revolt, turning a union-making event into an antagonistic “battle” (345). At the last 
moment, Olive “offer[s] herself to be trampled to death and torn to pieces” (348). The 
crowd is “hushed” by Olive’s presence, but we never learn what happens next. 
James also leaves it open for interpretation what happens to Verena and Ransom 
after the former’s defection from the political stage. On one level, the “tears” that follow 
“the union” between Verena and Ransom signal that the “inevitable agony” in Verena’s 
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mind is, indeed, inevitable (350, 343). While this gets us to the smallest scale of experience 
possible—Verena’s mind and body (her suffering)—it is still unclear how this “union” might 
resolve a fundamental social antagonism. And what about Verena’s voice, which Ransom 
admits is indestructible? The only answer we have is the one that Ransom gives Verena: her 
voice will “irrigate” the social world from the domestic realm. 
A version of this organic “union” can be found in James’s A New England Winter 
(1884). Written before The Bostonians, it takes place after the 1870s setting of the later work, 
offering a snapshot of Back Bay rowhouses a few years after James’s stroll through Boston: 
[T]he large clear windows of their curved fronts faced each other, across the street. . . 
. A great many ladies were looking out, and groups of children, in the drawing-
rooms, were flattening their noses against the transparent plate. . . . This continuity 
of glass constituted a kind of exposure, within and without, and gave the street the 
appearance of an enormous corridor, in which the public and the private were 
familiar and intermingled. (309) 
 
“[P]ublic and private” are “familiar and intermingled” because domestic spaces are projected 
onto the street; but they are also separated by a plate glass window. Ransom’s organic vision 
of society has been woven into the built environment. In 1904-05, James will find that the 
opposite position has achieved cultural hegemony: at that point, women control various 
public and semi-public spaces while also representing American life in equilibrium. Between 
his two U.S. visits, then, we can see how the antagonism between the masculine canvas and 
the feminine embroidery can be resolved with similar tools (architecture and the female 





Abraham Cahan’s Post-Marxism and the Problem of Jewish Identity 
 
 In his 2013 biography of the late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century realist 
author and political activist Abraham Cahan, Seth Lipsky describes the attraction of this 
biographical subject beyond their shared occupation as editors of the Jewish Daily Forward, a 
Yiddish-language socialist newspaper in Cahan’s days that became a right-leaning English-
language paper under Lipsky’s leadership. “Beyond that,” Lipsky writes, “I was also attracted 
by Cahan’s political story. He had stood with labor throughout its great awakening and the 
years during which it was being organized, but he had broken early with the hard-left 
factions and played a leading role in the long struggle against Communism” (3). This 
trajectory can be filled in with more details. After being introduced to underground anarchist 
literature in Russia, Cahan converted to Marxism once he emigrated to the U.S. in 1882. In 
1891, he attended the second meeting of the Second International Workingmen’s 
Association as a representative of the United Hebrew Trades. In the early-to-mid-twentieth 
century he served as editor of the Jewish Daily Forward. By 1951, when he died, Cahan was 
anti-Communist, pro-Zionist, and believed that change would come about through political 
reform, not by revolution. Lipsky’s narrative of Cahan’s life echoes the right-moving 
trajectory of the so-called New York Jewish intellectuals—Lionel Trilling, Sidney Hook, 
Norman Podhoretz—from prewar Marxian socialism to Cold War liberalism to 1960s 
neoconservativism and Zionism.1 
                                                      
1 See Schreier 101-106. 
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Despite the moral and ideological assurance with which Lipsky presents this right-
moving trajectory, Tony Michaels reminds us that “Jews . . . did not travel a short, direct 
road from Yiddish-language socialism to English-language liberalism. An ongoing tug-of-war 
between radical ideals and practical necessities shaped the Jewish labor movement from the 
beginning” (20-21).2 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have shown, on a more global 
scale, that the divide between high socialist theory and the daily realities of the labor 
movement in various countries (e.g. in the U.S., “where ethnic and religious identities 
predominated over those of class”) yielded a series of responses in the Second International, 
among which it would be interesting to map the early stages of Cahan’s political 
transformation (11). As a corrective to Lipsky’s narrative, I will show how Cahan’s Marxism 
was inflected by liberal-democratic pluralism from the start and how this affected his writing.  
Among those who study Cahan, there is a tendency to separate his newspaper 
editorship, and hence his socialism, from his concerns as a novelist.3 Philip Joseph posits 
that, while the Jewish Question (that is, the debate surrounding the status of Jews in modern 
society) produced equivocation if not denial within the ranks of international socialism, 
English-language fiction gave Cahan carte blanche to pose the question in all its complexity. 
Indeed, an 1890 statement by the Hebrew Federation of Labor read: “The only Jewish 
question we recognize is the question, how to prevent the development of such ‘Jewish 
questions’” (qtd. in Joseph 3). In their estimation, Joseph explains, “America offered an end 
to the Jewish question and an opportunity for a universalist working class movement” (3-4). 
If, as the editor of the Forward, Cahan could not take up the question of Jewish identity in its 
                                                      
2 For a critique of Lipsky’s biography on precisely these lines, see Guttenplan.  
3 See Sanders 86. This view goes back to those who knew Cahan. For example, Hutchins Hapgood claimed that 
after Cahan became disillusioned by “socialism in its narrow sense” he “turned, disgusted, to English 
newspapers and to realistic fiction” (qtd. in Joseph 4).  
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complexity, then “English fiction offered not only the status of American authorship but an 
intellectual hiatus from the obligations and narrow conventions of Yiddish journalism . . . 
Cahan could postpone taking a position on this question because many Americans had not 
yet defined Jews conclusively either as full citizens or as non-citizens” (5). 
Joseph is right to focus on the uncertainty of Jewish identity in America (“whether 
Jews had the same status as other marginal white populations or whether Jewishness like 
blackness constituted a racial and cultural exception”) (5). However, he is wrong to suggest 
that Cahan’s fiction represents a reprieve from his socialist commitments. Cahan, Ronald 
Sanders explains, “use[d] Howells as [an] example of his thesis that a genuinely realistic 
perception of the world leads inevitably . . . to an art of social protest—in other words, in 
Cahan’s view, to an argument in favor of socialism” (239-240). In his 1920 obituary for 
Howells, the man who had single-handedly jumpstarted his career as a novelist back in 1896, 
Cahan took issue with the popular characterization of Howells as a socialist: “His socialism 
was not of the sort which is expressed in the program of the Socialist parties. Howells did 
not believe in class struggle, but he did believe in the socialist ideal as do the rest of us” (qtd. 
in Kirk and Kirk 53). Howells appreciated the social and political aims of socialism without 
adhering to the Marxian narrative explaining how the socialist mode of production will come 
into existence (class struggle). As we saw in chapter 1, Howells formed an idiosyncratic 
theory of class antagonism: signs of class difference spoil the joy of “society” for both sides, 
leading to the geographic segregation that Jacob Riis visualized as the city’s two halves. 
While Howells hoped “society” would spread from the drawing room to the rest of the city 
and the world, eradicating antagonism and instituting “real equality,” he oscillated between 
ideological containment, melancholic despair, and a smiling mode that searched for instances 
of shared enjoyment in everyday urbanism. Cahan, in his own words, “could not imagine the 
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achievement of socialism without a bitter struggle” (Education 256-257). In aesthetic terms, 
Cahan realized that without the Marxian narrative of History—the one about capitalism’s 
constitutive antagonism (the class struggle) and the only path toward “real equality” 
(revolution)—Howells’s realist program would fail to incite change. If Joseph is correct that 
Cahan introduced American readers to the Jewish Question, then he did so in the context of 
placing the class struggle at the center of American realism’s aesthetic and political concerns.  
Cahan thus introduced an interested reading public to Jewish experience in urban 
America by problematizing from the start how Jewish identity would be defined (as a race? 
ethnicity? religion?); but this was not done out of the “greater scope” for exploring questions 
of identity offered by the world of letters (Joseph 5). Rather, the Jewish Question became a 
problem because Cahan first insisted on inserting the Marxian problematic into the fabric of 
American realism, not as a determinate contradiction between characters who represent 
opposing social classes but, much more interestingly (and less orthodox), as a free-floating 
master narrative that both explains and stands in tension with the Lower East Side world of 
his novels. Cahan describes in his autobiography his first days in Lower Manhattan: “I felt 
America’s freedom every minute. . . . But all the time I was saying to myself, ‘All of this is a 
capitalist prison’” (Education 228). This “confusion in [Cahan’s] brain” (228) manifests in his 
fiction as a tension between class identity and ethnic identity that eventually spurs a 
transformation to what I term his post-Marxism, where he fights capitalist unfreedoms as a 
Jewish-American citizen. At the later stage of his career, the master narrative of the 
eighteenth-century democratic revolution—which, in Laclau and Mouffe’s estimation, can 
subsume the Marxian problematic without its class essentialism—provides Cahan with the 
aesthetic and political means to argue for a cross-class, cross-national Jewish Left. 
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One might say that the debate between liberalism and Marxism, identity politics and 
class politics, has been played out. Cahan offers a unique opportunity to historicize an early 
(pre-Cold War) moment in this debate and measure where a politically active realist writer 
stands among its key players: Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein in his moment, Laclau and 
Mouffe, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Fredric Jameson in the aftermath of Cold War side-taking. 
In what follows, I first place Cahan’s political development within the context of a 
battle between orthodoxy (Kautsky) and revisionism (Bernstein) in the Second International, 
as told by Laclau and Mouffe. I will then read two of Cahan’s English-language realist 
works—Yekl (1896) and The Rise of David Levinsky (1917)—as steps in Cahan’s 
transformation from Marxist to post-Marxist. Yekl condenses a tension between the 
orthodox narrative of History—class struggle leading to revolution—and the plurality of 
subject positions occupied by Cahan’s Lower East Side characters. The orthodox position is 
smuggled into the novella via what Jameson, following Sartre, calls allegorical transcoding: a 
discussion of boxing in the opening pages tells at least two different stories, on different 
levels of meaning (roughly, economic and cultural). One story is about the antagonistic 
relations between capitalists and laborers and between the laborers themselves, and the other 
is about the viability of assimilation versus cultural separatism. The title character, Yekl (or 
Jake), likened to a boxer who tries and fails to rise above his class position, unwittingly 
follows the orthodox stance on assimilation (assimilate now, become class conscious later). 
This position is met in agonistic fashion by his wife Gitl, who desires a uniquely Jewish 
identity to emerge from the pluralistic world of urban America. However, it is unclear if or 
how a newfound Jewish-American subject position can become radicalized in a socialist 
direction after foregoing class as the true essence of one’s (political) identity. By the time 
Cahan writes The Rise of David Levinsky—a clearer variant of the “rise” narrative in Yekl—the 
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question he poses is: how can a Jewish political identity emerge on the Left without a 
reliance on class essentialism? The answer appears when Cahan has the Forward respond, in 
the pages of his novel, to the title character’s economic exploitation by calling for the Jewish 
Left to join forces in opposition to a Social Darwinian brand of liberalism that countenances 
inequality while defending free market capitalism.  
I. Orthodoxy versus Revisionism: The Global and the Local 
In the previous chapter, we saw that James’s The Bostonians operates on a scale of 
representation from the voice/body to the nation, with urban architecture mediating 
between them; Howellsian realism moves within a more restricted spectrum of scales: the 
body and its entanglement in urban public transportation. Cahan’s Lower East Side novels, 
following his career in the Yiddish-speaking socialist movement, exist at the tense meeting 
point of the local (the neighborhood) and the international (the socialist international); the 
particular (ethnic identity) and the universal (the “universal” class, the proletariat). 
These competing scales would have been evident to Cahan at the conference of the 
Second International he attended in Brussels in 1891. The tension between the Marxian 
narrative of History and the actual spread of capitalism, coinciding with the “growing 
dissociation between the different subject positions of the workers,” produced a “crisis” in 
Second International Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe 13). The solution to this crisis for those 
who wanted to stay true to Marx and Engels’s scientific analysis of society (Kautsky, Georgi 
Plekhanov) was to prepare for a revolution still necessitated by the development of the 
economic base. This position, known as orthodox Marxism, is a predictive, future-oriented 
“science” formed from an unstable combination of Hegel, Marx, and Darwin.4 The crisis 
also produced a “revisionist” camp that argued for the “piecemeal realization of socialism by 
                                                      
4 See Laclau and Mouffe 14. 
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normal political means” (Tudor 19).5 The two most influential revisionists were Bernstein, 
with whom Cahan carried on a correspondence, and Jean Jaures, whom Cahan met in Paris 
in 1912.6 Bernstein posited that democracy was not simply the political representative of the 
bourgeoisie, to be replaced in the revolutionary moment; rather, “democracy is a 
precondition of socialism to a much greater degree than is often supposed, that is, it is not 
only the means but also the substance” (Bernstein 160). Because “democracy is merely the 
political form of liberalism,” socialism is “organised liberalism” (149, 150). 
Jack Jacobs has argued that anti-Semitism within the socialist party and a related 
failure to address the Jewish Question caused Bernstein, an assimilated German Jew, to 
make the break with orthodoxy.7 Whatever the validity of this assessment, Cahan’s own 
political transformation began the moment he tried and failed to convince fellow members 
of the Second International to take a stance on the Jewish Question at the Brussels 
conference. “The Jews,” he argued, “are persecuted, hounded; they have been made into a 
special class. This class wants to fight and asks for its place in the ranks of Social 
Democracy” (qtd. in Frankel 132). The proposal led to an official condemnation of both 
anti-Semitism and philo-Semitism, but Cahan was nonplussed. There was no room, it 
seemed, for concern about the particular injustices of an ethnic or religious identity within 
the class universalism that dominated the party’s thinking—such problems, so the thinking 
went, would wither away with the state and the capitalist injustices it perpetuated.  
After he returned home from the conference, Cahan continued to play a central role 
in the Yiddish-speaking socialist movement on the Lower East Side. This movement was 
responsible for recruiting hundreds of members to the Socialist Labor Party and, more 
                                                      
5 See Laclau and Mouffe 1-36.  
6 See Lipsky 109. 
7 See Jacobs 58-59. 
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impressively, for the unionization of thousands of immigrants who participated in numerous 
strikes between 1890 and 1914. Historians have demonstrated the importance of this 
movement, not just to the ranks of international socialism but also to the intellectual, 
political, and even moral development of New York’s Jewish population, which boomed 
during the great “waves” of immigration following Russia’s anti-Jewish pogroms of 1881 
(when Cahan came to the U.S.) and 1905.8 Tony Michaels describes the difference between 
the Lower East Side socialist movement and its sister organizations on the continent: 
In more culturally homogenous countries, such as England, labor leaders 
discouraged Jews and other foreign-speaking workers from establishing autonomous, 
ethnic-based unions and political organizations. Similarly, many Russian socialists 
insisted in the name of “proletarian internationalism” that all workers, regardless of 
national background, join a single, Russian-speaking party. The socialist movement 
in New York, however, presented a different model of internationalism that reflected 
the population’s immigrant character. In a city where most workers were from 
someplace else, the main socialist political parties and union federations allowed 
them to form distinct linguistic subunits. Jews could maintain autonomous, Yiddish-
speaking organizations yet still participate in larger, multiethnic structures, such as 
the Socialist Party or New York’s Central Labor Union. Jewish socialists were also 
linked to comrades overseas through the Socialist International. (7) 
 
The allowance of ethnic or national autonomy—a response to the pluralism of this 
“polyglot” city (7)—within an organization that still saw itself as part of the Second 
International produced many sparks among Lower East Side socialist intellectuals and, as I 
will now show, catalyzed Cahan’s post-Marxism. 
A vignette in Ronald Sanders’s The Downtown Jews (1969) shows the earliest stages of 
this transformation. The time is 1902, and Cahan has just been asked to resume editorship of 
the Forward after a five-year hiatus during which he wrote his English-language novella, Yekl 
(1896). A series of ideological and personal squabbles led up to this moment. The 
                                                      
8 See Frankel; Herberg; Howe, World; T. Michaels; and Sanders. This is not to say that these historians agree on 
the overall significance of this movement. Howe and Michaels, for example, take issue with Herberg’s thesis, 
which is that the labor movement helped Jews assimilate. Howe also argues that the movement was quite weak 
at first, at least from an organizational point of view (289).  
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authoritarian personality and anti-union policies of Daniel De Leon had caused Cahan and 
others to leave the Socialist Labor Party for Eugene Debs’s Socialist Party of America; but 
then Cahan was quickly ousted from the Forward—the Yiddish-language newspaper created 
in 1897 by the anti-De Leon faction—because he refused to print polemics against their 
rivals. When he was approached on the streets of New York by his erstwhile colleagues and 
asked to rejoin the Forward, he responded by cataloguing the ways his thinking had changed: 
I’ve been out in the world . . . and I’ve found out that we socialists don’t have a 
monopoly on honesty and wisdom. The outside world is more tolerant of us than we 
are of it. It tries, at least, to understand us. You and your comrades are utterly 
parochial in your outlook. But if the Forward remains what it is, it won’t get very far. 
It won’t get to a very large audience because it doesn’t interest itself in the things that 
the masses are interested in when they aren’t preoccupied with their daily struggle for 
bread. I’m telling you . . . it’s as important, say, to teach the reader to carry a 
handkerchief in his pocket as it is to teach him to carry a union card. And it’s as 
important to respect the opinions of others as it is to have opinions of one’s own. 
(Cahan qtd. in Sanders 322-323) 
 
“Cahan . . . had just given a spontaneous little sermon on American liberalism,” Sanders 
writes, “but what had been its purpose?” (323).  
Motivating this speech is a feeling similar to the one that pushed him to speak up at 
the Second International conference ten years earlier: his desire for a uniquely Jewish 
political identity. A common sentiment was that the road to class unity in the U.S. would not 
be as formidable as the one in Europe because of the absence of ingrained anti-Semitism. 
Socialist leaders, Cahan included, championed assimilation as a means of readying the Jewish 
proletariat for the revolution. By 1902, on the brink of his return to the Forward, Cahan 
outlined a new vision for Yiddish-language radicalism consonant with the ideals of liberal 
pluralism: nobody has a monopoly on the “right” ideas. “For Cahan,” Sanders writes, “the 
purity of socialist orthodoxy was not nearly so important as any method for the betterment 
of mankind’s lot that worked” (317). In other words, Cahan began to think of socialism as 
being on all fours with other movements for the improvement of mankind. Importantly, he 
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does not say “Jew” or “Jewish” in the long speech above, and this is the point: a Jewish 
politics had to be invented for it to join those other fights for the betterment of mankind’s lot. 
As Cahan wrote of the socialist circles in which he first moved, “it never occurred to us that 
our primary purpose ought to be to organize the Jewish workers so that they might improve 
their physical and spiritual lot” (Education 254). This imagined Jewish politics retains a degree 
of autonomy within the general improvement of mankind’s lot by focusing on both spiritual 
and physical needs. Far from arguing for the erasure of Jewish identity with the fall of 
capitalism, as his orthodox comrades did, Cahan expresses a desire for a Jewish political 
identity to emerge as an autonomous entity within the socialist movement, which is itself but 
one of countless ways of improving mankind’s lot in a liberal-democratic milieu. 
After accepting the editorship, Cahan and his colleagues at the Forward pried open 
this previously nonexistent space within the socialist party for debates, concerns, questions, 
and lessons that Yiddish-speaking readers face as they navigate the realities of life on the 
Lower East Side. As Joseph points out, after Cahan’s return to the Forward in 1902, there 
was a general movement away from “the orthodox Marxist belief in total assimilation” and 
toward more broadly “Jewish working class interests” (27). Perhaps the most influential 
move Cahan made as an editor of the Forward was to initiate the popular letter-to the-editor 
series “A Bintel Brief” (literally: a bundle of letters). Many of the questions and answers in 
“Bintel Brief” focused on the unique plight of the Jewish immigrant worker and his/her 
family. One letter begins: “I am eighteen years old and a machinist by trade. During the past 
year I suffered a great deal, just because I am a Jew” (Bintel 63). “In the answer,” the editor 
writes, “the Jewish machinist is advised to appeal to the United Hebrew Trades and ask 
them to intercede for him and bring up charges before the Machinists Union about this 
persecution” (64). In 1891, Cahan was a representative of the United Hebrew Trades (UHT) 
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at the Second International’s second congress when he officially proposed condemning anti-
Semitism; twenty years later, the UHT had grown from around 40 members to some 
250,0009 and, as the editor’s answer implies, exerted great influence in the fight against anti-
Semitism in the workplace. The editor ends by noting “that people will have to work long 
and hard before this senseless racial hatred can be completely uprooted” (64).  
 The same goes for discrimination based on gender. In answer to a letter defending 
women’s suffrage, the editor writes: “Justice can reign among people only when they all have 
equal rights. If one has more power than the other, it leads to injustice” (95). The editor is 
not only talking about women but also about the injustice of any situation when one group 
has “more power than the other.” Laclau and Mouffe would call this a relation of 
subordination, which is only felt as oppression, and hence exposed as a site of antagonism, 
when compared to the rights inscribed by the eighteenth-century democratic revolution. By 
deeming relations of subordination oppressive in the light of the liberal-democratic language 
of “equal rights,” the Forward joins other movements (socialism, women’s rights, civil rights) 
in the fight for greater equality and justice in the capitalist world system. That the Jewish Left 
could theoretically focus on many different, highly specific situations and/or identities on 
the Lower East Side alone implies the scope of the unjust, undemocratic ground uncovered 
and overturned by this new counter-hegemonic bloc. 
If, as I suggested above, Cahan’s newspaper work should not be considered in 
isolation from his realist writing, then we have an opportunity to explore how his first 
English-language work, Yekl, condenses the debate between class identity and ethnic identity 
that was being sounded in his milieu. While Cahan ultimately pushed the Forward in the 
direction of Jewish cultural autonomy and away from the orthodox polemics of the 
                                                      
9 See Frankel 256. 
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magazine’s early years, Yekl is much more ambivalent. But it is ambivalent in a way that most 
critics miss by assuming the Jewishness of Cahan’s characters in advance. Rather, I claim, 
Jewish identity must be forged within the discursive context of socialist orthodoxy.  
II. Yekl and the Question of Jewish Identity 
 Yekl revolves around a Lower East Side sweatshop worker named Yekl Podovnik 
who came to the U.S. from “Povodye—a town in northwest Russia” about “three years 
before the opening of this story” (Cahan, Yekl 10, 9). He leaves behind a wife and child 
whom he means to send for; however, he perpetually evades this duty in order to preserve 
the bachelor life he leads in America. His friends and female admirers call him by the 
Americanized version of his name, “Jake,” and are unaware that he has a wife and child back 
home. In the first pages of the novella, Jake gives a lesson on American boxing to his fellow 
sweatshop workers while their boss is out searching for business: 
“When I was in Boston,” [Jake] went on, with a contemptuous mien 
intended for the American metropolis, “I knew a feller, so he was a preticly friend of 
John Shullivan’s. He is a Christian, that feller is, and yet the two of us lived like 
brothers . . .”  
“Say, Dzake,” the presser broke in, “John Sullivan is tzampion no longer, is 
he?” 
“Oh, no! Not always is it holiday!” Jake responded, with what he considered 
a Yankee jerk of his head. “Why, don’t you know? Jimmie Corbett leaked him, and 
Jimmie leaked Cholly Meetchel, too. You can betch you’ bootsh! Johnnie could not leak 
Chollie, becaush he is a big bluffer, Chollie is,” he pursued, his clean-shaven florid face 
beaming with enthusiasm for his subject, and with pride in the diminutive proper 
nouns he flaunted. “But Jimmie pundished him. Oh, didn’t he knock him out off shight! He 
came near making a meat ball of him”—with a chuckle. “He tzettled him in three 
roynds. I knew a feller who had seen the fight.” (2) 
 
It is immediately clear that Cahan’s realism will follow the Howellsian practice of 
rendering speech in dialect. Some critics have noted that Cahan distances himself and his 
readers from these characters by italicizing “English words incorporated in the Yiddish of 
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the characters of this narrative” (Cahan’s note attached to the above passage).10 As with 
Howells, however, the emphasis on dialect as a formal “strategy of containment” (Kaplan 
10) is misleading: dialect shows that the words in an agonistic encounter, which this will 
prove to be, are not only open to different interpretations but also different pronunciations. At 
this stage, though, Jake’s dialect merely emphasizes what appears to be the larger point of 
this speech: he fails in his attempt to look and sound as American as possible.    
There seems to be no doubt that this passage is about failed assimilation. According 
to Jules Chametzky, “[Jake] shows off his English and knowledge of American sports to his 
shopmates, rattling off some names of celebrities: ‘John Shullivan,’ [John Sullivan], ‘Cholly 
Meetchel [Charlie Mitchell].’ He prides himself on being Americanized; in only three years he 
seems to have cast off his old identity” (58). Or, in Dalia Kandiyoti’s words, “the first 
description of Yekl involves the demonstration of his . . . easy adoption of American popular 
culture. Yekl/Jake puts himself at the center of attention by showing off his knowledge of 
professional boxing” (76). However, Jake fails to convince his peers of his Americanness, 
because of his broken English—which, according to Hanna Wirth-Nesher, betrays “his 
Lithuanian roots”—and his physical “features,” which are “[s]trongly Semitic naturally” 
(Wirth-Nesher 55, Cahan, Yekl 3). Again, Kandiyoti is typical: “Cahan undermines Jake’s 
efforts by demonstrating that he may perform his way to assimilation all he wants, through 
boxing moves or dancing, but his racial truth is inexorably stamped on his face” (76).  
The problem with such formulations is the underlying assumption of a recognizable 
Jewish identity undergirding the assimilation narrative. According to Benjamin Schreier, the 
“assimilation or Americanization narrative has by now become . . . a machine that . . . 
produces largely predictable results; it is structured to find what it is looking for, namely, 
                                                      
10 See Barrish, American 83. 
 
 162 
Jewish identity” (80). Indeed, in the process of faulting Cahan for participating in “racializing 
discourses,” Kandiyoti herself fixes Jake’s identity by pointing to his race as the crux of the 
assimilation narrative (76). Schreier later describes this as “the pernicious historicist 
tendency—itself bearing a racialist heritage” to look back into what has been established by 
the academy as the canon of Jewish-American literature, with Cahan its “patriarch,” only to 
find a recognizable Jewish identity playing out a narrative of assimilation (70, 72). 
Rather than locating “the Jew” as a historical, national, racial, or biographical 
category undergirding the assimilation narrative, Schreier wants critics to consider a text’s 
anxiety about the legibility of Jewish-American identity. He combines the philosophies of 
Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière to claim that Jewish identity is the conflictual but 
nonetheless desired result of a group of people coming together—emerging as if for the first 
time—to define who “we” are (152-153). Schreier argues that Cahan’s fiction, in particular, 
reflects a desire for a Jewish-American identity “that does not (yet) exist” (92).11 
With Schreier’s polemic in mind, we need to approach the opening sequence afresh. 
Indeed, Cahan’s narrator notes that Jake’s Jewishness is far from given: “Jake’s very nose, 
which was fleshy and pear-shaped and decidedly not Jewish (although not decidedly anything 
else), seemed to join the Mosaic faith . . . as soon as that smile of his made his appearance” 
(Yekl 3). Rather than finding an identifiable Jewish subject, the text evinces an uncertainty 
about the main character’s Jewishness—he doesn’t look Jewish, but he doesn’t not look 
Jewish—an uncertainty that “seem[s] to” clear itself up when he smiles (3). While describing 
the contingent factors that work together to make “his features” “more” Semitic than usual, 
Cahan’s language (“as soon as”) makes it sound like his Jewishness is always “to come.”12  
                                                      
11 See Schreier 74, 85.  
12 Indeed, by calling it “the Mosaic faith,” Cahan links Judaism with the idea of the Moses’s covenant with God 
on Mt. Sinai—an oath promising future action. 
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When Jake leaves the sweatshop and walks down Suffolk Street, Cahan catalogues 
the Jewish identity “to come” on the Lower East Side in one of the most breathtaking 
descriptions of urban life in the American realist canon: 
Suffolk Street . . . lies in the heart of that part of the East Side which has within the 
last two or three decades become the Ghetto of the American metropolis, and, 
indeed, the metropolis of the Ghettos of the world. It is one of the most densely 
populated spots on the face of the earth—a seething human sea fed by streams, 
streamlets, and rills of immigration flowing from all the Yiddish-speaking centers of 
Europe. Hardly a block but shelters Jews from every nook and corner of Russia, 
Poland, Galacia, Hungary, Roumania; Lithuanian Jews, Volhynian Jews, south 
Russian Jews, Bessarabian Jews; Jews crowded out of the “pale of Jewish 
settlement”; Russified Jews expelled from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kieff, or Saratoff; 
Jewish runaways from justice; Jewish refugees from crying political and economic 
injustice; people torn from a hard-gained foothold in life and from deep-rooted 
attachments by the caprice of intolerance or the wiles of demagoguery—innocent 
scapegoats of a guilty Government for its outraged populace to misspend its blind 
fury upon students shut out of the Russian universities, and come to these shores in 
quest of learning; artisans, merchants, teachers, rabbis, artists, beggars—all come in 
search of fortune . . . You find there [also] Jews born to plenty, whom the new 
conditions have delivered up to the clutches of penury; Jews reared in the straits of 
need, who have risen to prosperity; good people morally degraded in the struggle for 
success amid an unwonted environment; moral outcasts lifted from the mire, 
purified, and imbued with self-respect; educated men and women with their 
intellectual polish tarnished in the inclement weather of adversity; ignorant sons of 
toil grown enlightened—in fine, people with all sorts of antecedents, tastes, habits, 
inclinations, and speaking all sorts of subdialects of the same jargon, thrown pell-
mell into one social cauldron—a human hodgepodge with its component parts all 
changed but not yet fused into a homogenous whole. (13-14) 
 
Cahan problematizes the assumption, made by the likes of Riis and Howells, that this urban 
enclave on the Lower East Side is “Jewish” and that this is where its reality lies. Instead, we 
find an overwhelming plurality of Jewish self-identifications there. For Cahan, the 
Jewishness of this relatively small section of Manhattan is a representational and political 
problem that he must tackle when writing about it. This is because the Lower East Side is 
“not yet fused into a homogenous whole.” Homogeneity does not mean “the same” here but 
names the result of a future collective identity, when the members of this heterogeneous 
crowd will fall under a single category, though what that would be remains unclear. Will it be 
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a class identity (proletariat, bourgeoisie)? A national identity (American, Russian, 
Lithuanian)? A religious identity (orthodox, secular)? An ethnic identity (Sephardi Jews, 
Ashkenazi Jews)? Or a hybrid identity (Jewish-American, American-Jewish)?   
 Schreier posits a disconnect between the spectral figuration of a Jewish identity “to 
come” in literature and the critic’s project of fixing Jewish identity in terms of a secured, 
legible past. The problem is that Schreier’s stringent anti-historicism causes him to focus 
almost exclusively on the text-critic relationship. If Cahan felt anxiety about the legibility of 
Jewish identity in the present and future, he was responding to the hegemonic discourse 
about assimilation and Jewish identity available in his own time: orthodox Marxism. 
 Orthodox Marxism “recognized” Jews as a nation or religious group but urged 
assimilation into capitalist America to usher in a future without religion, without nations, and 
thus without Jews. In Irving Howe’s words, “Jewish radicals did not matter enough insofar as 
they remained Jews; they could fulfill themselves as revolutionists only through the self-denial 
of assimilation” (World 289). “True,” Jonathan Frankel adds, “they were at war with the 
American system of free enterprise. But this was a dialectical hostility, qualified by their 
belief that socialism would result from the full fruition of capitalism . . . The ‘melting pot,’ 
for all its hardships and cruelties, was seen as a manifestation of progress, of historical 
inevitability” (454). The anxiety around Jewish identity is also related to the crisis in 
Marxism: the future was not coming about as projected and Cahan could either double-
down on the inevitability of the revolution or start to think about what Jewish identity might 
look like without an inevitable awakening of class consciousness and the fall of capitalism. 
 To approach Yekl afresh, we need to unveil the hegemonic discourse—orthodox 
Marxism—fixing the assimilation narrative within a predetermined, scientifically sanctioned 
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History (class struggle leading to revolution). Then we can locate an anxiety about (the future 
of) Jewish identity that emerges in response to the predictive failure of this discourse.   
 To begin with, one needs to be reminded of the setting of Jake’s opening speech: an 
“idle” “cloak shop” on the Lower East Side (Cahan, Yekl 1). The momentary pause in 
manual labor, far from coming as a relief, causes “suspense” in the workers (1). When the 
boss finally returns with bundles of cloth, the pressers and finishers are “overjoyed by the 
certainty of employment for at least another day or two” (8). Even though he stands to make 
more money if the materials are handed out as fast as possible, “[t]he little boss distributed 
the bundles with dignified deliberation,” a “feeling . . . overridden by a kind of malicious 
pleasure which he took in their eagerness and in the demonstration of his power over the 
men, some of whom he knew to have enjoyed a more comfortable past than himself” (9).  
 There is more to this class narrative, though, than the sweatshop setting of the novel. 
We can find a Marxian conception of class struggle buried in Jake’s opening speech, which 
centers on Irish-American boxer John Sullivan and his recent defeat, in 1892, at the hands of 
“Gentleman” Jim Corbett, a fellow Irish American. Jesús Constantino claims that, 
“[t]hrough the familiar cultural idiom of prizefighting, Jake reframes the ethnic balkanization 
of the tenements into the staged ethnic conflicts of the prize ring” (226). Beginning with a 
familiar reading—Jake’s mastery of boxing demonstrates “his American cultural expertise” 
(226)—Costantino then makes a much more interesting claim. With his lecture, Jake 
“attempts to step outside of the perpetual contingency of always waiting for work and to 
articulate an improvised theory of urban immigrant life, reimagining the violent conflict 
between labor and capital as a series of ethnic neighborhood rivalries” (228). Boxing is a way 
to cope with the uncertainty of sweatshop labor and, beyond that, the antagonism between 
labor and capital in urban-industrial society. It does so by “transforming lived urban 
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experience into a metaphorical homogeneity” via the abstract space of the ring, with its 
clearly defined oppositional identities, which becomes a stand-in for the “urban social 
totality,” itself “an emerging and partial understanding of the spatial logic of urban industrial 
labor” (242, 243). Later in the opening scene of Yekl, Constantino points out, Jake grabs a 
fellow worker by the collar as the boss walks in—the metaphorized violence of boxing 
threatens to devolve into the class violence it was meant to make readable in the first place. 
 Constantino’s focus on the “slippery interplay between boxing-as-metaphor and 
boxing-as-reality” is a welcome corrective to the assimilationist paradigm discussed above, 
which reads boxing as a sign of Americanization pure and simple (236). However, he 
partakes of a key aspect of this paradigm by treating the racial/ethnic identities in the boxing 
ring and, by extension, the tenement and the city as instantly knowable/known. It is, indeed, 
as if Jake’s Jewishness is stamped on his face the moment he starts talking about a fight 
between two Irishmen. The problem, I think, stems from Constantino’s choice of 
“metaphor” as the literary figure at work in the text’s deployment of boxing, which he also 
deems “a symbolic figure for the urban industrial ghetto” (237). According to Jameson, the 
problem with metaphor and symbol, as literary devices that can help map the abstract spaces 
of capital, is that they lock the terms of comparison into place without the interpretive static 
one would expect from holding so many levels of reality in mind. Allegory, by contrast, 
“models a relationship of breaks, gaps, discontinuities, and inner distances and 
incommensurabilities of all kinds” (Jameson, “Metaphor to Allegory” 25). Jameson’s 
understanding of allegory is indebted to Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason, the second 
volume of which contains a lengthy exposition—some might call it an extended metaphor—
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on boxing and/as the class struggle.13 While Sartre, like Constantino, traces the “slippery 
interplay” between bodily violence and the totality of antagonistic class relations 
(Constantino 236), the Sartrean paradigm allows for discontinuities. For our purposes, such 
interpretive static is necessary to trouble the differences between Jewishness and Irishness and 
then to start thinking about the tensions between Jewish identity and class identity.  
 In what follows, I will explicate Sartre’s analysis of boxing with an eye toward the 
elements that Cahan uncannily prefigures in his representation of Jake’s opening lecture on 
boxing, which will come to be seen as a class allegory. The discontinuities that emerge in this 
allegory when one starts to transcode across its various levels have the unintended 
consequence of forcing Cahan to rethink the question of Jewish identity outside the 
essentialist strictures of orthodox Marxism. An anxiety about Jewish identity emerges, in 
other words, when Cahan applies the abstract narrative of the class struggle to the reality of 
Russian-Jewish assimilation on the Lower East Side. 
III. “Commodities of the Fistic Business”: Bernstein vs. Jake 
 In the uncompleted, posthumously published second volume of The Critique of 
Dialectical Reason (1985), Sartre provides a breathtaking thirty-three-page analysis of boxing, 
which is meant to crystallize the philosophy of praxis outlined, in a purely abstract and 
philosophical way, in the first volume of the Critique (1960). Sartre’s interpretive problem in 
the second Critique is the intelligibility of History if its “motor” is the class struggle (15). 
How can the social fabric, torn apart by this fundamental conflict, be considered an object of 
analysis? (Henry James, we saw in the last chapter, asked his own version of this question.) If 
                                                      
13 Laclau and Mouffe claim that metaphor, not allegory, is the linguistic experience of the failure of language, as 
we saw in the previous chapter. We can reconcile these positions by positing that it is only when metaphor is 
put into play across a narrative—when it is made into an allegory (an extended metaphor being the basic 
definition of this term)—that we can confront the failure of language in the attempt to narrate antagonism. 
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History is unified by the class struggle, as Marx tells us it is, this contested unity would have 
to be intelligible from the punctuated historical event all the way down to an individual’s 
existential experience of the world. In other words, “if we actually establish this abstract 
principle, the materialist dialectic—as movement of History and historical knowledge—
needs only to be proved by the facts it illumines, or, if you prefer, to discover itself as a fact 
and through other facts” (16). Boxing is such an existential “fact” that illuminates the more 
abstract philosophical “fact” that “the class struggle . . . [is] the motor of History” (15). 
 Boxing, for Sartre, incarnates the violence endemic to the society in which it is 
treated as a spectacle, namely “bourgeois democracies” (34). The violence particular to this 
society is the class struggle, which results from capitalism’s (re-) production of the material 
fact of scarcity in Nature (where there is not enough to fulfill everyone’s needs) by 
“institutionally exclud[ing] certain social groups from full consumption, reserving it for other 
groups, insufficient in number to consume everything” (Critique I 139). The boxing match is 
an expression of class struggle (qua antagonism) in a condition of scarcity. Its participants 
“are of working-class origin,” as Sullivan and, to a lesser extent, Corbett were (Critique II 
35).14 “These young men, formed by the violence to which they have been subjected, are well 
fitted to subject others to violence. What they will incarnate in their fights is the same 
violence that the ruling class exerts against the labouring classes” (36). Sartre’s boxer is a 
loner who “sells” his anger to a middle-class promoter as a way of rising above, and even 
punishing, his class of origin. In other words, he has “invent[ed] the idea of having himself 
treated as a commodity, in order to transcend the status of his class all of whose members 
are commodities” (37). “The outstanding success of a few champions,” however, “should 
not hide from us the fact that . . . the great majority of boxers are in a situation hardly 
                                                      
14 See Isenberg 75. 
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superior to that of workers and often more precarious” (41). Sartre thus posits an imperfect 
but interesting correlation between the rise of sport as entertainment and the development 
of the industrial revolution: the bodies of boxers and laborers incarnate the movement of 
History by selling their labor-power and their wellbeing for the material profit of managers 
and the delight of consumers. This necessitates that there is not only an antagonism between 
labor and capital, but between the sellers of labor themselves. The difference between boxers 
and laborers, on this front, is just as telling: “with workers, years of trade-union experience 
and social conflict have at least ended by reducing these antagonisms and developing a class 
solidarity. The boxer, by contrast, a lone exploited individual who from childhood has been 
unable to solidarize with workers, experiences all the harshness of competition” (44). 
 Cahan seems to be uniquely aware of the comparison between boxing and the selling 
of labor-power: the boxer’s movements, as demonstrated by Jake—“‘right-handers,’ ‘left-
handers,’ ‘sending to sleep,’ ‘first blood’”—are “commodities of the fistic business,” much as 
Jake’s “brawny arms and magnificent form” and “robust legs” are made into salable 
commodities in the sweatshop market (Cahan, Yekl 2,11). Just as a future boxer is picked out 
of the urban crowd by a recruiter or manager, “his legs had been thought by his early 
American advisers eminently fitted for the treadle” (11). Jake’s body is thus linked directly to 
the sewing machines, his “weapo[n] in the battle of life” (11). Meanwhile, Jake’s “little boss,” 
like the boxing promoter or the audience, perversely enjoys the workers’ reaction to scarcity. 
Aping a social system that distributes scarce resources unequally, the boss pits the pressers 
against one another by ensuring that his “favorites”—Jake and “De Viskes”—receive their 
materials first, harvesting feelings of jealously, envy, anticipation, and anger that might have 
turned against the boss but are instead rerouted into an individual desire for advancement 
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out of scarcity: “The others went to their machines empty-handed and remained seated, their 
hungry glances riveted to the booty until they, too, were provided” (9).  
 There is also Jake’s audience to consider. Despite his best attempts, “his brawny 
arms and magnificent form did not charm” the women of the shop “as much as he thought 
they did. For a display of manly force, when connected—even though in a purely imaginary 
way—with acts of violence, has little attraction for a ‘daughter of the Ghetto.’ Much more 
interest did those arms and form command on their own merits” (3). Much like the boxer, 
Jake’s unique physical features and his invocation of justifiable class violence are stolen, as it 
were, and turned into a new kind of product (a commodity).15 Suddenly, Jake’s arms are not 
violent but “pleasant.” In other words, Jake’s female co-workers appreciate his brawny arms 
not for the violence they incarnate but for the aesthetic pleasure they evoke.  
 Boxing for both Sartre and Cahan could be mistaken for a static metaphor or 
symbol, where, in Jameson’s words, there is “a kind of identity between the historical 
processes and the existential individual” (“Foreword” xx). Jameson, though, argues “that a 
rather different use of Sartre’s idea may be available if we substitute the logic of allegory for 
that of the symbol” (xx). To use the language of The Political Unconscious, Sartre’s analysis of 
boxing is a form of allegorical transcoding—“the strategic choice of a particular code or 
language, such that the same terminology can be used to analyze and articulate two quite 
distinct types of objects or ‘texts’ or two very different structural levels of reality”—with the 
Marxian master code underwriting and justifying the movement across social levels (40).16   
 Similarly, in Yekl Jake incarnates the boxing match and the metaphysical ground of 
that match—the class struggle in a condition of scarcity: “He stood in the middle of the 
                                                      
15 See Sartre, Critique II 43. 
16 See Jameson, Political 10, 47, 88-102. History, for Jameson, is akin to Sartre’s scarcity in that it remains “the 
ultimate ground as well as the untranscendable limit” of writing and interpreting alike (100). 
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overcrowded stuffy room with his long but well-shaped legs wide apart, his bulky round 
head aslant, and one of his bared mighty arms akimbo” (Cahan, Yekl 2). As he shadow-boxes 
for his co-workers, he incarnates the truth of their menial existence as laborers selling their 
labor in the overcrowded, stuffy region that is New York’s Lower East Side. Put differently: 
Jake may be like the boxer (by turning his body into a commodity), but this metaphor 
becomes allegorized when Cahan asks us to keep multiple levels of social life in our heads: 
the “overcrowded stuffy room” (2) is at once a sweatshop, a boxing ring, the Lower East 
Side, and, at the final level of analysis, un-representable in itself, the realm of scarcity. 
 The language of boxing in Yekl is then transcoded into a heated debate on 
assimilation.17 Jake’s opponent is a “rabbinical-looking man” named Bernstein, who 
interjects with a jab at Jake’s Americanisms: “‘America is an educated country, so they won’t 
even break bones without grammar. They tear each other’s sides according to ‘right and left, 
you know.’ This was a thrust at Jake’s right-handers and left-handers” (4). An argument 
begins about the role of boxing in American society—which, Bernstein argues, condones 
violence so long as it is organized—that is itself a boxing match on a different level (the 
verbal “thrust”). Bernstein’s main point of attack takes the form of an imaginary fight pitting 
a Russian peasant’s unmediated violence against the American boxer’s highly mediated 
violence: “a burly Russian peasant would, without a bit of grammar, crunch the bones of 
Corbett himself; and he would not charge him a cent for it either” (4). An uneducated Russian 
peasant would defeat “Gentleman” Jim Corbett, so known because he argued for rigid 
boxing rules and adopted middle-class sensibilities. Since Bernstein, not the peasant, is in the 
                                                      
17 A Talmudic debate in Cahan’s short story, “The Imported Bridegroom” (collected with Yekl in the Dover 
edition) is also treated metaphorically as a boxing match, though differences are noted: “To her [Flora], it was 
something like a boxing-match, with every exciting element of the sport, but without any of its violence (which 
alone kept Flora from attending pugilistic performances), though the arms and fingers of our venerable 
combatants were even more active than the arms and fists of two athletes in a modern ring” (Cahan, Yekl 130). 
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“ring” with Jake, not Corbett, it becomes clear that the debate is also about the different 
levels of assimilation evinced by these two characters: Jake and his supporters (“the two girls 
and the presser”) “espous[e] the American cause, while Malke the widow and ‘De Viskes’ 
sid[e] with Bernstein” in defending the Russian peasant and hence the homeland (4). 
 With Schreier in mind, we should not assume the Jewishness of these characters in 
advance: so far, the debate about assimilation centers on an immigrant’s fidelity to either the 
country of origin or the new country. Jake introduces the question of Jewish identity into the 
debate only when pressed in a corner by “the widow,” who claims that he will give up his 
love of sport “when he has a wife and children to support” (5). Jake does indeed have a wife 
and child back home. Bernstein unwittingly forces him to recall this connection to Russia 
when he says, of the ostensibly figurative wife and child, “I do not see how you manage to 
live without them” (5). Jake responds “on the defensive”: “Once I live in America . . . I want 
to know that I live in America . . . Here a Jew is as good as a Gentile. How, then, would you 
have it? The way it is in Russia, where a Jew is afraid to stand within four ells of a Christian?” 
(5). For Jake, being in America means letting go of the past and standing on equal footing 
with “Gentiles.” Back in Boston, he had such a feeling: “I knew a feller, so he was preticly 
friend of John Shullivan’s. He is a Christian, that feller is, and yet the two of us lived like 
brothers” (2); “in New York,” however, “the Jews are a lot of greenhornsh and can not speak a 
word of English” (5). Jewishness strikes him as the very thing that, in New York, prevents 
him from feeling like he “lives” in America, a feeling once secured by his indoctrination into 
the cult of American sport in Boston. “As a consequence, since Jake’s advent to New York 
his passion for American sport had considerably cooled off” (24). He longs to regain that 
feeling of living in America, achieved when his Jewishness ceases to be a factor.  
 
 173 
 Jake questions Bernstein’s view of the Jew in America: “How then would you have 
it?” (5). Bernstein’s non-answer evinces his own anxiety about the future legibility of Jewish 
identity in America, but for different reasons than we saw with Jake. While Bernstein allows 
for the difference between Jew and Gentile, he obsessively reads “an English newspaper” to 
learn the language of his new country, suggesting some concessions to the assimilationist 
viewpoint (4, 1). Inversely, Jake wants to erase the distinction between Jew and Gentile, but 
his language, manners, and appearance are interpreted as “Semitic” by his peers (3).  
 The difference between Jake and Bernstein, on this point, is hinted at by the 
reference to a fight between first-generation Irish immigrants Sullivan and Corbett. These 
two fighters did not express Irishness in the same way: Sullivan wore his Bostonian Irishness 
on his sleeve, making it part of his personal mythos, while Corbett was “a bit outside the 
stereotypical mold of the Irish-American prizefighter,” embodying assimilationist aims like 
middle-class decorum and the importance of education (Isenberg 303). “I’ll betch you you 
don’t know that Corbett findished college,” Jake tells Bernstein after the latter implores him to 
follow educated fighters (Cahan, Yekl 5). In his autobiography, Corbett touches on this point 
of difference between himself and the man he defeated in 1892: 
My unpopularity with the Irish struck me as rather peculiar, for everybody that ever 
belonged to me, as far back as we could trace, was Irish through and through, and 
Sullivan, like myself, was born in this country, of Irish parents. Of course this 
attitude was due to Sullivan’s disposition, which was just the right mixture of good 
nature, aggressiveness and temper for a fighter, so people thought; while I was 
always more controlled and a little too businesslike, perhaps, to vie with him in 
popularity. (171-172) 
 
If Sullivan and Corbett’s Irishness were rewritten as the difference between Jake and 
Bernstein’s Jewishness, it would not be a perfect match: ever popular with the “daughters of 
the Ghetto,” Jake wants to assimilate to the American way of life without formal education 
while Bernstein, whose “reserved manner, if not his superior education, held [his] shopmates 
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at a respectful distance from him,” asserts the importance of a uniquely Jewish identity in 
American society (Cahan, Yekl 48). 
 The question of Jewish identity in America—what it will look like, now and in the 
future; its comparison to other nationalities and cultural/religious identities—irrupts into the 
act of transcoding between manual labor and assimilation debates with the shared language 
of boxing, shoring up the difference between these two “texts,” one of which is about class 
identity while the other stands in the more properly superstructural realm of ethnic or 
national identity. Jameson assures us that gaps and discontinuities are to be expected in any 
act of transcoding. The question to tackle, now, is whether the Marxian master narrative can 
account for the so-called “Jewish Question,” i.e. the problem of Jewish identity. 
 In “On the Jewish Question” (1843), Marx gave an allegorical account of the Jew’s 
place in his conception of History. The Jew is a symptom of the pluralism and individualism 
of civil society in a liberal-democratic state, where the right of free religious expression has 
become the right of private property and its protection, not just from the state but from 
other people: “The Jew, who occupies a distinctive place in civil society, only manifests in a 
distinctive way the Judaism of civil society” (50). Since civil society has become the secular 
sphere of capitalistic egoism, it must be eliminated along with its superstructural expression 
in/as the “Jew”: “As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the empirical essence of 
Judaism—huckstering and its conditions—the Jew becomes impossible” (52).  
 Needless to say, Cahan did not accept this diagnosis—which in its broad strokes 
influenced the orthodox stance on assimilation—especially once the future that Marx 
envisioned appeared out of step with actual conditions. Another vignette, this one is more 
properly termed an allegory, from Sanders’s The Downtown Jews explains what Cahan sees 
happening to the Marxian master narrative when it confronts the Jewish Question: 
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Cahan summed up his own position in a story which echoed both with the traits of 
Talmudic Haggadah [storytelling for spiritual instruction] and with his recently 
acquired passion for bird watching. Once upon a time, the story went, there was a 
city that had no birds in it who could sing. The inhabitants longed to hear the singing 
of birds. Then one day a Jew came into the city and proposed a remedy: he knew a 
certain way of chanting the Holy Name of the Lord (a traditional method for healing 
and working miracles in Jewish folklore) which would bring forth melodies from 
birds that had never sung before. He proceeded to try out his method on the birds of 
the city; but every time he approached one of them to make his incantation, it would 
fly away. Unable to get close enough to any of the birds to work his miracle, he 
became heavy-hearted with despair. Then one day another Jew came to the city and 
said to him: “Scatter some corn! If the birds have something to peck at, they won’t 
fly away so quickly. And while they’re pecking, you can make your incantation.” 
(Sanders 340-341) 
 
The allegory works on many levels, across many discourses, and not just the named ones 
(the Haggadah and bird watching). It can be rewritten to fit debates about realism. In 
Cahan’s obituary for Howells, we recall, he claimed that the Dean did not have a proper 
notion of class struggle to go along with his socialism. Howells, like the first man in the 
story, tries to convince his readers of the values of socialism without understanding or 
communicating with those who would most benefit from a world without classes. Cahan, 
meanwhile, wants to teach his readers about the class struggle, but knows that they need to 
be distracted, engaged in something else, before they will listen. Thus, his early English-
language realism is not about the class struggle but it gestures allegorically toward it: Jake is 
expressing a desire to assimilate to American culture when he talks about boxing, but Cahan 
is also telling his readers about the degraded position of the worker in an exploitative system.  
 In this sense, the allegory is best unraveled by the Marxian master narrative, which is 
its hidden “key.”18 From this point of view, the problem is clear: these urban birds live in a 
condition of scarcity, which is not only physical (hunger) but also political—they are isolated, 
                                                      
18 Sanders calls it a “the fable of the birds” but this is slightly misplaced. According to Jameson, a fable is binary 
in nature (“picture and caption, narrative and moral”) while the allegory has both of these aspects along with 
the intervention of “the allegorical code or system,” which “can be embedded in the text somehow, or can be 
found to float outside it in the form of cultural knowledge” (“Metaphor and Allegory” 25). 
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without the ability to participate in a common language. They are alienated from what Marx 
calls “species-being” (46), which is here represented by birds that can communicate with one 
another. While “the inhabitants longed to hear the singing of birds,” this promise of working 
class solidarity—the other side of the dialectical coin from pluralistic fragmentation—
appears to be permanently stalled. Class solidarity is not coming to fruition because certain 
segments of the urban proletariat are not fulfilling their “natural” role (which is to sing).  
 The two men represent the two responses to this crisis in international socialism: 
orthodoxy and revisionism.19 The first man suggests chanting the name of God, which, as 
the “remedy” for these ills, is the promise of socialism. This solution speaks to the role of 
propaganda in orthodox circles, which was one of the only political options they recognized 
that would ready workers for a revolution a little farther off than Marx expected. While 
theoreticians purported to speak to and for workers, the latter did not always respond with 
open arms (the birds fly away). Those who did were isolated from those who refused the call 
to organize along class lines.20 The second man suggests feeding the birds and chanting while 
they eat, speaking to revisionism’s emphasis on immediate concerns and piecemeal reforms.  
 It is here, on this level of party debates, that the Jewishness of the birds/masses and, 
more clearly, the two men, come into play. The crisis in the Marxian conception of History 
is brought to bear on debates about assimilation: what “kind” of Jew is the party willing to 
recognize as an agent for social change? The orthodox perspective, as we have seen, was that 
Jews “could fulfill themselves as revolutionists only through the self-denial of assimilation” 
(Howe, World 289). A nationalist arm of the socialist party, which gained strength around the 
turn of the century, argued for the acceptance of Jewish identity as a means for encouraging 
                                                      
19As Laclau and Mouffe have shown, when the working class did not coalesce as planned, and in fact appeared 
helplessly fragmented, the socialist party took on a bigger and bigger role in making sure this happened (46-47). 
20 See Laclau and Mouffe 16. 
 
 177 
collective action.21 The first man in the allegory is orthodox insofar as he “recognizes” the 
birds only in terms of the song he wants them to sing (he wants class solidarity). The second 
man tries to improve “the physical and spiritual lot” of these Jewish workers, with the hope 
that they will then learn the first man’s incantation (Cahan, Education 254). The corn is clearly 
enough bits of Jewish culture that Cahan believes the Forward should draw upon to meet the 
Jewish worker half way. Importantly, the second man shares the same goal as the first 
(getting the birds to learn the incantation), and thus does not abandon hope that class unity 
can be achieved by the socialist party (the birds will sing if you approach them correctly). 
 As Eduard Bernstein envisions this revised master narrative, the transition to 
socialism will be accomplished by the protection of civil society, not its elimination (along 
with the Jew):  
Social Democracy does not want to break up civil society and make all its members 
proletarians together; rather, it ceaselessly labours to raise the worker from the social 
position of a proletarian to that of a citizen and thus to make citizenship universal. It 
does not want to replace civil society with a proletarian society but a capitalist order 
of society with a socialist one. (146)  
 
For Marx, civil society divides man in his “species-being” from the “abstract citizen” and must be 
eliminated for the ideal of universal citizenship to become real (46). In contrast, Bernstein 
(like Mouffe, as we will see below) reconceives the radical possibilities of democratic 
citizenship within the ineradicable pluralism of civil society. For Kautsky, Sartre, and 
Jameson, who wish to remain true to Marx’s original thought, this is nothing but a panicked 
response to certain mutations in the economic base that occurred after Marx’s lifetime but 
that are wholly explainable in his purely economic analysis of capitalism.22 Even Laclau and 
                                                      
21 See Frankel 453-454. 
22 Kautsky argues that Bernstein is simply responding to a brief period of economic prosperity in the West (26-
27). Similarly, Jameson accounts for Bernstein’s revisionism in terms of the production of new technologies in 
the imperialist stage of history (Valences 377-378). Sartre claims, in terms that clearly influenced Jameson, that 
the Marxian analysis of History is the philosophy of our times, the “limit and horizon” of all thought and thus 
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Mouffe note that Bernstein’s revisionism is beset by a troubling ambiguity: “if the working 
class appears increasingly divided in the economic sphere, and if its unity is autonomously 
constructed at the political level, in what sense is this political unity a class unity?” (26).  
 To put it in Cahan’s terms: what will happen when the Jewish masses, won over by 
the second man’s recognition of their unique cultural/spiritual needs, sing the first man’s 
song? In 1902, when Cahan re-joined the Forward, there was a sense that an autonomous 
Jewish politics needed to emerge from the ranks of Second International Marxism. This led 
him to accept a revised Marxian master narrative that recognized the unique physical and 
spiritual needs of the Jewish worker in the here-and-now, but there was no substitute for 
class when it came time to imagine what this new identity would look like in the future. 
 Yekl is notable for acknowledging the pressure put on the orthodox master narrative 
by the desire for a Jewish identity. A question about the viability of a Jewish identity 
emerging from the class essentialism of Second International Marxism (orthodoxy and 
revisionism alike) makes itself felt when the text pits two kinds of assimilation narratives 
against each other: Jake, whose Jewish identity is a lingering problem that he would just as 
soon slough off (a position amenable with the orthodox stance on assimilation); and 
Bernstein, who wants to assert the difference between Jew and Gentile while accepting 
certain practical adaptations to life in America (a new position that combines revisionism’s 
pragmatism and nationalism’s emphasis on an autonomous Jewish identity). This is only an 
                                                      
“‘revisionism’ . . . is either a truism or an absurdity. There is no need to readapt a living philosophy to the 
course of the world; it adapts itself by means of thousands of new efforts, thousands of particular pursuits, for 
the philosophy is one with the movement of society . . . [T]he ‘philosophical crisis’ is the particular expression 
of a social crisis, and its immobility is conditioned by the contradictions which split the society. A so-called 
‘revision,’ performed by ‘experts,’ would be, therefore, only an idealist mystification without real significance. It 
is the very movement of History, the struggle of men on all planes and on all levels of human activity, which 
will set free captive thought and permit it to attain its full development” (Search 7). 
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undercard match, though, which ends when Jake attacks Bernstein’s “leading foible [,] his 
well-controlled vanity” by mocking the latter’s inability to learn English (Cahan, Yekl 48).  
 The main event begins when Jake attempts to become as American as possible but is 
thwarted (in his mind at least) by his wife and child. His wife Gitl represents the possibility 
of creating a Jewish-American identity from the intersection of numerous lines of self-
identification, putting pressure on the Marxian conception of class as the determinant 
identity. In the last chapter of Yekl, however, Cahan folds this identity back into the dialectic 
of History, with its promise of future class solidarity emerging from the current state of 
fragmentation, exposing the limits of his post-Marxism at this point in his career.  
IV. The Main Event: Jake vs. Gitl 
 Jake is the undisputed main character of Yekl for the first three chapters: we watch 
him pass some down time at work, toil at his labor, and then dance and flirt with abandon at 
Joe’s Dance Academy. It is only in the third chapter when the reader realizes that Jake has a 
wife and child back in Russia, to whom he has finally sent money for passage to America. In 
the fourth chapter, Jake meets his family “at the Immigration Bureau of Ellis Island,” which 
opened its doors after an 1891 act transferred “the inspection of immigrants from the states 
to the federal government” (Cahan, Yekl 33; Howe, World 54). When they meet for the first 
time in years, Jake, dressed in the latest American fashion, is embarrassed by his wife: “She 
was slovenly dressed in a brown jacket and skirt of grotesque cut, and her hair was concealed 
under a voluminous wig of a pitch-black hue,” as she is unaware “of the fact that in New 
York even a Jewess of her station and orthodox breeding is accustomed to blink at the 
wickedness of displaying her natural hair” (Yekl 34). “She was naturally dark of complexion,” 
we learn, “and the nine or ten days spent at sea had covered her face with a deep bronze, 
which combined with her prominent cheek bones, inky little eyes, and, above all, the smooth 
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black wig, to lend her resemblance to a squaw” (34). Jake pleads with his wife to take off the 
wig, and she compromises by replacing it with a scarf, which “made her look like an Italian 
woman of Mulberry Street on Sunday” (37). In Henry Wonham’s words, Gitl’s “racially 
marked eyes, cheeks, skin, and hair . . . embody a complex blending of ethnic cues (is she of 
Native-American, Hebrew, or perhaps Asian origin?), to the point that her caricatured image 
operates for [Jake] as a symbol of race itself, rather than any one race in particular” (127).  
 The overdetermination of Gitl’s identity, as I will call it, immediately poses political 
questions about her purported Jewishness: to what degree is Jewishness like other racial, 
ethnic, national, or cultural minority identities that are deliberately or unconsciously devalued 
by representatives of the federal government (the inspection agents)23 and the American 
people at large? Mary Esteve argues that Cahan’s representations of the immigrant crowd in 
Yekl and The Rise of David Levinsky support the nativist belief that “race or ethnicity per se 
had become a public-political matter. In other words, a newcomer’s political status as an 
immigrant and his or her personal status as belonging to an ethnic group were rendered 
inseparable” (Esteve 174). Esteve wants to break the link between the personal and the 
political; but there is no sure link between Girl’s “political status as an immigrant” and the 
ethnic group to which she belongs, as she seems to belong to many groups at once, none of 
which accords with the racial/ethnic identity one is tempted to project onto her.  
 Whenever Gitl measures herself up against her husband, though, one identity comes 
to surpass all others: her class. One of the first things she says to Jake is that he “look[s] like 
a poritz,” which the author’s note tells us is “Yiddish for nobleman” (Cahan, Yekl 35). After 
Gitl makes several “compromise[s] between her conscience and her husband,” she allows 
Jake and a neighbor, Mrs. Kavarsky, to buy her a fancy hat and a corset. After trying them 
                                                      
23 See Howe, World 46. 
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on in secret, Gitl looks in the mirror and thinks, “quite a panenke [noblewoman]!” (40). If the 
goal is, in Mrs. Kavarsky’s words, to “make a Fifth Avenue lady of” Gitl, then it becomes 
clear that Jake hopes to rid his wife of her “greenhorn” ideas, clothes, and behavior by 
instilling in her a desire to rise above their current class position (39). Mrs. Kavarsky assures 
Jake that Gitl will “give in” to the temptation represented by the clothes, and she appears to 
be right: “[Gitl] turned to the right, then to the left, to view herself in profile, as she had seen 
Mrs. Kavarsky do, and drew a step back to ascertain the effect of the corset . . . She viewed 
herself again and again, and was in a flutter both of ecstasy and alarm” (40). This 
performance, like the boxer’s before a crowd, shows the degree to which the body must 
become a commodity to even countenance rising above one’s condition.  
 Orthodox Marxism’s class essentialism functions much like the corset: it attempts to 
fix the identity of a newly arrived immigrant like Gitl in terms of class and, to this end, 
suggests a full assimilation to the new country, since the revolution can only come about 
from fully-developed capitalism. Cahan hints at a future call to arms when a knock at Gitl’s 
apartment door causes her to throw off the ill-fitting corset in shame: “Trembling all over, 
she scampered on tiptoe back into the bedroom, and after a little she returned to her calico 
dress and bandana kerchief. The knock at the door had apparently been produced by some 
peddler or beggar, for it was not repeated” (40). When the knock of revolution arrives, she 
must be ready to discard her assimilationist garb and accept her new class identity. In the 
meantime, however, the “corset proved utterly impotent against the baggy shapelessness of 
the Povodye [her hometown] garment” underneath, suggesting that this entire course of 
action—assimilate and wait—does not work for her (40). The indeterminacy (shapelessness) 
of her racial/ethnic/national identity appears to free Gitl from a present or future 
determination by class. With class unable to “fix” her political identity, the question of her 
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Jewishness is posed anew: to what degree is Jewishness like the other racial, ethnic, or 
national identities to which she is compared? 
 Gitl wants to create a new Jewish-American identity that embraces, rather than 
constrains, the plurality of self-identifications open to her: 
At one moment she took a firm resolve to pluck up courage and cast away the 
kerchief and the wig; but at the next she reflected that God would be sure to punish 
her for the terrible sin, so that instead of winning Jake’s love the change would 
increase his hatred for her. It flashed upon her mind to call upon some “good Jew” 
to pray for the return of his favor, or to seek some old Polish beggar woman who 
could prescribe a love potion. But then, alas! who knows whether there are in this 
terrible America any good Jews or beggar women with love potions at all! (42) 
 
“[T]he old Polish beggar woman” and the “good Jew,” who is Orthodox like Gitl, might 
help her acclimate to new conditions while retaining crucial elements of her past. The Lower 
East Side’s versions of the “old Polish beggar woman” and the “good Jew” who can help 
Gitl construct a Jewish-American identity are Mrs. Kavarsky and Bernstein. 
 Eventually, Mrs. Kavarsky gives up on making a “Fifth-Avenue lady” of Gitl and 
instead focuses on removing her wig, a holdover from Orthodox practices in Russia: “I am 
as pious as you . . . and come from no mean family, either . . . yet I am not afraid to go with 
my own hair. May no greater sins be committed!” (57). Gitl and Mrs. Kavarsky drop the 
business of the corset on the sudden appearance, in Jake and Gitl’s apartment, of “a veritable 
penenke,” Jake’s love interest Mamie Fein: “She was apparently dressed for some occasion of 
state, for she was powdered and straight-laced and resplendent in a waist of blazing red, 
gaudily trimmed, and with puff sleeves, each wider than the vast expanse of white straw, 
surmounted with a whole forest of ostrich feathers, which adorned her head” (49). When 
Gitl rushes over to Mrs. Kavarsky’s for advice, the neighbor berates her:  
“[Y]ou are a lump of horse and a greenhorn and nothing else!” (Gitl felt much 
relieved.) “That piece of ugliness should try and come to my house! Then she would 
know the price of a pound of evil. . . . America is not Russia, thanked be the Lord of 
the world. Here one must only know how to handle a husband. Here a husband 
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must remember ‘ladas foist’—but then you do not even know what that means! . . . It 
means that when a husband does not behabe as he should, one does not stroke his 
cheeks for it. . . . If the wife is no greenhorn she gets him shoved into the oven, over 
there, across the river [the prison].” (56)24 
 
Removing the wig will allows Gitl to shake the last vestige of patriarchal culture and embrace 
the legal options a wronged wife has over her husband in New York.  
 Turning to the law is a last resort, though: Mrs. Kavarsky’s immediate advice is to 
placate Jake by removing her wig and seeing if this can save the marriage. Despite her final 
plea for marital compromise, Mrs. Kavarsky’s original plan— where the wronged wife 
asserts her legal rights over the misbehaving husband—comes closest to the route Gitl takes. 
Gitl allows Mrs. Kavarsky to cut her hair, but when Jake reacts unfavorably and winds up 
proposing a divorce, Gitl strikes: “‘May you and your Polish harlot be jumping out of your 
skins and chafing with wounds as long as you will have to wait for a divorce!’ . . . Her 
unprecedented show of pugnacity took him aback” (71). The return of boxing language is 
unsurprising: Gitl has made her first step toward assimilation (removing her wig, cutting her 
hair) and openly challenges her husband’s attempt to rise above his condition with Mamie 
Fein, who has a healthy savings account. In this way, Jake and Gitl’s divorce represents a 
new entry in the pugilistic debates about Americanization begun by Jake and Bernstein.  
 Debra Ann MacComb places Yekl within the tradition of “divorce fiction,” 
explaining that divorce is a form of Americanization insofar as “participation in that 
institution figured the promise of American democracy”: “ironically, it was (and is) divorce 
rather than marriage that became internationally identified as a particularly American 
institution, in part because of the perception that it was a ‘citizen’s right in a democratic 
                                                      
24 Mrs. Kavarsky is implying that Jake could skip town: “In America one must take care not to displease a 
husband. Here one is today in New York and tomorrow in Chicago; do you understand?” (57). Desertion was a 
serious issue for residents of the Lower East Side and often led to prosecution. See Howe, World 179-180.   
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country dedicated to the principles of freedom and happiness’” (152).25 After only “three 
years” of residency in the U.S., however, Jake would not yet be eligible for citizenship status 
(the minimum was five years) and thus neither would his wife (Cahan, Yekl 12). We can 
salvage MacComb’s point by turning to Mouffe’s re-conception of democratic citizenship as 
an allegiance to the ethico-political values of democracy (liberty and equality), which has the 
benefit of moving political identity away from exclusionary state-level procedures and 
toward the ineradicable pluralism of civil society.26 This sets the stage for an agonistic battle 
between those with competing definitions of a citizen’s rights, which is what we see in the 
different styles of Americanization that emerge in Gitl and Jake’s divorce.  
 For Mouffe, even an agonistic or conflictual “consensus” on the ethico-political 
terms of democracy presupposes the existence of a fundamental antagonism that can never 
be resolved. Laclau and Mouffe define antagonism as “the presence of the ‘Other’ [that] 
prevents me from being totally myself . . . Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full 
presence for myself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective 
being is a symbol of non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings 
which prevent its being fixed as full positivity” (111). Sartre’s framework is also built on the 
fact of antagonism between self and Other. “In the framework of scarcity, constitutive 
relations are fundamentally antagonistic” (Critique II 15). “[This] means that the mere existence 
of everyone is defined by scarcity as the constant danger of non-existence both for another and 
for everyone” (Critique I 130). Theoretically, there could be another world outside of scarcity, 
and thus the utopian impulse survives in Sartre’s work, even if “we are completely incapable 
of simply imagining such a relation” (123). Mouffe claims that antagonistic relations can never 
                                                      
25 Macomb quotes from Glenda Riley’s Divorce: An American Tradition (Oxford UP, 1991), p. 34.  
26 See Mouffe, “Democratic Politics.” 
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be eradicated but they can be channeled into agonistic debate if the terms are agreed upon. 
Even in Yekl, Cahan starts to trend toward this post-Marxist position, avant la lettre.  
 We can sketch out Jake and Gitl’s clashing viewpoints like we did for Olive and 
Ransom in The Bostonians. While Jake desires a figurative divorce from Jewishness with his 
literal divorce, making him as free and equal as any consumer, Gitl hopes to match an 
allegiance to democratic ideals—the ones allowing her to be “divorced by the Government 
of the land”—with her ongoing, if transformed, allegiance to Orthodox Judaism, which is on 
display during the “rabbinical divorce” that she must “accept . . . with the same free will and 
readiness with which [she] hast married [her] husband” (Cahan, Yekl 85). Jewishness is not, 
as in the assimilationist narrative promoted by Jake and orthodox Marxism, relegated to the 
past and American-ness to the future; rather, in keeping with revisionism’s political fight for 
universal citizenship and the freedoms it entails, the Russian-Jewish past is brought into the 
present and made equivalent to the democratic “free will” implied in the right to divorce.  
 When Gitl and Jake receive the rabbinical divorce, both are joined by supporters: 
The low-ceiled room was fairly crowded with men and women. Besides the principal 
actors in the scene, the rabbi, the scribe, and the witnesses, and, as a matter of 
course, Mrs. Kavarsky, there was the rabbi’s wife, their two children, and an envoy 
from Mamie, charged to look after the fortitude of Jake’s nerve. Gitl, extremely 
careworn and haggard, was “in her own hair,” thatched with a broad-brimmed winter 
hat of a brown colour, and in a jacket of black beaver. The rustic, “greenhornlike” 
expression was completely gone from her face and manner, and, although she now 
looked bewildered and as if terror-stricken, there was noticeable about her a 
suggestion of that peculiar air of self-confidence with which a few months’ life in 
America is sure to stamp the looks and bearing of every immigrant. Jake, flushed and 
plainly nervous and fidgety, made repeated attempts to conceal his state of mind now 
by screwing up a grim face, now by giving his enormous head a haughty posture, 
now by talking aloud to his escort. (83)  
 
The setting should remind us of the “overcrowded stuffy room” in which the novella began 
(2). Indeed, the image of boxing returns: the “two principal actors” face off in front of a 
crowd of strangers, backed by their respective entourages. Again, varying levels of 
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assimilation square off. Gitl has shed her “greenhorn” look and appears in complete control; 
making subtle compromises between her Orthodox practices and the realities of life in 
America, Gitl asserts her rights as a Jewish-American woman wronged by her husband. Jake, 
meanwhile, overcompensates for his insecurity with a hyper-masculine performance, 
redolent of his workplace demonstration in the opening pages.  
 Cahan alludes to the fate of his characters in a final chapter entitled “A Defeated 
Victor.” Jake heads straight to City Hall to marry Mamie, while Gitl plans to marry Bernstein 
after a mandated period of “nine-one days” passes (86). Jake, who first sought the divorce 
and is outwardly overjoyed by the result, winds up losing in the long run: “instead of a 
conqueror, he had emerged from the rabbi’s house the victim of an ignominious defeat” 
(89). Meanwhile, Gitl heads home weeping, “followed . . . by a batch of neighbors,” for 
whose benefit she undertakes a “demonstration of grief”; inwardly, though, she is overjoyed 
at the new life that awaits her with Bernstein: “Already on her way from the rabbi’s house, 
while her soul was full of Jake and the Polish girl, there had fluttered through her 
imagination a picture of the grocery business which she and Bernstein were to start with the 
money paid to her by Jake” (88-89). One would be hard pressed to find a more Sartrean way 
to frame Jake and Gitl’s divorce: the winner loses and the loser wins, which is the dialectical 
logic by which the Marxian narrative of History envisages the fall of bourgeois capitalism. 
 Applied to Jake, what Jameson calls the Sartrean “‘winner loses’ logic” makes sense 
(Postmodernism 5). He attempts to rise above his current socioeconomic status by marrying 
Mamie. Like the boxer, however, victory is stolen from him—here in the form of divorce 
fees, state and rabbinical, to go along with a healthy alimony. On “a Third Avenue cable car . 
. . bound for the mayor’s office” where he and Mamie will get married, Jake is forced to 
confront the inevitable unhappiness that lies ahead: “Each time the car came to a halt he 
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wished the pause could be prolonged indefinitely; and when it resumed its progress, the 
violent lurch it gave was accompanied by a corresponding sensation in his heart” (89). From 
the start, Jake’s character—his desire to Americanize by rising above his current condition as 
well as his past—has been perfectly amenable not only to the boxer’s life but also to 
orthodox Marxism’s vision of capitalism’s inevitable, pre-determined march towards ruin.  
 Gitl, the “loser” in the divorce, wins in the end. Gitl has represented the 
overdetermination of identity, as opposed to final determination by class or race/ethnicity, 
and the possibility of joining a new hybrid Jewish-American community that makes room 
for, instead of closing off, the plurality of possible self-identifications on the Lower East 
Side. As Mrs. Kavarsky explains, by divorcing Jake and choosing to marry Bernstein, Gitl 
seems to have achieved this dream: “you are going to marry a young man of silk who is fit to 
be a rabbi, and is as smart and ejecate as a lawyer . . . You ought to say Psalms for your coming 
to America. It is only there that it is possible for a blacksmith’s wife to marry a learned man, 
who is a blessing both for God and people” (88). This is a class narrative that will later be 
called the “American Dream.” Once they are married and receive the alimony, Gitl and 
Bernstein will become petty bourgeois grocery store owners.  
 In the orthodox Marxist master narrative, the petty bourgeoisie was given the task of 
reforming bourgeois political democracy up to the point where the proletariat seizes 
control.27 Thus, Gitl’s status as a loser who wins is related not only to an economic rise from 
non-working poor to the petty bourgeoisie but also to the progressive changes that can be 
made within the context of liberal democracy by the latter class. This narrative, though, is 
                                                      
27 “The class nature of every demand or task,” as Laclau and Mouffe write of the limits of the concept of 
hegemony in Marxian discourse, “has to be fixed a priori. There are bourgeois-democratic demands, petty-
bourgeois demands, etc., and their relative progressiveness is established through a political calculation which 
analyses every conjuncture in terms of the traditional model of stages” (49).  
 
 188 
subjected to a reversal: the proletariat, the historical loser, emerges as the hegemonic class in 
the last instance and abolishes bourgeois democracy altogether. Given the ongoing crisis in 
Marxism, one wonders if Cahan, like Eduard Bernstein, sensed that this final dialectical 
reversal would never come about and that whatever progressive political reforms the petty 
bourgeoisie (or the working class, for that matter) are able to institute in the near future 
would be part of the ongoing work of protecting the rights of all working people in a liberal 
democracy. In this scenario, (future) political unity is a function of class. We need only recall 
the allegory of the birds to understand the logic Cahan becomes mired in here: he has made 
room for the existence of a Jewish-American identity amongst Lower East Side workers, one 
that accounts for both economic concerns and religious beliefs/practices, sartorial issues, 
marital problems, and the like; but the political destiny of this new identity is tied to a larger 
fight for workers’ rights (they must learn to sing the same song as the other birds). While 
Cahan puts subtle pressure on the class essentialism of orthodox Marxism, he cannot yet 
imagine the terms by which Gitl and Bernstein will become politicized enough to fight the 
injustices of capitalism as and for Jewish Americans or American Jews.  
 By the time Cahan wrote The Rise of David Levinsky—first serialized as the 
“Autobiography of an American Jew” in 1913 and published as a long novel in 1917—his 
outlook was different. Particularly after the Triangle Shirtwaist fire of 1911, where close to 
150 workers died after being trapped in a burning factory, Cahan began to sense that the 
fight against the injustices of capitalism would be most effective in the push for an eight-
hour workday, safer working conditions, and other reformist positions. The enemy, Cahan 
realized, was not so much the means of production—which will be seized by the proletariat 
in the final instance—but rather a political belief supporting gains for the few at the expense 
of the many. In The Rise of David Levinsky, Cahan calls for an alliance of Left-leaning Jews to 
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oppose a Social Darwinian offshoot of classical liberalism supporting a free market 
economy, rampant individualism, and a non-interventionist state.  
V. Social Darwinism vs. Marxian Socialism 
 Despite surface-level similarities, Cahan has almost nothing in common with his 
most famous literary creation, David Levinsky. Born in northwest Russia, Levinsky is 
orphaned at a young age, becomes fervently Orthodox, and is sent to America by the 
daughter of a wealthy assimilated Jew who agrees to care for him as an act of charity. In 
America, Levinsky begins his slow but steady rise from personal tutor to sweatshop worker 
(these experiences he shared with Cahan) to owner of his own small garment shop to tycoon 
in the clothing industry. The first sentences of the novel prepare us for this journey: “I was 
born and reared in the lowest depths of poverty and I arrived in America—in 1885—with 
four cents in my pocket. I am now worth more than two million dollars and recognized as 
one of the two or three leading men in the cloak-and-suit trade in the United States” (Cahan, 
Rise 3). Life at the top is “devoid of significance,” though, owing to his inability to find love 
(3). Levinsky’s unhappiness is intricately related to the secular ideology that comes to replace 
Orthodox Judaism as his central belief system: Social Darwinism. If he does not marry, he 
will pass down nether his successful traits nor his wealth to the next generation. 
 Importantly, it is socialism that draws Levinsky’s ire and leads him to see himself as 
one of the elect in Herbert Spencer’s concept of the “survival of the fittest”:  
In my virulent criticism of the leaders of the union I had often characterized them as 
so many good-for-nothings, jealous of those who had succeeded in business by their 
superior brains, industry, and efficiency. One day I found a long editorial in my 
newspaper, an answer to a letter from a socialist. The editorial derived its inspiration 
from the theory of the Struggle for Existence and the Survival of the Fittest. Unlike 
many of the other editorials I had read, it breathed conviction. It was obviously a 
work of love. When the central idea of the argument came home to me I was in a 
turmoil of surprise and elation. “Why, that’s just what I have been saying all these 
days!” I exclaimed in my heart. “The able fellows succeed, and the misfits fail. Then 
the misfits begrudge those who accomplish things.” I almost felt as though Darwin 
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and Spencer had plagiarized a discovery of mine . . . Later, however, when I dipped 
into [Spencer’s] Social Statics, I was overborne by the wondrous novelty of the thing 
and by a sense of my own futility, ignorance, and cheapness. I felt at the gates of a 
great world of knowledge whose existence I had not even suspected. I had to read 
the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man, and then Spencer again. I sat up nights 
reading these books. Apart from the purely intellectual intoxication they gave me, 
they flattered my vanity as one of the “fittest.” It was as though all the wonders of 
learning, acumen, ingenuity, and assiduity displayed in these works had been 
intended, among other purposes, to establish my title as one of the victors of 
Existence. (282-283) 
 
Cahan might as well be the socialist to whom the editorial responds and thus against whom 
Levinsky formulates his new self-identity as “one of the victors of Existence.” Given that 
Cahan “studied [Spencer] in order to rebut Spencerian arguments against socialism” 
(Pittenger 106), I will argue that the novel itself offers an extended journey into the heart of 
Levinsky’s Social Darwinism to better rebut it. Charles Chesnutt uses a similar technique in 
The Marrow of Tradition, which he calls “mining” the opposition, to fight against a Social 
Darwinian brand of white supremacy.28 In Cahan’s case, a similar process defamiliarizes his 
own Marxism; thus, the novel’s rebuttal of its main character’s Social Darwinism proceeds 
from Cahan’s awareness of the similarities between these hegemonic discourses. This 
awareness, however, also leads to the formal expression of Cahan’s post-Marxism.  
 In the long passage above, Spencer and Darwin are discourses in which David 
Levinsky recognizes himself not just as “one of the victors of Existence” but also as the 
original author of this idea (Cahan, Rise 283). Given the importance of discourse to 
Levinsky’s new self-identification, it will be productive to consider this moment alongside 
Laclau and Mouffe’s rewriting of Althusser’s ideological interpellation. There is clearly 
misrecognition when Levinsky finds himself in Social Darwinian ideology but it does not occur 
along the real/illusory axis. Rather, in his rush to identify with Social Darwinism, Levinsky 
                                                      
28 See chapter 5.  
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forgets about how precarious such a (political) self-identification is in the first place. Indeed, 
earlier in the novel, when he is a lowly sweatshop worker, he admits: “Had I then chanced to 
hear a Socialist speech I might have become an ardent follower of Karl Marx and my life 
might have been directed along other lines than those which brought me to financial power” 
(153). What separates the Marxian master narrative from its Social Darwinian counterpart is 
not scientific truth-value but access to the discourse at a certain point in life. Cahan had a 
similar intellectual awakening when he remembered Marx, whose works he read in secret in 
Russia, as he worked in an American factory: “These things I had previously read in books 
on political economy, and now I would say to myself, ‘Here am I, a dead tool like the rest.’ It 
fascinated me that the facts were just as the books said they were” (Education 231). Social 
Darwinism and Marxian socialism are related by what they do for those who discover them: 
they give an otherwise plural, contingent social identity a place in a larger master narrative 
that, after the moment of discursive misrecognition, is felt to be the correct one all along. 
 The novel itself—Levinsky’s account of his life, written when he is an adult—is an 
act of rewriting the past, present, and future to fit a master narrative that he discovered, by 
chance, in early adulthood. For example, Levinsky’s rise can be explained by his inborn 
“ability ‘to stand punishment,’ as the pugilists would put it” (Cahan, Rise 22). As with Sartre 
but for different reasons, boxing is the cultural expression of the violence endemic to a 
realm of scarcity. The quality helping Levinsky survive in this milieu is his ability to take 
punishment. A similar idea operates within Howells’s “economy of pain,” where the urban 
underclass is felt to have a higher tolerance for pain. For the Darwinist, however, every 
environment is different and requires new methods of adaptation. While he can go many 
days without eating in Russia, Levinsky has to find a new way to withstand hunger in the 
U.S.: “Sometimes . . . I would burn my hand with a match or bite it as hard as I could. Any 
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kind of suffering or excitement was welcome, provided it made me forget my hunger” (141). 
His adaptability later allows Levinsky to rise. One day, Levinsky spills milk in his sweatshop 
and takes his licking from his boss: “My head was swimming. I was about to say something 
insulting to my employer, to get up and leave the place demonstratively. But I said to myself 
that I should soon be through with this kind of life for good, and I held myself in leash” 
(188). Levinsky takes his verbal punishment while plotting future revenge: he convinces the 
factory’s best worker to join forces with him in his own clothing business (188).  
 The socioeconomic rise of David Levinsky only yields unhappiness, much like Silas 
Lapham’s in Howells’s The Rise of Silas Lapham, to which Cahan’s title clearly alludes: 
“Sometimes when I am alone in my beautiful apartments, brooding over these things and 
nursing my loneliness, I say to myself: ‘There are cases when success is a tragedy’” (529). 
One is tempted to rewrite Levinsky’s tragedy in “winner loses” logic, as Cahan does for Jake 
and Gitl at the end of Yekl. But this would ignore the degree to which the Social Darwinian 
master narrative can account for Levinsky’s unhappy rise in its own terms.  
 In the Social Darwinian master narrative Levinsky by which abides, the inborn trait 
that has enabled him to adapt so successfully to life in urban America—the ability to 
withstand pain—threatens to become extinct if he cannot pass it along to his offspring. 
Levinsky also feels a sense of alienation from his past: “My past and present do not comport 
well. David, the poor lad swinging over the Talmud volume at the Preacher’s Synagogue, 
seems to have more in common with my inner identity than David Levinsky, the well-known 
cloak manufacturer” (530). The price to pay for accepting biological traits as the backbone of 
his social and economic success is that he becomes alienated from what he calls “inner 
identity,” which signifies his feeling of Jewishness. A page earlier, though, Levinsky 
conceives of his identity in terms of “race” when explaining his inability to settle down with 
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his last viable mate, who happens to be a Gentile: “I often speculated and theorized on the 
question of proposing to her. I saw clearly that it would be a mistake. It was not the faith of 
my fathers that was in the way. It was that medieval prejudice against our people which 
makes so many marriages between Jew and Gentile a failure” (527). “It’s really a pity that 
there is the chasm of race between us,” he later tells her. “Otherwise I don’t see why we 
couldn’t be happy together” (528). Schreier finds in this use of “race” a disentanglement of 
Jewishness from identity-markers founded in the past (“faith of my fathers”) or in biology 
(the “chasm of race”), replaced by a desire for an alternative future where these essentialist 
categories no longer signify (74). The “chasm of race,” however, is called upon by Levinsky to 
explain why marriage between Jew and Gentile would be a “failure.” His assumption that the 
“chasm of race” will doom the marriage aligns him with the nativist sentiments that achieved 
hegemony in the first quarter of the twentieth century, leading to legislation requiring literacy 
tests for immigrants (1917) and setting quotas on certain nationalities (1924).29 Levinsky has 
become trapped in a master narrative that he initially uses to explain his worldly success. 
Now, at the end of his life, it marks him as Other and alienates him from his Jewishness. 
 At the end of Yekl, Cahan resorts to a “winner loses” logic that this pins Gitl’s newly 
won Jewish-American identity to a master narrative that predicted the future eradication of 
cultural/religious signifiers like “Jew” or “Jewish.” If a similar move is lurking in Levinsky 
calling upon the “chasm of race” to explain away his last real shot at love, Cahan has placed 
his main character in murkier waters. As Mike Hawkins shows, eugenicists drew on Social 
Darwinism to “produc[e] a graphic picture in which racial survival in a world of incessant 
conflict was predicated upon the maintenance of a healthy population purged of those 
elements which threatened its integrity” (247). The somber mood at the end of The Rise of 
                                                      
29 See Howe, World 53-57. 
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David Levinsky can be attributed to Levinsky’s recognition that his defense of the “chasm of 
race” feeds a white supremacist fantasy of racial purity, since he is unlikely to reproduce.  
 One also wonders if Cahan senses an uncomfortable family resemblance between the 
Social Darwinian prediction that (white) “race consciousness”30 will emerge from “the 
survival of the fittest” and the Marxian prediction that (proletarian) class consciousness will 
emerge from the class struggle. In a later passage, Cahan confronts the similarities between 
these two otherwise contrasting “sciences”: “For all my theorizing about the ‘survival of the 
fittest’ and the ‘dying off of the weaklings,’ I could not help feeling that, in an abstract way, 
the socialists were not altogether wrong” (Rise 519). The point where Levinsky feels socialists 
are not “altogether wrong” may be the shared belief that modern industrial society is but the 
midpoint of a larger evolutionary narrative. For both discourses, industrial capitalism and its 
pet political system, representative democracy, replaced an earlier way of life—feudalism for 
socialists, the militant age for Social Darwinists—and will, in turn, be superseded by the final 
stage in social evolution, the socialist mode of production or Spencer’s equilibration.31  
 The more “abstract” agreement between Social Darwinism and orthodox Marxism is 
that they offer a scientific account of social and political change modeled on Darwinian 
evolution, with the added spin that the future of the species could be predicted. Both 
discourses share the problems that occur when one turns Darwinian evolution into a 
predictive science. Laclau and Mouffe argue that the threat of authoritarianism is built into the 
solution that orthodoxy proposed for the “crisis” in Marxism, which gave the party the 
ability to intervene on behalf of the masses if they were not fulfilling their class role.32 The 
                                                      
30 The term is Lothrop Stoddard’s, from his book The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy (1920).  
31 For an account of Spencer’s vision of evolution and its influence on American thought, see Hofstadter 37. 
32 See Laclau and Mouffe 46-47.  
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threat of authoritarianism is even more evident in eugenics.33 Related to the authoritarian 
temptations built into these two master narratives is an issue that hit closer to home for 
Cahan. Both Social Darwinism and Marxian socialism fail to provide a place for the Jew in 
the projected futures that their theoreticians might have to make a reality for everyone else. 
These systems “recognize” Jews in terms of an essentializing identity (race or class) only to 
imagine a future in which this identification will be superseded or eliminated.   
 In the sentence after Levinsky admits that socialists may not be “altogether wrong,” 
Cahan re-poses the question of Jewish (political) identity on another level—the ground-level, 
as opposed to “abstract” conceptions of social evolution—and appears to gain a better 
foothold to make his own rebuttal to Social Darwinism: “The case was different, however, 
when I considered [socialism] in connection with the concrete struggle of trade-unionism 
(which among the Jewish immigrants was practically but another name for socialism) against 
low wages or high rent” (Rise 519). Jewish immigrants live out their role in the class struggle 
not by attending party meetings or reading Marx before bed, but by joining a union and 
striking for higher wages. Such is the reformist position. Importantly, Levinsky believes that 
his own position has also undergone a reform: “Not that I had remained inflexible in my 
views regarding the distribution of wealth in the world. Some of the best-known people in 
the country were openly taking the ground that the poor man was not getting a ‘square deal’” 
(518). He also claims to recognize the unique needs of Jewish workers by allowing them to 
work on Sunday instead of the Sabbath, which not coincidentally means juking the union.  
 Clearly enough, the difference between socialism and Social Darwinism is best 
articulated, not on the level of high scientific theory, but in the day-to-day relations between 
                                                      
33 Lothrop Stoddard, one of the U.S.’s main defenders of eugenics, “met German eugenicists . . . and Nazi 
politicians . . . and continued to enthuse over Nazi eugenic and racial measures into the 1940s” (Hawkins 246). 
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union members and their employers on the Lower East Side, with a special focus on 
questions about Jewish identity. At the same time, this more productive articulation of the 
agonism between Social Darwinism and socialism relies on another abstract point of 
agreement, but one very different from the authoritarian temptation discussed above. The 
agonism between Marxian socialism and Social Darwinism necessitates that both positions 
give up the pretension of predicting or influencing the course of social progress; instead they 
must burrow into the present moment of urban-industrial life, where the future is not given 
but is rather the contingent result of current political beliefs and actions. Importantly, both 
positions agree on the world we have now: liberal democracy shaped to fit the exigencies of 
urban-industrial capitalism. In fact, the opposition between socialism and Social Darwinism, 
when confronting the political system of the here-and-now, stems from a general agreement 
that the “natural,” God-given rights of liberal democracy—liberty and equality—are, in fact, 
man-made and thus open to new interpretations. “An adversary,” Chantal Mouffe writes, “is 
an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because 
we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and 
equality. But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles” 
(Democratic 102). This is how the adversarial relation between Levinsky and socialism plays 
out in The Rise of David Levinsky: as the common ground changes from the authoritarian 
temptations of scientific theory to the ethico-political principles of democracy, the difference 
between the two positions is re-staged as opposing conceptions of the same two terms, 
liberty and equality, and their application to the Jewish population on the Lower East Side. 
While this removes the scientific truth-value from both positions, it does not completely 
relativize them since Cahan imagines that one better serves this population. But to make his 
rebuttal, Cahan first articulates the Social Darwinian definitions of liberty and equality.  
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 Spencer was an ally of anarchism because his emphasis on individual liberty implied 
that the coercive state should be abolished.34 Another interpretation of his doctrine takes the 
opposite path to the state-sponsored weeding out of undesirables. A Social Darwinism that 
begins with the ethico-political values of democracy skates a position between these two 
extremes. Hawkins calls this political position “Individualism,” the practitioners of which 
(Spencer included) “fought to reassert what they saw as the essence of liberalism—negative 
freedom and laissez-faire”; it is thus a forerunner of what we now call neoliberalism (89).35 
Equality “was incompatible with liberty, and any interference in society and economy 
through political engineering was doomed to be counter-productive” (112). While this 
represents the orthodox Social Darwinian view, many of its practitioners countenanced 
equality on the state level while maintaining that it does not exist in civil society, except in 
the equal freedom to which one is entitled. William Graham Sumner, the most influential 
American Social Darwinist and someone far more pessimistic about democracy than 
Spencer, once said: “The State gives equal rights and equal chances just because it does not 
mean to give anything else” (qtd. in Hawkins 113). Still, Sumner was of the belief that 
political democracy would pass away in the next stage of sociopolitical evolution, so this 
concession to equality is not overly meaningful. But when historical events appeared to be 
going in a direction opposite of what he had envisioned, Sumner came to the defense of 
democracy (he predicted a regression to the militant stage of society if the U.S. became an 
imperialist superpower, defending state-level democracy as a protection against atavism).36  
                                                      
34 See Cahan, Education 333. See also chapter 4. 
35 Hawkins 98 for a comparison between Social Darwinian individualism and what we now call neoliberalism. 
36 Hofstadter points out that “[t]hose who were familiar with Sumner’s crisp iconoclasm on the subject of 
democracy may have rubbed their eyes to see [him] attack imperialists for preparing the abandonment of the 
nation’s democratic principles” in essays like “The Conquest of the United States by Spain” (1898) (195). 
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 Levinsky proves himself to be a thoroughgoing individualist who, like Sumner, 
defends a modicum of democratic equality. His individualism is evident the moment he 
discovers Darwin and envisions himself the rightful author of such ideas. Later in the text, 
after he has cemented himself as a major player in the clothing industry, he feels that even 
those who compliment him on his success do not “appreciate the subtlety of [his] thoughts 
and feelings” (Cahan, Rise 347). The seeds of his unhappiness are sown here—he is such an 
exceptional individual that he is alienated from everyone else, destined to be alone. 
 In this bleak outlook on the individualist’s future Cahan shares something with Jack 
London, whose main character in Martin Eden (1909) is also a self-made man (an author, no 
less) for whom Spencer offers “the master-key of life” (379). Martin is one of only a “half 
dozen individualists in Oakland” but, needless to say, they do not get together socially (384). 
London said of his creation: “Being unaware of the needs of others, of the whole human 
collective need, Martin Eden lived only for himself, fought only for himself, and, if you 
please, died for himself’” (qtd. in Sinclair 9). Without dying, Levinsky suffers from the same 
ironic “confirmation” of his specialness, which Cahan, like London, pits against the 
collective possibilities of Marxian socialism. There are also key differences between Levinsky 
and Eden. When faced with a Republican political candidate who professes belief in the 
survival of the fittest yet campaigns “on interstate commerce regulation, on regulation of the 
railway trust and Standard Oil, [and] on the conservation of the forests,” Eden denounces 
this man’s “mongrel democracy [as] nothing else than pseudo-socialism” (London 383). A 
strong democratic state, like socialism, goes against natural selection. A reader of Nietzsche, 
Eden instead argues that “[t]he world belongs to the true noblemen, to the great blond 
beasts, to the non-compromisers, to the ‘yes-sayers.’ And they will eat you up, you socialists 
who are afraid of socialism and who think yourselves individualists” (384).  
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 Cahan has his main character avoid a similar prognostication by accepting, later in 
his life, that democratic equality can be a subdued but nonetheless viable partner of a Social 
Darwinian commitment to individual liberty: “if my Antomir employees were willing to 
accept from me lower pay than they might have received in other places, their average 
earnings were actually higher than they would have been elsewhere. I gave them steady work. 
Besides, they felt perfectly at home in my shop. I treated them well. I was very democratic” 
(Cahan, Rise 379). These “democratic” relations are tied to that part of Levinsky that still 
feels close to his life in Russia: “It was enough for a cloak-maker to ask me for a job with the 
Antomir accent to be favorably recommended to one of my foremen” (378). This “special 
consideration” (378) counteracts natural selection. Yet Levinsky admits that “democratic” 
employee-employer relations are part of a selfish desire to make as much money as possible, 
confirming that the unforgiving capitalist in him survives his more “flexible” Social 
Darwinism: “All this, I confess, was not without advantage to my business interests, for it 
afforded me a low average of wages and safeguarded my shop against labor troubles” (378).  
 Cahan would reject this defense of individual gains at the expense of the workers he 
deigns to protect from the unions. Yet, in the novel there is an undeniable authorial 
understanding and even tenderness surrounding Levinsky’s rise. Perhaps this is because 
Levinsky makes room for Jewish self-identification outside the strictures of biological race: 
his Antomir society links Jewishness to region, religion, and work. Furthermore, he connects 
this identity to the promises of democracy. Near the end of the text, a musician plays the 
“Star Spangled Banner” for diners at a fancy Catskill Mountain resort and the audience, 
Levinsky included, is deeply moved. He acknowledges that capitalistic motives play into their 
patriotism but posits that there may be another sentiment motivating this response: 
Men and women were offering thanksgiving to the flag under which they were eating 
this good dinner, wearing these expensive clothes. There was the jingle of newly-
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acquired dollars in our applause. But there was something else in it as well. Many of 
those who were now paying tribute to the Stars and Stripes were listening to the tune 
with grave, solemn mien. It was as if they were saying: “We are not persecuted under 
this flag. At least we have found a home.” (424) 
 
The audience’s patriotic thanksgiving to their new “home” is related to the money they have 
made in the U.S.; but their more “solemn mien” is related to a respect for the equality before 
the law and the freedom to practice any religion promised by the democratic state. They will 
not be “persecuted” for being Jewish as they were in Russia during the pogroms.  
 Levinsky is still committed to individualism but he now acknowledges that the 
democratic state, on both the political and social level, best enables such a conception of 
individualism, not to speak of Jewish identity, to flourish. His ideal state is limited in scope 
and power—it grants your rights; what you do with those rights (make money or languish in 
poverty) owes everything to your unique skillset. The class interests of such a position are 
openly acknowledged and celebrated, since the opportunity to succeed in the free market 
economy is precisely what the democratic state offers. Thus, nobody should be ashamed if 
his or her natural, in-born proclivities enable him or her to rise above the “ruck” (283).  
 Levinsky gives Cahan both a language—liberty and equality—and a topic—Jewish 
identity—with which socialism can confront and, hopefully, unseat the growing hegemony 
of Social Darwinian individualism in American society. Levinsky, we recall, finds his greatest 
enemy in “the concrete struggle of trade-unionism (which among the Jewish immigrants was 
practically but another name for socialism) against low wages or high rent” (519).  
 This defense of trade unionism lines up with the reformist socialism promoted by 
Eduard Bernstein. In The Preconditions of Socialism (1899), Bernstein defends his position 
against two audiences—Tocquevillian liberals and Marxian socialists—by drawing on, while 
radically transforming, the two words they agree are important: liberty and equality. On the 
one hand, he wants to assure his liberal readers that a socialist commitment to social and 
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political equality will not lead to a “tyranny of the majority”: “in our times, there is an almost 
unconditional guarantee that the majority in a democratic community will make no law that 
does lasting injury to personal freedom, for today’s majority can easily become tomorrow’s 
minority” (142). He then argues, to his socialist brethren, that a concession to liberalism does 
not compromise socialism: “The aim of all socialist measures, even of those that outwardly 
appear to be coercive measures, is the development and protection of the free personality” 
(147). If the worker is not free to do as s/he pleases under capitalism, Social Democracy 
helps him become free by “transforming the people’s representatives from being the masters 
into being the real servants of the people” (144). In its fully realized form, democracy would 
see “the abolition of class government, although it is not yet the actual abolition of classes” 
(143). The problem, as Laclau and Mouffe show, is that there is not yet a substitute for class 
as the political identity capable of radicalizing democracy within the liberal-democratic state.  
 In Yekl, Cahan’s aesthetic and political imagination could only go this far: although 
Gitl’s divorce from Jake enables her to form a Jewish-American identity, Cahan projects her 
“victory” in terms of the Marxian dialectic. Cahan appears to recognize the ambiguities of 
this position in the very act that causes Levinsky to relent to the unions. Through a “spy,” he 
hears that a woman he once considered proposing to for her money, Gussie, has given the 
last pennies in her savings account to the union: “‘What do you want of me, murderers that 
you are? . . . Bleed me, bleed me, cruel people that you are!’” (521). This self-sacrifice for the 
good of the union reeks of the orthodox claim that the Jew must ultimately embrace his or 
her class identity in the final instance. It also evokes something much more sinister. In The 
White Terror and the Red (1905), his “Novel of Revolutionary Russia” set in 1881, Cahan 
shows how Jewish revolutionaries sacrificed their ethnic identities for the greater good of the 
Will of the People Party, which became problematic when it officially supported anti-Semitic 
 
 202 
riots because they were said to augur the beginning of the revolution. Echoes of this 
violence, and Cahan’s ambivalence about it, can be found in Gussie’s self-sacrifice.  
 The question of Jewish political identity helps Cahan avoid this “option” of 
sacrificing ethnic identity for class identity. By focusing on the freedom, within a Left 
politics, to express oneself as a Jewish worker or a friend of the Jewish worker instead of a 
proletarian tout court, Cahan avoids the return of class essentialism in Bernstein’s revisionism. 
Cahan seems to understand that the best response to someone like Levinsky is, first, to 
admit that the fight will play itself out in the confines of the liberal-democratic state—which 
means agreeing to the terms of the debate: liberty and equality—and, second, to create a 
Jewish political identity that is aligned with the socialist party in its attack on capitalism but 
which retains the freedom to explore uniquely Jewish issues (such as workers being exploited 
by their religious preference to take Saturday off). In The Rise of David Levinsky, this 
autonomous Jewish politics is made possible by Cahan’s Jewish Daily Forward, even if it is not 
explicitly named: “The socialist Yiddish daily, which had an overwhelmingly wide circulation 
now, printed reports of meetings at which I had been hissed and hooted. I was accused of 
bribing corrupt politicians who were supposed to help me suppress the strike by means of 
police clubs. I was charged with bringing disgrace upon the Jewish people” (520). The 
Forward not only contains the content of Cahan’s response to Social Darwinism but is also 
the aesthetic form (the Yiddish-language socialist daily) that this response takes in both the 
real world and the text. This is Cahan’s greatest realist gesture—he blurs the boundary 
between fiction and reality, aesthetics and politics, discourse and urban life via the subtle 
reference to the Forward in the pages of The Rise of David Levinsky.  
 The Forward does not use class-identity to police the boundary between Levinsky’s 
beliefs and practices and its own. In fact, “American papers” and general “[p]ublic opinion” 
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join the Forward’s fight “against [Levinsky]” along with “some German-Jewish financiers and 
philanthropists” (520). A new political identity—the Jewish Left—is cobbled together from 
those who “normally” identify as an Uptown or Downtown Jew, German Jew or Russian 
Jew, secular or Orthodox Jew, Marxian socialist or political democrat; and the very identity 
of this new formation, the sense of who “we” are, is formed in opposition to Levinsky, who 
brings “disgrace upon the Jewish people” (520). While in the throes of patriotic feeling, 
Levinsky suggests that Jews are not “persecuted” in the U.S. but Cahan and the members of 
the Forward know that this is not so (424). Recall that, in answer to one of the “Bintel Brief” 
letters detailing anti-Semitism in the workplace, the editor urged the writer to go to the 
United Hebrew Trades, who could “bring up the charges before the Machinists Union about 
this persecution” (Bintel 64). If the problem with the selfish Jewish individualist or the 
selfless Jewish Marxist is their distance from the Jewish “people,” then the Forward promises 
the creation of a political “we,” the Jewish Left, that absorbs all kinds of Jewish self-
identification under a common umbrella by articulating this new political identity within the 





Anarchy and Anachronism in The Age of Innocence 
 
In her 1910 polemic “Marriage and Love,” Emma Goldman argues, contrary to 
popular opinion, that “marriage and love have nothing in common; they are as far apart as 
the poles; are, in fact, antagonistic to each other” (58). Marriage is a “State and Church-
begotten weed” (65)—it is strict, repressive, hierarchical—while love is free and open to all. 
A force of anarchy, love breaks down hierarchies and, Goldman prophesies, will one day 
triumph throughout the world. In the Broadview edition of Edith Wharton’s The Age of 
Innocence (1920), editor Michael Nowlin includes extracts from “Marriage and Love” in 
Appendix E: Wharton and Others on the Status of Women. As Nowlin remarks, the 
inclusion of this piece is both startling and apt: “Though Wharton hardly thought of herself 
as a feminist and was largely indifferent to the issue of women’s suffrage,” in novels like The 
Age of Innocence “she clearly represents the institution of marriage in a critical light . . . that 
uncannily resembles that cast by far more radical thinkers such as Goldman, the anarchist 
from the Lower East Side, who was deported from the United States in 1919” (374).  
Even a barebones summary of the novel’s plot will make evident some of the points 
of comparison. Newland Archer, the perfect specimen of Old New York’s values—that is, 
the values of 1870s Manhattan elites who lived along Fifth Avenue from Washington Square 
to the edge of Central Park—intends to marry his sweetheart, the chaste and amiable May 
Welland. However, he falls for her worldly cousin, Ellen Olenska. Ellen appears in New 
York after leaving her “brute of a husband,” a Polish count “who kept her practically a 
prisoner” in Europe (Wharton, Age 87). Ellen’s presence causes Archer to view his social 
set’s marriage rituals as unequal (“[w]omen ought to be free—as free as we are”) though he 
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struggles to accept Ellen’s desire for a divorce (88). “Our ideas about marriage and divorce 
are particularly old-fashioned,” he tells a stunned Ellen. “Our legislation favours divorce—
our social customs don’t” (144). Archer goes through with his marriage to May, but he still 
loves Ellen with an intense passion. Although he has imagined throughout their courtship 
that May is “innocent,” she suspects Archer and Ellen of being “lovers in the extreme sense 
peculiar to ‘foreign’ vocabularies” (319). May plots with other members of society to expel 
Ellen back to Europe. The last chapter of the novel jumps forward twenty-six years, when 
Archer has an opportunity to reconnect with Ellen in Paris after May’s death. Archer, who 
considers himself a relic of a bygone era, decides not to rekindle his love with Ellen.      
It has become commonplace in Wharton criticism to point out, as Nowlin does, that 
the politics of her novels belie or even subvert her personal politics. Despite an avowedly 
conservative worldview befitting her own Old New York upbringing, Wharton’s novels 
engage in a proto-feminist critique of marriage, patriarchy, sexual oppression, and the social 
construction of femininity. Dale Bauer claims that Wharton’s willingness to engage with the 
cultural debates of her time, like the free love movement’s critique of marriage, produced 
“an intense, sometimes painful confrontation with her own presuppositions and 
expectations” (xv). Elizabeth Ammons posits an aesthetic and political Bildung punctuated by 
Wharton’s charity work for Belgian war refugees: “Until the First World War taught her how 
to work corporately, she remained the perfect product of her old New York rearing which 
told her to refrain from personal, direct political actions and statements” (2). The war 
experience made “her think even harder and more deeply about her native land” and its 
ills—“[e]conomic dependence, sexual repression, the double standard, propriety marriage,” 
all concerns of Goldman’s (127). Cynthia Griffin Wolff marks a transition after Wharton’s 
affair with Morton Fullerton from 1907 to 1910: in “[t]he group of novels that begins with 
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The Reef (1912) and concludes with The Age of Innocence (1920) . . . Wharton began to write 
about passion: sexual passion; the passion for acquisition, for experience, for love” (192).  
Jennie Kassanoff has troubled narratives of Wharton’s progressivism by resurrecting 
a discussion of her conservatism on the issue of race (her dismay that America lacked a 
racially pure, “innocent” origin) and aesthetics (her attack on modernist experimentation as 
“pure anarchy in fiction”) (Wharton, Writing 14). “If her native land generously welcomed 
the world’s huddled masses,” Kassanoff writes, “then the novel, under Wharton’s neo-
nativist laws of ‘pure English’ and her colonial determination to suppress ‘pure anarchy in 
fiction,’ formed an architectural, aesthetic and political bulwark against the menacing 
possibilities of democratic pluralism” (5). Kassanoff nonetheless intersects with the career 
arc described by Ammons and Wolff, this one matching historical ruptures with personal 
ones. After the affair with Fullerton and the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, which Wharton 
and others imagined as an allegory of class intermixing in the face of catastrophe, Wharton 
gave herself over to “the egalitarian temptations of pure sensation” in The Reef (6). The Reef is 
about the consequences of a brief affair between George Darrow and Sophy Vinter on the 
eve of Darrow reconnecting with a widowed woman to whom he plans to propose, the Old 
New Yorker Anna Leath. Kassanoff’s reading centers on Wharton’s notably anarchic 
description of Anna’s sexual awakening amidst the revelations of Darrow’s past with Sophy:  
She recalled having read somewhere that in ancient Rome the slaves were not 
allowed to wear a distinctive dress lest they should recognize each other and learn 
their numbers and their power. So, in herself, she discerned for the first time 
instincts and desires, which, mute and unmarked, had gone to and fro in the dim 
passages of her mind, and now hailed each other with a cry of mutiny. (Reef 290) 
 
For Kassanoff, this represents a high-water mark for Wharton’s politics, though it is not her 
last foray into the anarchic possibilities of sex and love. After a relapse in Summer (1917), 
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with its defense of Yankee values, Wharton “conceded the inevitability of elite defeat” at the 
hands of democratic pluralism1 and sexual experience in The Age of Innocence (7). 
Ferdâ Asya has brought this discussion full-circle by explicitly linking Wharton’s 
postwar transformation with developments in the anarchist tradition. Wharton’s sympathetic 
reading of Whitman and Nietzsche during the Fullerton affair, Asya argues, was a crucial 
component of her “emotional and intellectual” development (41). What Wharton found 
“exhilarating” in Nietzsche, she explained in a 1908 letter, was not his “logic, but [his] 
wonderful flashes of insight, & a power of breaking through conventions” (Letters 159). 
Whitman, whose Leaves of Grass was “kept under lock and key” while Wharton was growing 
up (“brought out, like tobacco, only in the absence of ‘the ladies’”), moved her with his 
conception of lovers as “amies” or comrades, words she used in letters to Fullerton (qtd. in 
Asya 41).2 Asya points out that Wharton shared this passion for Nietzsche and Whitman 
with Goldman and speculates that a cosmopolitan intellectual such as she was could not 
have avoided influential anarchist periodicals like Goldman’s Mother Earth. At the very least, 
“[i]n Wharton’s fiction, the basic motifs of anarchism are discernible in the constant struggle 
of the individual or community with oppressive familial, social, or political power” (43). 
This may be so, but for Nowlin to claim that Age “uncannily resembles” Goldman’s 
“Marriage and Love” is, I want to argue, both accurate and misleading. Wharton, to begin 
with, skewers the free love movement with her brief send-up of “Dr. Agathon Carver, 
founder of the Valley of Love Community,” who makes the rounds with Ellen’s free-spirited 
aunt (Age 181). Yet Wharton’s writing during the Fullerton affair—The Reef, her letters to 
Fullerton, her Love Diary, and a poem written after their first night together—suggest that 
                                                      
1 For a similar reading of Wharton’s politics, one more focused on New York City as the locus of democratic 
pluralism, see Griffith 21-49, 50-70. 
2 See also Price 387-388. 
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she does believe in the radical-democratic possibilities of love. Her worry is that, with the 
collapse of Old New York’s traditions under the weight of historical “progress,” the social 
and historical constraints producing the anarchic possibilities of love will be removed. For 
Wharton, the antagonism between love and marriage will not be resolved with love 
triumphing over Church and State. Instead, the poles of the antagonism can be momentarily 
reversed—instead of marriage dominating forever, love has its moments. Thus, Wharton 
looks for brief moments wherein love is unleashed, temporary unsettling and imperiling the 
hierarchical social order that otherwise blocks the possibility of such an expression.  
In chapter 2, I argued that James rewrites a hegemonic masculine discourse on 
male/female relations in a democracy to name a mutual “privation” or antagonism between 
men and women in the production of urban space (AS 51). Wharton, I claim here, rewrites a 
counter-hegemonic feminist critique of marriage. For her as for Goldman, the institution of 
marriage both creates a subordinate role for women and disproportionately oppresses them 
by blocking the free and equal expression of sexuality. But Wharton pushes her realism and 
her personal politics to their limits by courting antagonism for a radical-democratic 
aesthetics and politics of love. Wharton thereby solves one political problem that Howells 
could not while running aground on a familiar formal problem. Insofar as love is 
unspeakable before, during, and after its disruptive appearance, it is an example of what 
Jameson calls affect; but insofar as it radicalizes even Goldman’s conception of love, it is 
more amenable to radical-democratic politics than Howells’s “gay” transportation systems.3 
Like Howells, however, Wharton learns that anarchic bodily feelings threaten the traditional 
lines and limits of realist narration, pushing her writing into the realm of modernism.  
                                                      
3 In chapter 1, I compared Howells’s search for a positive feeling in and around public transportation to a 
poem by Wharton called “Terminus,” which related the passions of lovers in a hotel to the screeching of train 
cars outside. This poem will be a central piece of what I call Wharton’s aesthetics and politics of love.  
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To read Wharton’s rethinking of the antagonism between love and marriage along 
these lines, I will turn to the political philosophy of Jacques Rancière. Like Wharton, 
Rancière is deeply anti-utopian because the antagonistic relations between hierarchical social 
orders—what he calls the police—and radical-democratic expressions of equality will never 
be resolved. I agree with Asya, then, that Wharton’s novelistic experiments with anarchism 
can benefit from “anachronistic approaches” that read later developments in politics and 
philosophy back into her work as a hermeneutic tool (39). Though Asya does not mention 
Rancière, the pairing is an intriguing one because both writers make a connection between 
radical politics and aesthetics. While Wharton disparaged modernism as “pure anarchy in 
fiction” (Writing 14), Rancière traces the “anarchy of writing” back to Don Quixote (Mute 98). 
Wharton’s critique of modernism makes her conservatism a factor of her realism, but it also 
follows a similar line of reasoning as her critique of free love. Anarchy, like love, must be 
measured against constraint. The literary analogue for constraint, I argue, is the Aristotelian 
hierarchy of genres, which supplied rules for the proper kinds of novels, characters, settings, 
and readers. While Rancière claims that literary realism broke from this hierarchical genre 
system, the Old New York elite abided by similar rules in the 1870s—a part of their larger 
political ideology of civic republicanism, I will claim—and used them to try to quell 
Wharton’s literary interests. What is most troubling about Wharton’s conservatism, then, is 
that she appears to have retained Old New York’s aesthetic and political values despite her 
own unhappy marriage and her mother’s icy dismissal of the very idea of a woman novelist. 
I will argue that Wharton unleashes the anarchic power of love in brief moments of 
formal experimentation, momentarily subverting Old New York’s hierarchical worldview 
and her own realist practices. If anachronism is the critical mode of this chapter, this is 
because Wharton’s version of aesthetic and political experimentation—her version of 
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“anarchy in fiction”—is a deliberate anachronism. In Age, where every element of 1870s 
New York is expertly recreated and every reference seemingly triple-checked, it is no 
coincidence that Wharton has Ellen and Archer express their love in an urban space—The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in Central Park—that did not yet exist in this timeframe.  
The next section will be a prolegomenon to my analysis of anarchic anachronism in 
“the Met” (as the museum is now commonly called). It will offer a deeper exploration of 
Wharton’s place in the anarchist tradition, stretching from Goldman’s anarcho-feminism to 
Rancière’s anti-utopian aesthetic politics. We will begin by resuming the comparison between 
Goldman’s “Marriage and Love” and Age, showing more similarities and, most importantly, 
the points of departure that put Wharton on an anachronistic track to Rancière.  
I. Wharton, Goldman, Rancière: Marriage and Love in the Anarchist Tradition 
Goldman’s “Marriage and Love” and Wharton’s Age both critique the institution of 
marriage as a hierarchical, heterosexual ritual that disproportionately oppresses women by 
threatening their life and wellbeing. Marriage is an unequal insurance policy, Goldman points 
out: “If . . . woman’s premium is her husband, she pays for it with her name, her privacy, her 
self-respect, her very life . . . Man, too pays his toll, but as his sphere is wider, marriage does 
not limit him as much as woman” (59). The worst inequality is felt in the sphere of sexuality: 
From infancy, almost, the average girl is told that marriage is her ultimate goal; 
therefore her training and education must be directed towards that end. Like the 
mute beast fattened for slaughter, she is prepared for that. Yet . . . she is allowed to 
know much less about her function as wife and mother than the ordinary artisan of 
his trade. It is indecent and filthy for a respectable girl to know anything of the 
marital relation. . . . The prospective wife and mother is kept in complete ignorance 
of her only asset in the competitive field—sex. Thus she enters into life-long 
relations with a man only to find herself shocked, repelled, outraged beyond measure 
by the most natural and healthy instinct, sex. It is safe to say that a large percentage 
of the unhappiness, misery, distress, and physical suffering of matrimony is due to 
the criminal ignorance in sex matters that is being extolled as a great virtue. (60-61) 
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Newland Archer comes to learn these hard truths after Ellen Olenska returns to 
New York. Because of Ellen’s example of worldly experience, Newland suspects that May’s 
once-valued innocence is nothing but “an artificial product . . . cunningly manufactured by a 
conspiracy of mothers and aunts and grandmothers and long-dead ancestresses, because it 
was supposed to be what he wanted, what he had a right to, in order that he might exercise 
his lordly pleasure in smashing it like an image made of snow” (Wharton, Age 91). The 
echoes of Goldman’s “mute beast fattened for slaughter” are hard to miss. We also find the 
ironic reversals that make Goldman’s piece so biting: what is supposed to be pure, virtuous, 
or innocent is a social construct founded on sexual violence; but if a woman were to act on 
what Wharton, with Nietzsche in mind, called the “wholesome basis of naked instinct,” she 
would be labeled one of those women and be expelled from polite society (Wharton, Letters 
159). Indeed, “when ‘such things happened’ it was undoubtedly foolish of the man, but 
somehow always criminal of the woman” (Wharton, Age 132). Archer has freely sown his 
wild oats (an affair with a married woman, no less), while his betrothed is kept “innocent” by 
an “elaborate system of mystification”: “She was frank, poor darling, because she had 
nothing to conceal, assured because she knew of nothing to be on her guard against; and 
with no better preparation than this, she was to be plunged overnight into what people 
evasively called ‘the facts of life’” (90). Despite such moments of enlightened critique, 
Archer ends up participating in New York’s “precise and inflexible” marriage rituals, all the 
while feeling “shown off like a wild animal cunningly trapped” (75, 109).  
Though placed in the mouth of her male protagonist, this was a critique that 
Wharton honed from her own personal experience, beginning with her 1879 “debut” in New 
York’s marriage market. R.W.B. Lewis describes this moment using language from Age:    
In the phrase Edith Wharton used about it, it was an age of innocence. The word 
applied in particular to the young girl, the debutante, whose single-minded purpose . 
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. . was to make a suitable marriage. To this end her mother’s function was to supply 
her with elegant clothes and make every arrangement to launch her upon a proper 
worldly career. It was not her mother’s function, Edith Jones had to learn, to supply 
any hints about the real relationship between married men and women. About all 
that, the maternal contribution was an elaborate pattern of mystification, something 
which the mature Edith Wharton regarded with rancorous regret. (35) 
 
Her mother’s refusal to educate her on the facts of married life, in Wharton’s own 
words, “did more than anything else to falsify and misdirect [her] whole life” (qtd. in Lewis 
54). Unsurprisingly, her marriage to Teddy Wharton in 1885 proved to be disastrous (they 
failed to consummate the relationship for three weeks).4 Teddy, who suffered from what we 
would now call bipolar disorder, was given to bouts of jealousy or depression over 
Wharton’s social and financial success as a writer. The Whartons divorced in 1913 after 
Edith learned that Teddy had stolen from her savings to provide a secret home for his lover 
in Boston.5 Wharton, by contrast, never told anyone about her affair with Fullerton (though 
Henry James was privy)—in fact, it was not known until her letters were published in 1988.  
Love, in Goldman’s formula, knows nothing of such inequity, suffering, and mutual 
disdain. Love is pure anarchy, making it “antagonistic” to the institution of marriage (58):  
Love, the strongest and deepest element in all life, the harbinger of hope, of joy, of 
ecstasy; love, the defier of all laws, of all conventions; love, the freest, the most 
powerful moulder of human destiny; how can such an all-compelling force be 
synonymous with that poor little State and Church-begotten weed, marriage? (64-65) 
 
Love is not only free (“[a]s if love is anything but free!”) but also fundamentally equalizing: 
“High on a throne, with all the splendor and pomp his gold can command, man is yet poor 
and desolate, if love passes him by. And if it stays, the poorest hovel is radiant with warmth, 
with life and color. Thus love has the magic power to make of a beggar a king” (65). 
                                                      
4 See Lewis 53.  
5 See Lewis 275.  
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The clearest connections between Goldman and Wharton on the topic of love can 
be discerned in the latter’s personal correspondence and private writings during the 
Fullerton affair. A shared delight in Whitman colors a common conception of love as a 
quasi-transcendental but also remarkably common force that melts hierarchies and social 
distinctions. In a study of the Fullerton letters, Kenneth Price writes: “That [they] are 
everywhere marked by references to ‘comrades’ and ‘camaraderie’ displays her longing for 
Whitmanian reciprocity and symmetry [and] her effort to reconceptualize traditional 
hierarchical roles” (386-387). Both Whitman and Wharton “thought of ‘comrade’ as an 
ambiguous term applicable to either a committed friendship or a loving, sexual relationship 
based on mutuality” (387). In her Love Diary, her musings on and imagined conversations 
with Fullerton, Wharton writes, in more Emersonian terms: “I feel as though all the 
mysticism in me—the transcendentalism that in other women turns to religion—were 
poured into my feeling for you, giving me a sense of immanence, of inseparableness from 
you” (qtd. in Price and McBride 673). Remarking on Fullerton’s letters, “brought in on [a] 
breakfast-tray,” Wharton likens herself to “a hungry beggar who crumbles up the crust he 
has found in order to make it last longer!” (675). The metaphor bears out Goldman’s point: 
the anarchy of love disrupts, by inverting, the hierarchized relationship between king and 
beggar, splendor and poverty. Wharton, “who dominated life, stood aside from it,” is now, 
in her words, “humbled, absorbed, without a shred of will or identity” (673). 
In an unpublished poem, “Terminus” (1909), written the morning after a night with 
Fullerton in London’s Charing Cross Hotel, Wharton refines her conception of love. 
Looking around the “common-place room of the inn / With its dull impersonal furniture,” 
Wharton imagines “those others, the nameless, the many, / Who perhaps thus had lain and 
loved for an hour on the brink of the world” (“Terminus”). Kassanoff argues that, partly in 
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response to the “room’s democratic dinginess,” Wharton “is comforted, not repelled, by her 
sudden kinship with ‘the nameless, the many,’” “reveal[ing] [a] newfound compassion for the 
everyday experiences of the embodied multitude” (98, 99). For Wolff, the poem grounds the 
Love Diary’s mysticism in “the very heart of common, human experience” (198). 
In reality, however, the Fullerton affair was one-sided and for that reason deeply 
frustrating for both parties. Fullerton was known for affairs with both men and women, 
while for Wharton this represented a decisive break not just with her husband but with her 
entire identity up to that point. Wharton’s rapturous letters to Fullerton were often met with 
silence, leaving her to remark on “how unequal the exchange is between us” (Letters 189). 
She was privy to the fact that Fullerton was being blackmailed by a past lover using letters 
proving his sexual relationship with Ronald Gower,6 but this did not seem to bother her in 
the way one might expect based on her reputation. Instead, her sensibilities were tested to 
the breaking point by Fullerton’s secret engagement to Katherine Fullerton, who was raised 
as his sister but was discovered to be a first cousin when they were adults.7 For these reasons 
alone we can start to articulate a divergence between Goldman and Wharton that will 
become clearer in Age. Despite similar ideas about love as an equalizing force, Wharton was 
far more skeptical than Goldman about the realities of free love and unfettered sexuality.   
In Age, such skepticism is voiced by Ellen, who returns to New York seeking her 
family’s blessing on a divorce from her abusive husband, only to fall in love with a man 
(Archer) who counsels her to remain married out of consideration for social decorum. 
Archer even moves up the date of his own wedding to avoid the temptations represented by 
Ellen. “Is it your idea,” Ellen asks Archer pointedly, “that I should live with you as your 
                                                      
6 See Lewis 198-199.  
7 See Lewis 200-202; Wolff 198. 
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mistress—since I can’t be your wife?” (Age 284). Archer, in his defense, has come to think of 
love in terms that are beyond the official decrees of Church and State as well as loaded terms 
like “mistress”: “I want somehow to get away with you into a world where words like that—
categories like that—won’t exist. Where we shall be simply two human beings who love each 
other” (284). Two human beings who love each other: here we find the ideal of love as 
Whitmanesque reciprocity that Wharton expressed in the Fullerton letters. Ellen, armed with 
Wharton’s worldly experience, checks this utopian fantasy:  
Oh, my dear—where is that country? Have you ever been there? . . . I know so many 
who’ve tried to find it; and, believe me, they all got out by mistake at wayside 
stations: at places like Boulonge, or Pisa, or Monte Carlo—and it wasn’t at all 
different from the old world they’d left, but only rather smaller and dingier and more 
promiscuous. (285) 
 
This is a powerfully anti-utopian, and hence realistic, statement on the limits of 
cosmopolitan freedom, which is all too often held open as the salve for Old New York’s 
oppressive worldview. Asya, in fact, implies that Wharton’s brand of anarchism is utopian to 
the degree that it is cosmopolitan; that is, it is couched in the individual and social freedom 
represented by Europe as well as Wharton’s transatlantic reading regimen, which included 
many of Goldman’s precursors if not Goldman herself.8 Whatever her stance on 
cosmopolitanism, Goldman is certainly utopian: “Some day, some day men and women will 
rise, they will reach the mountain peak, they will meet big and strong and free, ready to 
receive, to partake, and to bask in the golden rays of love” (67). Wharton not only refuses to 
valorize free love but, quite the opposite, attacks the abandonment of social and sexual 
taboos in postwar society, where seemingly everything and everybody is accepted. As the 
heroine of The Mother’s Recompense (1925) notes, if the postwar world represents the “new 
tolerance,” “she had not yet discovered the new prohibitions” (Wharton, Mother’s 49). 
                                                      
8 See Asya 40-41, 44.  
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 Wharton gives Ellen and Archer the chance to experience this new world order in 
the last chapter of Age. Archer, however, refuses to enter Ellen’s Parisian apartment, an 
illogical act of self-denial that Goldman would no doubt reject as such. Framed against his 
son’s acceptance of his father’s past love, though, Archer’s position is clear: “The difference 
is that these young people take it for granted that they’re going to get whatever they want, 
and that we almost always took it for granted that we shouldn’t. Only, I wonder—the thing 
one’s so certain of in advance: can it ever make one’s heart beat so wildly?” (Wharton, Age 
334). Wharton draws even more radical conclusions about the central antagonism in 
Goldman’s “Marriage and Love.” For Goldman, love and marriage are “antagonistic” for 
being “as far apart as the poles” (58); but she believed that one day, with “the reorganization 
of our social life, based upon the principles of economic justice,” “man and woman can 
meet without antagonism and opposition” and hence embrace radical love (27). Wharton 
suggests that love is not antagonistic to marriage in the sense of being its opposite; rather, 
love is felt at the point where oppressive forces block the expression of sexual freedom and 
equality. This also makes love quite rare: “The trenchant divisions between right and wrong, 
honest and dishonest, respectable and the reverse, had left so little scope for the unseen” 
(Wharton, Age 332). Without the taboos set by Church and State to police the boundaries of 
marriage, love loses its anarchic potential. That being said, there is no world without 
“prohibitions”—it’s just harder to find them in the “new tolerance” (Mother’s 49). Without 
“the old . . . sign-posts and danger signals,” Archer adds his own prohibition on 
reconnection so he can feel a love that is “more real than if [he] went up” (Age 340).9 
Wharton’s rethinking of Goldman’s antagonism between love and marriage 
prefigures, and can thus can be further articulated through, the antagonism between the 
                                                      
9 This moment is Lacanian, avant la lettre: desire outstrips fulfillment. See Barrish, White 122-126; Bauer 13. 
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police order and democratic politics in the philosophy of Jacques Rancière. In one of the 
first English-language monographs on Rancière, Todd May argued that Rancière belongs to 
the anarchist tradition because he rejects the Marxian diagnosis of a “single site of 
oppression” (the class struggle) in modern society (May 80); rather, with his concept of the 
police, Rancière explodes the sites of possible oppressions, which, turning to the language of 
this study, are relations of inferiority/superiority that become sites of antagonism when held 
against the democratic promise of freedom and equality for all. The police order names a 
hierarchical distribution of the entire sensible world, giving everything and everybody their 
proper place, role, function, or identity. “Police” does not refer to a specific institution—the 
actual police, for example, or marriage—but to a pervasive logic about the scope, feeling, 
and consistency of sociopolitical life. Rancière identifies politics with the claim to equality 
wielded by those who have been excluded and/or left voiceless by the police order (“the part 
with no part”). Democratic politics is “antagonistic to policing” (Rancière, Disagreement 29) in 
the sense that the appearance of the “part with no part” and the language of equality call into 
question the naturalness and self-sufficiency of the arkhē, the “logic [that] presupposes that a 
determinate superiority is exercised over an equally determinate inferiority” (Dissensus 30).  
Though he has been taken to task for distorting Rancière’s politics via the forced 
connection to anarchism,10 May claims that Rancière represents the development of a line of 
thinking that could have but never did emerge from the classical tradition. There are two 
schools of classical anarchism, he claims: individualist and collectivist/communist. 
Individualists stress individual liberty without interference (and can be easily articulated with 
a neoliberal or Social Darwinian defense of the free market and non-interventionist state, as 
we saw in the previous chapter). Communist anarchists, like Abraham Cahan in his younger 
                                                      
10 See Chambers 75-87.   
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years, believed in individual and collective freedom from oppression, with the idea that a 
freer society would be an equal one. The problem for May is that this tradition subordinates 
equality to liberty while imagining a future where any tensions between these concepts (like 
the exercise of free will conflicting with the promise of equal outcomes) will be eliminated. 
This utopian vision prevented communist anarchists from acknowledging the 
irreconcilability of equality and liberty, something that also bothered Cahan and caused his 
break with anarchism.11 May imagines a different conclusion from the same discursive 
elements: an anarchist who privileges equality over liberty while resisting the temptations of 
utopian thinking. He then imagines Rancière emerging from this third path: “Democratic 
politics, for him, is a rare event, one that does not lead to a final state of justice but perhaps 
only to better conditions in a police order. Democratic politics . . . lies in the expression of 
equality rather than in the end-state it achieves” (99).  
Wharton has many characteristics of the would-be anarchist paving the way for 
Rancière. A few elements of this anachronistic anarchist legacy have already been detailed in 
Wharton’s anti-utopianism and her “rhetoric of equality” in the Fullerton letters (Price 386); 
indeed, she appears to have subordinated Whitman’s expression of individual freedom and 
rosy-eyed utopianism to his equalizing claims about comradeship, which she realized could 
not last, individually or socially. This is because love cannot exist without the very forces that 
make its anarchic expression rare and unforeseeable and ultimately doomed to fail.  
Before directly comparing Wharton to Rancière, it would be best to understand how 
she breaks from the classical anarchist tradition as May describes it. Asya claims that 
Wharton combines individualist anarchism and collectivist anarchism in The Children (1928). 
The titular children—step-siblings who travel across Europe without their overbearing 
                                                      
11 See Cahan, Education 332-333.  
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parents—represent a “microcosmic anarchist community” while their “parents epitomize the 
type of government by which they refuse to be ruled” (Asya 45-46). They are joined, in 
Asya’s reading, by the consummate individualist Martin Boyne, whose cooperation with and 
temporary guardianship of the children represent Wharton’s attempt to “fuse” individualist 
and collectivist anarchism (52). Wharton, however, signals the impossibility of Boyne’s 
dream of his life with the children, in a move akin to Archer’s realization that imagination is 
more “real” than reality.12 Through a reading of Ernst Bloch on daydreams, Asya finds that, 
despite her persistent anti-utopianism, Wharton wants to “shift the place of anarchism and 
utopianism from the terrain of the imagination to the domain of reality” (56). This 
conclusion is both correct and misleading. While Wharton does want to shift politics from 
the imagination to reality (she is not content to leave the expression of Ellen and Archer’s 
love to the latter’s imagination), she can only accomplish this through the anarchic 
possibilities of writing itself. The connection between Wharton and Rancière is most evident 
in their sense of the relationship between politics and aesthetics. Aesthetics, in other words, 
is the third point in the anachronistic trajectory from classical anarchism to Wharton and 
then to Rancière, after anti-utopianism and the “rhetoric of equality” (Price 386).  
Rancière argues that democratic politics has an aesthetic quality insofar as the once-
excluded group plays the part of all those who have no part in a hierarchical power structure, 
the demos, thereby reconfiguring what is normally seen, heard, or felt in the world as we know 
it. Politics is a mode of aesthetic dis-identification from the role in which one was placed in 
the police order. It “invents new forms of collective enunciation; it re-frames the given by 
                                                      
12 Years later, Boyne has a chance to reconnect with Judith, the eldest and de facto leader of her siblings, to 
whom he has a deeply buried attraction (his fiancée breaks off their engagement for this reason); but Boyne 
chooses not to pursue Judith after watching her dance at a gala. “Then he got up and walked away into the 
night” (Wharton, The Children 281-282). Age ends with a similar line: “Newland Archer got up slowly and 
walked back alone to his hotel” (Wharton, Age 341). 
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inventing new ways of making sense of the sensible, new configurations between the visible 
and the invisible, and between the audible and inaudible, new distributions of space and 
time—in short, new bodily capacities” (Rancière, Dissensus 139). This is what Wharton seems 
to have felt in the Charing Cross hotel room after a night with Fullerton. She had been 
taught by her mother to be a nice girl who avoids talking about sex and by society to respect 
the marriage vow (even if her husband does not); but she now experiences the feelings 
denied to her, opening a radical identification with the nameless and forgotten: 
The bed with its soot-sodden chintz, the grime of its brasses, 
That has borne the weight of fagged bodies, dust-stained, averted in sleep, 
The hurried, the restless, the aimless–perchance it has also thrilled 
With the pressure of bodies ecstatic, bodies like ours, 
Seeking each other's souls in the depths of unfathomed caresses, 
And through the long windings of passion emerging again to the stars . . . 
Yes, all this through the room, the passive & featureless room, 
Must have flowed with the rise & fall of the human unceasing current; 
And lying there hushed in your arms, as the waves of rapture receded, 
And far down the margin of being we heard the low beat of the soul, 
I was glad as I thought of those others, the nameless, the many, 
Who perhaps thus had lain and loved for an hour on the brink of the world; 
Secret and fast in the heart of the whirlwind of travel, 
The shaking and shrieking of trains, the night-long shudder of traffic, 
Thus, like us they have lain & felt, breast to breast in the dark, 
The fiery rain of possession descend on their limbs while outside 
The black rain of midnight pelted the roof of the station; 
And thus some woman like me, waking alone before dawn, 
While her lover slept, as I woke & heard the calm stir of your breathing, 
Some woman has heard as I heard the farewell shriek of the trains 
Crying good-bye to the city & staggering out into darkness, 
And shaken at heart has thought: “So must we forth in the darkness, 
Sped down the fixed rail of habit by the hand of implacable fate– 
So shall we issue to life, & the rain, & the dull dark dawning . . . ” (“Terminus”) 
 
Wharton identifies with other “nameless” lovers whose passion falls outside of, is excessive 
to, the normal distribution of people and places, emotions and affects. The “fixed rail of 
habit” will eventually carry her back into this dominant distribution of the sensible. In this 
moment, however, the hotel bed expands to include not just forgotten lovers but the 
“weight of fagged bodies, dust-stained, averted in sleep / The hurried, the restless, the 
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aimless”: in other words, ghosts of all sorts who become more real, more visible and audible, 
than the people, places, and things in “the waste lands” outside. 
Yet, this aesthetic identification with the nameless is mediated through the act of 
writing itself. Rancière compares the aesthetic dimension of politics to the political work 
done by aesthetics: “If there exists a connection between art and politics, it should be cast in 
terms of dissensus . . . [as] a dissensual re-configuration of the common experience of the 
sensible” (Dissensus 140). He also makes a razor-thin distinction between art and politics. 
Politics creates forms of “subjectification,” “the framing of a we, a subject [of] a collective 
demonstration whose emergence is the [antagonistic] element that disrupts the distribution 
of social parts” (141-142). Art, by disrupting the sensible fabric, alerts us to the impersonal 
flow of atoms that call into question the singularity of human individuality (affect, we named 
it in chapter 1). Politics frames collective identities; art challenges singular identities. One 
might lead to the other but “no direct cause-effect is determinable between the intention 
realized in an art performance and a capacity for political subjectivation” (140-141).  
The fine line between aesthetics and politics has troubled many of Rancière’s 
sympathetic critics, but to a certain degree Wharton would have appreciated the distinction. 
She compared the aesthetic and the sociopolitical effects of art, as we will see, but she 
dismissed overtly political novels as propaganda.13 The politics of her poem, to stick with 
that for a moment, inheres in the breaking apart of identity in the face of “impersonal” 
furniture, the weight of past travelers (lovers as well as “faceless automata”) on the worn 
springs of the bed, the shrieking of the train—all of which become radically equivalent in a 
Whitmanesque catalogue (“Terminus”). The political identification between Wharton and 
the nameless—which she pitted against the unequal role she played her whole life and will 
                                                      
13 See Bauer 59.  
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return to on “the fixed rail of habit”—becomes, in the act of writing, the temporary and 
contingent equivalence of objects, people, and feelings in the space of the poetic catalogue. 
When we turn to the art of novel-writing, as opposed to Wharton’s unpublished 
foray into Whitmanesque poetry, these conclusions become more complicated. Wharton 
views “modern art” as ceaselessly “cultivat[ing] the ground [Balzac and Stendhal] cleared for 
it” by transforming the aristocratic stick-figures from works like Madame de La Fayette’s La 
Princesse de Clèves (1678) into real people (Writing 8). Similarly, Rancière stages an ongoing 
clash between the “aesthetic regime of art” and the “representative regime of arts.” If 
politics disrupts the police order, the aesthetic regime of art—which includes novels, poetry, 
photography, and film—faces off against Aristotle’s hierarchical system of genres: “There 
were high genres, devoted to the imitation of noble actions and characters, and low genres 
devoted to common people and base subject matters. [Aristotle] also submitted style to a 
principal of hierarchical convenience: kings had to act and speak as kings do, and common 
people as common people do” (Rancière, Dissensus 156). Flaubert’s realism first disrupted 
this logic with a democratic indifference to its subject matter (a rural wife is as good a 
heroine as any) and an impersonal style (anybody could be speaking and anything could be 
narrated). Wharton, however, associates both trends with modernism, which she denigrates 
as “anarchy in fiction” (Writing 14). We again come face-to-face with the problem of her 
conservatism, which can now be viewed as having parallel political and aesthetic aims.  
Frederick Wegener has displayed the degree to which Wharton held fast to an 
ideology of “good form” that applied to both good society and good fiction. What raises 
Wharton’s concern about modernism is that “in devising techniques like stream of 
consciousness, the new novelists have been insufficiently ‘selective’ [by] favoring with 
imaginative treatment certain areas of society and members of certain classes instead of 
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selecting them out as somehow inherently unsuitable” (Wegener, “Form” 125). Stream of 
consciousness is both anarchy on the level of form (anything can enter the mind in stream of 
conscious prose) and content (we can enter anybody’s head); and it has a social equivalent in 
the flattening of distinctions with the standardization of life in the postwar world.14 What is 
most fascinating, because paradoxical, about Wharton’s “antimodernist criticism” is that 
(132), as Wegener puts it elsewhere, “[s]uch remarks . . . remind us of how lightly this 
American novelist regarded the writers of the literary tradition to which she belonged” 
(“Enthusiasm” 33). To name only the American literary realists in this study, W.D. Howells, 
Cahan, Charles Chesnutt, and James (of The Bostonians) introduced everyday people/subjects 
to reading audiences; and James’s late style makes everyone sound the same.15 Aside from 
Proust, whose drawing-room settings made him an exception,16 the development of modern 
fiction into modernism gave Wharton pause; but she overshoots the mark in critiquing it, 
retreating to a hierarchical aesthetics that held sway before the advent of realism, where the 
right kind of people speak in the proper way to the right audience.  
As with Wharton’s parallel between aesthetic and social form, Rancière clarifies that 
the hierarchy of genres “[w]as not simply an academic constraint. There was a homology 
between the rationality of poetic fiction and the intelligibility of human actions, conceived as 
an adequation between ways of being, ways of doing and ways of speaking” (Dissensus 156). 
In other words, the hierarchy of genres is the literary equivalent of the police distribution of 
the sensible. Yet, as we have seen, Wharton’s post-Fullerton novels are aimed at critiquing if 
not undermining hierarchical systems whose aesthetic and social constraints she felt 
                                                      
14 See Wegener, “Form” 130-132. Without critiquing the movement as Wharton does, Rancière notes a similar 
trajectory whereby a politically-active modernist literature “welcome[s] into its pages the standardized messages 
of the world” (Politics 27), with the example being Dos Passos’s USA trilogy. See Rancière, Politics 27-28.  
15 See Kurnick 144-152. 
16 See Wharton, Writing 151-178. 
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personally. When, as a little girl, she showed her first piece of writing to her mother—a 
dialogue that ends, “If I had only known you were going to call I should have tidied up the 
drawing room”—her mother responded: “drawing rooms are always tidy” (qtd. in Lewis 30). 
They are always tidy in good literature as in good society—that is, a well-policed society. The 
“good form” that Wharton defends in her “antimodernist criticism” is parallel to the 
worldview that her novels attack. Her own writing was not even accepted in the aesthetic 
and social hierarchy she defends. Amy Kaplan reads Wharton’s mother’s response to her 
first story as the origin for her realism, where upper-class life appears unreal and detached 
from the “real” world “out there,” in the streets and in the literary marketplace (reversing the 
ideology of Howellsian realism).17 “If the lady of leisure adorns the unreal hothouse of the 
drawing room,” Kaplan writes, “the professional author exposes the reality of its underlying 
untidiness and the concealed work that produces it. The professional realist then takes her 
own product out of the home and the drawing room to the streets of the market” (70).  
By critiquing modernist innovation, Wharton defends an aesthetic and sociopolitical 
ideology from which her favorite writers and her own writing/life dramatically broke. What 
do we make of these contradictory commitments? Wharton found an ingenious way both to 
adhere to “good form” and to expose the moral and political untidiness of the drawing room. 
The novels she liked best—the realism of Balzac and Stendhal—placed characters in a 
social/historical “order” that set constraints on “individual appetites” (Wharton, Writing 13-
14). Thus, she thought of realism as the proper form to represent and yet still critique 
oppressive hierarchical orders like Old New York. Rancière, too, takes Balzac as the example 
of a third kind of “politics of literature” and hence a third way, beyond democratic subjects 
                                                      
17 In chapter 1, we saw that Howells is aware of the ideological limits of his own novelistic practice and aims to 
spread “real equality” from the drawing room to the streets via public transportation.  
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and style, to dissociate the “modern” novel from the representative regime. Balzac is “a 
geologist or archaeologist exploring the labyrinths of the social world . . . He gathers 
remnants, exhumes fossils, and transcribes signs that bear witness to a world and write a 
history” (Rancière, Aesthetic Unconscious 37). “The naturalist and geologist Balzac is also a 
doctor able to detect, at the heart of the intense activity of individuals and societies, a 
sickness identical to this intensity” (38). The literary equality involved lies in the idea that 
anything and everything from a particular time mutely “speaks,” to the expert at least. 
Aligning this aesthetic practice with Freudian dream analysis and Marxian commodity 
critique,18 Rancière deems it “side politics” since it gives up the egalitarian indifference of 
style and subject for an expert’s symptomatic analysis of exhumed fossils (Dissensus 163). 
This is what Wharton is looking for, though—to distinguish her realism from the oppressive 
aspects of her upbringing without associating it aesthetically or politically with the twinned 
anarchic developments of modernist experimentation and postwar social tolerance.  
Nir Evron describes The Age of Innocence in terms that happen to echo Rancière: 
“Wharton . . . has her narrator assume the detached tone of the archaeologist who patiently 
and dispassionately reconstructs a lost age” (46). Nancy Bentley speaks of Wharton’s 
“science of manners,” likening her to an anthropologist, an ethnographer, an archeologist, 
and a museum curator. Wharton herself used archeology as a metaphor for her method of 
imaginatively returning to Old New York: “The compact world of my youth has receded 
into a past from which it can only be dug up in bits by the assiduous relic-hunter; and its 
smallest fragments begin to be worth collecting and putting together before the last of those 
who knew the live structure are swept away with it” (Backward 7). Wharton’s 1921 letter 
about a stage production of Age speaks volumes about her feelings on historical accuracy: 
                                                      
18 See Rancière, Aesthetic Unconscious 36-37. 
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I am very anxious about the staging & dressing. I could do every stick of furniture & 
every rag of clothing myself, for every detail of that far-off scene was indelibly 
stamped on my infant brain. . . . Of course [the male actors] ought all to have 
moustaches, & not tooth brush ones, but curved & slightly twisted at the ends. They 
should wear dark grey frock-coats & tall hats, & always buttonhole-violets by day, a 
gardenia in evening dress. White waistcoats with their evening clothes, & pumps, I 
think. . . . After all, beg [the director] to avoid slang & Americanisms, & tell her that 
English was then the language spoken by American ladies & gentlemen . . . Few 
people nowadays know that many of the young men of our day (in N.Y.) were 
educated in English Universities, & that English tutors & governesses were frequent 
& that no girl went to a school! (Letters 439) 
 
Historical accuracy is only part of the job requirement for the realist-cum-
archeologist. The other part is to locate a tension produced at meeting of social expectations 
and individual beliefs, feelings, or actions. The last line of her list above, which appears as an 
afterthought, is significant in this respect: “no girl went to a school!” As Goldman points out, 
“all her training and education must be directed toward” her future marriage (60). Age, we 
have seen, is clear-eyed in its attack on marriage. I am now prepared to argue that Wharton’s 
realism offers an expert representation and critique of Old New York as a police order intent 
on quelling the equalizing possibilities of love. Indeed, Anna Leath, heroine of Wharton’s 
The Reef, “looked back with melancholy derision on her old conception of life, as a kind of 
well-lit and well-policed suburb to dark places one need never know about” (322).  
Instead of providing space for an affair of the type she had with Fullerton, which for 
her was momentarily equalizing but ultimately imbalanced, Wharton appears to be complicit 
in the policing of such desire in Age. Hence readers’ dissatisfaction with the ending: why 
couldn’t Ellen and Archer finally consummate their relationship? Yet, to appreciate the 
politics of Age, we need to recall Wharton’s anti-utopianism. The point is not to hold up to 
twentieth-century readers—those living in the wake of women’s suffrage, achieved the year 
the novel was published (1920)—how much better they have it compared to cramped and 
unequal 1870s New York. The point, on the contrary, is to show that the old prohibitions 
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created an intensity of feeling, a kind of love, that is lost amongst the “new tolerance” 
(Mother’s 49). But what would that kind of love look like, feel like, or read like? 
In chapter XXXI of Age, Archer and Ellen share a final private moment before Ellen 
is expelled from the Old New York “tribe” by stealing away together to the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art (319). It is here that Ellen and Archer express their love for each other one 
last time. “The museum site is highly significant,” as Bentley notes, but not just because it 
“links Wharton’s fiction to the new institution of the museum” (55, 57). Especially for a 
space associated with the “science” of culture, the moment is suffused with an aura of 
untimeliness that the lovers seem to recognize: “‘It’s odd,’ Madame Olenkska said, ‘I never 
came here before’”; Archer responds: “‘Ah, well—Some day, I suppose, it will be a great 
Museum’” (299). When Archer first recommends “the Art Museum—in the Park,” Ellen 
“look[s] puzzled” (298). As many critics have noted, this moment is anachronistic: the novel 
takes place in the early 1870s but the Met did not move to Central Park until 1880. One of 
the exhibits Wharton mentions was not donated until 1887.19 Wharton became annoyed 
when critics pointed out anachronisms in the novel, telling her editor in a 1921 letter that her 
“allusions range from, say, 1875 to 1885. Any narrower field of evocation must necessarily 
reduce the novel to a piece of archeological pedantry instead of a living image of the times” 
(“From”). Yet, she proceeded to correct other historical errors in later printings, effectively 
confirming her novel as a piece of “archeological pedantry.” She did not change the 
anachronistic reference to “the Art museum—in the Park,” however (Age 298). This is 
because the anachronistic time-place provides a spark of energy and life at the antagonistic 
point of impact between sociopolitical constraints, aesthetic form, and individual passions  
                                                      
19 See Roffman 227-228; Wharton, Age 299 n. 1.  
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Recall that the problem with the anarchy of modern fiction is the making of 
formlessness into a condition of form, eliminating the aesthetic and sociopolitical constraints 
that make for the expression of intense feelings in great literature. Wharton’s realism, by 
contrast, leaves her beholden to the constraints of Old New York via the need for historical 
accuracy even while critiquing its marriage rituals. Chronologically, the museum sequence in 
chapter XXXI stands between the novel’s expert re-creation of the 1870s (chapters I-XXX) 
and its brief study of the twentieth century in chapter XXXIV; but after the trip to the Met 
in chapter XXXI, we return to the 1870s for two chapters before fast-forwarding. In the 
anachronistic, untimely space of the museum, Wharton gives figuration to objects and 
people that time has forgotten (archaeological artifacts from ancient Cyprus and a ghostly 
museum attendant). Like Wharton in “Terminus,” Ellen and Archer’s love becomes political 
when they identify with the nameless and the forgotten. And Wharton’s writing becomes 
anarchic when it represents ghosts as “living images” with whom one can identify (‘From”). 
Ellen and Archer’s love is radically anachronistic20—it is both ahead of its time and a relic of 
a bygone time—paralleling the anarchy on the level of form that is achieved by Wharton’s 
anachronism. On the level of form and content, then, Wharton deliberately courts the 
anarchy of modernism. To introduce forgotten bodies and voices into the novel, Wharton 
learned, much like Howells before her, that she must cease writing realism. In this case, she 
transgresses the realist prohibition on anachronism to give her characters, herself, and her 
readers an impossible time-space to feel radically different from what we have been taught. 
Before arriving at this conclusion, though, we need to be more precise about what 
Wharton is up against in both her anachronistic and archaeological modes. The simple 
answer is the institution of marriage. But, as Wharton knew, marriage is part of a much 
                                                      
20 See Coviello on the radical possibilities of anachronistic or untimely love. 
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larger sociopolitical logic. I have already suggested that Old New York is an example of the 
police order (defined as a hierarchical distribution of the sensible), against which both 
Wharton and her characters are pitted. Rancière claims that there are different kinds of 
police orders,21 so we need to be specific about the logic evinced by Old New York. This 
police order, I argue, is a species of civic republicanism for its emphasis on the common 
good (“The individual . . . is nearly always sacrificed to . . . the collective interest”), 
education, “Civic Virtue,” and good breeding (Wharton, Age 145, 207). The connection with 
the above is Aristotle, one of the forerunners of civic republicanism.22 Wharton is historical 
enough to show how, why, and to what end republicanism took hold in 1870s New York. 
The effect is the mutual defamiliarization of Old New York and the republican tradition in 
the U.S. As Archer’s mother states, Old New York is not an “aristocracy” but extends back 
to the early American Republic: “One of your great-grandfathers signed the Declaration, and 
another was a general on Washington’s staff . . . These are things to be proud of, but they 
have nothing to do with rank or class” (94); and, as Rancière insists, what we normally think 
of as democratic politics—in the U.S., a representative democracy that was first called a 
republic—is actually a form of police rule antagonistic to democratic politics.23  
II. “Our Little Republican Distinctions”: Old New York and/as the Police 
Archer’s mother places New York’s ruling families, who double as the characters of 
Age, in a hierarchical pyramid of power: the van der Luydens and other descendants of 
Dutch and English royalty are at the top; the Newlands and other descendants of the old 
mercantile elite are in the middle; and on the bottom are “‘plain people’; an honourable but 
                                                      
21 See Chambers 72. 
22 See Mouffe, Return 24.  
23 The classical work of political theory differentiating the American republic from the disorder associated with 
Greek democracy (Rancière’s reference) is James Madison’s “Federalist No. 10.” See Hamilton et al. 53-62. 
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obscure majority of respectable families who (as in the case of the Spicers or the Leffertses 
or the Jacksons) had been raised above their level by marriage” (Wharton, Age 93). With this 
image, Wharton exhumes a building from her first memory of New York, described in her 
autobiography as “the truncated Egyptian pyramid which so strangely served as a reservoir 
for New York’s water supply” (Backward 2). This is the Croton Reservoir, built in 1842 on 
Manhattan’s highest point between Fortieth and Forty-Second Street on Fifth Avenue, 
which funneled drinking water to Lower Manhattan until it was demolished in 1890 to make 
room for the New York Public Library (see fig. 4). The reservoir was a popular gathering 
place for the elite but Wharton uses it to define the socio-spatial scope of Old New York, 
including its ability to pull from and distribute a logic beyond its small bounds.  
 
Figure 4: The Croton Reservoir 
Source: http://www.bryantpark.org/about-us/history.html 
Like the Croton Reservoir, the very tip of Old New York’s family pyramid is defined 
by its absence: the van der Luydens “stood above all of them [but] had faded into a kind of 
super-terrestrial twilight, from which only two figures impressively emerged; those of Mr. 
and Mrs. Henry van der Luyden” (95). Even then, Henry and Louisa are out of town most 
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of the year. Ellen hits on something profound when she wonders whether the reason for 
their “great influence [is] that they make themselves so rare” (115). One is reminded of 
Claude Lefort’s description of the empty place of power in democracy: once “the people” 
replace the king’s body as the site of power, this place remains empty, even while occupied 
by elected officials for fixed periods of time.24 James Wilson—who, like Archer’s great-
grandfather, signed the Declaration—similarly conceived of republican government as a 
pyramid resting on the firm foundation of “the people” and rising to the preeminence of 
elected leaders. His lasting influence is the truncated pyramid on the one-dollar bill, where 
the Eye of Providence floats where the top should be.25 Such imagery plays into Wharton’s 
description of Old New York’s social pyramid, starting with the “super-terrestrial” absence 
of the van der Luydens on top. The base of the pyramid, however, is rigidly defined, “with 
old Catherine Spicer ruling one end of Fifth Avenue, and Julius Beaufort the other” (93). 
These are Mrs. Archer’s “plain people” (93): Catherine Spicer—Ellen’s trend-setting 
grandmother who married “up” into the Mingott clan—builds a mansion “modelled on the 
private hotels of the Parisian aristocracy” south of Central Park, around Fifty-Seventh Street 
(65); and Beaufort, a banker of obscure origins (that “he passed for an Englishman” suggests 
he is Jewish) lives north of Washington Square (70).  
“Beyond [this] small and slippery pyramid . . . lay the almost unmapped quarter 
inhabited by artists, musicians, and ‘people who wrote’” (135). This is where Ellen rents an 
apartment, scandalizing her family: “It was not the peril but the poverty that her family 
disliked; but that shade escaped her, and she supposed they considered literature 
compromising” (138). “Literature and art,” in fact, “were deeply respected in the Archer set, 
                                                      
24 See Lefort 17-20. 




and Mrs. Archer was always at pains to tell her children how much more agreeable and 
cultivated society had been when it included such figures as Washington Irving” (136). The 
literature they recognize is written by men you would invite into your home, literally and 
figuratively (in the act of reading). In other words, literature participates in an aesthetic and 
social hierarchy. Ellen’s place on the “thinly settled outskirt[s]” is not a coincidence (141): 
she has the sensibilities of an artist, with her craft being interior decoration.26 When Archer 
visits her apartment, his senses are awakened to an arrangement of art that he literally could 
not see before because of his education in the fine arts, with its hierarchy of schools and 
genres: “these pictures bewildered him, for they were like nothing that he was accustomed to 
look at (and therefore able to see) when he travelled in Italy” (111). 
While artists and unclassifiable art occupy a fringe location in Old New York’s social 
pyramid, a swath of bodies, voices, and professions do not seem to count. Lewis describes 
this population in terms that give full meaning to the phrase “distribution of the sensible”:  
The New York that struck the fancy of Edith’s future friend William Dean Howells 
when he and his wife moved down from Boston in the 1880s—the New York of 
cablecars and Italian grocers, German immigrants and Russian refugees, Mott Street, 
Chatham Square, and the picturesque litter of Third Avenue: all this was invisible 
and inaudible to the world in which Edith Jones was decorously growing up. (22) 
 
Kaplan uses the term “mob” to describe those voices and bodies just outside what Wharton 
calls the “tight little citadel of New York” (Kaplan 102, Age 79). According to Jean Carol 
Griffith, however, Wharton’s local color realism departs from that of its nineteenth-century 
predecessor—which imagined an insulated, lily-white region—by showing elites rubbing 
elbows with characters of uncertain origins. While Wharton thus recognizes the democratic 
pluralism of the American city, she remains ambivalent about these interlopers.27  
                                                      
26 This was one of Wharton’s many artistic skills as well. See Wharton and Ogden, Decoration.   
27 See Griffith 40-49.  
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In Manhattan Transfer (1925), Dos Passos quotes a (fake) news story about a snake 
emerging from the old Croton Reservoir, scaring fashionable “[l]adies” (29); for Archer’s set, 
the mysterious banker Beaufort is a snake in Old New York’s garden. Mrs. Archer says, of 
her youth, “[i]t was perfectly easy to place any one then; now one can’t tell, and I prefer not 
to try” (Wharton, Age 136). Yet, New York still “places” Beaufort. New York’s “authority on 
‘family,’” Sillerton Jackson, “was supposed to be the only man who could have told you who 
Julius Beaufort . . . really was” (63). To assist him, his sister provides “bits of minor gossip 
that filled out usefully the gaps in his picture” (80). The police distribution of the sensible is 
defined by the attempt to fill all voids, to have everything and everyone categorized to 
facilitate social interaction and decision-making. “New York society was, in those days, far 
too small, and too scant in resources, for every one in it (including livery-stable-keepers, 
butlers and cooks) not to know exactly on which evenings people were free” (93). At any 
given hour at his club, to which Beaufort belongs, Archer not only knows “what they were 
likely to be talking about, but the part each one would take in the discussion” (122).  
The narrator of the 1870s story in Wharton’s decade-by-decade chronicle of her 
mother’s era, aptly titled Old New York, explains how certain groups can be counted in 
society but then stripped of the right to speak: “[the Fifth Avenue hotel] was frequented by 
‘politicians’ and ‘Westerners,’ two classes of citizens whom my mother’s intonation always 
seemed to deprive of their vote by ranking them with illiterates and criminals” (Old 183). The 
more pointed comparison is unspoken: in the 1870s, women were counted as citizens but 
were prevented from voting; their realm was the private sphere, the logic went.28 In Age, 
women are accounted for in the pyramid but society’s authorities—Lefferts on “Form” and 
Jackson on “Family”—are male. Still, Ammons has found that some critics see matriarchal 
                                                      
28 See chapter 2 for James’s different conception of male and female “roles” in the production of urban space.  
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elements in the novel. For example, Catherine Mingott wields great social influence and 
Henry van der Luyden often defers to his wife. However, Ammons argues that this is still a 
patriarchal society, with Henry van der Luyden at its apex. Catherine Mingott, she points 
out, is obese and thus literally confined to her home while it is ultimately Henry who “wields 
the power” in the van der Luyden household and in New York society (Ammons 150).  
Henry van der Luyden’s reference to “our little republican distinctions” best 
describes Old New York’s official form of self-rule (Wharton, Age 127). In the republican 
tradition inherited and practiced by the Founding Fathers, wealth, property, and birth, in 
some order, determined who was qualified to participate in public life.29 In Old New York, 
the van der Luydens achieve the highest distinction because they are the descendants of the 
Dutch Patroon system, under which colonialists were given land to lord over in New 
Netherland. “They were the arbiters of fashion, the Court of last Appeal and they knew it, 
and bowed to their fate” (99). In a perfectly republican manner, the van der Luydens do not 
desire power for personal gain but rather bow to “some remote ancestral authority which 
fate compelled them to wield” (98). Mrs. Archer is therefore correct in telling her son that 
Old New York is not an aristocracy: its leaders may be high-born but they do not want to 
usurp the place of power; rather, they dispassionately accept that their lineage, wealth, and 
education have made them the most capable of making decisions for the good of the 
community. Thus, after conferences with his wife, Henry makes rulings on behalf of Old 
New York with his “bloodless hand weighed down by the Patroon’s great signet-ring” (126).  
Though Henry van der Luyden is still its leader, New York is in a state of transition 
from property and family to credit as the determinant of power, as Beaufort’s tumultuous 
social career illustrates: he is run out of town after rash financial speculation fails to save his 
                                                      
29 See Wilentz 27-28, 76.  
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bank, but Lefferts correctly predicts that “we shall see our children . . . marrying Beaufort’s 
bastards” (322).30 This narrative follows the transformation that historian Sven Beckert has 
traced within the leadership of New York’s economic elite from just before the Civil War to 
the turn of the century. The city’s early mercantile elite, Beckert shows, adopted republican 
ideals like civic virtue, prudence, thrift, good manners, self-education, and family networks 
not only to explain but to secure their wealth and status. Mrs. Archer suggests as much in 
her full explanation for why New York is not an aristocracy: “Our grandfathers and great-
grandfathers were just respectable English or Dutch merchants, who came to the colonies to 
make their fortune, and stayed here because they did so well” (92). The Archers’ place in the 
pyramid was determined by the early economic success of their ancestors, which provided 
future generations with enough wealth and property to inculcate good education, manners, 
and taste in seeming perpetuity. Wharton’s first book, The Decoration of Houses (1897), argues 
that families of means should also teach their children to appreciate fine art from a young 
age, as “the feeling for beauty needs as careful cultivation as the other civic virtues” (174).  
Given that Wharton’s pyramid is borrowed from a waterworks project, it is tempting 
to suggest that the refined taste and worldly ways of the economic elite trickle down to the 
rest of society, nourishing the common good. Dell Upton claims that the general sentiment 
surrounding the opening of the Croton Reservoir in 1842 “articulated a characteristically 
republican vision of New York society, but one that was rapidly fading by the time the 
Croton Waterworks opened. At its heart was the seductive image of a diverse population 
acting freely but as though animated by a single will” (11). By the twentieth century the 
Reservoir was gone and, Beckert shows, New York’s leaders, now bankers and industrialists, 
                                                      
30 Archer’s son is engaged to Beaufort’s daughter at novel’s end.  
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embraced liberal individualism, practiced conspicuous consumption, and consolidated 
themselves as the “bourgeoisie” against their increasingly class-conscious workers.31  
At its own pace, New York follows a much larger sociopolitical trajectory whereby 
liberal-capitalist individualism and the gradual expansion of suffrage eroded the republican 
hegemony of the Revolutionary period.32 After the publication of Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America in 1835, it was more common to speak of the U.S. as a democracy33 or, more 
pointedly, a liberal democracy. “In the aftermath of the Civil War,” James Kloppenberg 
writes, “republican echoes continued to reverberate” but “[t]he rise of laissez-faire liberalism 
made references to civic virtue or the public good, conceived as something separate from 
individual interest, seem quaint if not irrelevant” (Virtues 66). In the American tradition, 
republicanism was used to secure the economic and political hegemony of white land-
owning men and the exclusion of women, African Americans, Native Americans, and others. 
From this point of view, “republicanism appears to be a celebration of hierarchy, patriarchy, 
and militarism” (Virtues 61).34 Archer comes to understand a highly local version of this 
truth, which in Wharton’s hands becomes symptomatic critique. Old New York’s 
“republican distinctions” are exposed, by both Wharton as archeological analyst and Archer 
as skeptical citizen, as patriarchal rituals aimed at oppressing and silencing women, 
specifically around the issue of sexual freedom and equality (Wharton, Age 127).  
“In reality,” Wharton writes, reproducing Archer’s thought, “they all lived in a kind 
of hieroglyphic world where the real thing was never said or done or even thought, but only 
                                                      
31 See Beckert 20-42. Wharton’s New York novels set in that later time frame—The House of Mirth (1905), 
Custom of the Country (1913) and Twilight Sleep (1927)—portray liberal individualism in the guise of several 
representative characters (Lily Bart and Gus Trenor in Mirth; Undine Spragg and Elmer Mofatt in Custom; and 
Pauline Manford and Lita Wyant in Twilight). 
32 See Mouffe, Return 24-25 for an overview of such arguments by J.G.A Pocock and Gordon Wood. 
33 See Kloppenberg, Toward 614.  
34 Kloppenberg does believe that there are “strands” of this tradition worth salvaging, particularly its 
connection to Protestant Christianity in the U.S. context. See Virtues 62-70. 
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represented by a set of arbitrary signs” (Age 90). Ellen’s desire for a divorce threatens these 
arbitrary distinctions: “The case of Countess Olenska had stirred up old settled convictions 
and set them drifting dangerously through [Archer’s] mind. His own exclamation: ‘Women 
should be free—as free as we are,’ struck to the root of a problem that it was agreed in his 
world to regard as non-existent” (89). Archer here instigates what we have called the 
transformation of antagonism into agonism. In other words, the conversation where Archer 
first makes this surprising “exclamation” comes closest to an argument about one of the 
catchwords of democracy (freedom) and its lack of application to women, briefly allowing 
Archer to expose the hierarchical marriage rituals as oppressive and hence antagonistic.  
As in Cahan’s Yekl, the agon centers on divorce. At dinner with Jackson, his mother, 
and his sister, Archer expresses a “hope” that Ellen will get a divorce: “The word had fallen 
like a bombshell in the pure and tranquil atmosphere of the Archer dining-room” (87). Once 
he throws the “bomb” of agonistic discussion, Archer himself realizes “the bad taste of 
discussing such intimate matters in public” and moves to another subject until he can take 
up Ellen’s case privately with Jackson over cigars (87): “Who had the right to make her life 
over if she hadn’t? I’m sick of the hypocrisy that would bury alive a woman of her age if her 
husband prefers to live with harlots” (88). This is where the argument stops: Archer is “too 
irritated to measure the terrific consequences” of what he has said and Jackson replies that 
Count Olenski does not seem interested in taking “his wife back” (88). We should recall 
Howells: “good society, which always hates a scene, instinctively does its best to ignore 
inequality” (“Equality” 64). Old New York, of all the urban communities we have studied, 
“hates a scene” the most: disagreements represent the violence of their own patriarchal 
society bubbling to the surface, unsettling their hard-earned tranquility.   
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Instead of containing antagonism through agonism, as with other novelists, Wharton 
shows the degree to which even these momentary outbursts are themselves already signifiers 
of male privilege. To begin with, the men and women are segregated before the former 
resume the argument: “After dinner, according to immemorial custom, Mrs. Archer and 
[Archer’s sister] trailed their long silk draperies up to the drawing-room . . . while the 
gentlemen smoked below stairs” (Age 87). The smoking room is more private than the 
“public” dining room (87), but here the men take up the private, as in personal, issue of a 
woman’s sexual freedom within the public, as in political, space of rational male deliberation. 
By taking up the issue of women’s personal freedom in the context of a male debate, Archer 
realizes later, he and Jackson participate in a time-honored charade: 
“Nice” women, however wronged, would never claim the kind of freedom he meant, 
and generous-minded men like himself were therefore—in the heat of argument—
the more chivalrously ready to concede it to them. Such verbal generosities were in 
fact only a humbugging disguise of the inexorable conventions that tied things 
together and bound people down to the old pattern. (89)  
 
Men make all sorts of empty claims about women’s freedom, which do nothing more 
than make the men feel better and effect no change whatsoever. The “root of the problem” 
runs deeper (93): to say “women should be as free as we are” is to say that they should be 
equal (as free as). Archer senses that the repressed idea of women’s (sexual) equality, if 
brought into the open, would antagonize Old New York’s hierarchical worldview. For now, 
Archer goes through the motions while Wharton uses his skepticism to critique the arbitrary 
suppression of women. Again we see why symptomatic reading does “side politics”: all it can 
do is expose the violence of the police order; it inaugurates no change in and of itself.35 
Politics begins when a marginalized voice and/or body upsets a hierarchical regime 
by acting out, and thus confirming, the logic of equality. To flesh out Rancière’s theory of 
                                                      
35 See Rancière, Aesthetic Unconscious 38.  
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politics, I will provide a relevant historical example. In 1872, Susan B. Anthony voted in 
New York, citing her status as a citizen since the Fourteenth Amendment prevented states 
from interfering with the voting rights of citizens. She was convicted for illegal voting and an 
1875 Supreme Court ruling specified that women did not have a right to vote, which held 
until the Nineteenth Amendment almost fifty years later.36 By voting in 1872, Anthony 
showed that all citizens have the right to take part in the ruling of the community, stymieing 
the “relentless privatization of public life” (Rancière, Dissensus 57). Age’s setting—1870s New 
York, the time and place of Anthony’s radical act—and publication date—1920, the year 
(white) women37 won the right to vote in the U.S.—signal that the issue of women’s suffrage 
should not be far from any claim that there is a radical-democratic politics to the novel.  
Yet Wharton and Goldman, to return to the pairing with which we began, were both 
opposed to women’s suffrage, though for slightly different reasons. For Goldman, 
emancipation should not be thought of as identical to the development of representative 
political systems. Emancipation is an act of self-realization for a woman, first “by asserting 
herself as a personality, and not as a sex commodity. Second, by refusing the right to anyone 
over her body; by refusing to bear children, unless she wants them; by refusing to be a 
servant to God, the State, society, the husband, the family, etc., by making her life simpler, 
but deeper and richer” (56-57). “Only that,” she concludes “and not the ballot, will set 
woman free, will make her a force hitherto unknown in the world, a force for real love, for 
peace, for harmony” (57).38 Goldman believed that class antagonism would need to be 
eliminated before even her own utopian state of pure love could come into existence.39  
                                                      
36 See Gordon v. 
37 Black women, for example, did not have full voting rights until 1965. 
38 The essay I quote from here is “Woman Suffrage” from 1910. See Goldman 45-57.  
39 Economic considerations are at the center of Goldman’s critique of Susan B. Anthony. See Goldman 54.  
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Wharton, for her part, “agreed [with the Woman Movement] that the position of 
women in American society was the crucial issue of the new century; [but] she did not 
believe that change was occurring. In her opinion the American woman was far from being a 
new or whole human being” (Ammons 3). This points to the conception of social 
antagonism that we have been working with in this study: “Insofar as there is antagonism, I 
cannot be a full presence for myself” (Laclau and Mouffe 111). Here it is not only marriage 
or class strife, but an entire hierarchical distribution of the sensible that blocks women from 
achieving “full positivity,” particularly around issues of sex and desire (111). (Wharton and 
Goldman suggest that men suffer from the marriage relation as well, only much less.) The 
arbitrariness of the rituals of oppression and hence of society itself—“society, if it can be 
said to exist,” Archer puts it—make antagonism thinkable (Wharton, Age 259). However, 
Wharton imagined no clear path for the emancipation of women across the world, neither 
through the ballot nor through socioeconomic change. Furthermore, Wharton questioned 
the essentialist assumption behind the idea of self-realization as a force of love: subtracting 
herself from the hierarchical identities she has occupied (daughter, wife, mother), woman 
does not then return to her “natural” biological identity, as Goldman implies; rather, she 
must invent a new identity, a new sense of self and community, which may be difficult if not 
impossible in a hierarchical distribution of the sensible that has a place for everybody.  
We have already shown that Ellen is the force of anti-utopian realism dampening 
Archer’s vision of a “world” where they will be free to be themselves—just “two human 
beings who love each other,” i.e. radical equals qua humans who express their feelings 
openly (285). Archer, Pamela Knights notes, “still assumes that somewhere a ‘real’ self 
survives. The suggestion of the unfolding narrative is, more radically, that without the shape, 
the social mold, there may be no self at all” (21). Archer imagines a world existing beyond or 
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outside the hierarchical pairing of married man and his mistress, but as Ellen warns him 
there is no such place, no such identity. The minute they act on their love, they will be given 
a place in New York’s cosmopolitan imagination (they will be foreign lovers, elopers, etc.). 
Ellen tells Archer that their love is not simply improbable but is founded on impossibility: 
there’s no us in that sense! We’re near each other only if we stay far from each other . 
. . Otherwise we’re only Newland Archer, the husband of Ellen Olenska’s cousin, 
and Ellen Olenska, the cousin of Newland Archer’s wife, trying to be happy behind 
the backs of the people who trust them. (Wharton, Age 285) 
 
Contra Goldman, radical action seems permanently blocked, both because the utopia 
will never arrive and because, in the here-and-now, even though one’s “social role” is 
constrictive, “declassification is a loss of being” (Knights 35). Radical action, in the form of 
dis-identification, would be “a form of death,” a becoming-ghost (36). Do not be fooled: 
ghosts exist. “The melancholy possibility of having to ‘kill time’,” for example, “was a vision 
that haunted [Mrs. Welland] as the spectre of the unemployed haunts the philanthropists” 
(Wharton, Age 232). The distinction is between accounting for time and letting it slip by. In 
the parallel case, the unemployed are counted as an object of the philanthropist’s charity but 
the specter of the unemployed is an excessive number beyond the count of those he can 
possibly help—the “part with no part,” in other words. “Here rises up the ghost of what lies 
beyond the furthest boundaries of the Family’s territory: the persistent depressions of the 
1870s and the thousands of homeless on the streets of New York” (Knights 25).  
On the edges of self and society, then, we find the forgotten and the nameless, i.e., 
those whose spectral existence threatens the imagined self-sufficiency of the police order. 
This is a radical reframing of antagonism: those who have been oppressed, forgotten, or 
silenced call the hierarchical totality into question by announcing their right to be counted as 
full human beings and hence equals. Knights argues that Wharton’s characters can only 
experience “a different kind of self (one, impossibly, beyond the social)” in the imagination, 
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which requires a different mode of writing for Wharton, where “the mimetic mode of 
realism” becomes “the terrain of fantasy” (35). Fantasy does not have to be separate from 
reality; taken into the realm of aesthetics, as in Wharton’s “Terminus,” it can disorient and 
rearrange our sense of self and our sense of reality.40  
Knights turns to the moments when “Archer’s perception is radically disarranged” 
and the novel’s perfectly curated set pieces and controlled stylistic irony become warped in 
space and time trying to relate his fantasies (37). Dissensus occurs in moments when Ellen 
and Archer steal time alone but know “their minutes [are] numbered” or “fe[el] the pressure 
of the minutes” (Wharton, Age 187, 300). The only escape is to go outside of time, it seems. 
For example, when Archer sees Ellen while visiting the van der Luydens’ Patroon house, its 
colonial setting suggests “that Archer and Ellen can go back, escape from their history and 
begin again” (Knights 37). The generic mode is historical fantasy: “The homely little house 
stood there, its panels and brasses shining in the firelight, as if magically created to receive 
them” (Wharton, Age 161). Another example is when Archer picks up Ellen from a New 
Jersey train station. Picturing their trek back to Manhattan, he glimpses the future: 
he remembered that there were people who thought there would one day be a tunnel 
under the Hudson through which the trains of the Pennsylvania railway would run 
straight into New York. They were of the brotherhood of visionaries who likewise 
predicted the building of ships that would cross the Atlantic in five days, the 
invention of a flying machine, lighting by electricity, telephonic communication 
without wires, and other Arabian Night marvels. 
“I don’t care which of their visions comes true,” Archer mused, “as long as 
the tunnel isn’t built yet.” In his senseless school-boy happiness he pictured Madame 
Olenska’s descent from the train, his discovery of her a long way off, among the 
throngs of meaningless faces, her clinging to his arm as he guided her to the carriage, 
their slow approach to the wharf among the slipping horses, laden carts, vociferating 
teamsters, and then the startling quiet of the ferry-boat, where they would sit side by 
side under the snow, in the motionless carriage, while the earth seemed to glide away 
under them, rolling to the other side of the sun. (280) 
 
                                                      
40 See Rancière, Dissensus 141.  
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We can name this mutual disarrangement of character and genre, which clearly 
affects the reader as well, a form of anarchic anachronism within the context of 
archeological realism. Given Mrs. Welland’s attempt to scatter the specters of excess time by 
planning every minute of the day; given Wharton’s realist emphasis on historical accuracy; 
given the novel’s fast-forwarding in the last chapter, with its implied but misleading narrative 
of progress; given the novel’s publication in the year of women’s suffrage, with its own 
implied but misleading narrative of progress; given such aesthetic and political emphases on 
time surrounding the novel, a radical mode of being and writing would have to be one that is 
anachronistic. An anachronistic aesthetic and political identity falls aslant of at least three 
dominant modes of measuring time: Old New York’s method of occupying all moments of 
the day (the characters’ sense of time); the archeologist’s method of placing all people and 
objects in the proper time and place (the writer’s sense of time); and our sociopolitical 
progress from the oppressive time-place expertly recreated by the author/expert (the 
reader’s sense of time). Anachronism is of a piece with the formal and political “anarchy” of 
modernism (Wharton, Writing 14). Being anachronistic shows that one can do anything in 
and by writing—at the sweep of the pen, 1870s New York becomes a colonial fantasy or an 
“Arabian Night” portrayal of the future (Wharton, Age 280). Instead of becoming a new rule 
of form, Wharton’s anachronisms occur in small but significant moments that break from 
the aesthetic and political constraints of her expert archeological re-creation of Old New 
York. This momentary concession to modernism via anachronism gives Wharton and her 
characters the opportunity to express, on the level of form and content, what Archer implies 
in his utopian plea—that his and Ellen’s love outstrips and invalidates the expansive 
categories for illicit love in Old New York—while also recognizing Ellen’s skepticism: such 
love is impossible to act on, or else it would not be what it is.  
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The Patroon house is not the most instructive example of anarchic anachronism, if 
only because the fantasy exists only in Archer’s mind. We are looking for a staging of the 
fantasy of being outside time. Archer’s image of New York’s future is anachronistic to the 
degree that the fantasy has become reality for the reader. What gets lost in this fantasy-as-
future is clear: Archer imagines recognizing Ellen “among the throngs of meaningless faces” 
and, on the ferry, “among the slipping horses, laden carts, vociferating teamsters” (280). Like 
Howells’s Lapham, Archer picks out his loved one from the anonymous, faceless crowd of 
the ferry. Even though Archer refuses to participate in the narrative of civic progress, since 
he wants this journey to be slow, he also refuses to recognize not just the anonymous 
(“meaningless faces”) but also the possibility of their collective organization (“teamsters”).    
In chapter XXXI, however, Wharton does something more radical. She jumps from 
between Washington Square and Fifty-Seventh Street in the 1870s to the Met in Central 
Park, which, as we have noted already, did not exist at this location until 1880 (this is 
something Wharton would have known: she had family on the Board of Trustees). Instead 
of being a historical fantasy or the imagination of a now-realized future, Wharton gives her 
characters an impossible time-place to express the impossibility of their love. The Met enacts 
an antagonistic redistribution of the sensible on three levels: setting, character, and author’s 
voice. First, the Met’s Central Park location and the objects housed there upset New York’s 
understanding of the right place, the right crowd, and the right kinds of art for a viewing. 
Inspired in part by the objects he and Ellen find in the museum, Archer is able to see their 
love made visible in the world like a piece of art. Since their love will eventually—or, given 
the impossible setting, has already—banish(ed) Ellen from New York, the feeling bodied 
forth into the museum anachronistically speaks back from the edges of society, challenging 
New York’s conception of love as much as art. Like Wharton in “Terminus,” these lovers on 
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the edge of the world identify with the ghosts of time. Finally, Wharton is inspired by both 
the setting and her characters to challenge her readers’ expectations of the kinds of bodies, 
voices, and situations that can be registered in an archeological account of an era. 
III. The Met and Anachronism: Setting, Character, Style 
After the eighteenth century, artistic works were no longer viewed by aristocrats in 
private holdings and were made available to the public in the modern museum. This change, 
Rancière notes, coincided with the French Revolution, when the Louvre became filled “with 
princely portraits and pious paintings looted by the revolutionary armies from Italian palaces 
or Dutch museums” (Aisthesis x). In other words, the dawn of the modern museum 
coincided with the democratic revolution. Works of art were stripped of their original 
context and thus “the hierarchies of genres tended to vanish, and the works, separated from 
their hierarchical destinations, were increasingly perceived as expressions of the collective 
grandeur of the people and of their collective patrimony” (“Aesthetics and Politics” 291). 
More simply, anonymous spectators now stood before grand pieces of art and made what 
they would of them—a terrifying idea, for some. “Over time,” however, “the new institution 
created a certain form of policy of the institution, more or less putting lay people out of the 
museum to have them reenter through educational programs” (293). 
The Met restaged this aesthetic revolution in 1880 by moving from a converted 
mansion on West Fourteenth Street, the heart of Old New York, to an unfinished building 
in Central Park. Winifred Howe’s 1914 history of the museum notes “that the trustees, 
notwithstanding the emphasis they placed on the educational side of Museum work, 
apparently made no attempt to arrange the pictures according to schools” (190). Despite a 
desire to educate and hence refine the populace, the space of the Met made it impossible by 
upsetting the hierarchical system of genres with a confusing jumble of pictures and artifacts 
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(see fig. 5). Divorced from their context and from their schools/genres, there was no 
prescribed way for art in the Met to speak to patrons. This was radical insofar as the 




Figure 5: “The First Building in Central Park (Details)” 
Source: W. Howe, p. 191. 
As Kassanoff points out, Wharton “deplored the movement to make galleries more 
democratically accessible” (155). What she deplored most was the educational function of 
the museum, which sought to teach people how to view art.41 Rancière would agree: to 
                                                      
41 See Roffman 209-210.  
 
 247 
describe art to the masses is to talk down to them instead of letting the work exist on its own 
for each and every person. This tension is staged when Wharton has her characters avoid the 
Wolfe collection, which contained high art with “anecdotic” labels, and instead seek out the 
Cesnola antiquities, comprising archaeological artifacts from ancient Cyprus (Age 299). 
Looking at these objects, Ellen remarks: “It seems cruel that after a while nothing matters . . 
. any more than these little things, that used to be necessary and important to forgotten 
people, and now have to be guessed at under a magnifying glass and labelled: ‘Use 
unknown’” (300). The uncertain use of the Cypriot artifacts speaks to both the aesthetic 
power and the political limitations of the art museum. For Rancière, “museum works are art 
. . . because they were nothing like that for those who made them. And reciprocally, these 
works come to us as the product of a collective life, but on the condition of keeping us away 
from it” (Aisthesis 19). Ellen tries to imagine the Cypriots using these objects but notes the 
loss of meaning across time. This points to the fine line separating art and politics: though 
they both reconfigure the sensible world, Rancière explains, “[t]his does not mean that the 
museum creates a new kind of collective popular appropriation. Rather, it creates the 
possibility of new forms of perception that can also be implemented in the relation of people 
to their lived experience” (“Aesthetics” 295). This is what happens in the novel: the aesthetic 
evocation of a “forgotten people” yields a new way of seeing, feeling, and moving about the 
world that will link Ellen, Archer, and the Cypriots (Wharton, Age 300). 
As they are about to part, Archer looks at Ellen and “felt that he had never before 
beheld love visible” (303). The shock to Archer’s perceptual system signals a new 
distribution of the sensible. To understand how, we need first to distinguish this mute 
recognition of love from New York’s facility for nonverbal communication. Archer has 
spent most of his adult life interpreting the mute signs and symptoms of well-practiced faces 
 
 248 
to communicate about something unpleasant like an affair, the mechanisms of which are of 
anthropological value for Wharton. Once an affair is subtly referenced, society polices the 
parties unequally: the man receives looks but the woman is treated as a “criminal” (132). In 
the museum, however, Archer is struck dumb by the visibility and brute obviousness of 
Ellen’s love: this is love. More simply, Archer is shocked to see a previously repressed feeling 
visible in the world. The shock is similar to the one Anna Leath experiences in The Reef and 
has the same political significance: “she discerned for the first time instincts and desires, 
which, mute and unmarked, had gone to and fro in the dim passages of her mind, and now 
hailed each other with a cry of mutiny” (Wharton, Reef 290). Unlike Anna Leath, though, this 
is not an intrapersonal but an interpersonal revolution.42  
Ellen’s love is bodied forth into the world as a confirmation of equality, an 
indifference to difference, signaled by the lack of a possessive pronoun (it is not “her love”). 
Rancière is fond of a line cut from the final version of Madame Bovary, which speaks to this 
kind of love: “[Rodolphe] understood nothing of that voracious love which throws itself 
upon things at random . . . plunging entire into the being which is loved, taking possession 
of his sentiments . . . and almost reaching the proportions of a pure Idea through amplitude 
and impersonality” (qtd. in Mute Speech 119). We can compare this to Sharon Cameron’s 
“impersonality,” which “disrupts elementary categories we suppose to be fundamental to 
specifying human distinctiveness” (ix). Such is the mode of Wharton’s “Terminus,” which 
also never made it to print, showing how radical these ideas of love are: “the common-place 
room of the inn / With its dull impersonal furniture, kindled a mystic flame” and tears 
Wharton from her previous identity, facilitating her identification with the “nameless.”   
                                                      
42 An implication of this reading might be that Ellen’s body is aestheticized for Archer’s individual viewing 
pleasure, a tendency Emily Orlando has located in Wharton’s male protagonists (see Orlando 170-200); but 
here, on the contrary, the expressions of love shocks the two characters out of their familiar identities. 
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Of course, the lovers in “Terminus” have acted on their desires, unlike Ellen and 
Archer, who never consummate their relationship, even though society assumes they have 
and Ellen is thereafter ritualistically banished. Their love, in other words, is the thing that 
New York will eventually silence in its typically unequal fashion, which Archer belatedly 
realizes at Ellen’s going-away party not long after the museum rendezvous: 
And then it came over him, in a vast flash made up of many broken gleams, that to 
all of them he and Madame Olenska were lovers, lovers in the extreme sense peculiar 
to “foreign” vocabularies. He guessed himself to have been, for months, the centre 
of countless silently observing eyes and patiently listening ears, he understood that, 
by means as yet unknown to him, the separation between himself and the partner of 
his guilt had been achieved, and that now the whole tribe had rallied about his wife 
on the tacit assumption that nobody knew anything, or had ever imagined anything, 
and that the occasion of the entertainment was simply May Archer’s natural desire to 
take an affectionate leave of her friend and cousin. (Wharton, Age 319) 
 
In chapter XXXI, Ellen’s expression of love is anachronistically polemical: it exposes the 
impersonal, equalizing nature of love before and after New York silences her as Archer’s 
mistress (this moment comes before Ellen is banished in terms of the plot but after her 
silencing in terms of the historical possibility of visiting the Met’s Central Park location). 
When Ellen makes love visible in the untimely act of planning their affair, Wharton 
equates her and Archer not only with other lovers but the nameless many forgotten in and 
by time. Like love, time is indifferent to difference: “after a while nothing matters.” Perhaps 
this is why Archer and Ellen keep hearing ghostly footsteps all around them: “The step drew 
nearer, and a guardian in a braided cap walked listlessly through the room like a ghost 
stalking through a necropolis” (301). We can compare this simile to an earlier one: “The 
melancholy possibility of having to ‘kill time’ . . . was a vision that haunted [Mrs. Welland] as 
the spectre of the unemployed haunts the philanthropists” (232). In the museum, Ellen and 
Archer are killing time and expressing emotions outside of Old New York’s distribution of 
the sensible: they are like spectral remainders. When he returns home, Archer makes this 
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identification clear: “he looked about at the familiar objects in the hall as if he viewed them 
from the other side of the grave. . . . He sat there without conscious thoughts . . . in a deep 
and grave amazement that seemed to suspend life rather than quicken it” (303). 
The spectral imagery—specifically the metaphorical relationship between her 
characters and death/ghosts—signals that Wharton is writing in a different mode to show 
the antagonistic emergence of forces unseen and unheard in archeological realism. Bentley 
argues that Wharton rescues her brand of realism with the modern museum. Faced with the 
onslaught of modernity, museums and Wharton’s realism alike took to collecting priceless 
fragments and placing them under the broad social-scientific category of “culture.” Indeed, 
the Met marks the transition from the 1870s to the twentieth century in the last chapter: 
[Archer] had just got back from a big official reception for the inauguration of the 
new galleries at the Metropolitan Museum, and the spectacle of those great spaces 
crowded with the spoils of the ages, where the throng of fashion circulated through a 
series of scientifically catalogued treasures, had suddenly pressed on a rusted spring 
of memory.  
“Why, this used to be one of the old Cesnola rooms,” he heard some one 
say; and instantly everything about him vanished, and he was sitting alone on a hard 
leather divan against a radiator, while a slight figure in a long sealskin coat moved 
away down the meagerly-fitted vista of the old Museum. (Wharton, Age 326) 
 
In the new century, it is fashionable to visit the Museum. However, there is something 
radically different between this space of culture (“scientifically catalogued treasures”) and the 
untimely (for Ellen/Archer) and anachronistic (for Wharton/her readers) visit to the 
museum in the 1870s.43 The return to the museum in the last chapter shows the return to 
archeological realism. As Archer’s memory of Ellen walking away illustrates, however, the 
original, anachronistic museum is populated by ghosts of time, including Ellen and Archer.  
                                                      
43 Kassanoff points out that the Cesnola antiquities were deemed to be fakes—altered and touched up at best, 
created for the exhibit at worst (158-160). By setting the scene amongst possible fakes, Kassanoff reasons, 
Wharton lets go of her own fantasy for a historically “innocent” origin for democracy in America (162).  
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We can understand the distinction between the two museum sequences through the 
paradox of mute speech. This phrase takes its cue from the archaeological novel, where 
every object equally tells the story of a time. The problem is that the author-as-expert does 
all the talking. The revolutionary employment of mute speech brings bodies and objects 
onto the stage without speaking for them, instead letting their muteness resonate. The 
Cesnola antiquities accomplish this in the absence of archeological knowledge: their use 
being unknown, the Cypriots emerge from and recede back into the senseless march of time. 
Mimicking this movement in her writing, Wharton has Ellen and Archer stop talking as the 
ghostly museum attendant walks by; and “when [he] had vanished down a vista of mummies 
and sarcophagi Archer spoke again” (301). An anonymous body lumbers onto and then exits 
the stage, silently telling a story that Wharton’s characters and readers identify with thanks to 
Ellen and the Cypriots: in the longue durée, we will all be forgotten.   
The ghostly image of Ellen walking away, spurred by the reference to the Cesnola 
collection in the twentieth-century incarnation of the Met, parallels the way Ellen once 
recalled the forgotten Cypriots. Just as Ellen makes love visible after viewing the artifacts, 
Wharton’s readers may be inspired by Ellen and Archer’s redistribution of the sensible once 
it becomes a relic of the past. The novel was serialized in the Pictorial Review alongside 
editorials like “Does Your Husband Really Love You?” and “Tell Us What You Really Think 
About Marriage” (qtd. in Thornton). Wharton reconceives love as something disruptive to 
the institution of marriage by being open to anyone. In relation to the Nineteenth 
Amendment, the novel warns against any assumption that democracy has finally arrived, 
encouraging readers instead to see oppression where it persists and to look for democracy in 





“A Catalogue of Wrong and Outrage”: 
Undermining White Supremacist Discourse and Spatial Practice in The Marrow of Tradition 
 
 In The Marrow of Tradition (1901), Charles W. Chesnutt represents the events leading 
up to the November 10, 1898, riot in Wilmington, the largest city in North Carolina at the 
time and the home of one of the busiest ports along the Southern Atlantic Coast.1 Two days 
after an election won by the white supremacist arm of the Democratic party thanks to ballot 
stuffing and voter intimidation, a mob of armed whites shot black citizens on the streets of 
Wilmington. The city’s white elite then staged a coup, forcing the resignation of local 
Republican leaders and the expulsion of influential black citizens. Chesnutt’s novel, set in 
“Wellington,” charts the buildup of racial antagonism in the city—race difference 
constructed as an us-versus-them relation, where “they” threaten “our” way of life—until 
“The Storm Breaks,” as the title of chapter XXXII describes it (164). 
 The Marrow of Tradition contains four interwoven plots. First, there is a political plot 
involving the white supremacist editor Major Carteret, who uses his newspaper (the Morning 
Chronicle) to launch a campaign to restore the city to white Democratic rule. There is a 
genealogical plot involving Carteret’s wife, Olivia, and her black half-sister and near-twin 
Janet Miller. In a related professional plot, Janet’s husband, Dr. William Miller, returns from 
an extensive education to set up a black hospital in Wellington. Finally, there is a courtship 
plot involving a dissolute aristocrat, Tom Delamere, and an upstanding young man, Ellis, 
who are both fighting for the hand of Carteret’s sister, Clara Pemberton. The last plot takes 
                                                      
1 Wilmington had a population of 20,056 in 1890 (census records). The next largest cities were Charlotte 
(11,557) and Asheville (10,235). By the 1900 census Wilmington’s population stayed about the same (20,966) 
but was still the largest city in the state. On the importance of the city as a regional hub, see Prather 17.  
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a dark turn when Tom murders his aunt in blackface, framing his father’s servant Sandy, 
who is nearly lynched for the crime. The rest of the plots come together during Chesnutt’s 
rendering of the Wilmington massacre. Carteret realizes that his inflammatory rhetoric has 
created a monster beyond his control and he returns home in disgust to find his only son 
suffering from an unrelated medical emergency. Major Carteret must ask Miller for 
assistance but Miller refuses, revealing that his son was killed in the riot. Olivia heads to the 
Miller household as a last resort, and Miller leaves the choice to his wife, who shows mercy. 
Ever since W.D. Howells deemed it “bitter, bitter,” The Marrow of Tradition has been 
dogged by the question of genre (“Psychological” 882). While the depiction of the riot is 
realistic, there are other elements that would seem to push the novel outside the boundaries 
of realism. Howells hits on one in his review: Chesnutt’s novel is unflinching in its account 
of racial violence. Howells comes off as a Northern liberal who is blind to the realities of the 
Jim Crow South, begging the question: would Chesnutt even want to be associated with this 
“tradition”? Chesnutt also changes the name of the city and alters historical facts (his riot is 
before the election), something a card-carrying realist might not do. Joseph McElrath and 
Andrew Hebard claim that Chesnutt’s rendering of the Wilmington “revolution” owes more 
to the Southern chivalric romance or the historical romance than it does to realism.2 Other 
critics have highlighted the melodramatic, gothic, and epic elements of Marrow’s plots.3  
My overarching claim, however, will be that Marrow is the realist novel par excellence. 
Citing Laclau and Mouffe, Kenneth Warren has shown that American literary realism began 
as an attempt to spread “democratic struggles” to new areas of civil society via the 
representation of everyday life (13), which carried an important “promise”: “as realism 
                                                      
2 See Hebard; and McElrath, “Why Charles W. Chesnutt is Not a Realist.” 
3 On melodrama and Marrow, see Wilson 142-144; on the gothic, see Ianovici; on the epic, see Rutledge.  
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secured a position as the dominant aesthetic in the nation’s most prestigious magazines the 
unfinished business of black political liberation would emerge from the relative oblivion that 
had enveloped it following the abandonment of Radical Reconstruction” (50). However, the 
realists’ “conflation of aesthetics and politics” as well as “the insistence of writers like Henry 
James on seeing the political in terms of its social manifestations” unintentionally abetted the 
contemporaneous defense of Jim Crow segregation, since it stoked fears of undifferentiated 
social spaces (50, 14). Chesnutt, I claim, merges aesthetics and politics, social and political 
equality in realist fashion, but also plays up the distinctions between white supremacist 
ideology and the original “promise” of American literary realism. Marrow marks a return to 
the beginning for realism that is also a decisive step forward, aesthetically and politically.  
A key to Chesnutt’s political and representational method in Marrow can be found in 
his description of the start of the massacre in chapter XXXII of the novel: 
[A]t three o’clock every passing colored man was ordered, by the first white man he 
met, to throw up his hands. If he complied, he was searched, more or less roughly, 
for firearms, and then warned to get off the street. When he met another group of 
white men the scene was repeated. . . . If he resisted any demand of those who halted 
him—But the records of the day are historical; they may be found in the newspapers 
of the following date, but they are more firmly engraved upon the hearts and 
memories of the people of Wellington. (164) 
 
Chesnutt stops in his tracks when he approaches the historical record, pivoting to the 
ground-level experiences of “the people of Wellington.” Chesnutt interviewed victims of the 
Wilmington massacre and based numerous characters on real people. For example, the 
unifying element of Chesnutt’s depiction of events—Miller’s ride across the city in search of 
his wife and child—is “based on the riot experiences of Dr. Thomas Mask, the third African 
American doctor to practice in Wilmington” (McKoy 55). Josh Green, who implores Miller 
to join his party of armed men, is a composite of those who resisted that day.4   
                                                      
4 See Yarborough 238; and McKoy 69. 
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According to the logic of Chesnutt’s sentence, the ground-level account would 
appear to complement the historical record. However, there are few agreed-upon facts about 
either the start of the riot (who shot first/when) or the number of black lives lost (estimates 
range from six to sixty). Furthermore, the circulation of white supremacist discourse helped 
shape the unfolding of the massacre itself and the local/national response. Chesnutt is not 
working with historical facts but working against the discursive spin found in local and 
national papers. Ryan Simmons argues that Chesnutt’s realism “demands a deep awareness 
that ‘reality’ is both negotiated and rooted in discourse, and it requires an experimental 
attempt to reorient readers’ reception of language in order to do its work” (4). “The murder 
of African Americans on the city streets,” he clarifies, “is both a bodily and a textual act, a 
killing but also a spectacle and a warning to others. Chesnutt attempts to reclaim the 
symbolism of this violence in the interests of African Americans’ rights” (91). We can put a 
finer point on this by looking at the moment Simmons has in mind: “The negroes seemed to 
have been killed, as the band plays in circus parades, at the street intersections, where the 
example would be most effective” (Chesnutt, Marrow 171-172). Miller knows “what it 
signified” (a warning not to resist the pogrom) because of the white supremacists’ deliberate 
arrangement of bodies in urban space (171). Representing the Wilmington riot realistically, 
Chesnutt realized, meant confronting the entwining of white supremacist discourse 
(newspapers, speeches, fiction, Jim Crow laws, symbolic warnings) and spatial practice 
(segregation, paramilitary marches, street violence, the arrangement of bodies). 
The version of events peddled by local newspapers run by the white Democrats 
leading the statewide white supremacy campaign—Thomas Clawson’s Wilmington Daily 
Messenger, the model for Carteret and his paper, and Josephus Daniels’s Raleigh News and 
Observer—went something like this: Radical Reconstruction (1868-1877) and a recent run of 
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Republican victories (1894-1897) had given an undue amount of economic and political 
clout to North Carolina’s large black population, all in the name of greater democracy 
(voting power for black men, removal of local voting restrictions, equal protection before 
the law, and free schools).5 The relatively large, black-majority city of Wilmington (11,324 
blacks to 8,731 whites) helped a Republican/Populist bloc virtually sweep the state and local 
elections of 1894-1897, placing some black men in positions of political power, including 
members of Wilmington’s Board of Aldermen.6 When John Campbell Dancy, a black man, 
was appointed by President McKinley as customs collector for Wilmington’s busy port, he 
was promptly labeled the “Sambo of the Custom House” in local papers.7 Black 
entrepreneurs and artisans had also achieved a high degree of economic success in the city 
after the Civil War—earned, the white supremacist argument ran, at the expense of skilled 
white laborers and business leaders, though poverty and job insecurity were daily realities for 
many African Americans. Those who took menial jobs were accused of stealing them from 
unskilled white laborers, with the exception of the largely-female population of domestics (in 
Chesnutt’s Marrow, a member of the city’s black professional class supposes that “the white 
folks . . . favored [black domestic servants] because they had once belonged to them”) (29).8  
White Democrats returned to political power across North Carolina after the 1898 
elections but, in their minds, Wilmington was still under “Negro Domination”—a catch-all 
phrase for black political, economic, and sexual power. As Leslie Hossfield has shown, 
Wilmington’s white supremacist politicians, namely Alfred Moore Waddell (who may have 
                                                      
5 See Prather 34.  
6 The “Fusion” ticket of 1894 and 1896 combined Republican and Populist interests in a powerful bloc meant 
to offset Democratic hegemony at the state and local level. Fusionists dominated the 1896 ticket and a white 
Republican, Daniel L Russel of Wilmington, became governor. Prather writes that “[e]xactly how many blacks 
held office under Fusion rule has never been determined. An often repeated claim was that there were at least a 
thousand Negro office-holders in the state after the complete Fusion victory in 1896” (35).  
7 See Sundquist 414. 
8 On Wilmington’s labor force, see Prather 27; and Honey 174-175.  
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been distantly related to Chesnutt),9 compared themselves to “Confederate and 
Revolutionary War heroes” (32). They argued that the gains made by the black population 
after the Civil War had oppressed the country’s rightful democratic subjects, landed white 
men. As Michael Honey explains, white supremacist leaders also called on Social Darwinist 
logic to cement their case for there being “too much democracy” in Wilmington (170): “In 
the view of white business elites, the exercise of power at the ballot box or in the halls of 
government by African Americans and lower-class whites violated the natural order” (165).  
Wilmington’s white supremacist leaders drafted a “White Declaration of 
Independence” the day before the massacre, in which the signatories “declare[d] that [they] 
will no longer be ruled, and will never again be ruled by men of African origin.”10 One of the 
articles stipulated that the editor of Wilmington’s black-run daily newspaper, Alexander 
Manly, be banished from the city along with his printing press. In August, Manly’s Daily 
Record had printed an editorial, written by Manly himself, that white supremacists argued 
“slandered” white women by suggesting that they might consent to a sexual relationship with 
a black man, a point Manly originally made to show that the specter of the black rapist was 
an imaginary justification for lynching.11 Before the election, this editorial had been widely 
republished with outraged commentaries; now Waddell’s group singled out Manly as a 
unique threat to the law and order of their white-controlled city.  
After reading the Declaration to an assembly of the city’s black leaders, Waddell 
demanded a response the next morning. When the time passed without a response, due to a 
                                                      
9 See Sundquist 418.  
10 The Declaration is reproduced in the Norton Critical Edition of Marrow (276-278). 
11 See McKoy 43-46; and Sundquist 410-411. 
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miscommunication,12 Waddell walked to the armory of the Wilmington Light Infantry, 
where he was met by “a crowd of about 500 men” representing “a cross section of the town, 
including large numbers of professionals and clergy” (1898 Wilmington Riot Commission 
123). The crowd marched toward the Daily Record, armed with Winchester rifles and a large 
horse-drawn machinegun. In Waddell’s account, published in Collier’s Weekly, the riot was an 
unfortunate result of the black community leaders failing to respond to their demands. The 
political coup, which saw Waddell named the new mayor, is described as the legal assumption 
of power by Democrats after the outgoing government lost control of the city.13  
White supremacist leaders still had to explain the fact that the escalation to violence 
only came after the paramilitary crowd ransacked and set fire to the temporary home of the 
Daily Record: Love and Charity Hall, affiliated with the adjacent St. Luke’s Church. Waddell 
insisted that the “we” only meant to destroy Manly’s press and quickly put out the fire. He 
neglected to say that the crowd fired on the all-black neighborhood fire crew as they doused 
the fire.14 As for those who spent a night in the forests and swamps outside the city, to 
Waddell this was a sign that the black population needed white protection: “I have sent 
messengers of both races out into the surrounding woods, where, it is said, fugitives are in 
hiding, begging the people to come back to their homes, and to rest assured they will be 
protected in their persons and property” (295). 
                                                      
12 The Committee of Colored Citizens drafted a response and a representative placed it in the mail instead of 
hand-delivering it to Waddell’s home as planned because many armed whites stood guard in the neighborhood 
(1898 Wilmington Riot Commission 117). Waddell knew this but did not inform the crowd (124). 
13 Waddell, Alfred Moore. “The Story of the Wilmington, N.C., Race Riots.” Collier’s Weekly (Nov. 26, 1898): 3-
5. Reprinted in the Norton Critical Edition of Marrow 293-297. I will cite this edition parenthetically.  
14 See 1898 Wilmington Riot Commission 129.  
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National newspapers swallowed the white supremacist narrative of events hook, line, 
and sinker. The Washington Post’s headline from November 11, 1898 read “Negro Rule 
Ended.” An editorial published a week later claims that, for years, the people of Wilmington  
have been subjected to insult and indignity at the hands of the uppish negro. Our 
daughters and sisters have been slapped across the mouth in the open street by 
young negro bucks, when no white man was near; pulled from bicycles and jostled 
into the ditch; poked in the side with umbrellas by negro wenches; our mothers 
forced to walk in the ditch by negro women linking hands together and walking four 
or five abreast on the sidewalk; our taxes squandered; our jury boxes filled with 
negroes; our dead loved ones sat over by a Coroner’s jury composed of negroes, the 
Coroner himself a negro; ourselves and sometimes our women hauled up on a 
trumped-up charge, by a negro Constable, before a negro Magistrate, in a negro 
barber shop. All these things have we stood, because we loved law and order, 
because we hated riot and bloodshed. But when Manley [sic] attacked the honor of 
the fairest and purest womanhood that breathed, he overran the cup. Still loving law 
and order, they gave him twenty-four hours to remove himself and his property from 
the soil he had profaned. He made no move in that direction and at the expiration of 
the time the press upon which the vile slander was printed was broken to atoms and 
the plague-spot purged with fire. The negroes outnumbered the whites over two to 
one, became enraged, and, trusting in superior numbers, fired the first shot.15  
 
Almost nothing in this editorial is true—not the trumped-up charge of violent street 
encounters; nor that Manly refused to leave town; nor that blacks fired first. The truths it 
contains—Wilmington had a black coroner, black police officers, and black lawyers—are 
twisted into the image of a white citizenry unlawfully gazed at, poked, and prodded by 
power-hungry blacks. The whites loved law and order so much that they put up with such 
behavior until the breaking-point (Manly’s article), after which they were needed to restore 
law and order with military force. The fact that the mob of heavily-armed whites kicked off 
the riot by destroying Love and Charity Hall becomes, incredibly, an act of divine vengeance.  
A novel like Marrow, Chesnutt understood, had to undermine white supremacist 
discourse and spatial practice with a counter-hegemonic version of events in defense of 
                                                      
15 Green, Ernest M., “The Riot at Wilmington.” Washington Post, 22 November, 1898, p. 3. Reprinted in the 
Norton Critical Edition of Marrow, 283-284.  
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black civil rights. If Chesnutt wanted to counter white supremacist lies with a more 
objective, realistic account, this would have been no easy task. The 1898 Wilmington Riot 
Commission confronted the problem of accuracy in their exhaustive Final Report (2006):  
Because of the frantic nature of the story and the way in which it was reported at the 
time of the event—often with papers going to press while guns were fired in the 
streets—many inaccurate or incomplete accounts were circulated and survive today. 
Letters and other primary documents survive from witnesses and participants to add 
their personal experiences to printed versions of the day’s activities. Some who 
participated in the riot and later recalled the day in order to record the “rebellion” 
for posterity added through their memories many of the reporting inaccuracies. 
Confusion has arisen over the accuracy and truthfulness of participant records, 
contemporary newspaper articles, and similar data. Therefore, one must piece the 
day’s events together using multiple, often overlapping, information sources. (130) 
 
Another option, for Chesnutt, would have been to embrace the subjective mode, 
matching personal accounts of the riot with an impassioned defense of black civil rights. 
This was the route taken by David Bryant Fulton in Hanover; or the Persecution of the Lowly, 
published under the pseudonym Jack Thorne in 1900. In contrast, Chesnutt spends most of 
Marrow inside the heads of white supremacist characters while also testing out various 
responses from the black community via the many secondary characters in the novel, any 
one of whom, it is imagined, might become a hero during the riot and point a way forward.    
In a journal entry written years before (May 1880),16 Chesnutt intuited the aesthetic 
and political challenge he would face in approaching the novel this way:  
the subtle almost indefinable feeling of repulsion toward the negro, which is 
common to most Americans . . . cannot be stormed and taken by assault; the 
garrison will not capitulate: so their position must be mined; and we will find 
ourselves in their midst before they think it.  
This work is of a twofold character. The negro’s part is to prepare himself 
for social recognition and equality; and it is the province of literature to open the way 
for him to get it—to accustom the public mind to the idea; and by while amusing 
them to familiarize lead them on imperceptibly, unconsciously, step by step to the 
desired state of feeling. (Journals 140, alterations in original) 
 
                                                      
16 In a notable coincidence, this entry begins: “Susie [his wife] has been in Wilmington a month” (Journals 136). 
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Despite the very real anger he felt,17 Chesnutt does not attempt to “storm” the white 
supremacist version of events with a violent counter-example. He loses many sympathetic 
readers here since he seems to invalidate the black militant position represented by Green 
and accept the placid liberal progressivism of Miller.18 Indeed, his position is seemingly 
echoed by Miller when the latter gives his reason for not joining Green’s party: “Our time 
will come,—the time when we can command respect for our rights; but it is not yet in sight. 
Give it up, boys, and wait” (Chesnutt, Marrow 169). While Chesnutt does step back from 
Green’s politics on account of its violence, which to him is the inverse of white supremacy, 
Miller is invalidated for the opposite reason: he naively believes that “the race antagonism 
which hampered his progress and that of his people was a mere temporary thing, the 
outcome of former conditions, and bound to disappear in time” (Marrow 43).  
Following Stephen Knadler and others,19 I will argue that the secret hero of the novel 
is Miller’s wife, Janet, who only wants to be recognized by her white half-sister Olivia, the wife 
of Major Carteret. Although it is framed as a “weakness,” Janet’s desire for recognition is not 
born of naïveté: “She . . . appreciated to the full the social forces arrayed against any such 
recognition as she had dreamed of” (44). Janet is banished from Olivia’s life and mind 
because she looks exactly like her half-sister and thus threatens to expose the arbitrariness of 
the Carteret family’s sense of superiority over the Millers. If Olivia were to recognize Janet, 
in other words, it would challenge the socio-spatial system that makes one sister black and 
another white, with all the social and political inequities that follow. In the last moments of 
the novel, Olivia finally sees and hears Janet as she (Janet) describes the wrongs done unto 
                                                      
17 His daughter, Helen, later claimed that “he realized that [the novel] would antagonize a large part of the 
reading public, especially in the South, but he was by nature a crusader and was burning with anger” (H. 
Chesnutt 170).  
18 See Yarborough 238.  
19 See Knadler; Danielson; and Hamilton.  
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her and “the people of Wellington” (164). Here Chesnutt breaks through the construction of 
race antagonism in white supremacist discourse and spatial practice with a radical-democratic 
alternative. Since his method of countering white supremacy is at once discursive, spatial, 
and antagonistic, it must be distinguished from the white supremacist variety.   
Jacques Rancière will help us isolate the radical-democratic valences of Janet’s final 
speech. Rancière’s work centers on the sudden appearance of a political being in a time and 
place that had been relegated to the apolitical private sphere, where only the noise of 
suffering can emerge but not actual speech. The “antagonistic” appearance of a new subject 
disrupts the hierarchical distribution of bodies, places, and functions that Rancière calls the 
police order (Disagreement 29). As we saw in the previous chapter, politics is aesthetic insofar 
as a once-excluded voice/body re-forms the dominant sense of what can be seen, heard, or 
felt by identifying with all those who have been left out of the dominant order. Once on the 
political stage, this new collectivity states the wrong behind their exclusion from 
sociopolitical life: it is wrong because all parties are equal.20 Edith Wharton, we should 
clarify, never made it this far: she was more interested in the aesthetic and political act of 
identification with “the nameless, the many” than the declaration of wrongs (“Terminus”). 
Rancière is equally well known for his ideas on the politics of literature, or the 
qualities that writing shares with political speech: they both stage an “intervention in the 
carving up of objects that form a common world, the subjects that people that world and the 
powers they have to see it, name it and act upon it” (Politics 7). Yet the politics of literature, 
unlike the aesthetics of politics, “does not give collective voice to the anonymous” (Dissensus 
142). As we have seen, the democratic aspects of the realist novel are its indifference toward 
its subject matter/meaning (any subject/reading is as good as another) and its ability to 
                                                      
20 See Rancière, Disagreement 23-24. 
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awaken our senses to the mute speech of objects or the swirl of atoms that make everything 
equal. Realism’s democratic indifference and its dance with muteness open the door for 
Warren’s thesis—that the entangling of aesthetics and politics in American realism 
unintentionally fueled arguments for segregation. Furthermore, as we saw in chapters 1 and 
4, on Howells and Wharton, the innovations involved in making mute people/objects 
appear and be felt or heard as equals pushed American realism into the realm of modernism.  
For Chesnutt, confronting a race riot in a politically-expedient way meant blunting 
the free-floating elements of realism, style fully as much as message.21 But this does not 
mean that he telegraphed the message to such an extent that he sacrificed aesthetic interest 
or the principles of his realism. A delicate balance had to be struck, as he claims in his 
journal: “it is the province of literature . . . to accustom the public mind to the idea [of ‘social 
recognition and equality’]; and . . . to lead them on imperceptibly, unconsciously, step by step 
to the desired state of feeling” (Journals 140). Janet’s plotline is an extended meditation on 
what it would look, sound, or feel like to be recognized as an equal. For most of the novel 
Janet is banished not just from Olivia’s life and mind but from the narrator’s attentions as 
well. In practice, this means that Chesnutt confronts the issue of recognition from Olivia’s 
point of view. This is deliberate. First, he says, the engaged artist must “mine” the 
opposition’s mindset before they, or his readers, realize it. Abraham Cahan, we recall, 
accomplished a similar feat in The Rise of David Levinsky: he goes into the mind of his Social 
Darwinian main character before making a rebuttal via a strike organized by the unnamed 
Jewish Daily Forward, blurring the boundary between reality and fiction. This moment is subtle 
enough to miss, however. Chesnutt perfects the aesthetics and politics of realism by relating 
Janet’s speech at the climax of Marrow, forcing his readers to confront the wrongs of slavery 
                                                      
21 See Simmons 87-112.   
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and segregation from the point of view of absolute human equality, as codified by the ever-
evolving discourse of the democratic revolution.22  
 The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows. First, we will show how Chesnutt 
“mines” white supremacist ideology to arrive at the riot’s underlying cause: the bubbling 
over of race antagonism brought on by the hysterical reaction to Wilmington’s visible black 
middle class. Second, I will argue that Chesnutt uses “the province of literature” to open a 
time-place for Olivia’s recognition of Janet, and through her black Wilmington/Wellington, 
as an equal, preparing readers “for social recognition and equality.” The novel touches all the 
bases of American literary realism along the way. Race antagonism, for Chesnutt, is directly 
tied to urban space and democratic discourse; it can be appropriated and re-defined by 
competing ideologies (white supremacy or radical democracy). At its best, antagonism yields 
agonistic debate, but only when the novel’s white characters see and hear the black middle 
class not as threats to their identities, but as human beings who have been deeply wronged. 
I. Mining the Opposition 
 In “Rights and Duties” (1908), originally given as a speech in Washington, D.C., 
Chesnutt argues that signs of black economic and political success in the city incite a “latent” 
race antagonism in white onlookers: 
With each step forward the Negro has aroused some latent antagonism. Once the 
colored people all lived in mostly alleys and low marshy places which white people 
avoided; when one of them would buy a house in a better locality, and he was 
touching the tender pocket nerve of his white neighbors, a new source of 
antagonism was developed. Once they were mostly glad to eat, at the white man’s 
back door, the leavings of the white man’s table. But when a dignified government 
official or a dapper department clerk or a daintily attired school teacher, with a dollar 
to spare, would enter a Washington restaurant to eat, in a public space amid 
agreeable surroundings, a palatable meal, the nerve of racial exclusiveness was 
                                                      
22 By framing absolute equality in terms of the history of liberal-democratic discourse, I aim to transcode 
Rancière into Laclau and Mouffe’s framework. Rancière frames human equality as the equal capacity for speech 
and intelligence. Chesnutt views equality similarly but frames the equal capacity of everyone and anyone within 
a language of liberal universalism, as we will see.  
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touched and a new source of antagonism developed. I need not multiply instances. 
(Essays 252)  
 
I suggest that, for Chesnutt, the undisguised race antagonism found in white supremacist 
discourse and spatial practice result from such “instances” of “latent antagonism” in mixed 
spaces being multiplied beyond what the white onlooker takes to be a breaking point (252). 
Bryan Wagner has argued, in a similar vein, that the Wellington/Wilmington riot is 
the cumulative effect of an “inchoate anxiety” produced by the visibility of the black middle 
class in mixed urban spaces (“Charles” 326). “Chesnutt advances his critique of racial 
violence,” Wagner writes, “by highlighting the elaborate interface of race, class, and urban 
visibility” (312). White supremacist ideology is built upon a certain “way of seeing” (to use a 
phrase from chapter 2): blacks are meant to live on the margins (in Chesnutt’s terms: alleys, 
swamps); when they cross into white society, they are to show deference and humility, 
generally mimicking the master-slave relations of old (315). The economic, political, and 
spatial development of postbellum Wilmington, however, made this fantasy unsustainable:  
In the years after Reconstruction, Wilmington became one of the most economically 
and geographically integrated cities in the South. . . . In these years, African 
Americans transformed the city’s demographics by purchasing homes and businesses 
in predominantly white neighborhoods. As the Southern Workman proudly announces, 
the new class of “colored citizens” rapidly “[moved] out of the lanes and alleys of 
Wilmington, N.C. . . . and into houses” that were scattered amongst those of their 
white neighbors. At the same time, many successful African American artisans and 
professionals moved into offices in prominent downtown locations along Market 
Street and in the Front Street Market. (313-314)23 
 
Chesnutt draws these realities into his portrait of Wellington, highlighting the resulting crisis 
in white supremacist thought and identity. For example, the white supremacist Captain 
McBane gives a speech that turns on the same kind of hysterical reaction to signs of black 
economic and political success that we found in the Washington Post editorial24 quoted above: 
                                                      
23 Wagner quotes “North Carolina Notes,” Southern Workman, 1 Jan. 1872, p. 2. 
24 Wagner turns up other newspapers “reporting” on sidewalk skirmishes (“Charles” 326-327). 
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A negro justice of the peace has opened an office on Market Street, and only 
yesterday summoned a white man to appear before him. Negro lawyers get most of 
the business in the criminal court. Last evening a group of young white ladies, going 
quietly along the street arm-in-arm, were forced off the sidewalk by a crowd of negro 
girls. Coming down the street just now, I saw a spectacle of social equality and negro 
domination that made my blood boil with indignation,—a white and black convict, 
chained together, crossing the city in charge of a negro officer! (Marrow 23-24) 
 
McBane does “not express a conscious intention to overthrow the government. Rather, [he] 
express[es] an inchoate anxiety about the ‘spectacles of social equality’ that interrupt the 
process of white perception” (Wagner, “Charles” 326). The charge of “too much 
democracy” in the weeks leading up to the riot is thus mined by Chesnutt to get at its source 
(Honey 170): “an epistemological crisis that is simultaneously a crisis of white identity” 
brought on by the visibility of Wellington’s black middle class (Wagner, “Charles” 312). 
While he is right to call it an identity crisis, epistemology may not be the best name or 
category for the related disturbance in the white supremacist’s vision of the world. A better 
term and explanation is in Chesnutt’s “Rights and Duties”: the “latent antagonism” brought 
on when the outside world fails to support the socio-spatial norms Southern whites gleaned 
from antebellum culture, which white supremacist (and aligned) discourse tries to perpetuate 
in the post-Reconstruction world. For Laclau and Mouffe, too, antagonism marks an identity 
crisis at the limits of discourse: “If the subject is constructed through language . . . any 
putting into question of that order must necessarily constitute an identity crisis” (112, 113).  
The strength of Wagner’s reading, though, is his sense that this crisis defines the 
New South, not just those who openly espouse white supremacist ideology. Wagner focuses 
on a carriage ride taken by Olivia Carteret and her Aunt Polly. A new building pops into 
view, which Polly assumes to be a reconstruction of an “old . . .  mansion [that had been] 
burned during the war”; instead, Olivia tells her it is Miller’s “new colored hospital” 
(Chesnutt, Marrow 79). Polly’s response—“[t]he world is upside down” (79)—encapsulates 
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the identity crisis brought on by the visibility of the black middle class in Wellington. Order 
is momentarily restored by the appearance of Sandy, Mr. Delamere’s servant: “‘There’s Mr. 
Delamere’s Sandy!’ exclaimed [Olivia], touching her aunt on the arm. ‘I wonder how his 
master is?’ . . . Sandy, no less than his master, was survival of an interesting type. He had 
inherited the feudal deference for his superiors in position” (81).25  
 The white supremacy campaign, Wagner argues, offers an opportunity to make the 
“real” city fit Polly and the New South’s degraded, crisis-ridden ideology and thus restore 
damaged white Southern identity. But it is worth pausing here because Wagner hits on a 
central aspect of Chesnutt’s construction of “Wellington” and its relationship to 
Wilmington. Wagner places Miller’s hospital—which we later learn is surrounded by “a 
schoolhouse and a large church, both used by the colored people”—in Wilmington’s 
Campbell Square (Chesnutt, Marrow 178). The historical square included two of the largest 
black churches in the city, First Baptist and St. Stephen’s A.M.E.,26 and a Peabody School. 
Since the square served as the center of black community life, “it is not surprising that it 
occupies the anxious center of the novel’s political geography” (Wagner, “Charles” 316). 
Still, Chesnutt does not name the square, surrounding it with fictional streets: “‘the Weldon 
Road . . .  and . . . Pine Street’” (Marrow 79). Just as no map of Wilmington will show these 
roads there was no black hospital in Campbell Square, or anywhere else in the city.27  
                                                      
25 Chesnutt later provides a nuanced account of why Sandy would willingly play into the white supremacist 
vision of the world. After Tom Delamere murders Aunt Polly in blackface and frames his father’s servant for 
the crime, Sandy misrecognizes himself in the racial caricature in the city streets, suggesting the degree to which 
white supremacist ideology has infected the Southern mind: “As it seemed to Sandy, he saw himself hurrying 
along in front of himself toward the house” (102). 
26 St. Stephen’s A.M.E. is the likely model for Sandy’s church, explaining his presence in the square. His 
congregation is “the largest in the city” and “to him was a social club as well as a religious temple” (Chesnutt, 
Marrow 76). St Stephen’s A.M.E. had one of the largest congregations in the state (Reaves 105).  
27 After the Civil War, the city attracted educated, well-trained black doctors like Miller but they “saw patients 
in their homes or offices . . . When hospitalization was needed, there was little choice but to care for the patient 
at home. Surgery was often performed in the bedroom, on the parlor floor, or kitchen table” (Reaves 319). 
James Walker Memorial Hospital replaced City Hospital in 1901, with a promise for “an annex for black 
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Chesnutt thus draws on the history of Wilmington to create his own socio-spatial 
novelistic construct, Wellington. As Fredric Jameson reminds us, “as far as the category of 
space itself is concerned, it cannot be assumed to preexist the text . . . but must be projected 
by the latter as that ‘code’ of space which the reader must learn to read” (Raymond Chandler 
31). Since Chesnutt is mining the opposition, the “code” of space in this novel might be 
thought of as a white supremacist “distribution of the sensible,” to use Rancière’s phrase—
an entire world divided into white and black spaces/roles. The lesson of the Polly-Olivia 
carriage ride, then, is that when white characters circulate through the city, they are shocked 
by the visibility of black bodies in what they have been taught to think of as white spaces.  
Take, for example, Carteret’s “walk to the office”: “while passing the city hall . . . he 
had seen the steps of that noble building disfigured by a fringe of job-hunting negroes . . . 
like a string of buzzards sitting on a rail, awaiting their opportunity to batten upon the 
helpless corpse of a moribund city” (Chesnutt, Marrow 22). We later learn that most of 
Chesnutt’s white characters live close to one another, about a half a mile from City Hall, and 
that one of Carteret’s employees, Ellis, likes to walk past the Carteret home on his way to 
this cluster of houses. If Carteret’s newspaper is located downtown, near the Wilmington 
Messenger (21 N. Front), then this places his home either on the eastern section of town, 
around 11th and Market (see fig. 6 in the next section, below), or the southwestern part of 
town (fig. 7).28 Both are areas where white participants of the riot lived. While Wellington 
                                                      
citizens,” which took years to complete and opened in 1905. “[I]it was all the community had until 1920-21 
when the first African-American hospital opened at 415 North Seventh Street” (220). 
28 Mr. Delamere lives “a short distance beyond” Ellis’s boarding house; but Ellis likes to walk home from the 
newspaper so that he passes the Carteret household (104). The walk straight to the boarding house is only 
“slightly shorter,” so the Carteret house is likely nearby, in that cluster of homes owned by white participants in 
the real-life riot (see fig. 6, below). The man Carteret is based on—Thomas Clawson—lived right next to the 
City Hall, a mere stone’s throw from the newspaper office; Carteret cannot live here, otherwise Ellis’s walk 
would always go by the Carterets. While Chesnutt based his newspaper on the Messenger, he chose to have his 
white characters clustered together in the mostly-white eastern portion of the city. It is also possible that the 
Carterets live in a southwestern cluster, around Third and Church. See fig. 7.  
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can be overlaid on the “real” city, what matters most is the interrelationship between 
characters and spaces, real and fictive. Carteret passes a real location, City Hall—by no 
means a white space, in actuality—and is shocked to see black job seekers, who become the 
future black middle class feeding on Wellington’s carcass.29 Carteret then works through this 
threat to his identity in an editorial, eliminating the spectral presence altogether: 
Taking for his theme the unfitness of the negro to participate in government,—an 
unfitness due to his limited education, his lack of experience, his criminal tendencies, 
and more especially to his hopeless mental and physical inferiority to the white 
race,—the major had demonstrated, it seemed to him clearly enough, that the ballot 
in the hands of the negro was a menace to the commonwealth. He had argued, with 
entire conviction, that the white and black races could never attain social and 
political harmony by commingling in their blood; he had proved by several historical 
parallels that no two unassimilable races could ever live together except in the 
relation of superior and inferior . . . (Marrow 22) 
 
Carteret’s editorial represents the manifestation of race antagonism in white supremacist 
discourse, which in turn leads to the riot. When the crowd later sets fire to Miller’s hospital, 
it is “the logical outcome of the crusade which the Morning Chronicle preached, in season 
and out of season, for many months” (182). White supremacist discourse and spatial practice 
thus exist in a feedback loop: the discourse draws the world into two unequal camps, which 
everyday urban life undermines with examples of bodies and spaces that do not fit the 
pattern; and the only perceived recourse is to either make them fit or destroy them.  
The riot is not the only example of this feedback loop in action. De facto and de jure 
segregation also bespeak a desire to expel signs of black economic and political success from 
white vision to maintain an imagined black/white hierarchy. In Marrow, the Miller family 
represents black economic success and upward mobility—Miller’s father, a stevedore on the 
city’s port, bought the Carteret family home after the war, and the doctor’s family now lives 
                                                      
29 Known as Thalian Hall, the building was both a city hall and a theater. Reaves notes that City Hall has gone 
unrecognized as a specifically black space, a fact that Carteret would seem to be repressing. “It was the most 
frequent venue for black entertainers and lecturers,” including Frederick Douglass (August 1, 1872) (46). 
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there—and it is no coincidence that they are the locus of white anxiety and de facto/de jure 
segregation. I want to focus on two scenes that show Chesnutt “mining” the white 
supremacist worldview for its reaction to the Millers more specifically: Miller’s journey into 
the city by train (chapter V) and Janet Miller’s buggy ride past Olivia’s house (chapter XI). 
These scenes will continue to teach us to read white supremacist spatial “codes” but they will 
also cause us to reevaluate Wagner’s claims. Once the Millers become the center of attention, 
we will notice that the identity “black middle class” is applied from the outside to explain the 
source of the anxiety they provoke; but, in the moment, they appear as vague threats.30 
Second, we will need to distinguish between Miller and Janet, with Janet best evoking the 
radical position Chesnutt sketched in his nonfiction writing on U.S. race relations. 
*** 
“A Journey Southward” deals with the ground-level consequences of the recently-
adjudicated Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). The sequence involves the last stages of Miller’s journey 
to Wellington from New York City, where Miller has just “purchase[d] equipment for his 
new hospital” (Chesnutt, Marrow 34). Miller, in this sense, is like Chesnutt returning to the 
South “as a possible literary subject” after gleaning elements of his craft in “northern literary 
markets” (Brodhead 21). At the stop for Philadelphia Miller meets the glance of his old 
mentor, Dr. Burns, who happens to be traveling to Wellington to operate on Major 
Carteret’s son, who has swallowed a rattle. For the moment, they meet as equals, as 
colleagues, while Chesnutt’s narrator defamiliarizes any differences: 
                                                      
30 The readings that follow line up more closely with Wagner’s later work. In Disturbing the Peace (2009), Wagner 
argues that blackness in America is not a fixed category traceable across time and place; rather it is a condition 
of statelessness produced by what he calls the “police power,” a pervasive system of judicial and extra-judicial 
codes (although he is only named in a single footnote, Rancière’s conception of the police is clearly in play 
here). “Seen from the standpoint of the police power,” Wagner writes, “blackness is imperceptible except for 
the presumed danger it poses to public welfare” (Disturbing 6-7). In the decades following the Civil War, “the 
ex-slave was portrayed, in the press and on the stump, as a threat to society” (7).  
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A celebrated traveler, after many years spent in barbarous or savage lands, has said 
that among all varieties of mankind the similarities are vastly more important and 
fundamental than the differences. Looking at these two men with the American eye, 
the differences would perhaps be the more striking . . . for the first was white and the 
second black, or, more correctly speaking, brown; it was even a light brown, but both 
his swarthy complexion and his curly hair revealed what has been described in the 
laws of some of our states, as a “visible admixture” of African blood. (33) 
 
Race is a social construct based on biological and/or physiological cues. It even varies by 
state how certain bodies are categorized. For Burns, this is all rather abstract and seemingly 
out of their control: “It is a great problem, Miller, the future of your race . . . It is a serial 
story which we are all reading, and which grows in vital interest with each successive 
installment” (34). Miller is optimistic, offering a statement drenched in dramatic irony: “If 
our race had made as much progress everywhere as they have in Wellington, the problem 
would be well on the way toward solution” (35). In this view, “race antagonism” in the 
South is a great, unfolding story of “slo[w],” “painfu[l]” progress (34-35). 
Chesnutt then introduces his characters and his readers to the segregationist socio-
spatial code of the South, which not only names Miller as “black” and Burns as “white” but 
also anxiously polices the boundary between them. “They were already far down in Virginia, 
and had stopped at a station beyond Richmond,” when the conductor asks everyone to 
please move to the day car, after which point he returns to speak with the two doctors (35): 
“Excuse me, sir,” said the conductor, addressing Dr. Burns, “but did I 
understand you to say that this man was your servant?” 
“No, indeed!” replied Dr. Burns indignantly. “The gentleman is not my 
servant, nor anybody’s servant, but is my friend. . . . ” 
“I’m sorry to part friends, but the law of Virginia does not permit colored 
passengers to ride in the white cars.  . . . ” 
“I have paid my fare on the sleeping-car, where the separate-car law does not 
apply,” remonstrated Miller. 
“I can’t help that. You can doubtless get your money back from the sleeping-
car company. But this is a day coach, and is distinctly marked ‘White,’ as you must 




Once the train conductor has identified Miller as a black person, the next step is to read his 
class.31 A black person can ride in a white car as a servant because it mimics master-slave 
relations. A black person who has “paid first-class fare” must be expelled to a car that is 
separate but certainly not equal (38): “It was an old car, with faded upholstery, from which 
the stuffing projected here and there through torn places” (37). Miller sums it up neatly: “As 
the traditional negro,—the servant,—he is welcomed; as an equal, he is repudiated” (40). 
 When the conductor confirms that Miller is not a servant but a middle-class black 
man, he asks him to leave the car. Burns pushes back, creating the first agonistic debate over 
democratic rights in the novel: “‘You shall not stir a step, Miller,’ exclaimed Burns 
wrathfully. ‘This is an outrage upon a citizen of a free country. You shall stay right here’” 
(36). Agonism, in Mouffe’s account, is a disagreement between adversaries who share the 
language of liberal-democratic rights, which, as a baseline, means recognizing the right to 
defend one’s views. The claim to Miller’s rights as a citizen is met by the conductor’s 
reference to “the law of Virginia,” which gives him broad power to identify Miller’s race and 
police his movement (36). Burns continues his fight: “my friend has his rights to maintain . . 
. There is a vital principle at stake in the matter” (36). Miller’s silence is deafening—a hint, 
confirmed by the rest of the novel, that agonism rarely travels across the color line, though 
there are fierce debates between white characters32 and between black characters.33 
The debate on the train ends when the conductor plays his trump card: 
The law gives me the right to remove him by force. I can call on the train crew to 
assist me, or on the other passengers. If I should choose to put him off the train 
                                                      
31 Chesnutt was fascinated and horrified by the broad power of racial classification given to the Jim Crow 
conductors, and often quizzed them on how easy it was to identify a black person, the irony being that they 
often thought they were talking to a white man in the light-skinned Chesnutt. See Chesnutt, Essays 141.  
32 See chapter XXV (pp. 125-129) and chapter XXVII (pp. 133-141). Mr. Delamere must convince Carteret, 
who then has to convince an agitated crowd, that Sandy should not be lynched for a crime he did not commit.  
33 See chapter XII (pp. 68-72.) The argument, here, is whether Miller or Green would “die to defend a right” 
(71). While Miller “[w]as willing to give up his life to a cause” (i.e., give his career to a cause), he cannot go as 
far as Green and propose that he “die for it” (71).  
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entirely, in the middle of the swamp, he would have no redress—the law so provides. 
If I did not wish to use force, I could simply switch this car off at the next siding, 
transfer the white passengers to another, and leave you and your friend in possession 
until you were arrested and fined or imprisoned. (37) 
 
It turns out that Miller does not have the rights he has as a citizen of the country. This is 
because he has been deemed a threat to the white supremacist ideology behind Jim Crow 
segregation. That is, Miller’s unwillingness to self-identity with the word “Colored” on the 
sign (38), and thereby enforce his own segregation, threatens the socio-spatial system 
founded by those signs and the bedrock difference they supposedly signify. He must either 
accept that hierarchical reality or be left “in the middle of the swamp.”  
The conductor’s warning functions like the “conspicuous” signs, which suggest that 
if “a colored person [might] endeavor, for a moment, to lose sight of his disability, these 
staring signs would remind him continually that between him and the rest of mankind not of 
his own color, there was by law a great gulf fixed” (38). If Miller needs to be reminded that 
he is a threat, he will be expelled not just from the car but from the South’s entire socio-
spatial system. The conductor provides the key to the whole system: it is not internally self-
sufficient but relies on an imagined outside (“the swamp,” populated, we imagine, by other 
outlaws)34 that threatens it but for the same reason gives it coherence. This is why Chesnutt’s 
white supremacists later riot: an internal threat disrupts their system of hierarchical 
differences and hence their sense of self, providing the impetus to expel that threat (to the 
swamps outside Wellington/Wilmington, no less) to “save” the system and themselves.  
Miller chooses to ride in the “colored” car, as putting up a fight “would delay 
[Burns’s] journey and imperil a life at the other end” (37). However, this scene of segregation 
effectively repeats itself in Wellington. Burns invites Miller to participate in the surgery but 
                                                      
34 Wagner claims that, thanks to antebellum figures like Bras-Coupé, “the swamp becomes an archetypal 
wilderness, a wasteland, by virtue of its association with the outlaw” (Disturbing 71).  
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Carteret refuses to allow a black man in his home. Pressed by Burns, Carteret settles on the 
“personal” conflict between their wives as the reason Miller cannot come in (47). Accepting 
this, Burns dispatches a local doctor, Dr. Price, to let Miller know the decision. Miller waits 
on the back steps, symbolically on the margins with all black visitors, sans servants. As Price 
notes to himself, the threat Miller poses is that he is a “social misfit, an odd quantity, 
educated out of his own class, with no possible hope of entrance into that above it” (49). 
The reference to Miller’s in-between position points back to the train sequence. 
When he enters the “colored” car, he feels alienated from the class of people therein:  
Toward evening the train drew up at a station where quite a party of farm laborers, 
fresh from their daily toil, swarmed out from the conspicuously labeled colored 
waiting-room, and into the car with Miller. They were a jolly, good-natured crowd, 
and, free from the embarrassing presence of white people, proceeded to enjoy 
themselves after their own fashion. Here an amorous fellow sat with his arm around 
a buxom girl’s waist. A musically inclined individual—his talents did not did not go 
far beyond inclination—produced a mouth-organ and struck up a tune, to which a 
limber-legged boy danced in the aisle. For a while Miller was amused. They were his 
people, and he felt a certain expansive warmth toward them in spite of their obvious 
shortcomings. By and by, however, the air became too close, and he went out upon 
the platform. For the sake of the democratic ideal, which meant so much to his race, 
he might have endured the affliction . . . but personally, and apart from the mere 
matter of racial sympathy, these people were just as offensive to him as to the whites 
in the other end of the train. Surely, if a classification of passengers on trains was at 
all desirable, it might be made upon some more logical and considerate basis than a 
mere arbitrary, tactless, and, by the very nature of things, brutal drawing of a color 
line. (40-41) 
 
Miller wishes to replace the “arbitrary” color line with a more substantial distinction based 
on class, which, Kenneth Warren argues, “differ[s] little from tactics of conservative 
Southerners in the immediate postwar period who sought to maintain their position atop the 
social order by” drawing upper-class African Americans into an alliance (79).35 For Walter 
                                                      
35 We will see an example of this alliance later, when Carteret and Miller form an unlikely connection in their 
desire to separate personal and political matters on the day of the riot.  
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Benn Michaels this moment encapsulates liberal antiracism’s “monetarization of the 
technology of discrimination” (293). 
The problem is that both critics associate this position with Chesnutt himself. In 
fact, Chesnutt had a different response to the same experience on the Southern railroad: 
It was pleasant enough till we took on about fifty darkies who were going to Norfolk 
to work on a truck farm. They filled the seats and standing room, and sat in each 
other’s laps for want of seats. As the day was warm and the people rather dirty, the 
odor may better be imagined than described [.] Although it was nothing to me, I 
could empathise with my fellow traveler, who stuck his head out of the window . . . 
It was a merry crowd however, especially one young fellow who would gravely line 
out a hymn and then sing it himself, with all the intonations of a camp meeting. 
(Journals 112) 
  
Though he begins in the key of class discrimination, Chesnutt’s feelings move in the 
opposite direction of Miller’s, echoing the affective possibilities of the crowded train car in 
Howells, which is secured by the ear if not the nose. Chesnutt enjoys the hymn, as it reminds 
him of African American spirituals and hence the persistence of black culture in America.  
 We are left to wonder what position Miller inhabits if it is not the author’s own. It is, 
in fact, what I have called the “naïve liberalism” of George Washington Cable. Indeed, in 
“The Freedman’s Case in Equity” (1885), Cable advances the argument that the law of 
“‘equal accommodations’ . . . at once reduced to half all opportunity for those more 
reasonable and mutually agreeable self-assortments which public assemblages and groups of 
passengers find it best to make in all other enlightened countries, making them on the score 
of conduct, dress, and price” (415). A more reasonable method of self-sorting is by class. 
This more substantial difference is founded on Cable’s idea that, while we might one day 
achieve political equality, there will never be social equality. So, while we must fight for equal 
rights for African Americans, there is nothing one can or should do to prevent “natural” 
class differences from expressing themselves in private life (the train car, the office, the 
home). Chesnutt vehemently disagrees with this assumption: “We hear men speak of 
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different kinds of equality. They are willing to concede the Negro this kind of equality, but 
deny him that kind of equality. There is but one kind of equality, as there is but one kind of 
truth” (Essays 254).   
 In the train sequence, Chesnutt has not only demonstrated how the socio-spatial 
system of race hierarchy falters in the face of an excessive, unclassified element and requires 
mobilization on antagonistic (us/them) lines to correct; he has also tested out a response, 
which is to retreat to class difference to avoid race antagonism. Chesnutt adds yet a second 
possible response in this same sequence when Green emerges during a brief stop for water: 
“As the train came to a standstill, a huge negro, covered thickly with dust, crawled off one of 
the rear trucks unobserved” (Marrow 39). Miller notices in his face “a concentrated hatred 
almost uncanny in its murderousness” (39). Green has hitched a ride into Wellington 
determined to kill the white supremacist McBane for murdering his father and ruining his 
mother. He represents the return of the stateless Other that the white supremacist relies on 
to secure his personal and political identity (while Miller is an internal threat that would be 
made to occupy that stateless space if he fails to self-segregate). But to Chesnutt, Green’s 
“concentrated hatred” is the inverse of white supremacy (39).36 Indeed, he later mobilizes in 
an us-versus-them defensive position amidst the outbreak of race antagonism in Wellington.  
If Chesnutt does not fully embrace a uniquely black (political) identity in either the 
Miller or Green plotlines this is because he wants to combine autonomy with equality, the 
particular with the universal. Equality goes all the way or it goes nowhere, he argues in 
“Rights and Duties,” leveraging liberalism’s starting point—absolute human equality and the 
equal capacity of everyone—for radical-democratic ends. Liberal democracy, as a political 
system, may have started with the assumption of equality but political philosophers 
                                                      
36 See Knadler 442 for a similar argument.  
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immediately made qualifications: equality before the law but not in the office or the home; 
equality for some but not for others.37 “We cannot classify equality as we do eggs—eggs, 
fresh eggs, strictly fresh eggs. It means an equal chance for every man” (Chesnutt, Essays 
254). Nor should we categorize humans like eggs: “men [should look] upon one another as 
man upon man and [not] black and white” (253). Cable shows that the foundation of 
Southern ideology is the arbitrary designation of the slave as “alien” (410); if so, the remedy 
is not to retreat to the more justifiable difference of class or to arm oneself against the whites 
but to demand the black “race” be seen and heard as human beings because they are equals. 
Chesnutt pits a universalist argument against the hierarchical logic of Jim Crow to highlight 
and overturn the unfair exclusion of a particular group—really a set of voices and bodies 
marked as Other—from liberal democracy’s foundational promises for “every man.”  
I will argue that Olivia’s recognition of Janet accomplishes this feat at the end of 
Marrow. To understand how this works, we first need to understand the nature of the sisters’ 
relationship, as captured in chapter XI (“The Baby and the Bird”). As with “The Journey 
Southward,” this chapter will teach us to read the “code” of space in the Southern city while 
preparing us to recognize its revolutionary overturning during the riot.  
 In this short chapter, Carteret’s sister Clara holds his child, Theodore (“Dodie”), 
close to an open window because the baby delights in the sound of a bird, while Olivia and 
Mammy Jane, the family nurse, look on. “So absorbed were the three women in the baby 
and the bird that neither one of them observed a neat top buggy, drawn by a sleek sorrel 
pony, passing slowly along the street before the house. In the buggy was seated” Janet and 
her child. Olivia, “chancing to lower her eyes for an instant, caught the other woman’s look 
directed toward her and her child. With a glance of cold aversion she turned away from the 
                                                      
37 See Chambers 26-27. 
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window” (Chesnutt, Marrow 66). Down on the street, meanwhile, Janet is “stung by Mrs. 
Carteret’s look,—the nearest approach she had ever made to a recognition of her sister’s 
existence” (67). In the interim, Janet’s child notices that Dodie has “slipped from Clara’s 
arms” and Janet screams out at the last moment so that the baby is caught (67).  
 All Janet wants in life is ‘“a kind word, a nod, a smile [from Olivia], the least thing 
that imagination might have twisted into a recognition of the tie between them,” but when 
Olivia briefly meets Janet’s look at the window, giving the barest register of her existence, 
Olivia “felt a violent wave of antipathy sweep over her toward this baseborn sister who had 
thus thrust herself beneath her eyes” (43, 67). The “thrust” of Janet into Olivia’s field of 
vision makes her lose sight of Dodie; thus, in her mind, recognition threatens her family. She 
therefore tries to avoid all contact with her sister, though this proves difficult in a small city: 
“Never, while this woman lived in the town, would she be able to throw the veil of 
forgetfulness over this blot upon her father’s memory” (158). 
Again, “black middle class” works in a pinch to describe the source of the identity 
crisis brought on by the sight of Janet in the streets of Wellington. As Janet passes the house, 
Mammy Jane says to herself: “‘Fo’ty yeahs ago ‘who’d ’a’ ever expected ter see a nigger gal 
ridin’ in her own buggy?’” (67). But this is not the sole source of Olivia’s anxiety. There is 
also the issue of their physical likeness, which Mammy Jane explained earlier: “Dis yer Janet, 
w’at’s Mis’ ’Livy’s half-sister, is ez much like her ez ef dey wuz twins. Folks sometimes takes 
’em fer one ernudder,—I s’pose it tickles Janet mos’ ter death, but it do make Mis’ ’Livy 
rippin’” (9). Here, Chesnutt evokes a pervasive stereotype of the “mulatto” as a threat, which 
can be traced back to the urban “passing” novel and the tragic mulatto genre.  
 In his Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man (1912), James Weldon Johnson gives the 
definitive account of the successful mulatto passing as white in the city. While in Eric 
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Sundquist’s words “Johnson would exploit the nation’s anxiety about the invisible mulatto 
population . . . [t]he theme . . . was already a common property of literature when Chesnutt 
came to it” (393-394). Chesnutt plays on the theme in interesting ways. For instance, 
Wellington is small enough that Janet cannot be anonymous like the ex-colored man in New 
York. But this is Olivia’s fear: a citizen might misrecognize Olivia in Janet or vice versa.  
 Hortense Spillers has given a penetrating structural analysis of the tragic mulatto 
trope by unveiling the historical violence embedded in the signifier “mulatto/a”:  
Created to provide a middle ground of latitude between “black” and “white,” the 
customary permissible binary agencies of the national adventure, mulatto being, as a 
neither/nor proposition, inscribed no historic locus, or materiality, that was other 
than evasive and shadowy on the national landscape. To that extent, the mulatto/a 
embodied an alibi, an excuse for “other/otherness” that the dominant culture could 
not (cannot now either) appropriate, or wish away. An accretion of signs that 
embody the “unspeakable,” of the Everything that the dominant culture would 
forget, the mulatto/a, as term, designates a disguise, covers up, in the century of 
Emancipation and beyond, the social and political reality of the dreaded African 
presence. Behind the African-become-American stands the shadow, the 
unsubstantial “double” that the culture dreamed in the place of that humanity 
transformed into its profoundest challenge and by the impositions of policy, its 
deepest “un-American” activity. (165-166). 
 
An unfixed identity—it is neither/nor—the mulatto both exposes and obscures “the 
national adventure” founded on “the false opposition of cultural traits that converge on the 
binary distribution of ‘black’ and ‘white’” (166). Perhaps the “tragic mulatto/a” became a 
popular image in the nineteenth century38 because it contained this threat by literally killing 
her off. This ideological containment strategy would thus be of a piece with race “science” 
suggesting that mulattos were a degenerate species bound to pass out of the gene pool, as 
well as the South’s anti-miscegenation laws meant to make this deluded dream a reality.39   
                                                      
38 Spillers begins her analysis by noting that “the thematic of the ‘tragic mulatto/a’ seems to disappear at the 
end of the nineteenth century” (165). 
39 See Fredrickson 218-219, 234-235. 
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 In “The Future American” (1901), a controversial series of articles for the Boston 
Evening Transcript, Chesnutt argued the opposite point: in the future, we will all be mulattoes, 
and the white/black distinction will fall by the wayside. “Any dream of a pure white race, of 
the Anglo-Saxon type, for the United States, may as well be abandoned as impossible, even if 
desirable” (Essays 123). Lest we think Chesnutt walks into the opposite trap—the naïve 
liberal dream of a post-racial society—his point needs to be taken as a provocation, as in 
“Rights and Duties” but calling on the opposite temporal register: the future, or what 
Derrida calls the “democracy to come,” instead of the state of equality “before” society.40 In 
the face of a white supremacist argument for the weeding out of mixed-raced people, and 
thus a hardening of the black/white hierarchy, Chesnutt claims that the American identity 
“to come” will be a hybrid one, unlocking absolute human equality because race will cease to 
be a category of identification.41 But the indistinction between white and black in the body of 
the Future American is a provocation meant to antagonize current anti-miscegenation laws.  
A truly radical antagonistic event, then, would be the sudden appearance of the 
Future American in a socio-spatial system founded on race hierarchy. This would collapse 
into the here-and-now two time-places typically seen as outside or excessive to modern 
political society: the foundation of liberalism in the state of nature “before” society and the 
dream of a democracy “to come.” This is the promise Janet symbolizes, though for the same 
reason she enters the text as a threat. Janet was born and raised in her father’s house after 
Olivia’s mother died. Janet’s mother “had a easy time; she had a black gal ter wait on her, a 
buggy to ride in, an’ eve’ything she wanted” (8). But when Janet’s father dies unexpectedly, 
                                                      
40 For Rancière’s critique of this concept, see Dissensus 45-61 and “Should Democracy Come?” Rancière argues 
that Derrida does not make room for democracy in practice—it is always “to come”—which Chesnutt gets 
around by having his Future American suddenly appear in flesh and blood in his novel. See below.  
41 See Knadler 438.  
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they are expelled from the home by Aunt Polly, who had been raising Olivia in the interim. 
The young Janet is then sent to a “mission school” up north (9). Now that she’s returned to 
Wellington as the wife of Miller, Janet threatens to expose their father’s “shocking 
mésalliance” to everyone and anyone (162). Like the Future American, equality is written on 
her body, not as the presence of two races but as the absence of any difference between her 
and Olivia. Janet also has a child before Olivia, who had trouble bearing children before 
Dodie (and he is sickly, at that), sowing doubt into the supremacy of Anglo-Saxon stock.  
 If Janet is a threat for these reasons, she must be expelled from view. Olivia’s “veil of 
forgetfulness” is met with a related method suggested by Mammy Jane: “Might [Janet] not 
have cast the evil eye upon the baby and sought thereby to draw him out of the window? . . . 
By the same reasoning, the mockingbird might have been a familiar of the witch, and the 
two might have conspired to lure the infant to destruction” (68). Olivia later finds a charm 
hidden in Dodie’s crib, placed there by Mammy Jane to ward off evil spirits, and seems to 
accept this theory: “To remove it would give unnecessary pain to the old nurse. Of course 
these old negro superstitions were absurd,—but if the charm did no good, it would at least 
do no harm” (68). This renders white supremacy a species of “negro superstition” while 
pulling the Mammy trope into the defense of white supremacy. By turning Janet into a 
“witch,” Olivia and Mammy Jane name and contain the threat to the hierarchy on which 
they both rely. As a witch, in other words, Janet is neither fully human nor fully non-human, 
confirming that she is a threat because she is an unfixed identity.  
While Miller ultimately acquiesces to this hierarchy while wishing that a more 
substantial difference will one day overtake it, Janet is effectively banished from the white 
supremacist socio-spatial system. Indeed, in a novel filled with tense dialogues about the 
political situation in Wellington, Janet is never seen interacting with anybody but her 
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husband. In this way, her plotline embodies the problem alluded to above, where characters 
rarely cross the color line in agonistic dialogue. She also returns us to the question of genre. 
Chesnutt imbues Janet’s plot with elements of the gothic (doubling, the supernatural, the 
multigenerational home), the “passing” novel (metaphorized as the witch who “passes” as 
human), and the tragic mulatta genre to show how literature can be complicit in 
segregationist practices. This would appear to include the “conjure tales” Chesnutt wrote 
before Marrow. Indeed, he suggests that his own literary recovery of antebellum folk magic 
works alongside other generic elements and spatial practices (namely segregation) to contain 
the threat of blackness by expelling it from view, sending it to the past, to another world, or 
to the grave.42 Contra Warren, Chesnutt wants to make sure his realism stays off this list.  
 Olivia’s recognition of Janet’s existence promises the return of realism to this plot: it 
means ceasing to view her sister as a supernatural threat and at least acknowledging her day-
to-day existence. Indeed, during the time that Janet is banished as a threat, Olivia is forced to 
work through the consequences of recognizing her sister’s existence. She uncovers 
documents, suppressed by her Aunt Polly, stating that their father legally married Janet’s 
mother in the brief time this was allowed during Reconstruction—when “[t]he air was full of 
liberty, and equal rights”—and left a small portion of his estate to Janet (156). She decides to 
burn the will, a decision that comes back to haunt her: 
                                                      
42 Chesnutt subtly acknowledges this point in his 1901 essay “Superstitions and Folk-Lore of the South.” He 
first places conjure tales in the past, historical and personal: “During a recent visit to North Carolina . . . I took 
occasion to inquire into the latter-day prevalence of the old-time belief in what was known as ‘conjuration’ or 
‘goopher,’ my childish recollection of which I have elsewhere embodied in a number of stories” (155). He then 
subtly links the superstition behind these tales with Jim Crow segregation: “It is a condition of all witch stories 
that there must in some way be contact, either with the person or with some object intended to represent the 
person to be affected; or, if not actual contact, at least close proximity. The charm is placed under the door-sill, 
or buried under the hearth, or hidden in the mattress of the person to be conjured . . . It may [also] be . . . a line 
drawn across a road or path, which line it is fatal for a certain man or woman to cross. I heard of a case of a 
laboring man who went two miles out of his way, every morning and evening, while going to and from his 
work, to avoid such a line drawn for him by a certain powerful enemy” (Essays 156-157). 
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The will she had burned gave this sister of hers—she shuddered at the word—but a 
small part of the estate. Under the law, which intervened now that there was no will, 
the property should have been equally divided. If the woman had been white,—but 
the woman had not been white, and the same rule of moral conduct did not, could not, 
in the very nature of things, apply, as between white people! For, if this were not so, 
slavery had been, not merely an economic mistake, but a great crime against 
humanity. If it had been such a crime, as for a moment she dimly perceived it might 
have been, then through the long centuries there had been piled up a catalogue of 
wrong and outrage which, if the law of compensation be a law of nature, must some 
time, somewhere, in some way, be atoned for. (159) 
 
Olivia realizes that slavery was founded on the idea of a “natural” inequality between the 
white and black races; but once her initial desire to see their father’s property divided 
unequally comes to feel arbitrary, not to say criminal, so does slavery. In other words, slavery 
might have been a “moral” crime, which presupposes an injury done to a fellow human 
being, rather than a just system giving the subjected place to the “naturally” inferior race. 
Newland Archer confronts a similar logical pitfall in Wharton’s Age of Innocence: he comes to 
believe that “women ought to be free—as free as we are,” but subconsciously realizes that, if 
women were “as free as we are,” they would be equal (88). What it would mean for Olivia to 
act on the realization that black people can be morally wronged is an open question, as it is 
for Archer until the anachronistic visit to the Metropolitan Museum of Art.   
 It is equally an open question what Janet would accept as recognition. Would a 
confession about the will count? Chesnutt gives us no assurances. In fact, Janet is openly 
critical of her own desire for recognition, which implies that the black community requires 
some form of recognition from the white community to justify its existence: “So strong was 
this weakness that she had been angry with herself for her lack of pride, or even of a decent 
self-respect. It was, she sometimes thought, the heritage of her mother’s race, and she was 
ashamed of it as part of the taint of slavery” (Chesnutt, Marrow 44).  
Between Olivia and Janet’s musings, Chesnutt seems to be testing and invalidating 
certain forms of recognition (legal, familial, racial) without positing a positive example. This 
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is because recognition requires something that is repressed by the South’s socio-spatial 
codes: not just face-to-face contact but also an agonistic conversation across the color line. 
Olivia intuits that the recognition of Janet would come in the form of “a catalogue of wrong 
and outrage,” which she imagines being delivered by Janet in a moment of triumph, 
foreshadowing the last scene. At this point, though, Olivia could neither see nor hear such a 
speech. Chesnutt clarifies why and how this is possible when Olivia’s husband, Carteret, 
responds to the novel’s version of Manly’s editorial: “To meet words with words upon such 
a subject would be to acknowledge the equality of the negro and his right to discuss or 
criticise the conduct of the white people” (148). If the human being, per Aristotle, is a 
political animal capable of speech, then agonism requires interlocutors to acknowledge an 
equal—an opponent, to be sure, but a fellow speaking being who has the right to a critical 
opinion. Mouffe does not adequately consider the socio-spatial barriers preventing certain 
voices and bodies from being acknowledged as an adversary. For Rancière, the recognition 
of a human voice/body as a political being is not given. Politics is a struggle over what a 
human being looks and sounds like, adjudicated by the statement of a fundamental wrong—
that of being left out of the political, which is to say human, community—by a once-
excluded voice/body.43 Similarly, for Olivia to recognize Janet and confront the “catalogue 
of wrong and outrage,” she must acknowledge a fellow human being—an equal (160).  
Olivia’s recognition of Janet as a human (i.e., verbal) being comes in the last scene of 
the novel. This marks the movement between the two parts of Chesnutt’s representational 
project. The first part is to mine the inner workings of the white supremacist mindset, which 
we’ve shown to be a lesson in the New South’s socio-spatial “codes” and why/what happens 
                                                      
43 See Rancière, Disagreement 21-23.  
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when they are threatened. The final chapters find Chesnutt working with Janet to “prepare 
[for] social recognition and equality” (Chesnutt, Journals 140).  
II. The Wellington Riot 
The massacre takes up Marrow’s final four chapters. Chesnutt begins his 
representation of the riot on the margins of the city, with a “black voice” speaking back 
from the “swamps” about white violence (Marrow 166). Once we enter the city, the novel’s 
representational energies diverge. The first three riot chapters focus on Miller, with Green 
and others intersecting his trajectory at various points. Then, Chesnutt turns the 
representation over to Green’s armed defense, which takes him down to “the cotton 
compress” (170),44 then up into the black neighborhood, and finally to Miller’s hospital in 
Campbell Square, where Green briefly intersects with Carteret when the mob sets fire to 
Miller’s hospital. From there we follow Carteret home. The novel ends with Carteret and 
then Olivia running over to the Miller household to beg the doctor to save Dodie. See fig. 6 
and fig. 7 for two possible visual representations of these trajectories, based on some likely 
real-world locations. The best way to analyze the riot is to follow the trajectories leading to 
the final encounter at the Miller home, as they all build on each other.  
Let’s begin with Miller’s trajectory. His itinerary “was suggested by a vivid 
description given [to Chesnutt] by Dr. Mask, during a visit of his to Cleveland, of the events 
of the riot and a ride which he took across the city during its progress” (Chesnutt qtd. in 
McKoy 56). We can establish the likely location of Miller’s home based on Dr. Mask’s home 
at 510 South Seventh Street. While by no means definite, this at least provides an anchor 
point for his movements, many of which will confirm his location on the relatively well-off 
south side of the city, a few blocks from homes owned by the white supremacist characters.  
                                                      





Figure 6: “Homes of Key Participants” (Edited I) 




Figure 7: “Homes of Key Participants” (Edited II) 
Source: 1898 Wilmington Riot Commission, Chapter 4. 
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Miller does not start this day in the city. He “had received a call, about one o’clock, 
to attend a case at the house of a well-to-do colored farmer, who lived some three or four 
miles from the town” (Chesnutt, Marrow 165). Chesnutt clarifies that Miller travels the same 
road as he did during a prior emergency: when he heads to Mr. Delamere’s old plantation to 
warn him that his servant, Sandy, is in danger of being lynched for a crime he did not 
commit. “Belleview,” we learn then, is “ten miles away,” taking “around an hour and a half” 
to reach in ideal conditions (117). The plantation, which “dated from 1750,” stands “[a]long 
the bank of the river [Cape Fear],” where “the famous pirate Blackbeard had held high 
carnival” (118). There were colonial-era plantations along the Lower Cape Fear, southwest 
of the city (fig. 6), and the Northeast Cape Fear to the northeast (fig. 7).  
On his way back from his house visit, Miller intersects with black citizens of 
Wellington who are fleeing to the “swamps” (166). Historically, people fled north to Oakdale 
Cemetery and the swamps along Smith Creek or down to the western shores of the Cape 
Fear and possibly over to the swampy morass of Eagles Island across the river. If Miller had 
gone on the Lower Cape Fear that day (fig. 6), he would have met people along the banks of 
the Cape Fear; if he had come from the Northeast Cape Fear, he would have found them in 
the forests and swamps near Oakdale Cemetery (fig. 7). “As he neared the town,” Miller 
saw ahead of him half a dozen men and women approaching, with fear written in 
their faces . . . looking behind now and then as if pursued by some deadly enemy. At 
sight of Miller’s buggy they made a dash for cover, disappearing, like a covey of 
frightened partridges, in the underbrush along the road. (165)  
 
Whatever identity one held in town before, during the riot it is friend versus enemy, “the 
whites against the negroes” (177). Miller’s buggy gives off the sign of an approaching enemy. 
Almost immediately, though, Miller is recognized, aligning him with black Wellington. When 
Miller saw these men and women scampering into the bushes, he divined, with this 
slumbering race consciousness which years of culture had not obliterated, that there 
was some race trouble on foot. His intuition did not long remain unsupported. A 
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black head was cautiously protruded from the shrubbery, and a black voice—if such 
a description be allowable—addressed him:— 
“Is dat you, Doctuh Miller? . . . “[A]ll hell’s broke loose in town yonduh. De 
w’ite folks is riz ’gins’ de niggers, an’ say dey ’re gwine ter kill eve’y nigger dey kin lay 
han’s on” (166) 
 
An anonymous “black voice” speaks back from the literal and symbolic swamp to which the 
black community has fled. This statement troubles the white supremacist account of order 
restored from a state of disorder brought on by black economic and political success in 
Wilmington: “all hell’s broke loose” because the whites have risen against the blacks.  
 While reversing the hegemonic white supremacist narrative is a central part of 
Chesnutt’s counter-representation of the riot, he troubles Miller’s mutual recognition of the 
“black voice” in the swamps, paralleling the situation we found on the train. The next person 
Miller meets is his friend Watson, a black lawyer who has been ordered out of town:  
The white people are up in arms. They have disarmed the colored people, killing half 
a dozen in the process, and wounding as many more. They have forced the mayor 
and aldermen to resign, have formed a provisional city government a la française, and 
have ordered me and a half a dozen other fellows to leave town in forty-eight hours, 
under pain of sudden death . . . I don’t imagine they mean you any harm, personally, 
because you tread on nobody’s toes . . . (167) 
 
Watson’s account, which closely follows the Wilmington riot, explicitly aligns the black 
middle class with the undifferentiated black voices hiding in the swamps—they are all 
“exiled wanderer[s]” (168). Miller is carefully distinguished from them because he wants to 
return to the city to find his wife and child. While this opens the possibility of countering 
not just the white supremacist narrative about the riot but also the real/desired spatial 
movements on that day, Watson suggests that Miller might be accepted in the post-riot city.  
Before this, Chesnutt had shown the white supremacists’ debate over Miller’s fate. 
While McBane wants to “run him out with the rest,” his co-conspirators make the case for 
him to stay (151). Carteret’s defense of Miller turns on the liberal-capitalist argument that the 
personal and the political should be kept separate: “if I consulted my own inclinations, [I] 
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would say expel him with the rest; but my grievance is a personal one, and to gratify it in that 
way would be a loss to the community” (151). Like Miller and the naïve liberals, Carteret 
wants to maintain the public/private distinction. While the doctrine he espouses yields race 
warfare, Carteret is made uncomfortable by McBane’s “brutal characterization of their 
motives”: “It robbed the enterprise of all its poetry, and put a solemn act of revolution upon 
the plane of a mere vulgar theft of power” (151). Miller becomes distanced from “the 
people” just as Carteret starts to distinguish himself from “[t]he baser elements of the white 
population” (181). Or better, Miller and Carteret become more aligned with each other 
based on their common desire to separate the personal and the political.     
 Indeed, both men focus on protecting their families from the riot. Carteret has a leg 
up, since he planned the “political demonstration,” and warns Olivia to stay home (163). 
Miller hurries home to check on his wife and child. He finds his house empty and begins a 
journey across the city to a friend’s house, where Janet and the child may be:  
The distance across the city to the home of the Mrs. Butler whom his wife had gone 
to visit was exactly one mile. Though Miller had a good horse in front of him, he was 
two hours in reaching his destination. Never will the picture of that ride fade from 
his memory. In his dreams he repeats it night after night, and sees the sights that 
wounded his eyes, and feels the thoughts—the haunting spirits of the thoughts—that 
tore his heart as he rode through hell to find those whom he was seeking. (171)45 
 
The riot wounds the eyes and haunts the mind, making representation impossible. A body in 
the street alludes, almost metaphorically, to this antagonistic violence through “what it 
signified” (171). Such bodily signs become mere background as Miller rides on:  
Every professional instinct urged him to stop and offer aid to the sufferer; but the 
uncertainty concerning his wife and child proved a stronger motive and urged him 
resistlessly forward. Here and there the ominous sounds of firearms was audible. He 
might have thought this merely part of the show, like the “powder play” of the 
Arabs, but for the bloody confirmation of its earnestness which had already assailed 
his vision. (173)  
 
                                                      
45 If Mrs. Butler lives a mile away, this likely put her in Brooklyn, the black neighborhood. See fig. 6 and fig. 7. 
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After Carteret returns home he finds that Dodie has a medical emergency that his 
“revolution” has made hard to remedy: his wife has called Dr. Price, but he is out of town 
with the expectation “of some kind of trouble in town today,” after which the phone lines 
were cut, “the servants were gone, and the nurse was afraid to venture out into the street” 
(185). Carteret heads out in search of doctors, his movements echoing Miller’s: 
Far down the street he could see the glow of the burning hospital, and he had 
scarcely left his own house when [a] fusillade of shots . . . was audible. Carteret 
would have hastened back to the scene of the riot, to see what was now going on, 
and to make another effort to stem the tide of bloodshed; but before the dread of 
losing his child, all other interests fell into the background. (187) 
 
While the light of the burning hospital and the sound of gunshots are relegated to the 
background during Miller and Carteret’s searches, Chesnutt forces his readers to confront 
this scene of violence head-on when he turns to Green’s riot experiences. Chapter XXXV 
turns to Green and his defensive battle against the white supremacist mob at the hospital. 
The violent climax of this sequence is Green’s revenge against McBane: “Armed with a huge 
bowie-knife, a relic of the civil war, . . . [Green] dashed through the mob, which parted 
instinctively before him, and . . . Captain McBane . . . stood waiting to meet him. A pistol-
flame flashed in his face, but he went on, and . . . buried his knife to the hilt in the heart of 
the enemy” (184). Antagonistic violence, which pits Green against his “enemy” in a battle to 
the death, is self-cancelling—a political and representational zero. As the Civil War knife 
indicates, it is a “tragedy” that repeats itself but never ends (184). 
 Critics are often stuck choosing between Miller and Green as Chesnutt’s avatars. Is it 
best to make a home for oneself amidst the backdrop of race antagonism in the hopes that, 
with your example, the future can become a better place? Or is it better to meet the armed 
defense of white equality and autonomy with the armed defense of black equality and 
autonomy? Both options reinsert the black body into the city, frustrating the dream of a 
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return to white order. However, this binary ignores the third option held up by Janet. Or, to 
stay with character pairings, the focus on Miller/Carteret and Green/McBane elides the 
import of the sisterly recognition between Janet and Olivia, which bookends the novel.  
 The last two chapters take place in the Miller’s house. Miller has found his wife 
kneeling over their child’s dead body in the streets and they have carried him home. 
Meanwhile, out of other options, “Carteret dashed out of the yard and ran rapidly to Miller’s 
house; ordinarily a walk of six or seven minutes, Carteret covered it in three” (189). Miller 
refuses to care for Dodie, showing Carteret “a specimen of your handiwork” (his dead child) 
(190). Carteret views “Miller’s refusal to go with him [as] pure, elemental justice”: “He was 
indeed conscious of a certain involuntary admiration for a man who held in his hands the 
power of life and death, and could use it, with strict justice, to avenge his own wrongs. In 
Miller’s place he would have done the same thing” (190-191). If the self-erasing violence of 
McBane and Green is undesirable, this moment appears to stand out as a viable alternative. 
Yet, these are Miller’s “own wrongs” and Carteret hears them as a father rather than as an 
adversary (191). The moment is private, speaking to an element of the realist novel that is as 
pervasive as it is problematic: agonistic dialogue is in the foreground while the world burns.   
 On both a formal and political level Chesnutt knows the novel cannot end with this 
“narrow” or “logical” application of justice (190). Wai Chee Dimock has argued that there is 
always a “residue” in liberal accounts of justice that the novel, as genre, is uniquely able to 
capture. The residue in Marrow takes the form of the final chapter, “The Sisters.” When 
Carteret returns home without Miller, Olivia decides to go beg for mercy. Miller is now 
moved, like Carteret, by family connection. Wisely, he leaves his decision to Janet.  
 Chesnutt’s description of the sisters’ first face-to-face meeting is remarkable: 
The two women stood confronting each other across the body of the dead child, 
mute witness of this first meeting between two children of the same father. Standing 
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thus face to face, each under the stress of the deepest emotions, the resemblance 
between them was even more striking than [before]. But Death, the great leveler, 
striking upon the one hand and threatening upon the other, had wrought a 
marvelous transformation in the bearing of the two women. The sad-eyed Janet 
towered erect, with menacing aspect, like an avenging goddess. The other, whose 
pride had been her life, stood in the attitude of a trembling suppliant. (Marrow 193) 
 
Miller and Carteret had both accepted the mute victim(s) of the riot as the sign of a race 
antagonism that had gone too far (into private life). Now the body is a “mute witness” to the 
sisters standing face to face. This a re-conception of antagonism rooted in recognition. 
 On one level, recognition occurs when Olivia calls Janet “my lawful sister” (194). 
“This, then, was the recognition for which, all her life, she had longed in secret,” but Janet 
understands the problem with it now: “it had come, not with frank kindliness and sisterly 
love, but in a storm of blood and tears; not freely given, from an open heart, but extorted 
from a reluctant conscience by the agony of a mother’s fears” (194-195). In the novel’s 
climatic speech, Janet abruptly switches gears from the personal to the political:  
“Listen!” she cried, dashing her tears aside. “I have but one word for you,—one last 
word,—and then I hope never to see your face again! My mother died of want, and I 
was brought up by the hands of charity. Now, when I have married a man who can 
supply my needs, you offer me back the money which you and your friends have 
robbed me of! You imagined that the shame of being a negro swallowed up every 
other ignominy,—and in your eyes I am a negro, though I am your sister, and you 
are white, and people have taken me for you on the streets,—and you, therefore, left 
me nameless all my life! . . . For twenty-five years I, poor, despicable fool, would 
have kissed your feet for a word, a nod, a smile. Now, when this tardy recognition 
comes, for which I have waited so long, it is tainted with fraud and crime and blood, 
and I must pay for it with my child’s life! . . . I throw you back your father’s name, 
your father’s wealth, your sisterly recognition. I want none of them,—they are 
bought too dear! . . . But that you may know that a woman may be foully wronged, 
and yet may have a heart to feel, even for one who has injured her, you may have 
your child’s life, if my husband can save it!” (195) 
 
Janet confirms what Olivia feared—people misrecognize her as Olivia on the streets—and 
the fear behind the fear: they are no different. As Olivia intuited, Janet has been morally 
wronged with all (ex-)slaves and she must open herself and the (ex-)masters to critique.  
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 The speech centers on the ways in which Janet has been “foully wronged.” Janet 
speaks first about the wrongs Olivia and her “friends” have done to Janet and her mother. 
But she works from this particular set of wrongs to a broader one: “you . . . left me nameless 
all my life!” “Whoever is nameless cannot speak,” Rancière writes: “They do not speak 
because they are beings without a name, deprived of logos—meaning, of symbolic 
enrollment in the city” (Disagreement 23). When they do speak, it is to name the “wrong” 
done when any group excludes any other from the community of speaking beings. To arrive 
at a similar point, Janet “throw[s] [Olivia] back” identities by which Olivia could recognize 
her and still maintain her worldview. Then she gives her lesson: “But that you may know 
that a woman may be foully wronged” (Chesnutt, Marrow 195). Woman signifies both herself 
and anybody whatsoever, making it the universal signifier for “human being” in place of the 
more common (and exclusionary) “man.” Olivia must recognize the wrong of rendering a 
human being nameless and banishing her to the literal and symbolic swamps outside civilized 
life. Janet is not alone in this shadowy no-place—not anymore. As the citizens of Wellington 
lose their assigned names, places, and roles they also become the nameless, stateless many.46  
Janet’s speech is antagonistic because the identification with the nameless and the 
declaration of the equality threaten the hierarchical order that had banished them as unequal. 
Such is Rancière’s conception of politics. The aesthetic component is the reconfiguration of 
the sensible by this new subject, typically in what had been a private/apolitical space and by 
beings that had once uttered sheer noise. While this would seem to line up nicely with Janet’s 
speech, the radical-democratic statement of a wrong is not something literature accomplishes 
in Rancière’s account. Literature has its own forms of equality: the equality of subjects; the 
                                                      
46 Many counter-narratives of the massacre were delivered in unsigned letters. One letter sent to President 
McKinley by “a Negro woman of this city” forcefully asks: “are we to die like rats in a trap? With no place to 
seek redress or to go with our grievances? Can we call on any other Nation for help?” (qtd. in Hossfield 44-45). 
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mute speech of bodies and objects, deciphered by the author; and the molecular equality of 
things. Wharton moved from the second to the third option but ultimately wanted to avoid a 
direct political message. I ended the last chapter by speculating whether her readers would 
have been moved to political action because of her representation of anachronistic love. 
Chesnutt weaves the aesthetic and the political so tightly that it is not enough to say that 
literature does something akin to politics by producing mute speech or that its re-
configuration of the sensible prepares the ground for political action. Furthermore, unlike 
Wharton Chesnutt accomplishes a representation of antagonistic, radical-democratic politics 
while remaining within the context of realism.  
Everything hinges on the connection between Janet’s desire for recognition and 
Chesnutt’s sense that the novel should prepare readers for “social recognition and equality” 
(Journals 140). In the first face-to-face meeting between sisters, the child’s body is a “mute 
witness” (139) of Olivia’s recognition of a speaking being—a political animal—where there 
was once the noise of a threat (for instance, Janet’s cry to save Dodie’s life had been “a 
mother’s instinct,” a reflex) (67). The mute speech of death and the antagonism of which it 
speaks (to those who know how to interpret its signs), become the living, breathing 
antagonism of a political speech founded in identification with the nameless and the 
confirmation of equality. Rancière reserves the term demos for any part(y) that is excessive to 
the police order and hence whose presence antagonizes the police. Janet “plays the part of 
the demos” and confirms their equality qua human beings who can articulate a wrong 
(Rancière, “Should Democracy Come?” 278). Janet’s appearance as a speaking being, in a 
novel where she had been relegated to the margins as a threat, is a representation of radical-
democratic politics, while her “catalogue of wrong and outrage” is an example of Mouffe’s 
agonistic politics (Chesnutt, Marrow 160). Antagonism and agonism emerge on the same 
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stage, which lasts as long as Olivia listens (“Stay—do not go yet! . . . I have not done”) (195). 
This speech thus brings the stage of politics into existence in a private home in what had 
been a private recognition scene: the personal is the political; the private is the public. 
Janet’s status as a mulatta places her in a great position to play the role of the demos 
and deliver the agonistic “catalogue of wrong.” The mulatta is an excessive, neither/nor 
identity that both exposes and conceals the violence of a socio-spatial system founded on 
racial hierarchy. She also evokes the American identity “to come,” where the promise of 
absolute human equality is confirmed in the body, not as the presence of two races but as 
the absence of any difference. Radical-democratic aesthetics and/as antagonistic politics 
brings all this onto a single plane, a single stage: the injuries done by a hierarchical system, 
told from the point of view of the excluded voice/body, and the promises of a democracy 
“to come” arriving in the here-and-now. The key is that both the catalogue of wrongs and 
the confirmation of equality are seen and heard by a spectator who once tried to ignore a 
pure threat. If this can be deemed recognition, it stretches the typical meaning: far from re-
cognizing an already-existing identity, Olivia is seeing and hearing Janet speak for the first time 
as a fellow human being, an equal, someone capable of articulating a wrong.47  
Where Janet once waited for a kind word or smile from Olivia, Olivia now waits for 
Janet’s decision as a “suppliant” before “an avenging goddess” (193). The point is not that 
this is a new, permanent inequality but that the previous one has been reversed, imperiling 
Olivia’s identity and disrupting the socio-spatial “codes” the reader had learned. Janet 
decides that Dodie should be saved, if possible, because his life is as worthy as anyone 
else’s—to decide otherwise would undermine the point of her speech. 
                                                      
47 See Honneth and Rancière 90-95. 
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This moment represents the radical confirmation of realism’s aesthetic and political 
aims, as Chesnutt and the rest of the authors in this study envisioned them. First, it is borne 
of a plausible but contingent web of actions and counter-actions that have been traced 
against the backdrop of race antagonism in a city on the Atlantic seaboard. If it strikes us as 
less probable than the moments that brought it about, this is because Chesnutt is attempting 
to reach that third gear of realist representation where “the people”—those who have been 
left voiceless and nameless in the background—antagonistically emerge onto the plane of 
characterological debate. This leads to the second point: Janet speaks as and for “the 
people,” which does not only signal the black citizens of Wilmington/Wellington on 
November 10, 1898 but anybody who has been excluded and rendered nameless. In 
Rancière’s words, she “link[s] a peculiar wrong done to a peculiar group with the wrong 
done to anyone by the police distribution—the police denial of the capacity of anyone” 
(“Should” 278). In other words, this moment is both particular and universal in the way the 
best realist novels are. Finally, it confirms a radical presupposition that there is no difference 
between the sisters that would justify Janet’s wrongs or Dodie’s death.  
 In his understanding of the political work of the realist novel, Chesnutt stands alone 
and Marrow is the realist novel par excellence. It is the “province of literature” to represent the 
antagonistic appearance of “social recognition and equality” where there was once a vague 
threat and inequality (Chesnutt, Journals 140). But it is up to Chesnutt’s readers to make 
changes in the direction of black civil rights. To do so, readers must walk back from the 
universal (the equality of all human beings) to the particular (the inequalities of the Jim Crow 
South), awakening a feeling of injustice: this specific group in this specific time and place has 
been unjustly left outside the foundational promises of liberal-democratic society as well as 
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